Chamberlain and Slade
[2008] FMCAfam 37
•30 January 2008
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| CHAMBERLAIN & SLADE | [2008] FMCAfam 37 |
| CHILD SUPPORT – Application for judicial review of decision of delegate of child support registrar – court has no jurisdiction to review decision – no basis demonstrated for departure from decision challenged – application dismissed. |
| Administrative Decision (Judicial Review) Act 1977, s.3 Child Support Assessment Act 1989, s.117 |
| In the Marriage of Gyselman (1992) 15 Fam LR 219 Savery & Savery (1990) FLC 92-131 |
| Applicant: | MR CHAMBERLAIN |
| Respondent: | MS SLADE |
| File Number: | ADM 883 of 2006 |
| Judgment of: | Brown FM |
| Hearing date: | 21 November 2007 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 21 November 2007 |
| Delivered at: | Adelaide |
| Delivered on: | 30 January 2008 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | The Applicant in Person |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | The Respondent in Person |
ORDERS
The application of Mr Chamberlain filed on 18 December 2006 and subsequently amended on 7 February 2007 be dismissed.
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT ADELAIDE |
ADM 883 of 2006
| MR CHAMBERLAIN |
Applicant
And
| MS SLADE |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
Mr Chamberlain and Ms Slade are the parents of J born in March 1991 and S born in March 1997. The two children live predominantly with Ms Slade.
The parties are in dispute about very many matters to do with the care of the children. As a result there have been a large number of proceedings regarding the children in this court and the Family Court of Australia.
There have also been very many applications to the Child Support Registrar pursuant of Part 6A of the Child Support (Assessment) Act. Both Mr Chamberlain and Ms Slade have usually acted on their own behalf in those proceedings.
The current matter ostensibly relates to child support. The applicant in the proceedings is Mr Chamberlain. He has demonstrated himself to be a determined advocate in the pursuit of his case. However he is not legally qualified and it is not always easy to discern what particular outcome he seeks from the case, particularly given the numerous documents he has filed in these proceedings.
Initially I had assumed that Mr Chamberlain was bringing an application for departure from a child support assessment pursuant to the Child Support (Assessment) Act.
During the course of the hearing on 21 November 2007, Mr Chamberlain informed me that his application was in fact for judicial review and was brought pursuant to the provisions of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act.
Both pieces of legislation are products of the Commonwealth Parliament and this Court has jurisdiction in respect of each of them. However the interplay between the two pieces of legislation is complex.
The decision to which Mr Chamberlain takes exception is a decision of Mr L made on 3 February 2006, although the written decision is in fact dated 20 February 2006. Mr L is a Senior Case Officer and a Delegate of the Child Support Registrar. Mr L determined that Mr Chamberlain’s level of child support for the children should be fixed at $3,521.00 per annum.
Mr Chamberlain objected to this decision. His objection was determined by Ms M on 6 April 2004. She partially allowed Mr Chamberlain’s objection and set Mr Chamberlain’s annual rate of child support at an amount of $2,463.00 for the period between 1 February 2007 and 31 December 2007.
The gravamen of Mr Chamberlain’s complaint is that the hearing before Mr L, which occurred on 2 February 2006, took place in his absence and as such constitutes a breach of the rules of natural justice.
Ms Slade is wearied and puzzled by the proceedings and can see little point to them. She wishes them to be dismissed.
The history of the proceedings
Mr Chamberlain first commenced proceedings in this Court in regards to child support matters on 17 March 2006. He named the Child Support Agency as the respondent to his application.
His application specified that he sought the following order on a final basis:
i)I seek that the change of assessment of 2-2-06 of Mr Chamberlain be set aside until the outcome of the objection or the ombudsman investigation.
On an interim basis he sought that this assessment be set aside and a new assessment be made.
In support of his application he filed an affidavit in which he asserted that the hearing before Mr L had constituted a “denial of [his] civil liberties…[as it had] proceeded without any input from [him and without him being] given the opportunity to question the mothers (sic) and her allegations”.
Mr Chamberlain also raised other matters which seem to relate to grounds for departure in his application. These can be summarised as follows:
·He had significant personal costs in respect of his medication;
·Ms Slade had an earning potential of $49,000.00 per annum, whilst his was $23,000.00;
·The costs incurred by him in litigating in the Family Court should be taken into account in some way in respect of the child support assessment;
·The cost of karate lessons for the children had been erroneously taken into account in the child support assessment.
Mr Chamberlain amended his application on 11 April 2006. He sought to substitute Ms Slade in lieu of the Child Support Agency as the respondent to the application. He also sought repayment to him of any monies which the court subsequently found to have been paid in excess of the proper child support assessment. Up to this stage, Mr Chamberlain had not provided the Court with copies of any child support determinations to which he took exception.
The application came on for mention initially before Mead FM on 24 April 2006. Ms Slade was ordered to file a response and provide copies of all the relevant child support decisions and reasons from November 2005 onwards. The matter was also listed for hearing on 30 June 2006.
Ms Slade filed a lengthy affidavit on 17 May 2006 to which was attached extensive documentary material from the Child Support Agency. The documents included the decision of Mr L and the subsequent objection decision of Ms M.
In her response filed with her affidavit, Ms Slade sought the dismissal of Mr Chamberlain’s application and the payment to her of $23.00 by Mr Chamberlain, which sum represented the costs of photocopying a number of documents, which Mr Chamberlain himself had been unable to supply.
The hearing scheduled for 30 June 2006 did not take place. In lieu thereof Mr Chamberlain was directed by Mead FM to file a further application specifying precisely the child support assessment periods in respect of which he sought departure. The parties were also directed to file additional affidavits and statements of their financial circumstances. The hearing was re-scheduled for 28 September 2006.
Mr Chamberlain filed a further application on 9 August 2006. In essence he again sought that the assessment made by Mr L be set aside and in lieu thereof an earlier assessment made by Senior Case Officer Swifte be reinstated. Order 2 of the interim orders sought in this application also alluded to concerns Mr Chamberlain had regarding his perception that his civil liberties had been infringed.
In support of this application, Mr Chamberlain filed an affidavit, to which was attached extensive correspondence between him and the Child Support Agency and documents relating to decisions made by the Agency in respect of the payment of child support for the two children concerned.
Again the hearing scheduled for 19 September 2006 did not proceed. It seems that this date clashed with other proceedings the parties had in the Family Court. As a result, the hearing was rescheduled for 6 December 2006. On this later (6 December 2006) date Mead FM made the following order:
“The applications filed herein on 17 March 2006, 11 April 2006, 18 April 2006, 9 August 2006 and 4 December 2006 be dismissed summarily as same fail to disclose any cause of action noting that the orders sought by the applicant as regards the setting aside of the decision of Senior Case Officer L of 3 February 2006 have been made in that the said decision was set aside by the Child Support Agency dated 6 April 2006 and upon further noting that the other orders sought by the applicant as regards the conduct of the Child Support Agency and various Officers therein are beyond the jurisdiction of the Court.”
The application of 4 December 2006 was an application brought by Mr Chamberlain to have his Child Support Agency case worker, a person known as “Linda” removed. Clearly FM Mead had no jurisdiction to deal with such an application.
As is clear from the above order, FM Mead was of the view that Mr Chamberlain’s application was flawed in that the decision to which he principally objected, that of Mr L had been effectively set aside by Ms M’s decision.
In her reasons for judgement, FM Mead raised with the parties the prospect of Mr Chamberlain being declared a vexatious litigant pursuant to the provisions of Rule 13.11 of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules.
Mr Chamberlain commenced another round of proceedings in this Court on 18 December 2006. Again the respondent to this application was the Child Support Agency. He sought the following orders on both an interim and final basis:
i)I seek that all amounts of child support in excess of $106 paid from 1 January 2005 until 6 March 2006 paid by Mr Chamberlain be credited back to Mr Chamberlain.
ii)Also seek the amount of $400.00 be credited back to Mr Chamberlain as per the setting aside of the assessment of Mr L by Ms M in regards to karate.
In support of this application, Mr Chamberlain provided a brief affidavit which set out some of his history with the Child Support Agency. He referred to a number of decisions made by senior case officers of the Agency, namely Ms LV of 14 December 2004; Mr SE of 1 November 2005; as well as the decision of Mr L of February 2006.
These various decisions were attached to a subsequent affidavit filed on 19 December 2006. Ms LVs dealt with an application by Mr Chamberlain to change the then assessment of child support on the basis of the high costs of contact; his own costs of support; and that the assessment did not reflect Ms Slade’s income. Ms Slade cross applied on the basis of the high costs of child care.
Mr Chamberlain was successful on the basis of the costs to him of his own support, primarily the costs of purchasing prescription drugs which he required. It was found that he was likely to purchase drugs to the value of around $1,200.00 per annum. It was also accepted that Ms Slade had a higher child support income than that reflected in the assessment.
Accordingly Mr Chamberlain’s level of exempt income was increased by an amount of $1,500.00 and Ms Slade’s child support income was increased to $49,000.00. These changes resulted in Mr Chamberlain being assessed to pay child support at the rate of $106.00 per month. The period of the assessment was from 1 January 2005 to 31 March 2006.
Mr Chamberlain objected to Ms LV’s decision but his objection was disallowed on 25 February 2005. The basis of Ms LV’s decision was child support income of $25,864.00 for Mr Chamberlain and a child support income of $49,000.00 for Ms Slade.
On 10 October 2005 Mr Chamberlain made a further application for departure on the same grounds as advanced before Ms LV. This came before Mr SE who refused to make any determination in the matter, primarily on the basis that there had been no change of circumstances since Ms LV’s decision, which still had a number of months to run. His decision is dated 1 November 2005.
On 29 November 2005, Mr Chamberlain brought another application to change the administrative assessment of child support. He relied on the grounds of his own high costs of personal support and the fact that the assessment did not take into account the financial position and income of either himself or Ms Slade.
Ms Slade cross applied on 15 January 2006, citing the high costs of the children’s education and training as well as child care in support of her application to change the administrative assessment of child support.
It was these applications which were dealt with by Mr L in February of 2006. As previously indicated, Mr Chamberlain did not attend the conference prior to the decision being made. Ms Slade attended the conference by telephone. Mr L notes in the decision that attempts to telephone Mr Chamberlain were unsuccessful.
Unlike Ms LV, Mr L was not satisfied that Mr Chamberlain had high costs of personal support. He disallowed Mr Chamberlain’s claims regarding the costs he had incurred in pursuing Family Court proceedings and various bill and fines he had incurred.
In particular, as Mr Chamberlain had apparently indicated to Judicial Registrar Forbes in the course of other proceedings in December of 2005 that he did not take medication and had never seen a psychiatrist, Mr L was not satisfied that Mr Chamberlain had significant pharmaceutical expenses.
Mr L found that Ms Slade’s income had reduced to around $41,000.00 per annum, as she had reduced the number of night shifts she worked as a nurse.
Mr L accepted that the parties had agreed that J should undertake training in karate and that the costs of this were $800.00 per annum. Ms Slade abandoned her application regarding the high costs of child care.
As a result of these matters, Mr L set aside Ms LV’s assessment, particularly the increase in Mr Chamberlain level of exempt income based on his pharmaceutical expenses. Rather he proceeded on the basis of a child support income of $25,864.00 (based on 2004/2005 taxable income) and one of $41,000.00 for Ms Slade. This produced a child support assessment of $3,121.00 per annum. To this sum, Mr L added $400.00 being half of J’s karate expenses, making a total of $3,521.00 or $293.00 per month.
This reasoning led to the decision of Mr L that the annual rate of child support payable by Mr Chamberlain for the children be $3,521.00 for the period 1 February 2006 until 31 January 2007.
Mr Chamberlain lodged an objection to this assessment, which was determined by Ms M on 6 April 2006. Mr Chamberlain was partially successful in his objection and the annual amount of child support was fixed at the amount of $2,463.00 for the period 1 February 2006 until 31 January 2007 or $205.00 per month. Mr Chamberlain exempt income was increased by $2,600 for the period from 1 February to 31 December 2007.
Mr Chamberlain had provided further details of his pharmaceutical expenses with his objection. Ms M accepted that these expenses were both significant and extraordinary, amounting to somewhere between $169.00 and $187.00 per month. Accordingly she accepted that Mr Chamberlain had high costs of personal support.
In regards to karate, Ms M found that the parties had finally separated in January 1997, when J was six years of age. The parties offered contradictory evidence towards Ms M regarding the history of J’s involvement with karate. Accordingly she was unable to establish that the parties had agreed that J should undergo karate training and so she disallowed this aspect of the earlier assessment.
It seems to me that otherwise Ms M accepted that Mr Chamberlain’s child support income was around $25,800.00 and Ms Slade’s was around $41,000.00. The rationale for the increase in Mr Chamberlain’s exempt income was the extent of his ongoing pharmaceutical expenses.
Mr Chamberlain amended his application on 7 February 2007 (although Mr Chamberlain has indicated on the application that the amendment is made on 6 July 2007. He named Ms Slade as the respondent to his amended application. He sought the following orders:
·I seek all amounts of child support paid in excess of $106 paid from 1/1/05 until 6/4/06 paid by Mr Chamberlain be credited back to Mr Chamberlain.
·I seek the amount of $400.00 be credited back to Mr Chamberlain as per the setting aside of the assessment of Mr L by Ms M in regard to karate.
·I seek the setting aside of Mrs M (sic) amount of child support made on 6/04/06 and to be set at Mr SE (sic) assessment of November 2005 of $106.00 and all over payments returned.
Ms Slade responded to this application on 4 April 2007. She sought that Mr Chamberlain’s application be dismissed.
As I understand matters, Ms LV’s assessment, unaltered by Mr SE, remained in place for the period from 1 January 2005 until 1 February 2006, when it was replaced by that of Ms M. Mr L’s decision has been rendered redundant by Ms M’s decision. Accordingly Mr Chamberlain’s application seems to be an application for departure for the period from 1 February 2006 onwards.
Mr Chamberlain’s application came before FM Mead on 12 February 2007. The Child Support Registrar appeared on that day, as did Mr Chamberlain and Ms Slade. FM Mead removed the Child Support Registrar as a party to the proceedings. She also ordered that Mr Chamberlain file an affidavit in which he was to set out the specific child support assessments from which he sought departure, together with the specific sections of the legislation on which he relied. The affidavit was to be filed by 23 March 2007. Otherwise the proceedings were adjourned until 18 April 2007.
On 16 March 2007 Mr Chamberlain filed an application in which he sought that FM Mead disqualify herself from further hearing of his substantive application on the basis of ostensible bias. He filed an affidavit in support of this application. The basis of his application being that he felt overborne by FM Mead’s possible invocation of the vexatious litigant provisions. The application was made returnable on 30 April 2007.
In response to the order of 12 February 2007, Mr Chamberlain filed an additional affidavit on 16 March 2007. In the affidavit Mr Chamberlain indicated that he sought “to have a departure order the assessment of Ms M (sic) made on the 6th of April 2006 be set aside in it’s (sic) entirety,” Thereafter Mr Chamberlain made reference to “rule 4.3.7 and rule 1.3.1. of the guide” and invoked section 5 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act. He concluded the affidavit by stating that he wished the reinstatement of Mr SE’s assessment and the repayment of all monies to him.
In her affidavit filed on 4 April 2007, Ms Slade pointed out that Mr Chamberlain had not provided any specific reasons why he sought a departure from Ms M’s decision or indeed any other of the assessments which have been made.
The matter came before me for the first time on 18 April 2007. Mr Chamberlain did not appear. Ms Slade appeared on own behalf. In the absence of Mr Chamberlain I determined to strike out his application for want of prosecution. Subsequently Mr Chamberlain appeared on 30 April 2007, the date on which his bias application had been listed, again before me. He explained he had mistaken the dates. On that basis I reinstated his principle application.
On 30 April, I fixed Mr Chamberlain application for final hearing on 25 July 2007. I noted in the order that it was an application for departure from the assessment of child support made by Ms M. Given the matter was proceeding before myself, I could see no utility in dealing with Mr Chamberlain’s application regarding the disqualification of FM Mead.
The hearing scheduled for 25 July 2007 did not proceed. The reason for this is that on that day there was a malfunction in the audio equipment used to record the court’s proceeding. I informed Mr Chamberlain of this malfunction, which meant that there would be no possibility of a verbatim record of what was said during the case being produced.
In these circumstances Mr Chamberlain did not wish to embark upon the case. He informed me that “there would certainly be an appeal in the matter” and therefore a transcript would be required. Ms Slade had no objection to the proceedings being adjourned. Accordingly they were refixed for hearing on 21 November 2007.
On 23 July 2007, Mr Chamberlain had filed another affidavit in the proceedings. To this affidavit were annexed several documents. These included letters of complaint Mr Chamberlain had sent to the Premier of South Australia; the Federal Minister responsible for the Child Support Agency; and to the Child Support Agency itself.
Mr Chamberlain also supplied some sections of the Child Support Agency’s Law and Policy Guide, which is available from the internet. Finally Mr Chamberlain provided yet another decision which had been made in respect of an application by him for a departure from administrative assessment of child support. This decision was made on 12 September 2006 by Senior Case Officer SH.
Once again the grounds for the departure application were the high costs of contact; the necessary expenses Mr Chamberlain had in supporting himself; and the fact that the assessment did not take into account Ms Slade’s income earning capacity, property and financial resources. Once again Ms Slade cross applied.
The Senior Case Officer rejected the application regarding the alleged high costs of contact arising from Mr Chamberlain claim that he was incurring significant costs in pursuing his application to spend time with the children in the Family Court. His claim had been rejected on this basis in the past.
Again Mr Chamberlain raised his concerns regarding the high costs of his medication, which the Senior Case Officer considered had been dealt with by Ms M in her objection decision.
The Senior Case Officer also rejected Mr Chamberlain claim regarding Ms Slade’s financial resources, particularly that she had recently received a bequest. The Senior Case Officer found that Ms Slade’s income was currently around $35,000.00 per annum, slightly less than it had been at an earlier stage.
Ms Slade’s cross application regarding karate lessons for J was disallowed on the same basis as by Ms M. In addition so was the application regarding Ms Slade’s reduction in income, as the Senior Case Officer considered that the change would have only a minimal impact upon the assessment.
Senior Case Office SH observed as follows in the decision dismissing both Mr Chamberlain’s application and Ms Slade’s cross application:
“I also consider that all child support issues would be best ventilated in the proceedings instituted by Mr Chamberlain seeking a further departure to the administrative assessment of child support, in the Federal Magistrates’ Service.”
The hearing of 21 November 2007
During the hearing of 21 November 2007, Mr Chamberlain took me back to an affidavit which he had filed on 21 November 2006, in the earlier proceedings. To this affidavit was attached a letter of complaint about Mr L; some documents concerning Mr Chamberlain’s financial circumstances; a letter confirming that he had borrowed money to finance proceedings in the Family Court; details of his medication; and most importantly in the context of these proceedings, further extracts from the Child Support Agency’s law and policy guide.
In particular Mr Chamberlain provided me with the sections of the guide headed 4.3.7 The Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1997 and 1.3.1 Objects of the Assessment Act. Thus I became aware of the prevenance of the references made by Mr Chamberlain in his most recent affidavit filed on 23 July 2007.
I had initially thought that Mr Chamberlain was dissatisfied with the decision of Ms M and wished to pursue some form of application pursuant to Part 7 of the Child Support (Assessment) Act. This inadvertence on my part is clear from my order of 30 April 2007, when I fixed the matter initially for hearing.
At the time I thought it best to allow ample time so that the court could get to the bottom of the matter, particularly whether there were any proper grounds for departure from any of the relevant administrative assessment of child support. I appreciated that it was difficult for Mr Chamberlain to grapple with the complexities of the applicable child support legislation, given his long history with the Agency and Ms Slade.
However on 21 November, it became apparent that the gravamen of Mr Chamberlain’s complaint was the sense of injustice he continues to feel at the decision of Mr L, which had occurred in his absence. Although at least a good part of this decision had been put right, so far as he was concerned, by the subsequent objection decision of Ms M.
In any event, although ostensibly Mr Chamberlain has said that he wishes there to be a departure from Ms M’s decision, he has provided no specific grounds for this departure pursuant to the provisions of Part 7 of the Child Support (Assessment) Act, in particular pursuant to section 117.
The letter annexed to Mr Chamberlain’s affidavit of 21 November 2006 raised his concerns regarding Mr L’s treatment of his pharmaceutical expenses and the issue regarding J’s karate lessons, both matters which continue to rankle with Mr Chamberlain, although, as I say, Ms M has dealt with both these issues apparently in Mr Chamberlain’s favour.
Mr Chamberlain did not seek to prevent elaborate argument before me or wish to give any additional evidence on 21 November 2007. Rather he stated that section 4.3.7 of the Child Support Agency’s Law and Policy Guide set out his position clearly and established that he had not been treated with procedural fairness by Mr L.
It would seem to be Mr Chamberlain’s position that, if the decision of Mr L is in some way quashed, the earlier decisions of Ms LV and Mr SE will be reinstated.
Ms Slade did not seek to present any elaborate arguments either other than she observed that it had not been as a result of her action that Mr Chamberlain had been denied any procedural fairness before Mr L. Accordingly she queried why she was the respondent to the application.
Conclusions
Mr Chamberlain’s application is misconceived. Section 3 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act sets out the administrative decisions to which the Act has application. It specifies that the Act does not apply to any of the types of decision set out in Schedule 1 of the Act. This schedule contains and includes determinations made by the Child Support Registrar under Part 6A of the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989.
The decisions of both Mr L and Ms M are such decisions. The section of the Child Support Agency Law and Policy Guide to which Mr Chamberlain has made reference also says this clearly. The Guide states as follows:
“The AD(JR) Act allows a parent to apply to the Federal Court or the Federal Magistrates Court for judicial review of most of CSA’s administrative decisions. The AD(JR) Act applies to all decisions under the Registration and Collection Act and all Assessment decisions except those made under Part 6A of the Assessment Act (i.e. decisions on a parent’s application to change a child support assessment or a Registrar-initiated change of assessment).”
Accordingly I have no jurisdiction to undertake a judicial review of the decision made by Mr L or the subsequent objection determination of Ms M.
I have jurisdiction under Part 7 of the Child Support (Assessment) Act to determine departure applications pursuant to the provisions of section 117 of the Act, following any administrative review of the applicable child support assessment pursuant to Part 6A of the Act.
In the case of Gyselman [1] the Full Court of the Family Court indicated the process to be followed by a court such as this one in any departure application pursuant to section 117. It is a three step process.
[1] In the Marriage of Gyselman (1992) 15 Fam LR 219
Firstly the court is required to determine whether one or more of the grounds set out in section 117(2) is established. Secondly determine whether it is just and equitable to make a departure order. Thirdly determine whether it is otherwise proper to make such an order.
Section 117(2) provides that there is only to be a departure from an administrative assessment if special circumstances exist in the case concerned. The Full Court has said that special circumstances are circumstances that set a case apart from the ordinary run of cases or make it special in some way.[2]
[2] See Savery & Savery (1990) FLC 92-131
In spite of a number of orders which have directed that Mr Chamberlain provide specific details of the grounds of any departure which he seeks, he has declined or been unable to provide them.[3] In these circumstances there is limit to how much scrutiny the court can give to the various child support determination in this matter and the amount of latitude which it can give to Mr Chamberlain in pursuing his inchoate objections to them. Mr Chamberlain has reached that limit.
[3] See order of FM Mead made 12 February 2007
On the basis of the material before me, I am not persuade that it would be either just and equitable or otherwise proper for there to be a departure from the administrative assessment of child support made by Ms M on 6 April 2006 or indeed any other of the child support assessments to which I have made reference, particularly in the absence of any articulated grounds under section 117(2) from Mr Chamberlain.
These proceedings are not an appropriate forum for Mr Chamberlain to articulate his dissatisfaction in regards to the fact that Mr L made a decision following a hearing from which he (Mr Chamberlain) was absent.
The various delegates of the Child Support Registrar, in several departure applications brought by Mr Chamberlain, have dealt with Mr Chamberlain’s complaint that the administrative assessments in question do not properly take into account his living expenses (particularly his pharmaceutical expenses); his allegedly high cost of spending time with the children; and Ms Slade’s financial circumstances and income earning capacity.
Ms Slade’s cross application regarding the costs of J’s karate lessons has been put to rest in Mr Chamberlain’s favour by virtue of Ms M’s decision.
I can see no error in any of these decisions. There seems to be no controversy about Mr Chamberlain’s level of income. The decision of Ms M takes into account Mr Chamberlain pharmaceutical expenses. No evidence has been presented before me showing anything to indicate that Ms Slade’s income has been wrongly calculated or improperly taken into account in any of the decisions in question.
Similarly I do not consider that there is either any error or any special circumstances which dictate that the costs Mr Chamberlain has incurred in pursuing proceedings in the Family Court in regards to the children or indeed any other expenses he has incurred should be taken into account in any of the administrative assessment of child support in question.
For all these reasons it must follow that Mr Chamberlain’s application should be dismissed.
I certify that the preceding ninety (90) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Brown FM
Associate: P SladeSmith
Date: 30 January 2008
2
0
2