Chalmers v The Commonwealth of Australia

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73 CLR 19

THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA Public Service-State officer-Employment on annual basis - Temporary transfer to

Commonwealth service-Overtime-Rate of remuneration Not less favourable" than immediately prior to transfer-Statutory proviso-" Usual office hours" Different in State and Commonwealth service-Income Tax (War-time Arrange- ments) Act 1942-1944 (No. 21 of 1942-No. 32 of 1944), S. 6 (1)-Income Tax (War-time Arrangements) Regulations (S.R. 1942 No. 375), reg. 14 (1).

The plaintiff was an officer of the public service of New South Wales who was temporarily transferred to the public service of the Commonwealth by virtue of S. 4 of the Income Tax (War-time Arrangements) Act 1942-1944. Section 6 of that Act provides, with certain immaterial exceptions, that " 'the terms and conditions of employment of every transferred officer shall, during the period of transfer, be as prescribed' and a proviso to the section provides,

SO far as material, that the rate of remuneration of a transferred officer shall be not less favourable than that to which he would be entitled if he had been transferred at the rate of remuneration to which he was entitled immediately prior to his transfer." The plaintiff was in receipt of an annual salary as an officer in the New South Wales service and the annual salary he received as a transferred officer was never less than, and at times exceeded, the annual salary to which he would have been entitled had he remained in the New South Wales service. The plaintiff was, however, by virtue of reg. 14 (1) of the Income Tax (War-time Arrangements) Regulations required to work longer hours on being transferred to the Commonwealth service. The plaintiff claimed (i) that, inasmuch as he was, as a transferred officer, required to work longer hours "his rate of remuneration" was less favourable, and that accordingly he had been underpaid; (ii) that reg. 14 (1) of the

73 CLR 20

Income Tax (War-time Arrangements) Regulations contravened the proviso to S. 6 of the Act and accordingly was invalid.

Held that the plaintiff's claim failed, By Latham C.J., Rich, Dixon, McTiernan and Williams JJ., on the ground that reg. 14 1 of the Income Tax (War-time Arrangements) Regulations was a valid exercise of the power conferred by the Act to prescribe office hours of remuneration which was a rate per year and not a rate per hour.

By Starke J. on the ground that although the Income Tax (War-time Arrange- ments) Act 1942-1944 and the Regulations thereunder were unconstitutional and invalid, the change of hours of duty, did not change the rate of remunera-

CASE STATED.

An action was brought in the original jurisdiction of the High Court by William Chalmers, of Randwick, New South Wales, to recover from the defendant, the Commonwealth of Australia, the sum of £116 11s. 10d. which he alleged was due to him by the Common- wealth in respect of hours worked by him in excess of the "usual office hours" provided for in a relevant State industrial award, he being an officer…

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Details
Case
[1946] HCA 37
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The plaintiff, William Chalmers, a New South Wales public servant, was temporarily transferred to the Commonwealth public service under the *Income Tax (War-time Arrangements) Act 1942-1944*. He claimed that his rate of remuneration had become less favourable due to increased working hours in the Commonwealth service, arguing that this contravened a proviso in the Act. The matter was heard in the original jurisdiction of the High Court, with a case stated for the consideration of the Full Court.

The central legal issues before the court were: firstly, whether the plaintiff's claim for additional remuneration for hours worked beyond the "usual office hours" of his former State employment was valid, given the Commonwealth's power to prescribe different terms and conditions of employment; and secondly, whether regulation 14(1) of the *Income Tax (War-time Arrangements) Regulations*, which applied Commonwealth public service conditions to transferred officers, was invalid for contravening the Act's proviso. The court was asked to determine which set of "usual office hours" should apply for the calculation of overtime and whether the plaintiff was entitled to be paid at rates not less favourable than those prescribed by his former State award for work done outside those hours.

A majority of the High Court (Latham C.J., Rich, Dixon, McTiernan, and Williams JJ.) held that the plaintiff's claim failed. Their reasoning centred on the interpretation of "rate of remuneration" in the proviso to section 6 of the Act. The majority concluded that remuneration was paid at an annual rate, and that an increase in the hours worked to earn that annual salary did not constitute a less favourable rate of remuneration. They found that the Act permitted the Commonwealth to prescribe different office hours, and that such a variation in hours did not alter the annual rate of remuneration. Consequently, regulation 14(1) was considered a valid exercise of the power to prescribe office hours. Starke J. dissented, finding the Act and regulations unconstitutional, but agreed that the change in hours did not alter the rate of remuneration.

The court answered the questions posed in the case stated accordingly. The usual office hours for the purpose of calculating overtime were to be those prescribed by the Commonwealth regulations. The plaintiff was entitled to overtime pay for work done outside Commonwealth weekday hours and on Sundays or public holidays, but not for Saturday work that fell within the Commonwealth's usual Saturday office hours. The regulation prescribing these hours was deemed valid. As a result, judgment was to be entered for the defendant.

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