FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Chalissery v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FCA 923
Appeal from: Chalissery v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 795 File number(s): NTD 16 of 2022 Judgment of: O'SULLIVAN J Date of judgment: 8 August 2025 Catchwords: MIGRATION — application for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal — short delay, no prejudice to the first respondent — where no draft notice of appeal accompanied the application — where applicant was without sponsored employment for more than 60 days — where no prospects of a successful appeal — application dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 116, 359AA
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), rr 1.34, 36.01(1) & (2), 36.03, 36.05(3)(d)
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Sch 8 - subcl 8107(3)(b)
Cases cited: Naveed v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 1332
Division: General Division Registry: Northern Territory National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Number of paragraphs: 44 Date of hearing: 6 August 2025 Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant appearing in person Counsel for the Respondents: Mr M Vethcan Solicitor for the Respondents: Clayton Utz ORDERS
NTD 16 of 2022 BETWEEN: NIDHIN CHALISSERY
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
O'SULLIVAN J
DATE OF ORDER:
8 AUGUST 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The name of the first respondent is amended to the ‘Minister for Immigration and Citizenship’.
2.The application for an extension of time is refused.
3.The applicant is to pay the first respondent’s costs to be assessed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
O’SULLIVAN J:
The applicant is a citizen of India.
On 15 February 2018, the applicant’s nomination as a chef made by Kathrine Club Inc as the applicant’s Sponsor, was approved by a delegate of the Minister.
A visa was granted by a delegate of the Minister on 5 March 2018.
The applicant’s employment with the Sponsor ended on 6 July 2018.
That cessation of employment was formally reported to the Department of Home Affairs by the Sponsor on 12 July 2018.
On 4 April 2019, the Department of Home Affairs issued a ‘Notice of intention to consider cancellation’ on the basis a visa condition had been breached, in particular that the applicant had been unemployed for more than 60 consecutive days, contrary to cl. 8107(3)(b) of Schedule 8 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth). The applicant’s unemployment comprised grounds for cancellation under s 116 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).
The Notice invited the applicant to comment on the information and show either why no grounds existed and/or why the visa should not be cancelled. The applicant was asked…
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- Case
- [2025] FCA 923
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the factors pertinent to granting an extension of time, particularly focusing on the absence of a draft notice of appeal as required by the Federal Court Rules. The Minister's submission highlighted that the applicant had not provided a draft notice of appeal as mandated, which carried significant weight in the Court's consideration. Additionally, the Minister argued that Chalissery's failure to provide an adequate explanation for the delay in filing the notice of appeal further undermined the credibility of his application. The Court noted that while the delay was minor and there was no identifiable prejudice to the Minister, these factors alone were not sufficient to warrant an extension of time. The absence of reasonable prospects of success in the proposed appeal was a critical factor, as the Court has previously held that it will not grant an extension of time if any proposed appeal has no reasonable prospects of success.
The Court concluded that the application for an extension of time should be refused. The Court found that the absence of a draft notice of appeal and the lack of reasonable prospects of success outweighed any minor delay or lack of prejudice. The Court dismissed the application, and Chalissery was ordered to pay the Minister's costs, to be assessed if not agreed. The Court also amended the name of the first respondent to 'Minister for Immigration and Citizenship' to reflect the current title of the Minister.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The name of the first respondent is amended to the ‘Minister for Immigration and Citizenship’.
2. The application for an extension of time is refused.
3. The applicant is to pay the first respondent’s costs to be assessed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
As to the last of the four factors, if any proposed appeal has no reasonable prospects of success, the Court will not grant an extension of time: CKT20 [17].Submissions and consideration The Minister submits that the delay in lodging the appeal, although short, does not warrant an extension of time being granted. The Minister accepts that the delay was minor and that there is no identifiable prejudice to the Minister arising from the delay. A lack of prejudice is essentially neutral given that factor alone is not sufficient reason for granting the application to extend time: Naveed v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 1332, [38] (Perry J). The Minister identifies two matters that the Minister submits weigh against the granting of any extension of time. First, the applicant failed to file a draft notice of appeal in accordance with FCR 36.01(1) or 36.01(2), or as required by FCR 36.05(3)(d). Consequently, the Minister submits that the Court can be satisfied that the primary judge did not err, particularly in circumstance where no appellable grounds have been advanced. I do not accept that the absence of a draft notice of appeal does inevitably lead to the conclusion that the primary judge did not err, however its absence carries significant weight. Second, the Minister points to the applicant’s failure to provide an adequate explanation for the extended delay in not filing a draft notice of appeal. The Minister submits that this prolonged inaction undermines the credibility of the applicant’s explanation and weighs heavily against the extension. It is certainly the case that there is no explanation for the failure to file a draft notice of appeal. As I have noted, the absence of a draft notice of appeal in this case carries significant weight. Before the primary judge, the applicant relied on s 359AA(1) of the Act, which provides that the Tribunal must disclose to an applicant the clear particulars of any information that the Tribunal considers would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision under review. The applicant contended that the Tribunal failed to inform him that the breach of cl. 8107(3)(b) would serve as the foundation of its affirmation of the decision to cancel the applicant’s visa such that he was denied procedural fairness. The primary judge reviewed the transcript before the Tribunal observing that:(a)The Tribunal advised the applicant clearly that he would be permitted to submit supporting documentation post-hearing; [J4](b)The applicant acknowledged that he had not been employed in a sponsored position for over sixty days; [J5](c)Although the applicant stated that his employer wished to sponsor him, he conceded no sponsorship letter had been provided; [J6](d)The Tribunal clarified that sponsorship was legally distinct from mere employment, a point the applicant appeared to accept; [J6](e)On further questioning, [J7-J8] the applicant revealed that he had in fact been working at the Kathrine RSL, but admitted the employer “didn’t sponsor [him]”; and(f)The Tribunal had encouraged the applicant to submit additional material to address these deficiencies. [J10]