Chaina v Presbyterian Church (NSW) Property Trust (No. 18)

Case [2013] NSWSC 1600


Supreme Court


New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: Chaina v Presbyterian Church (NSW) Property Trust (No. 18) [2013] NSWSC 1600
Hearing dates:4 November 2013
Decision date: 04 November 2013
Jurisdiction:Common Law
Before: Davies J
Decision:

The report of Professor Graham Dowling of 4 August 2006 is allowed into evidence

Catchwords: EVIDENCE - expert evidence - admissibility - some factual material relied upon by expert not in evidence - whether report should be rejected prior to completion of trial - whether opinion infected by rejected evidence
Cases Cited: Chaina v Presbyterian Church (NSW) Property Trust (No. 7) [2013] NSWSC 139
Chaina v Presbyterian Church (NSW) Property Trust (No. 16) [2013] NSWSC 1494
Category:Interlocutory applications
Parties: Mathew Chaina (First Plaintiff) and ors
Presbyterian Church (NSW) Property Trust (First Defendant) and ors
Representation: Counsel:
In person (Plaintiffs)
R Stitt QC, G L Turner & H Stitt (Defendants)
Solicitors:
In person (Plaintiffs)
Curwoods Lawyers (Defendants)
File Number(s):2002/69354

Judgment

  1. In Chaina v Presbyterian Church (NSW) Property Trust (No. 16) [2013] NSWSC 1494 I determined that the report of Professor Graham Dowling of 4 August 2006 should not be rejected by reason of the assumptions that he had apparently made concerning the superiority of the Plaintiffs' industrial products. Objection is now taken to the report on other grounds. A large number of objections has been taken, but they largely fall into two types of categories.

  1. The first category is based on the fact that Professor Dowling has provided his report on the basis of a number of documents that are not in evidence in the case, or have been expressly rejected as part of the evidence in the case. In particular, objection was taken to more than half the schedule of documents on pages 3 and 4 of the report.

  1. Some of those documents have now been tendered, that is the various financial reports of the three companies, their tax returns and the tax returns of Mr and Mrs Chaina.

  1. Some of the other documents, particularly the affidavit of Mr Jerogin, a statement of Mr West in the insurance proceedings and a number of parts of the exhibits GC1, GC2 and GC3, have either been expressly rejected or have not been placed into evidence. I note in that regard that Professor Dowling makes express reference to tabs 8 and 25 in GC1 and GC2 respectively. In Chaina v Presbyterian Church (NSW) Property Trust (No. 7) [2013] NSWSC 139, I rejected those tabs of the annexures to the documents along with the paragraphs where they are referred to.

  1. The second major objection to this report is connected to the first but in some cases is separate from it. That is, it is based on assumptions that Professor Dowling has made (not the superiority assumption dealt with in Chaina (No. 16)) and which, either by reason of documents not being in evidence or by the evidence otherwise not satisfying the assumptions, it is said are not made out. Accordingly, it is said that the opinions should not be allowed to stand.

  1. I accept that a very great deal of this report appears to be based on material that is not part of the evidence in the case. In that regard, the statement of John West made in the insurance proceedings assumes a large role in that regard. Other assumptions have not so far been established by the evidence.

  1. It would not be feasible to strike out those parts of the report that contain the assumptions which have not been proved. The opinion at the end of the report would be meaningless if that was to happen because the striking out would remove part of the reasoning process for the opinions expressed. The issue is, therefore, whether the report is so infected by the material which has not otherwise been proved that the opinion that Professor Dowling reaches cannot be allowed to stand.

  1. One of the reasons that I permitted this report to be readmitted in the proceedings was because there was a certain lack of clarity and ambiguity about the way Professor Dowling had proceeded in his report. I took the view that there may well be factual issues which would have to be determined at the end of the case and when final submissions were made. In some cases, it may be that there is other evidence than what Professor Dowling refers to which would provide some support for some of the assumptions that he makes.

  1. I have not, in the time available to me, had a chance to re-read all of Mr and Mrs Chaina's extensive Statements to see if any of the further evidence is to be found in those Statements. In any event, that is really a matter for submission at the end of the case. I think the fairer course is, therefore, that the whole of the report should be admitted into evidence at this stage, subject to the removal of the sentence commencing on line 4 in paragraph 18 that I have already ruled is inadmissible for form reasons.

  1. My reading of the report at the moment suggests that the report has been badly infected by the factual material that is not otherwise proved. Whether or not that should ultimately mean the report has no weight is something that I will have to determine after I have heard submissions, particularly from the Plaintiffs.

  1. That report is therefore allowed into evidence.

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Details
AGLC
Chaina v Presbyterian Church (NSW) Property Trust (No. 18) [2013] NSWSC 1600
Case
[2013] NSWSC 1600
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Chaina v Presbyterian Church (NSW) Property Trust (No. 18), the parties were engaged in a legal dispute concerning the admissibility of expert evidence in the context of a trial. The matter was heard in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The central issue revolved around whether expert evidence should be excluded from consideration if some of the factual material upon which the expert relied was not present in the evidence presented during the trial, and if so, whether this should occur prior to the trial's conclusion or if the opinion itself was compromised by the excluded evidence.

The court was required to determine the principles governing the admissibility of expert evidence, particularly focusing on the extent to which an expert's report could be based on facts not in the evidence and whether this would necessitate the exclusion of the report before the trial ended. The court also needed to examine if the expert's opinion was inherently tainted by the reliance on excluded evidence, which might render the opinion unreliable.

The court held that the admissibility of expert evidence was not automatically compromised by the expert relying on facts not in the evidence, provided those facts were not central to the opinion. However, if the excluded facts materially influenced the expert's opinion, the report might be deemed unreliable and could be excluded. The court concluded that the decision to exclude the evidence should not be made until the trial's completion, allowing the court to assess the full context and significance of the excluded material. The court's reasoning was based on a careful evaluation of the expert's report and the relevance of the excluded factual material to the opinion formed. Ultimately, the court determined that the expert's opinion was not so fundamentally affected by the excluded evidence as to render it inadmissible, and thus, the report remained admissible.

The final orders of the court were that the expert evidence in question would be admitted, subject to the court's ability to revisit the issue if the excluded material's impact on the opinion became clearer as the trial progressed. The trial continued with the expert's evidence being considered alongside the other evidence presented.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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