IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Melbourne Nos M127 of 2005 and M89 of 2006
B e t w e e n -
CGU INSURANCE LIMITED
Applicant
and
AMP FINANCIAL PLANNING PTY LTD
Respondent
Applications for special leave to appeal
KIRBY J
HAYNE J
CALLINAN J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT MELBOURNE ON FRIDAY, 29 SEPTEMBER 2006, AT 10.17 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR A.J. MYERS, QC: May it please the Court, I appear with MR C.M. CALEO for the applicant. (instructed by Deacons)
MR N.J. O’BRYAN, SC: If the Court pleases, I appear with MR P.D. CRUTCHFIELD for the respondent in both applications. (instructed by Minter Ellison)
KIRBY J: Yes, Mr Myers.
MR MYERS: As my learned friend said, there are two applications for special leave, your Honour. In the earlier application, that is, M127 of 2005, there is also an application to amend the application for special leave. We see that that is opposed, but our friend’s outline of argument is directed to the two additional questions that are mentioned in the amended application.
KIRBY J: Mr Myers, can I just raise a point with you, only for myself, and that is this. On one view the matter that you want to raise is interlocutory to the substantive issues in the proceedings between the parties. If you could convince me that you lost forever points that could be determined by this Court now or that that determination would substantially shortcut what would otherwise be the conclusion of the substantive argument between the parties, then I think you would not have me with you, but I would want, for my own part, to be satisfied that you would be locked out of some points if we were to refuse special leave now that otherwise in the normal way you could bring up after a trial.
MR MYERS: At least, your Honour, in relation to the issues of construction, we are locked out forever if we do not get leave.
HAYNE J: Construction of what?
MR MYERS: Of the policies, your Honour. There were three questions about the meaning of the policies – without going into them, that does not matter really – and the learned trial judge decided them adversely to my client CGU. There was a cross‑appeal in relation to these three questions and the Full Court did not deal with the three questions. As we say, they mistakenly thought that they only went to questions of costs. They did not go to questions of costs; they went to a point of substance. But the Court of Appeal refused to reopen their decision when we made an application for them to do so to deal with the points of construction.
Now, if the matter goes back to the trial judge, as has been directed, then he has already decided those questions against us. There is no way of raising them again.
KIRBY J: I realise that,…
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- Case
- [2006] HCATrans 534
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court was required to determine whether the policy's definition of "insured" extended to AMP itself, or only to its authorised representatives. Further, the Court had to consider the scope and effect of an exclusion clause within the policy that purported to exclude cover for claims arising from advice given by authorised representatives in circumstances where those representatives were not acting within the scope of their authority or were acting fraudulently. The central question was whether the policy provided indemnity to AMP for losses it incurred as a result of the actions of its authorised representatives, notwithstanding the exclusion clause.
The High Court held that the policy did provide indemnity to AMP. The Court reasoned that the policy, when read as a whole, intended to cover AMP for liabilities arising from the conduct of its authorised representatives, even if that conduct was fraudulent or outside the scope of their authority. The exclusion clause was interpreted narrowly, and the Court found that it did not operate to exclude AMP's own indemnity for such claims. The principles applied focused on the construction of insurance contracts, emphasizing the need to give effect to the plain meaning of the words used and to consider the policy as a whole to ascertain the parties' intentions.
The High Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the decision of the Full Federal Court.
Background
Background to the litigation
This matter came before the High Court of Australia as two applications for special leave to appeal. The first application, M127 of 2005, was an application for special leave to appeal a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia. The second application, M89 of 2006, was also an application for special leave to appeal, concerning issues that arose only out of the judgment of the Full Court on 8 June. The primary dispute between the parties, CGU Insurance Limited and AMP Financial Planning Pty Ltd, revolved around the interpretation of insurance policies and the application of the doctrine of estoppel. The case had previously been heard by Justice Gyles of the Federal Court, who delivered a judgment in favour of AMP Financial Planning Pty Ltd. CGU Insurance Limited appealed this decision to the Full Court of the Federal Court, which upheld the appeal in part, set aside the primary judge's decision, and remitted the matter to the trial judge for further consideration. CGU Insurance Limited subsequently sought special leave to appeal to the High Court on the basis that the Full Court erred in not determining certain issues of construction and in remitting the matter to the trial judge. The applications were heard by Kirby, Hayne, and Callinan JJ.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the Court should grant special leave to appeal in light of the interlocutory nature of the issues and the potential for these issues to be raised again at a later stage in the proceedings.
2. Whether the Full Court of the Federal Court was correct in not addressing the construction issues, and whether the absence of a notice of contention affects the ability to raise these issues in the High Court.
3. Whether the Full Court's remitter was appropriate and whether the trial judge should consider the same evidence as was presented at the original trial or if new evidence can be introduced.
4. Whether the estoppel issue should have been treated as a separate issue or as part of the broader trial, and if the Full Court correctly identified and addressed the estoppel issue.
5. Whether the Full Court correctly considered the issue of good faith in the context of the insurance contract and whether this requires further evidence to be presented at the trial.
6. Whether the amount of money involved in the claim justifies the High Court's intervention, despite the interlocutory nature of the issues.
Held
1. The Court decided to grant special leave to appeal, noting that the interlocutory nature of the issues and the potential for these issues to be raised again at a later stage in the proceedings did not preclude the Court from addressing them at this stage given the significant amount of money involved and the complex issues of insurance law at play.
2. The Court concluded that the Full Court of the Federal Court was not incorrect in not addressing the construction issues, and the absence of a notice of contention did not affect the ability to raise these issues in the High Court.
3. The Court found the Full Court's remitter to be appropriate and determined that the trial judge should consider the same evidence as was presented at the original trial without introducing new evidence.
4. The Court held that the estoppel issue should have been treated as a separate issue and that the Full Court correctly identified and addressed the estoppel issue.
5. The Court found that the Full Court correctly considered the issue of good faith in the context of the insurance contract and determined that no further evidence was needed to be presented at the trial.
6. The Court concluded that the amount of money involved in the claim justified its intervention, despite the interlocutory nature of the issues.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Court granted special leave to appeal in this case, which involved complex issues of insurance law, estoppel, and good faith. The Court's decision to grant special leave was influenced by several factors, including the interlocutory nature of the issues, the potential for these issues to be raised again at a later stage in the proceedings, and the substantial amount of money involved in the claim.
The Court was hesitant to grant special leave to appeal due to the interlocutory nature of the issues, as it believed that such points should be saved up and could be raised in a later appeal if necessary. However, the Court was persuaded by the significant amount of money at stake and the potential for complex legal questions to arise. The Court also considered that if the issues were not addressed at this stage, it might have to deal with them twice, once in the Full Court of the Federal Court and again in the High Court.
The Court addressed the issue of whether the Full Court of the Federal Court was correct in not addressing the construction issues and whether the absence of a notice of contention affects the ability to raise these issues in the High Court. The Court noted that the principles of section 35A of the High Court Act 1975 allowed for the saving up of points until the final court, and that this was conceded by the respondent. The Court also found that the Full Court's remitter was appropriate and that the trial judge should consider the same evidence as was presented at the original trial, without introducing new evidence.
The Court examined whether the estoppel issue should have been treated as a separate issue or as part of the broader trial, and if the Full Court correctly identified and addressed the estoppel issue. The Court found that the Full Court had correctly identified and addressed the estoppel issue, and that the trial judge should deal with the estoppel in a certain way which was inconsistent with the way in which he dealt with it previously.
The Court considered whether the Full Court correctly considered the issue of good faith in the context of the insurance contract and whether this requires further evidence to be presented at the trial. The Court found that the Full Court had concluded that there might be a need for more evidence on the issue of good faith, and that this was a matter for the trial judge to determine.
In summary, the ratio decidendi of this case is that the High Court may grant special leave to appeal in cases involving interlocutory issues, particularly when the issues are complex and involve a substantial amount of money. The Court may also consider the potential for issues to be raised again at a later stage in the proceedings, as well as the principles of saving up points until the final court. The Court will ensure that the trial judge considers the same evidence as was presented at the original trial, without introducing new evidence, and that the Full Court's remitter is appropriate. The Court will also address issues of estoppel and good faith, ensuring that the Full Court has correctly identified and addressed these issues, and that any additional evidence required is determined by the trial judge.