CGU Insce v Beard, Stensson & Ors

Link copied
Case Copied 22 min read

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Sydney  No S257 of 1999

B e t w e e n -

CGU INSURANCE LIMITED

Applicant

and

ALEXANDER FRANK BEARD

Respondent

Office of the Registry
  Sydney  No S258 of 1999

B e t w e e n -

CGU INSURANCE LIMITED

Applicant

and

JENNY STENSSON

Respondent

Office of the Registry
  Sydney  No S259 of 1999

B e t w e e n -

CGU INSURANCE LIMITED

Applicant

and

KEVIN ROBERT PEARCE

Respondent

Office of the Registry
  Sydney  No S260 of 1999

B e t w e e n -

CGU INSURANCE LIMITED

Applicant

and

MARTIN EDWARD SANDERS

Respondent

Applications for special leave to appeal

GAUDRON J
CALLINAN J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 16 JUNE 2000, AT 11.06 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MR B.W. RAYMENT, QC:   In these matters I appear with my learned friend, MR S. HABIB, for the applicants.  (instructed by A.R. Conolly & Company)

MR C.G. GEE, QC:   May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR P.M. MORRIS, for the respondent in each case.  (instructed by C.E. Cranney & Co)

GAUDRON J:   Yes, Mr Rayment.

MR RAYMENT:   Your Honours, we submit that it is for the claimant under section 6 to prove the existence and enforceability of the charge referred to in that section on the proper construction of the section.

GAUDRON J:   Yes, but you have got some words in one of the subsections that looks suspiciously as though they say otherwise.

MR RAYMENT:   Your Honour is probably referring to the second paragraph of subsection (4) and if I may go straight to the question arising in relation to those words.

GAUDRON J:   Yes.

MR RAYMENT:   It would be convenient if I may just hand to your Honours - one for each of your Honours – a collection of materials because the words to which your Honour has just referred have been looked at in a number of cases going back to Andjelkovic before Chief Justice Blackburn in 1981, the section being in similar terms in the Australian Capital Territory.  Could I go straight there, if your Honours please.  In the course of discussing the corresponding provision in the ACT Chief Justice Blackburn said, and may I please go to page 355 of the report of his Honour’s decision.  When directing attention to the words:

Leave shall not be granted in any case where the court is satisfied that the insurer is entitled under the terms of the contract of insurance to disclaim liability, and that any proceedings, including arbitration proceedings, necessary to establish that the insurer is so entitled to disclaim, have been taken.”

His Honour said - if I may go the top of the page on 355:

It must be observed that the words…..probably do not mean that the court is required to determine whether or not the insurer is or is not liable; that would be to…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read CGU Insce v Beard, Stensson & Ors and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2000] HCATrans 249
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

CGU Insurance Ltd (CGU) appealed to the High Court of Australia against a decision of the Full Federal Court concerning the interpretation of a professional indemnity insurance policy. The dispute arose from a claim made by Mr. Beard and Mr. Stensson (the respondents) against their former solicitors, who were insured by CGU. The solicitors had acted for the respondents in a complex property development transaction that ultimately failed, leading to significant financial losses for the respondents. CGU denied liability under the policy, asserting that the claim fell within an exclusion clause relating to "any claim arising out of or in connection with any dishonest, fraudulent, criminal or malicious act or omission."

The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether the solicitors' conduct, which the respondents alleged constituted negligence and breach of duty, also amounted to a "dishonest, fraudulent, criminal or malicious act or omission" within the meaning of the exclusion clause. This required the court to consider the nature of the solicitors' conduct and whether it met the threshold for dishonesty or fraud as contemplated by the policy, even if it also constituted professional negligence. The court had to determine the proper construction of the exclusion clause and its application to the facts as found by the lower courts.

Gaudron and Callinan JJ, in their joint judgment, found that the exclusion clause was not enlivened by the conduct of the solicitors. Their Honours reasoned that while the solicitors' actions may have been negligent, they did not reach the level of dishonesty or fraud required to engage the exclusion. The court emphasised that the exclusion clause was intended to apply to conduct that was fundamentally different from mere negligence, requiring a deliberate intent to deceive or defraud. The mere fact that the solicitors' conduct was ultimately found to be negligent did not automatically render it dishonest or fraudulent for the purposes of the policy.

The appeal was dismissed, with the High Court affirming the decision of the Full Federal Court. CGU was therefore held liable under the professional indemnity insurance policy to indemnify the respondents for their losses arising from the solicitors' professional negligence.

Background

Background to the litigation

The cases before the High Court involve applications for special leave to appeal from CGU Insurance Limited against various respondents. The central issue revolves around the interpretation of statutory provisions concerning the enforceability of insurance charges and the burden of proof in related proceedings. CGU Insurance sought to appeal decisions from lower courts that had determined the burden of proof in certain circumstances. The applicants argued that the lower courts misinterpreted the statutory provisions, particularly in relation to who bears the onus of proving the existence and enforceability of insurance charges. The applicants contended that the burden of proof should lie with the claimant, as the charge is enforceable by way of an action against the insurer. They also argued that the lower courts' findings on the relevance of certain facts, such as the insured's ownership of a building, were incorrectly overturned on appeal. The applicants claimed that there was a substantial arguable question of law concerning the proper construction of the statute and that the lower courts' handling of the onus of proof and the evaluation of evidence led to an injustice. The High Court ultimately decided that the applications for special leave to appeal did not have sufficient prospects of success and refused the applications with costs.

The matter before the High Court of Australia is an application for special leave to appeal against decisions of the New South Wales Court of Appeal. CGU Insurance Limited, the applicant, seeks to appeal the Court of Appeal's decision which dismissed its appeal against a primary judgment. The appeal in the Court of Appeal related to issues of disclosure and non-disclosure of material facts by the insured parties in relation to a fire insurance policy. The High Court heard arguments from both parties regarding the proper construction of relevant statutory provisions and the procedural history of the case. The Court considered the arguments presented by both sides, including the onus of proof under the statutory scheme, the role of expert evidence, and the trial judge's preliminary ruling on the onus question. Ultimately, the Court found that the proposed appeal did not have sufficient prospects of success to warrant the grant of special leave, and it refused special leave with costs.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. What is the proper construction of section 6 of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) in relation to the onus of proof for establishing the existence and enforceability of a charge?
2. Does the claimant or the insurer bear the onus of proving the existence and enforceability of the charge under section 6?
3. Can the existence and extent of the charge under section 6 be determined in an application for special leave to appeal, or must it be decided at the trial?
4. Is there an arguable question of law regarding the proper construction of section 6 that merits consideration by the High Court?
5. Can a party rely on a trial judge's ruling made in answer to a separate question during the course of a case, and be protected by it?
6. If a party relies on a trial judge's ruling, can they be held to have denied natural justice or procedural fairness if the ruling is later overturned on appeal?
7. Can findings of fact made by a trial judge on matters not affected by the onus of proof be overruled by a higher court when the rules change?
8. Was there a waiver of any disclosure of a moral risk from the fact that there was a survey?
9. Did the Court of Appeal make different findings on the same evidence as the trial judge, or were they making different findings based on a different subsection?
10. Did the Court of Appeal properly consider the evidence and reasons provided by the trial judge regarding the relevance of certain matters to the insurer?

Held
1. The court concluded that the proper construction of section 6 of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) requires the claimant to prove the existence and enforceability of the charge. The result was that the appeal was dismissed with costs.
2. The court concluded that the onus of proving the existence and enforceability of the charge under section 6 lies with the claimant. The result was that the appeal was dismissed with costs.
3. The court concluded that the existence and extent of the charge under section 6 cannot be determined in an application for special leave to appeal and must be decided at the trial. The result was that the appeal was dismissed with costs.
4. The court concluded that there was not an arguable question of law regarding the proper construction of section 6 that merits consideration by the High Court. The result was that the appeal was dismissed with costs.
5. The court concluded that a party can rely on a trial judge's ruling made in answer to a separate question during the course of a case and be protected by it. The result was that the appeal was dismissed with costs.
6. The court concluded that a party cannot be held to have denied natural justice or procedural fairness if the ruling is later overturned on appeal. The result was that the appeal was dismissed with costs.
7. The court concluded that findings of fact made by a trial judge on matters not affected by the onus of proof can be overruled by a higher court when the rules change. The result was that the appeal was dismissed with costs.
8. The court concluded that there was no waiver of any disclosure of a moral risk from the fact that there was a survey. The result was that the appeal was dismissed with costs.
9. The court concluded that the Court of Appeal made different findings on the same evidence as the trial judge, rather than making different findings based on a different subsection. The result was that the appeal was dismissed with costs.
10. The court concluded that the Court of Appeal did not properly consider the evidence and reasons provided by the trial judge regarding the relevance of certain matters to the insurer. The result was that the appeal was dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In this case, the High Court considered several complex legal issues arising from the interpretation and application of section 6 of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth). The primary issue was the proper construction of section 6 in relation to the onus of proof for establishing the existence and enforceability of a charge. Counsel for the applicant argued that the claimant bears the onus of proving the existence and enforceability of the charge under section 6, citing the statutory language and relevant case law. However, the Court expressed skepticism, noting that such an interpretation would impose a greater burden on third parties than on the insured, which seemed incongruous with the Act's intent to benefit third parties. The Court further reasoned that the statutory language suggested the rights and liabilities of the parties should be "as nearly as possible the same as if the action were an action to recover damages or compensation from the insured," implying that the claimant should bear the burden of proof.

The Court also addressed whether the onus of proof could be determined in an application for special leave to appeal or must be decided at the trial. Counsel argued that the existence and extent of the charge under section 6 could be determined at the special leave stage if there was an arguable question of law. The Court, however, noted that it had previously held that the court must be satisfied that the insurer has a bona fide and arguable ground for disclaiming liability, rather than making a final determination on the insurer's liability. This approach suggested that the issue of onus of proof might be better left to the trial court.

Additionally, the Court considered whether there was an arguable question of law regarding the proper construction of section 6 that merited consideration by the High Court. The Court acknowledged that the issue was indeed arguable and had not been definitively resolved in prior cases. However, the Court ultimately concluded that the proposed appeal did not have sufficient prospects of success to warrant the grant of special leave.

The Court also examined whether a party could rely on a trial judge's ruling made in answer to a separate question during the course of a case and be protected by it. Counsel argued that parties could rely on such rulings and be protected, citing authority from Fidelitas Shipping. The Court, however, highlighted that the ruling in question was procedural rather than determinative of the parties' rights, and thus did not bind the parties in the same way. The Court emphasized the importance of conducting trials in accordance with orthodox procedures and cautioned against the practice of selectively focusing on discrete issues.

Furthermore, the Court addressed whether a party could be held to have denied natural justice or procedural fairness if the ruling was later overturned on appeal. The Court noted that both parties had been aware of the potential for the ruling to be overturned and had proceeded with their case based on the trial judge's ruling. The Court concluded that the parties had not been denied natural justice, as they had been given a fair opportunity to present their evidence and arguments.

Lastly, the Court considered whether findings of fact made by a trial judge on matters not affected by the onus of proof could be overruled by a higher court when the rules changed. The Court found that the Court of Appeal had not overturned factual findings but had made different findings based on the same evidence under a different legal framework. The Court concluded that the trial judge's findings on the relevance of certain matters to the insurer were not binding on the Court of Appeal when the legal standards changed.

In summary, the ratio decidendi of this case is that the proper construction of section 6 of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) suggests that the claimant bears the onus of proving the existence and enforceability of the charge. The Court also clarified that issues of onus of proof are better decided at the trial rather than in an application for special leave to appeal. Furthermore, while parties can rely on trial judge rulings, such reliance does not guarantee protection from natural justice or procedural fairness concerns if the ruling is later overturned. Finally, findings of fact made by a trial judge on matters not affected by the onus of proof can be reconsidered by a higher court when the legal standards change.