FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
CFT15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 283
File number: VID 690 of 2015 Judge: DAVIES J Date of judgment: 23 March 2016 Catchwords: MIGRATION – judicial review of Minister’s decision to cancel applicant’s visa on character grounds pursuant to Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 501(2) – application for extension of time – merits of proposed application – where applicant convicted of offences of a sexual nature – consideration of risk of reoffending – whether non-refoulement obligations to applicant – whether exercise of discretion legally unreasonable – application dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 501 Cases cited: Ayoub v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 231 FCR 513; [2015] FCAFC 83
Bridges v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 114 FCR 456; [2001] FCA 1647
Evans v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCAFC 180
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11
Date of hearing: 25 February 2016 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 28 Counsel for the Applicant: R Sorensen Solicitor for the Applicant: Goz Chambers Lawyers Counsel for the Respondent: W Mosley Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor ORDERS
VID 690 of 2015 BETWEEN: CFT15
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Respondent
JUDGE:
DAVIES J
DATE OF ORDER:
23 MARCH 2016
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application be dismissed.
2.The Applicant pay the costs of the Respondent, such costs to be taxed in default of agreement.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The Applicant has applied for an extension of time in which to make an application for review of a decision of the Respondent (“the Minister”) made on 22 October 2014 pursuant to s 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) to cancel the Applicant’s Class XB Refugee and Humanitarian Subclass 200 Refugee Visa (“the visa”). An extension of time is required because the proposed application is some 11 months out of time.
BACKGROUND
The Applicant is a citizen of Liberia and was granted the visa on 29 August 2002. He arrived in Australia on 30 January 2003 together with his wife and children.
In September 2006, the Applicant was convicted in the District Court of New South Wales on four counts of sexual intercourse without consent and one count of indecent assault. The offences were committed a year after the Applicant’s arrival, on 31 January 2004. He was sentenced to 11 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of eight years. On 2 September 2008, the Applicant’s appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal for New South Wales against the convictions was dismissed.
On 6 September 2013, the Minister’s Department sent the Applicant a Notice of Intention to Consider Cancellation of the visa pursuant to s 501(2) of the…
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- Case
- [2016] FCA 283
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the applicant's proposed grounds for judicial review lacked sufficient prospects of success to warrant an extension of time for the application. The court emphasised that the concept of legal unreasonableness does not allow the court to substitute its view on the exercise of discretion for that of the decision-maker. Instead, the court must assess whether the decision is lawful by reference to the statutory source of the power, its scope, purpose, and objects. The court determined that the Minister's decision was not legally unreasonable and dismissed the application for judicial review.
The court ordered that the application be dismissed and that the applicant pay the costs of the respondent, such costs to be taxed in default of agreement. This case highlights the high threshold for judicial review in cases involving the exercise of discretionary powers under the Migration Act. The court must ensure that the decision-maker has properly exercised their discretion and considered relevant factors, but it cannot substitute its view for that of the decision-maker.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application be dismissed.
2. The Applicant pay the costs of the Respondent, such costs to be taxed in default of agreement.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
He then deposed that whilst in gaol, he was told by delegates of the Minister who visited the gaol on a regular basis that his only option was to appeal to the Minister to allow him to remain in Australia under s 417 of the Act and that had he known that this Court has jurisdiction to review the Minister’s decision, he would have sought review within the time allowed under the Act. CONSIDERATION The Minister did not challenge the explanation given by the Applicant for failing to file his application within time. However it was submitted that it is not in the interests of justice to grant an extension of time to bring the application because the delay is very substantial and the Applicant’s grounds lack sufficient prospects to warrant an extension. The delay is extensive but it appears from the Applicant’s affidavit that the delay was occasioned by his lack of knowledge of his legal right to challenge the Minister’s decision in judicial review proceedings. I am prepared to accept the Applicant’s explanation for the delay in making his application for judicial review but, for the reasons that follow, I do not consider that an extension of time should be granted for the reason that the Applicant’s proposed grounds lack sufficient prospects of success to warrant an extension of time in the interests of the administration of justice.Grounds 1 and 2 Grounds one and two of the proposed Application for Judicial Review essentially raise the same review ground and can be dealt with together. It was submitted for the Applicant that the Minister’s decision was unreasonable in the legal sense because of alleged deficiencies in the reasoning. It was submitted that as the consequence of the deficiencies in reasoning, the Minister’s decision was not based on the Applicant’s actual circumstances but on “speculative reasoning” with respect to the Applicant’s risk of reoffending, despite the recognition at [24] of the Minister’s decision that the Applicant had been independently assessed as a low risk of sexual reoffending. It was submitted that the decision accordingly lacked a proper logical chain of reasoning. As Allsop CJ recently cautioned in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11 at [8], [12], the concept of legal unreasonableness does not provide a vehicle for the Court to remake the decision according to its view as to reasonableness. Rather, the task is to evaluate the quality of the decision, by reference to the statutory source of the power and thus, from its scope, purpose and objects to assess whether it is lawful. The determination as to whether a decision is unreasonable in the legal sense does not involve the Court substituting its view as to how the discretion should be exercised for that of a decision maker and the fact that a Court exercising judicial review may disagree with a primary decision maker’s evaluation of the relevant facts and considerations and the exercise of a statutory discretionary power is insufficient of itself to justify judicial intervention: Stretton at [74]–[75].