CFT15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CFT15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 283

File number: VID 690 of 2015
Judge: DAVIES J
Date of judgment: 23 March 2016
Catchwords: MIGRATION – judicial review of Minister’s decision to cancel applicant’s visa on character grounds pursuant to Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 501(2) – application for extension of time – merits of proposed application – where applicant convicted of offences of a sexual nature – consideration of risk of reoffending – whether non-refoulement obligations to applicant – whether exercise of discretion legally unreasonable – application dismissed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 501
Cases cited:

Ayoub v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 231 FCR 513; [2015] FCAFC 83

Bridges v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 114 FCR 456; [2001] FCA 1647

Evans v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCAFC 180

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11

Date of hearing: 25 February 2016
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 28
Counsel for the Applicant: R Sorensen
Solicitor for the Applicant: Goz Chambers Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent: W Mosley
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

VID 690 of 2015
BETWEEN:

CFT15

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

Respondent

JUDGE:

DAVIES J

DATE OF ORDER:

23 MARCH 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application be dismissed.

2.The Applicant pay the costs of the Respondent, such costs to be taxed in default of agreement.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. The Applicant has applied for an extension of time in which to make an application for review of a decision of the Respondent (“the Minister”) made on 22 October 2014 pursuant to s 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) to cancel the Applicant’s Class XB Refugee and Humanitarian Subclass 200 Refugee Visa (“the visa”). An extension of time is required because the proposed application is some 11 months out of time.

    BACKGROUND

  2. The Applicant is a citizen of Liberia and was granted the visa on 29 August 2002. He arrived in Australia on 30 January 2003 together with his wife and children.

  3. In September 2006, the Applicant was convicted in the District Court of New South Wales on four counts of sexual intercourse without consent and one count of indecent assault. The offences were committed a year after the Applicant’s arrival, on 31 January 2004. He was sentenced to 11 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of eight years. On 2 September 2008, the Applicant’s appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal for New South Wales against the convictions was dismissed.

  4. On 6 September 2013, the Minister’s Department sent the Applicant a Notice of Intention to Consider Cancellation of the visa pursuant to s 501(2) of the…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 283
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of CFT15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the applicant, who had a substantial criminal record, sought judicial review of the Minister's decision to cancel his visa on character grounds under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The primary issue before the court was whether the Minister's decision to cancel the applicant's visa was legally unreasonable. The Minister had considered the nature and seriousness of the applicant's criminal conduct, the risk of reoffending, and Australia's non-refoulement obligations in making his decision. The applicant argued that the Minister's decision was based on speculative reasoning, particularly regarding the risk of reoffending, and lacked a proper logical chain of reasoning.

The court found that the applicant's proposed grounds for judicial review lacked sufficient prospects of success to warrant an extension of time for the application. The court emphasised that the concept of legal unreasonableness does not allow the court to substitute its view on the exercise of discretion for that of the decision-maker. Instead, the court must assess whether the decision is lawful by reference to the statutory source of the power, its scope, purpose, and objects. The court determined that the Minister's decision was not legally unreasonable and dismissed the application for judicial review.

The court ordered that the application be dismissed and that the applicant pay the costs of the respondent, such costs to be taxed in default of agreement. This case highlights the high threshold for judicial review in cases involving the exercise of discretionary powers under the Migration Act. The court must ensure that the decision-maker has properly exercised their discretion and considered relevant factors, but it cannot substitute its view for that of the decision-maker.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The Applicant pay the costs of the Respondent, such costs to be taxed in default of agreement.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

It was not disputed that the Applicant has a substantial criminal record and did not pass the character test in s 501(6). In issue is whether the Minister fell into legal error in the exercise of his discretion under s 501(2). MINISTER’S DECISION Having found that the Applicant did not pass the character test, the Minister considered whether to exercise his discretion to cancel the Applicant’s visa. The consideration included an assessment of the criminal conduct of which the Applicant was convicted, which the Minister stated “to be very serious violent sexual offences that are repugnant to the Australian community and contrary to community values”. The consideration also included the Applicant’s risk of reoffending. Amongst other matters, the Minister took into account that the Applicant had completed the SOP PREP (PREP) Pre-treatment Program which aims to increase offenders’ motivation and willingness to participate in a sex offender treatment program, though the Minister observed that such a treatment program has not been available to the Applicant in prison. The Minister also took into account that the Applicant, in December 2013, was assessed as a low risk of reoffending. The Minister, nonetheless, considered that even a low risk that the Applicant would commit further violent sexual offences was unacceptable. The Minister noted at [17] of his Reasons for Decision that in 2007, 2013 and 2014 the Applicant repeatedly denied his offending, made claims of innocence and stated that he had been set up, whereas:In contrast, a Pre-release report dated 10 July 2014 revealed that he made admissions of guilt during an assessment with a Forensic Psychologist. According to authoritative opinions, [the Applicant] has not gained insight into his offending or the impact of his offending on the victim. The Minister stated that the Applicant’s “repeated stance of denial and lack of insight into his offending” concerned him in terms of his risk of reoffending. After noting other matters, including the support and commitment of the Applicant’s family and friends to assist the Applicant to reintegrate into the community following his release from custody and the Applicant’s resolve to be a law abiding citizen in the future, the Minister concluded at [24]:[The Applicant’s] offending is very serious, violent sexual offending and I consider that the extent of his rehabilitation has not yet been tested in the community, particularly since he has not participated in offence targeted programs. [The Applicant] has been independently assessed as a low risk of sexual reoffending. However, I find that if he was to reoffend in a similar manner the risk of harm to victims would be significant, with the possibility of ongoing psychological and physical injury. I therefore find that even a low risk that [the Applicant] would commit further violent sexual offences is unacceptable as his offending would result in great harm. Other matters considered by the Minister in the exercise of his discretion included Australia’s non-refoulement obligations to the Applicant. The Minister noted that an International Treaty Obligations Assessment conducted by Onshore Protection Victoria on 27 November 2013 in relation to the Applicant (“the Assessment”) made the finding that a cancellation of the Applicant’s visa would not result in a breach of Australia’s international treaty obligations. Based on that Assessment the Minister therefore concluded that Australia did not have any non-refoulement obligations to the Applicant.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

He then deposed that whilst in gaol, he was told by delegates of the Minister who visited the gaol on a regular basis that his only option was to appeal to the Minister to allow him to remain in Australia under s 417 of the Act and that had he known that this Court has jurisdiction to review the Minister’s decision, he would have sought review within the time allowed under the Act. CONSIDERATION The Minister did not challenge the explanation given by the Applicant for failing to file his application within time. However it was submitted that it is not in the interests of justice to grant an extension of time to bring the application because the delay is very substantial and the Applicant’s grounds lack sufficient prospects to warrant an extension. The delay is extensive but it appears from the Applicant’s affidavit that the delay was occasioned by his lack of knowledge of his legal right to challenge the Minister’s decision in judicial review proceedings. I am prepared to accept the Applicant’s explanation for the delay in making his application for judicial review but, for the reasons that follow, I do not consider that an extension of time should be granted for the reason that the Applicant’s proposed grounds lack sufficient prospects of success to warrant an extension of time in the interests of the administration of justice.Grounds 1 and 2 Grounds one and two of the proposed Application for Judicial Review essentially raise the same review ground and can be dealt with together. It was submitted for the Applicant that the Minister’s decision was unreasonable in the legal sense because of alleged deficiencies in the reasoning. It was submitted that as the consequence of the deficiencies in reasoning, the Minister’s decision was not based on the Applicant’s actual circumstances but on “speculative reasoning” with respect to the Applicant’s risk of reoffending, despite the recognition at [24] of the Minister’s decision that the Applicant had been independently assessed as a low risk of sexual reoffending. It was submitted that the decision accordingly lacked a proper logical chain of reasoning. As Allsop CJ recently cautioned in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11 at [8], [12], the concept of legal unreasonableness does not provide a vehicle for the Court to remake the decision according to its view as to reasonableness. Rather, the task is to evaluate the quality of the decision, by reference to the statutory source of the power and thus, from its scope, purpose and objects to assess whether it is lawful. The determination as to whether a decision is unreasonable in the legal sense does not involve the Court substituting its view as to how the discretion should be exercised for that of a decision maker and the fact that a Court exercising judicial review may disagree with a primary decision maker’s evaluation of the relevant facts and considerations and the exercise of a statutory discretionary power is insufficient of itself to justify judicial intervention: Stretton at [74]–[75].