FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
CEZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 631
Appeal from: CEZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 2) [2017] FCCA 2824 File number: NSD 2058 of 2017 Judge: GRIFFITHS J Date of judgment: 10 May 2018 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to appeal from orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – whether the primary judgment and a related judgment explaining why the applicant’s request for an adjournment was refused were attended by sufficient doubt to warrant leave to appeal – whether substantial injustice would result if leave were refused – Held: application dismissed, with costs Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 24(1A) Cases cited: Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Philip Morris Inc [1981] HCA 39; 148 CLR 170
CEZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 2) [2017] FCCA 2824
In re the Will of F B Gilbert (dec) (1946) 46 SR (NSW) 318
Minister for Home Affairs v SZRWS [2018] FCAFC 51
MZAFZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1081; 243 FCR 1
Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 183; 244 FCR 305
Date of hearing: 10 May 2018 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 17 Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person, with the assistance of an interpreter Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr J Pinder of MinterEllison Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs ORDERS
NSD 2058 of 2017 BETWEEN: CEZ16
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
GRIFFITHS J
DATE OF ORDER:
10 MAY 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for leave to appeal is refused.
2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
GRIFFITHS J:
The applicant seeks leave to appeal from orders dated 10 November 2017 of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA). The FCCA upheld the Minister’s application that the applicant’s judicial review application be dismissed under r 44.12(1)(a) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) because it did not raise an arguable case for the relief sought. The judgment is reported as CEZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 2) [2017] FCCA 2824 (CEZ16 (No 2)). Prior to hearing and determining the Minister’s show cause application, the FCCA heard and refused the applicant’s request for an adjournment, for reasons which are set out in CEZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 2823 (CEZ16 (No 1).
FCCA’s reasons for judgment in CEZ16 (No 1) and CEZ16 (No 2)
The matter came before the FCCA for a show cause…
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 631
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the Court involved the exercise of discretion under section 24(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976. The Court considered whether the primary judgment was attended by sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration and whether the refusal of leave would result in substantial injustice. Given that the matter pertained to procedural issues, the Court emphasised the need for finality and restraint in reviewing such decisions. The applicant argued that the FCCA hearing was not fair due to a lack of legal representation and dissatisfaction with the outcome, but the Court found these arguments unconvincing. The primary judge had correctly applied the relevant principles, and there was no arguable appealable error in the application of those principles.
The Court concluded that the applicant had not demonstrated sufficient doubt in the correctness of the FCCA’s decisions. The primary judge had provided comprehensive and rational reasons for denying the adjournment request, and the applicant had no enforceable right to legal representation. Furthermore, the Court found no prospects of establishing procedural unfairness. Therefore, the application for leave to appeal was dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay the first respondent’s costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for leave to appeal is refused.
2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The applicant failed to provide a written outline of submissions and made only brief oral submissions in support of leave being granted. When asked by the Court why the FCCA hearing was not fair, he said that he did not have a lawyer and had to argue the case himself and was unhappy that his case had been dismissed on a show cause basis and without a full hearing. Consideration and disposition of the application The central question is whether this Court should exercise its discretion under s 24(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) to grant leave to appeal from the FCCA’s judgment, which is an interlocutory judgment. It is well settled that among the considerations which guide the exercise of that discretion is whether the judgment of the primary judge is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant it being reconsidered on appeal and whether substantial injustice would result if leave were refused, supposing the decision to be wrong (see Minister for Home Affairs v SZRWS [2018] FCAFC 51 at [40] per Flick, Robertson and Griffiths JJ and the cases referred to therein). Another relevant consideration is that where the primary judgment relates to a matter of practice or procedure, as is the case here, there is a need for finality and restraint in reviewing such decisions (see, for example, Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Philip Morris Inc [1981] HCA 39; 148 CLR 170 and In re the Will of F B Gilbert (dec) (1946) 46 SR (NSW) 318). In the latter case, Jordon CJ said at 323:… there is a material difference between an exercise of discretion on a point of practice or procedure and an exercise of discretion which determines substantive rights. In the former class of case, if a tight rein were not kept upon interference with the orders of Judges of first instance, the result would be disastrous to the proper administration of justice. The disposal of cases could be delayed interminably and costs heaped up indefinitely, if a litigant with a long purse or a litigious disposition could, at will, in effect transfer all exercises of discretion in interlocutory applications from a Judge in Chambers to a Court of Appeal. Although the application for leave to appeal is said to be addressed to the orders made in CEZ16 (No 2), the grounds strongly suggest that the applicant’s real complaint is directed to the rejection of his adjournment request. I am not satisfied that the applicant has demonstrated sufficient doubt in the correctness of the primary judge’s reasons for refusing his adjournment application. The applicant had no enforceable right to be legally represented at the hearing. Nor am I persuaded that the applicant has any prospects of establishing procedural unfairness. The applicant’s claims to the contrary appears to amount to a statement of dissatisfaction with the primary judge’s ultimate findings. The primary judge correctly identified the relevant principles guiding the exercise of his discretion, which unquestionably involved a matter of practice or procedure and, in the light of authority, must be approached with appropriate self-restraint. I am not satisfied that the applicant has demonstrated any arguable appealable error in the primary judge’s application of those principles to his particular circumstances. The primary judge gave comprehensive and rational reasons why he was not prepared to grant a further adjournment.