Cervo, R.A. v Vrakas, J

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JUDGMENT No. .ZA - f

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF

AUSTRALIA )

)

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY

)

)

No. ACT G 119 of 1993

DISTRICT REGISTRY

)

)

GENERAL DIVISION

)

BETWEEN: RENATO ANTONIO CERVO

Applicant

AND: JULIETTE VRAKAS

Respondent

MINUTE OF ORDER

''P/X A ^,

received̂

JUDGE MAKING ORDER :

Neaves J.

»®m/ii?)994 h)

DATE OF ORDER

:

10 March 1994

'FEDERAL COURT OF

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'

\a\

AUSTRALIA ^

VO\

prin«3Sa.

,y/

WHERE MADE

;

Canberra

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THE COURT ORDERS TtiAT:

1.   The application for leave to appeal from the interlocutory judgment of the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory given on 23 November 1993 is dismissed.

2.   The applicant pay the respondent's costs of the application.

Note; Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order

36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF

AUSTRALIA )

)

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY

))

No. ACT G 119 of 1993

DISTRICT REGISTRY

)

)

GENERAL DIVISION

)

BETWEEN: RENATO ANTONIO CERVO

Applicant

AND: JULIETTE VRAKAS

Respondent

CORAMr Neaves J.

DATE: 10 March 1994

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

This is an application for leave to appeal from an interlocutory judgment of the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory {Higgins J.) given on 22 November 1993. The application is made by Renato Antonio Cervo who is the defendant in an action (No. SC 755 of 1993) instituted in the Supreme Court by writ of summons by Juliette Vrakas as plaintiff on 18 November 1993.

The action in the Supreme Court concerns premises known as Suite 9, Green Square Centre situate at Kingston in the Australian Capital Territory of which, at the time of the events complained of, Mr Cervo was the sub-lessor and Ms

Vrakas was the sub-lessee. At the relevant time, the business of a restaurant and bar was being conducted on the premises by the sub-lessee. Ms Vrakas complained that Mr Cervo had on 18 November 1993 unlawfully re-entered the premises and purported to terminate the sub-lease on the ground that she, as the sub­ lessee, was in breach of an essential term of the sub-lease, namely clause 6.2. That clause relevantly provides:

"6.2 The Lessee must not carry on or permit to be carried on upon the said premises or any part thereof any noxious, noisy, dangerous or offensive business or premises or any part thereof which may be or become process or do or permit anything in or upon the said

a nuisance, annoyance or damage to the tenants or occupiers of other premises in the neighbourhood

The breach relied upon was that the sub-lessee had carried on or permitted to be carried on upon the premises an offensive business and had done or permitted something in or upon the premises which was or might be or become a nuisance, annoyance or damage to the tenants or occupiers of other premises in the neighbourhood. Particulars of the breach were given as follows:

"On 5th November,…

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Details
Case
[1994] FCA 96
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Renato Antonio Cervo, the sub-lessor, applied to the Federal Court for leave to appeal from an interlocutory judgment of the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory. The interlocutory judgment was made in a proceeding brought by Juliette Vrakas, the sub-lessee, in the Supreme Court in which she sought declarations that she had not breached clause 6.2 of a sub-lease of premises in Kingston and that Cervo's re-entry of the premises and purported termination of the sub-lease was unlawful. Cervo's appeal was from a decision of Higgins J, who refused to discharge an interlocutory injunction made by Gallop J. The injunction required Cervo to permit Vrakas to have possession of the premises and restrained him from interfering with her quiet enjoyment of the premises. The appeal was also from a direction by Higgins J that Cervo pay Vrakas's costs of and incidental to the application.

The sole issue before the Court was whether leave to appeal should be granted. The Court held that it should not be. The proceeding before Higgins J was an application to discharge an interlocutory injunction and not the final determination of whether there had been a breach of clause 6.2 of the sub-lease. The resolution of that question must await a final determination of the factual issues in the action pending in the Supreme Court. To allow the interlocutory decision to remain unreversed would work no substantial injustice to Cervo as he could seek to bring the action on for trial as a matter of urgency. A further factor militating against the granting of leave to appeal was the fact that, by operation of orders made by Miles C.J., the activities complained of were no longer continuing.

The Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal and ordered that Cervo pay Vrakas's costs of the application.

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