CEPU v Australian Postal Corporation
[2010] FMCA 461
•23 June 2010
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| CEPU v AUSTRALIAN POSTAL CORPORATION | [2010] FMCA 461 |
| INDUSTRIAL LAW – Practice and procedure – union claims against employer for contravention of general protection of members’ entitlements – broad allegations confined to identified members and incidents – small monetary claims – employer’s application for transfer to Federal Court – relevant considerations – application for transfer refused – particulars of allegations required. |
| Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), ss.340, 340(1), 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 362, 545(2)(b) Federal Magistrates Act 1999 (Cth), ss.3, 39, 39(1), 39(3), 45 Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 (Cth), rr.8.02, 8.02(4) Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) |
| Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Limited ACN 005 357 522 [2010] FCA 230 King v Office National Limited & Ors [2007] FMCA 1840 Van Efferen v CMA Corporation Limited [2008] FMCA 875 Verge & Anor v Devere Holdings Pty Ltd & Ors (No.4) [2008] FMCA 1421 |
| Applicant: | COMMUNICATIONS, ELECTRICAL, ELECTRONIC, ENERGY, INFORMATION, POSTAL, PLUMBING AND ALLIED SERVICES UNION OF AUSTRALIA (CEPU) |
| Respondent: | AUSTRALIAN POSTAL CORPORATION |
| File Number: | SYG 638 of 2010 |
| Judgment of: | Smith FM |
| Hearing date: | 23 June 2010 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 23 June 2010 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr D Dwyer |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Ms R Bernasconi |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Blake Dawson |
ORDERS
The respondent’s application in a case filed on 2 June 2010 is refused.
The applicant’s claims to be addressed in these proceedings shall be confined to the allegations made in the statement of claim filed on 11 May 2010 of contraventions of section 340 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) in relation to the events and the employees identified in paragraphs 21 to 69 (the ‘sick leave’ cases) and paragraphs 74 to 99 (the ‘overtime’ cases). Note that this order is not intended to preclude the applicant or any of its members from making other or similar claims in relation to other employees in separate proceedings in this or another Court.
Paragraphs 100 to 106 of the statement of claim are struck out, and the applicant must file an amended application on or before 12 July 2010.
The amended statement of claim must identify in relation to the sick leave cases and the overtime cases particulars of:
(a)the separate contraventions which are alleged,
(b)the person or persons who are alleged to be the subject of each separate contravention,
(c)the particular item and paragraphs in the Table to s.342 which it relies upon as the adverse action taken against that person or those persons for the purposes of s.342, and, whether by reference to earlier paragraphs of the statement of claim or otherwise, the material facts constituting the adverse action,
(d)the particular provisions of legislation, instrument, award or other legal sources which conferred or constituted the ‘workplace rights’ of that person or those persons which it relies upon for the purposes of s.340, and, whether by reference to earlier paragraphs of the statement of claim or otherwise, the material facts by which those rights were acquired or enjoyed,
(e)which of the paragraphs and subparagraphs of s.340(1) are relied upon in relation to that person or those persons, and, whether by reference to earlier paragraphs of the statement of claim or otherwise, the material facts by the workplace rights were enjoyed, exercised or proposed to be exercised,
(f)the particular employees and the nature and amount of his or her entitlements for which compensation is sought under s.545(2)(b).
The respondent must make any request for further particulars on or before 16 July 2010.
The applicant must respond to that request on or before 23 July 2010.
The respondent must file and serve a defence on or before 2 August 2010.
The applicant must file and serve all affidavits relied upon on or before 9 August 2010.
The respondent must file and serve all affidavits relied upon on or before 13 September 2010.
The applicant must file and serve all affidavits in reply on or before 27 September 2010.
If any party is in default in relation to the above timetable for more than 4 working days, the other party must immediately request the Associate to appoint a directions hearing. Alternatively, the parties may forward to the Associate consent orders signed by all parties, which varies the timetable except in relation to listings.
The proceeding is listed for pre‑hearing directions on 14 October 2010 at 9.30am. The parties must forward by email to the Associate on the preceding day short minutes of any proposed directions preparatory for a final hearing.
The application is listed for hearing on 26 October 2010 at 10.15am (3 days allowed).
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 638 of 2010
| COMMUNICATIONS, ELECTRICAL, ELECTRONIC, ENERGY, INFORMATION, POSTAL, PLUMBING AND ALLIED SERVICES UNION OF AUSTRALIA (CEPU) |
Applicant
And
| AUSTRALIAN POSTAL CORPORATION |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(revised from transcript)
This judgment addresses an application by the respondent, “Australia Post”, for the proceedings to be transferred to the Federal Court. Also listed today was Australia Post’s application to strike out parts of the statement of claim and for further particulars. I thought it appropriate first to address the transfer application, although, as will appear, the implications of the CEPU’s pleadings are relevant to deciding that application.
The CEPU commenced the proceedings on 23 March 2010, by filing the relevant forms in which the imposition of unspecified pecuniary penalties and compensation was sought for contraventions of civil remedy provisions of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). Item 21 of the claim form identified the provisions of the Fair Work Act “relevant to this claim” as “Section 340 and/or Section 346”.
The CEPU has today confirmed that it only alleges breach of s.340, which provides:
340Protection
(1)A person must not take adverse action against another person:
(a)because the other person:
(i) has a workplace right; or
(ii) has, or has not, exercised a workplace right; or
(iii) proposes or proposes not to, or has at any time proposed or proposed not to, exercise a workplace right; or
(b)to prevent the exercise of a workplace right by the other person.
Note:This subsection is a civil remedy provision (see Part 4‑1).
(2)A person must not take adverse action against another person (the second person) because a third person has exercised, or proposes or has at any time proposed to exercise, a workplace right for the second person’s benefit, or for the benefit of a class of persons to which the second person belongs.
Note:This subsection is a civil remedy provision (see Part 4‑1).
Section 340 invokes extended definitions of ‘workplace rights’ and ‘adverse action’ which are provided in ss.341 and 342 respectively.
It appears to me that s.340 covers similar territory to that previously covered by civil remedy provisions of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth), although it does involve a new approach to drafting such provisions. In particular, the section rolls up sanctions against both employers and workers for a wide field of prohibited conduct, which was addressed in separate provisions of the previous legislation. Because of its wide ambit, an allegation of breach of s.340 requires careful particularising both of the legal components within its defined terms which are relied upon, and of the material factual allegations made within those components.
In the present case, the CEPU attached to its Form 4 some “particulars of the compensation sought” which pleaded its allegations very broadly:
Details of compensation sought
1.The adverse action was taken against an estimated several hundred employees.
2.The locations are across Australia with cases noted in Queensland, NSW, Victoria and Tasmania. The overtime issues particularly arise from large facilities including:
oSydney West Letter Facility
oSydney Parcel Facility
oDandenong Letter Centre
3.In some cases, no pecuniary loss occurred.
4.In some cases, overtime was withdrawn or not offered, and the amounts will vary according to the site and salary of the staff. The monies involved are unlikely to exceed $200.00 in any individual case.
5.In some cases, sick leave taken on days when no industrial action was occurring, was rejected, and staff lost pay for one day, or will lose pay for one day. The monies involved are unlikely to exceed $200.00 in any individual case.
6.The Applicant can provide examples of the pecuniary losses, but is not in a position to detail the full claim at this stage.
7.The Respondent is already aware of the above examples as these were detailed when the matter was heard in Fair Work Australia pursuant to two Section 365 applications. No settlement was reached in those proceedings.
8.Given the large numbers involved, the Applicant will need to formally seek the full details from the Respondent.
The obscurity of this pleading, its reference to several hundred employees in unspecified locations across Australia, and its suggestion that discovery would be needed before particulars could be provided as to losses and contraventions, caused me to raise at the first court date on 9 April 2010 how the CEPU proposed to give more precision to the claims being brought in the proceeding. However, at that stage, the parties wished to discuss their dispute privately before any directions were given in the proceedings, and the application was adjourned for this purpose.
At the subsequent directions hearing on 29 April 2010, I again raised how the potential complexities in the matter would be addressed, and touched upon the possibility that it might be a matter which should be transferred to the Federal Court, pursuant to s.39 of the Federal Magistrates Act 1999 (Cth). The parties, however, had prepared short minutes for a full timetable to a hearing, and expressed optimism that their discussions would be able to identify discrete ‘test cases’ which would allow particular claims to be efficiently addressed in this Court.
I therefore made directions by consent:
1.The applicant must file and serve a statement of claim on or before 7 May 2010.
2.The statement of claim will identify test cases in the two areas of dispute (overtime payments and sick leave payments).
3.The respondent may make any request for further particulars of the statement of claim on or before 21 May 2010.
4.The applicant must respond to that request on or before 28 May 2010.
5.The respondent must file and serve a defence on or before 11 June 2010.
6.The applicant may make any request for further particulars of the defence on or before 23 June 2010.
7.The respondent must respond to that request on or before 7 July 2010.
8.The applicant must file and serve all affidavits relied upon on or before 26 July 2010.
9.The respondent must file and serve all affidavits relied upon on or before 23 August 2010.
10.The applicant must file and serve all affidavits in reply on or before 6 September 2010.
11.If any party is in default in relation to the above timetable for more than 4 working days, the other party must immediately request the Associate to appoint a directions hearing. Alternatively, the parties may forward to the Associate consent orders signed by all parties, which varies the timetable except in relation to listings.
12.The proceeding is listed for pre‑hearing directions on 14 October 2010 at 9.30am. The parties must forward by email to the Associate on the preceding day short minutes of any proposed directions preparatory for a final hearing.
13.The application is listed for hearing on 26 October 2010 at 10.15am (3 days allowed).
The CEPU subsequently filed a statement of claim on 11 May 2010. It contained general references to the industrial background suggested in the previous document, but sought to isolate two areas of action by Australia Post which were alleged to give rise to contraventions of the Fair Work Act. The first area is pleaded in paragraphs 13 to 69, with allegations that sick leave entitlements had been refused or withdrawn for reasons involving contraventions of the Act. Fourteen named employees who were affected in separate incidents in December 2009 were identified, and the particular circumstances in which they were alleged to have been improperly denied sick leave were pleaded. Very small amounts of lost sick leave payments were identified as the subject of compensation or recovery claims on behalf of these particular employees.
The second area is pleaded in paragraphs 70 to 99, which alleges events in relation to “2009 Christmas Arrangements” for rostering overtime at three work sites, being the Sydney West Letter Facility, the Sydney Parcel Facility, and the Dandenong Letter Centre. It is alleged that Australia Post failed to afford overtime to some employees contrary to their expectations, that these actions implemented a policy evidenced in staff information bulletins issued at the three workplaces, and that the policy or how it was implemented in relation to union members constituted an unlawful response to legitimate industrial action taken, or proposed, by CEPU members. Particular employees so affected are not identified by name or by precise numbers, although thirteen team members at the Sydney West Letter Facility are identified by name as persons who were rostered to perform overtime before it was withdrawn. It appears to me that further particulars of the alleged circumstances in relation to the withdrawal of overtime may be necessary, and will probably appear in the affidavits which I have ordered the CEPU to present. However, I consider that the statement of claim sufficiently identifies discrete events involving discernable employees or groups of employees, and sufficiently identifies at this stage of the proceedings the factual substratum of the CEPU’s claims.
The statement of claim, however, does not plead with sufficient clarity the particular provisions of Div.3 of Pt.3‑1 of the Fair Work Act, which are alleged to have been breached by Australia Post in the circumstances narrated in the statement of claim, including identification of the particular provisions of the definitional sections which are relied upon. There is a need to plead the precise provisions which are alleged to have been contravened, and to isolate the material facts relevant to each relevant statutory provision.
There was an exchange of correspondence between the parties in which Australia Post sought further particulars, and this has given rise to the second interlocutory application listed before me today. Although there has been discussion today which has considerably refined the CEPU’s claims which it wishes to litigate, I have not yet heard full argument in relation to improving the pleadings at the time of giving this judgment.
I first received the parties’ submissions addressing Australia Post’s application filed on 2 June 2010, in which an order is sought that the proceedings be transferred to the Federal Court, pursuant to s.39(1) of the Federal Magistrates Act. In view of that application, and the perceived need for further and better particulars and re‑pleading by the CEPU, Australia Post has not yet filed a defence nor, except in a very broad‑brush way in the course of oral submissions today, foreshadowed how it might intend to defend the matter.
At the start of submissions in relation to the transfer application, I discussed with the representative of the CEPU how its claims could be simplified to make the proceedings more suited to this Court. I foreshadowed that I might be inclined to transfer the matter to the Federal Court, if the CEPU regarded the proceedings as a vehicle for broad allegations of very numerous breaches of the Fair Work Act, affecting all of its members across Australia in relation to the events suggested in the original claim form. Such proceedings might require very elaborate pleadings, and protracted interlocutory stages, to ensure that all of the separate contraventions and relevant events were sufficiently isolated. I suggested to the representative of the CEPU that I might also be more inclined to transfer the proceedings, if the CEPU wished to develop general suggestions which are found at the end of the statement of claim, that Australia Post’s conduct involved not only contraventions of s.340, but also of other provisions of Div.3 of Pt.3‑1, including ss.343, 344, 345, and 362.
However, Mr Dwyer for the CEPU indicated that his client wished the matter to stay in this Court, and accepted that it should be confined to the named employees in relation to the denial of sick leave claim, and the identified groups of union employees at the three workplaces in relation to the denial of overtime claim. He also indicated that the CEPU was content to be confined to allegations of breaches only of s.340. Any other claims by other employees for lost sick leave or overtime payments could be left for pursuit, if necessary, in separate proceedings.
Mr Dwyer foreshadowed that he accepts that there is a need to strike out the concluding paragraphs of the statement of claim, and to re‑plead the statement of claim so as to relate its factual contentions with particularised statutory elements of s.340 and the subordinate definitional provisions.
Notwithstanding this foreshadowed simplification of the claims which the CEPU wishes to litigate in the present proceedings, Australia Post pressed its application for transfer to the Federal Court.
I was referred to the Court’s power under s.39 of the Federal Magistrates Act, to the considerations which are required to be addressed under that section and under r.8.02 of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 (Cth), and to the discussion of these in the judgment of Lucev FM in Verge & Anor v Devere Holdings Pty Ltd & Ors (No.4) [2008] FMCA 1421. I was also referred to judgments of other Federal Magistrates who have transferred ‘complex’ matters to the Federal Court, including those of O’Sullivan FM in Van Efferen v CMA Corporation Limited [2008] FMCA 875, and of myself in King v Office National Limited & Ors [2007] FMCA 1840.
As these judgments illustrate, s.39(3) and r.8.02 raise broad areas of consideration which address the nature of the proceedings, the wishes of the parties, and the resources available to the docket Federal Magistrate in relation to particular proceedings. The resources available for the exercise of its general federal jurisdictions can vary across Australia in different Registries of the Court, and have changed from time to time. In Sydney at present there are eight Federal Magistrates engaged solely in general federal law matters, of whom six constitute an industrial panel dealing with what has become a substantial workload. Our docketing arrangements at present pose no difficulty in bringing matters to expeditious hearings, even where five or more days of hearing are likely. I am unaware of the current resources of the Sydney Registry of the Federal Court, but I have a general impression that it is not better resourced at present than this Court in relation to trials at first instance of matters such as the present.
I accept that the interlocutory and hearing procedures which would normally be expected to be followed in the Federal Court in relation to a matter such as the present are likely to deliver a higher level of technical justice to parties, but with possibly substantially greater legal expenses and a risk of substantially longer delays before judgment. The Federal Court is therefore normally expected to be an appropriate venue for the trial of matters which are inherently highly complex in their legal or factual issues, or which involve monetary or legal consequences which deserve the attention of a superior court at first instance, or in which one or both of the parties exhibit an inability to adapt their approach to litigation to the objectives of this Court which are promoted in s.3 of the Federal Magistrates Act.
Because of the uncertain ambit and potential complexity of the CEPU’s present claims, I foreshadowed to Mr Dwyer that I would feel it appropriate to transfer the matter to the Federal Court to allow its more thorough case management processes to operate, unless at the present stage of the proceedings he confined the claims of contravention and compensation to easily manageable dimensions, so that they pursued only a discrete number of very small claims to lost entitlements of individually named or clearly identifiable members of his union. This Court would then appear to be the appropriate forum for recovering these amounts.
As I have indicated above, Mr Dwyer accepted that the case should be so confined, both in relation to the allegations of contravention and the identification of the union members whose rights would be considered. The proceedings therefore now appear to me to be not dissimilar to some, if not most, of the industrial matters currently brought in this Court.
Once the legal and factual issues raised for judicial determination in the proceedings are found suitable to remain in this Court, the fact, which I am prepared to assume, that the industrial background to the matter may be of general importance to the employer and to the union does not itself point to reasons for transferring the matter to the Federal Court.
Amendments to industrial laws in 2006 vested this Court with concurrent jurisdiction over contravention proceedings with the Federal Court, and this jurisdiction was continued in the provisions of the Fair Work Act. There is plainly an intention by Parliament that there is a role to be played by this Court in relation to enforcement of the civil remedy provisions of the new Act in relation to employers large and small, and in relation to employees whether collectively or individually. I therefore do not accept the broad submission which was made by Australia Post that this Court should transfer matters involving allegations which concern sections of the new legislation which have not yet been judicially addressed to the Federal Court. It is not infrequent in all of our jurisdictions that Federal Magistrates are required to interpret statutory provisions which have not yet received a settled interpretation in a superior court.
Nor am I persuaded that there is any particular aspect of the present allegations of contravention of s.340 which raises legal issues which would be inappropriately addressed at first instance in this Court. I attempted to explore this with the representatives of both parties today. The solicitor for Australia Post endeavoured to persuade me that there were such issues, but she failed to do so. She was unable precisely to identify any question of law, whether ‘complex’ or otherwise, that would justify the transfer of the present matter for determination by a superior court judge exercising first instance jurisdiction.
Although she foreshadowed that there may be complex issues of fact in relation to the employer’s reasons for taking its challenged actions, in relation to which an onus of proof may fall upon the employer under s.360 of the Fair Work Act, I was not persuaded that the foreshadowed reasons, which have not yet been raised by any defence or affidavits filed in the matter, would pose difficulties any different than those addressed regularly in this Court when determining an employer’s true reasons for taking action affecting its employees.
The fact that the consideration of these issues might require the Court to understand an industrial background, including past proceedings before Fair Work Australia and industrial relations issues of a past and ongoing nature, does not, in my opinion, in this case require me to transfer the matter to the Federal Court. A contravention proceeding of the present type is confined to the legal and factual issues posed by the Act in relation to past conduct, and any on‑going industrial issues will need to be addressed by the parties in other forums.
Since the CEPU’s claims will be confined in the manner I have explained, essentially, in my opinion they now consist of a number of small claims in which the union is seeking to obtain economical and swift justice for the benefit of some discrete members of the union, seeking monies which they claim to have been unlawfully denied in December 2009. I accept that there might be ‘flow on’ consequences for the employer in relation to other employees, but they are consequences which would not arise for judicial determination in the present proceedings. Obviously, the union is hoping that if a small number of employees can be shown to have been adversely affected by breach of s.340 as alleged in the present matter, then it will be unnecessary for other employees who might have similar claims to bring similar actions. Such a hope often is in the mind of persons bringing ‘test cases’, and sometimes it is fulfilled and sometimes it is not. However, this background does not necessarily render a lower court unsuited for deciding the ‘test case’. In the present case, I am satisfied that the present confined claims do not pose any case management or other concerns which should make the continuance of the matter unsuited to this Court.
Turning to the specific matters which I am required to address, s.39(3) provides:
39Discretionary transfer of proceedings to the Federal Court or the Family Court
…
(3)In deciding whether to transfer a proceeding to the Federal Court under subsection (1), the Federal Magistrates Court must have regard to:
(a) any Rules of Court made for the purposes of subsection 40(2); and
(b) whether proceedings in respect of an associated matter are pending in the Federal Court; and
(c) whether the resources of the Federal Magistrates Court are sufficient to hear and determine the proceeding; and
(d) the interests of the administration of justice.
In relation to paragraph (b), there is no proceeding in an associated matter pending in the Federal Court.
In relation to paragraph (c), as I have indicated above, in my opinion the resources of this Court are sufficient at present to hear and determine the proceeding.
In relation to paragraph (d), I have not been persuaded that it is in the interest of the administration of justice for the CEPU’s desire that the matter should be heard and decided in this Court to be disturbed.
Rule 8.02(4) provides:
8.02 Transfer to Federal Court or Family Court
…
(4)In addition to the factors required to be considered by the Court under subsections 39 (3) and (4) of the Act for transfer of proceedings to the Federal Court or the Family Court, the following factors are relevant:
(a) whether the proceeding is likely to involve questions of general importance, such that it would be desirable for there to be a decision of the Federal Court or the Family Court on one or more of the points in issue;
(b) whether, if the proceeding is transferred, it is likely to be heard and determined at less cost and more convenience to the parties than if the proceeding is not transferred;
(c) whether the proceeding will be heard earlier in the Federal Magistrates Court;
(d) the availability of particular procedures appropriate for the class of proceeding;
(e) the wishes of the parties.
[Notes omitted]
In relation to r.8.02(4)(a), I have above indicated that I have not been persuaded that there is any such question of general importance raised in the present case merely because there may not be ‘settled law’ to apply, because the statutory provision to be applied is new, or because difficult assessments of evidence might need to be made when determining the employer’s reasons for adverse action against employees. I have not been shown any point of law which should receive the first instance attention of the Federal Court and not this Court.
I accept that at present there remain some obscurities in how the CEPU will formulate the contraventions which it will now rely upon, in particular, in relation to the overtime cases at the three workplaces. However, I am hopeful that these will be sufficiently elicited when it re‑pleads its statement of claim and files all its evidence in chief in its affidavits. I am not satisfied that any potential factual complexity and uncertainty in the matter points to a point of general importance requiring the matter to be transferred.
I consider this Court’s case management processes to be suitable for handling any such uncertainties in the future course of the management and hearing of the case.
In relation to r.8.02(4)(b), I am not satisfied that if the matter were transferred it is likely to be heard and determined at less cost and more convenience to the parties. Indeed, I think the converse is much more likely.
Similarly, in relation to paragraph (c).
In relation to paragraph (d), it was submitted by Australia Post that this is a proceeding in which discovery and interrogatories would be contemplated in the Federal Court and not in this Court. I am unpersuaded at present that these procedures would be “appropriate, in the interests of the administration of justice” in this Court because, inter alia, they “would be likely to contribute to the fair and expeditious conduct of the proceedings” (see s.45 of the Federal Magistrates Act). However, I also am far from persuaded that the Federal Court would look kindly upon any application for interrogatories in this case (see Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Limited ACN 005 357 522 [2010] FCA 230 at [14]).
I am also doubtful whether formal discovery on the application of Australia Post is likely to be either sought or ordered by the Federal Court, if the matter were transferred there.
In relation to discovery by Australia Post, the confining of the CEPU’s matter to discrete claims and to allegations of contravention of only one provision, and the presence of the reverse onus of proof, may well mean that the CEPU will not need to seek discovery, and that, to the extent that it wishes to tender documents of Australia Post as part of its evidence, it will be able to elicit them either by cooperation of Australia Post’s solicitors, or by use of the Court’s subpoena and notice to produce powers.
In other respects, this Court has the same case management through docket procedures as are followed in the Federal Court, albeit that I might approach case management in a rather more ruthless fashion than a Federal Court judge. I am not at this stage persuaded that the present proceeding cannot appropriately be brought to trial in accordance with the directions which I have previously made, with some modifications to the timetable. It appears to me that the cases of both parties will be able sufficiently to be prepared and presented in a short exchange of pleadings and affidavits, aided if necessary with the service of subpoenas or notices to produce. I am hopeful that the presently allocated hearing dates in October will be able to be met.
In relation to the wishes of the parties, I have noted that the CEPU strongly wishes to pursue the matter in this Court and not the Federal Court, and that Australia Post equally vehemently wishes the matter to proceed in the Federal Court.
I have taken into account the wishes of both parties, and their submissions today. Assessing all the relevant considerations overall, I have decided not to exercise my power of transfer.
[POSTSCRIPT. After delivering the above judgment, I received further submissions in relation to the pleadings and timetable. I then made the orders set out at the beginning of this judgment. They largely reflected the agreement of the parties, and the reasons for the orders sufficiently appear from the above judgment and from the transcript of my exchanges with the parties’ representatives.]
I certify that the preceding forty-five (45) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Smith FM
Associate:
Date: 12 July 2010
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