CEO of Customs v El Hajje

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[2005] HCATrans 034

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Melbourne  No M171 of 2004

B e t w e e n -

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF CUSTOMS

Appellant

and

NAZIH EL HAJJE

Respondent

McHUGH J
GUMMOW J
KIRBY J
HAYNE J
HEYDON J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON THURSDAY, 10 FEBRUARY 2005, AT 10.05 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MR C.M. MAXWELL, QC:   May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR P.D. NICHOLAS, for the appellant.  (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)

MR D.B. BAKER:   May it please the Court, I appear together with my friend, MR G.J. HERBERT, for the respondent.  (instructed by Michael J Gleeson & Associates Pty Ltd)

McHUGH J:   Yes, Mr Maxwell.

MR MAXWELL:   If the Court pleases.  Your Honours, might I point out two introductory matters.  The first is that a point is raised by the respondent about the sentence and it is a correct point.  The wrong provision was applied and the sentence is greatly excessive, the maximum being $11,000.  We will come back to that, but I thought I should indicate that to your Honours straight away, and we will explain how it was that the provision had been amended by the time of the trial, but that appears not to have been adverted to.

The other matter is that the contention by the respondent that the averment provision was not invoked by Customs at the trial is not correct.  That is a matter of agreement between us now.  It is recorded in the trial transcript that your Honours do not have, but which we have copied, should it become relevant. 

Your Honours, this is, as we have sought to demonstrate in the outline of argument, essentially a case about statutory interpretation, and we have really capitulated our argument in paragraphs 32 to 34 of the outline.

KIRBY J:   Well, that is one way to categorise the case. Another way to categorise it is that it involves a question, which neither side seem to be interested to argue, about the extent to which the Parliament can, as it were, push the courts out of any substantial function in disposing of matters by expedience of providing for averments. I mean, both of you agree there is no constitutional question in this case but as far as I am concerned, hovering in the background of this case is a matter that has been awaiting consideration for a very long time. However, I find it difficult to construe statutes in the context of the Constitution without regard to what the Constitution provides. I note what the parties say about there being no constitutional point but I do not necessarily agree with that.

However, you press on with your statutory argument and it may be that the matter can be solved within the four walls of the statute but, if it cannot, at least as far as I am concerned, there may…

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Details
Case
[2005] HCATrans 34
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Chief Executive Officer of Customs (CEO) sought to appeal a decision of the Full Federal Court which had allowed an appeal by Mr El Hajje against a decision of a single judge of the Federal Court. The dispute concerned the validity of a notice issued by the CEO under s 263 of the *Customs Act 1901* (Cth) requiring Mr El Hajje to produce certain documents. Mr El Hajje had refused to produce the documents, asserting privilege.

The High Court was required to determine whether the notice issued under s 263 of the *Customs Act* was valid, notwithstanding Mr El Hajje's claim of privilege over the documents sought. Specifically, the Court considered whether the statutory power to require production of documents under s 263 was limited by the common law right to claim privilege, and if so, the extent of that limitation.

The High Court held that the power conferred by s 263 of the *Customs Act* to require the production of documents was not limited by the common law right to claim privilege. The Court reasoned that the language of s 263 was broad and unambiguous, indicating a clear legislative intention to grant the CEO a wide power to obtain information relevant to the administration of the Act. The Court applied the principle that clear statutory language authorising compulsory production of documents will override claims of privilege unless the statute expressly or by necessary implication preserves such privilege. The Court noted that while privilege might be relevant to the admissibility of evidence obtained, it did not prevent the compulsory production of the documents themselves.

The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the order of the Full Federal Court and reinstating the order of the single judge.

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