CEO (Housing) v Brown and Cooper - [2000] NTSC 29

CEO (Housing) v Brown & Cooper [2000] NTSC 29
PARTIES:CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER (HOUSING)

v
KEITH BROWN and ANGELINE COOPER

TITLE OF COURT:  SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
JURISDICTION:  SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY exercising Territory jurisdiction
FILE NO:LA9/2000 (9929197)
DELIVERED:  17 May 2000
HEARING DATES:  2 May 2000
JUDGMENT OF:  THOMAS J
CATCHWORDS:
REPRESENTATION:
Counsel:
Appellant:M Grant
Respondent:  J Duguid
Solicitors:
Appellant:Morgan Buckley
Respondent:  North Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service
Judgment category classification:        C
Judgment ID Number:  tho20008
Number of pages:  15

IN SUPREME COURT
OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
OF AUSTRALIA
AT DARWIN
CEO (Housing) v Brown & Cooper [2000] NTSC 29
No. LA9/2000 (9929197)

BETWEEN:
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER (HOUSING)

Appellant
AND:
KEITH BROWN and ANGELINE COOPER

Respondent

CORAM: THOMAS J
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Delivered 17 May 2000)

This is an appeal from a decision of Mr Gillies SM sitting in the Local Court at Darwin.

The appeal concerns the interpretation by the learned stipendiary magistrate of s 47(1)(b) of the Tenancy Act (NT) 1979.
The grounds of appeal are as follows:
“1The learned Magistrate erred in construing section 47(1)(b) of the Tenancy Act (NT) so as to require a Notice to Quit to contain the specific date on which the premises are to given up by the tenant.
2The learned Magistrate erred in finding that the Notice to Quit dated 25 November 1999 did not comply with the requirements of section 47(1)(b) of the Tenancy Act (NT). It is the Appellant’s contention that a Notice to Quit which states:
“TAKE NOTICE that you are required to quit the dwelling … on or before the expiry of fifteen (15) days after the date this Notice is served on you”
is valid and is in compliance with the Tenancy Act (NT).”
The orders sought are as follows:
“1     The determination of the learned Magistrate is set aside.
2     The matter is remitted back to the Local Court for trial.
3     The Respondent is to pay the Appellant’s costs of the Appeal.”
Section 47(1)(b) of the Tenancy Act provides as follows:
“(1) Subject to section 47A, a notice to quit premises, being a dwelling-house, shall –
……..
(b)be given for not less than the period prescribed in this section and specify the day on which the premises are to be delivered up; ….”
The Notice to Quit, which is the subject of the present argument, was tendered and marked Exhibit 1. The Notice is to the tenants of the premises and states:
“TAKE NOTICE that you are required to quit the dwelling situated at 21 Schombacher Circuit, Moulden NT 0830 (“the premises”) which you occupy as Lessee from the Chief Executive Officer (Housing) (“the Lessor”) on or before the expiry of fifteen (15) days after the date this Notice is served on you.”
The Notice to Quit was served personally on each of the tenants.
In the course of his Reasons for Decision the learned stipendiary magistrate stated as follows:
“To my mind there is no ambiguity or doubtful meaning…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [2000] NTSC 29
Decision Date: 17 May 2000

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal heard by Thomas J in the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory involved a dispute between the Chief Executive Officer (Housing) and Keith Brown and Angeline Cooper over the interpretation of section 47(1)(b) of the Tenancy Act (NT) 1979. The appellant, the Chief Executive Officer (Housing), sought to overturn a decision by a stipendiary magistrate who ruled that a Notice to Quit was invalid because it did not specify the exact date by which the tenants had to vacate the premises. The appellant argued that the notice was valid as it gave a reasonable timeframe for the tenants to vacate.

The court had to decide whether the Notice to Quit complied with the statutory requirements and whether it was necessary for the notice to specify the exact date of vacating within the document itself. The court considered several precedents which held that a notice to quit could be valid even if it did not specify a precise date, as long as it was clear and the tenant could reasonably calculate the vacating date with the information provided. The court found that the common law principles applied to the interpretation of the Tenancy Act and that the notice to quit was clear and unambiguous to a reasonable tenant.

Thomas J concluded that the magistrate erred in their interpretation of the statutory requirements. The court found that a reasonable tenant, having been personally served with the notice and knowing the date of service, could calculate the vacating date. Therefore, the notice to quit was valid as it complied with the provisions of section 47(1)(b) of the Tenancy Act. The appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted back to the Local Court for further proceedings. The court will hear further submissions from the parties regarding the consequential orders, including the question of costs.

Orders