Cenrim Pty Ltd v Suncorp Insurance Finance

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DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Cenrim Pty Ltd and Anor v. Suncorp Insurance Finance [2002] QDC 078

PARTIES:

CENRIM PTY LTD (TRADING AS JOHN SEPOS & SONS AND FRIDGTRANS) AND JAYTRON PTY LTD (Plaintiffs)

v.

SUNCORP INSURANCE AND FINANCE (Defendant)

FILE NO/S:

Plaint 1945 of 1993

DIVISION:

PROCEEDING:

Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

District Court Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

19 April 2002

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

11 April 2002

JUDGE:

McGill D.C.J.

ORDER:

Application dismissed with costs

CATCHWORDS:

PRACTICE – leave to proceed – three year delay in 9½ year old claim – claim on insurance policy – reasons for and responsibility for delay – whether prejudice to defendant – Uniform Civil Procedure Rules r.389(2)

Tyler v. Custom Credit Corporation Ltd [2000] QCA 178 – applied
Cooper v. Hopgood & Ganim [1999] 2 Qd.R. 113 – cited
William Crosby & Co Pty Ltd v. The Commonwealth (1963) 109 CLR 490 – applied
Dempsey v. Dorber [1990] 1 Qd.R. 418 - applied
Bazley v. State of Queensland [2001] QSC 476 – cited
Quinlan v. Rothwell [2001] QCA 176 - cited
Elesanar Constructions Pty Ltd v. Thiess Contractors Pty Ltd [2001] QDC 293 – cited

COUNSEL:

D.R.M. Murphy for the plaintiff

W.D.P. Campbell for the defendant

SOLICITORS:

King and Co for the plaintiff

HBM Lawyers for the defendant

  1. This is an application by the plaintiffs pursuant to r.398(2) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules for leave to proceed with the action. The application was opposed by the defendant, but there was no cross-application that the action be dismissed for want of prosecution.

History of the action

  1. By a plaint filed on 1 July 1993 the plaintiffs claimed from the defendant $200,000, together with interest pursuant to s.57 of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984, as money due from the defendant pursuant to a policy of insurance, or alternatively as damages for breach of the policy of insurance.  It was alleged in the plaint that on 1 August 1992 three motor vehicles owned by the plaintiffs and insured under a policy of insurance issued by the defendant were accidentally destroyed by fire in circumstances coming within the scope of the policy.  It was alleged that accordingly the defendant was liable to pay to the plaintiffs the agreed value of the three vehicles which, after deducting an excess provided for by the policy, left a balance payable of $200,000.  

  1. Evidently the defendant was served promptly because an Entry of Appearance and Defence was filed on 26 July 1993.  It was however in the nature of a “holding” defence, because apart from denying that the vehicles were destroyed by fire, that they had the agreed values alleged, and that the defendant had in breach of its obligations of the policy refused to pay the amount due, all of the allegations in the plaint were not admitted, other than the allegation of incorporation of the defendant, but no specific defences were raised.  However, on 2 March 1994 an amended Entry of Appearance and Defence was filed which pleaded certain…

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Details
Case
[2002] QDC 78
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Cenrim Pty Ltd, the plaintiff, filed a claim against Suncorp Insurance Finance, the defendant, concerning an insurance policy. The dispute revolves around a three-year delay in the plaintiff's claim, which spanned a total of 9½ years. The plaintiff sought leave to proceed under Uniform Civil Procedure Rules r.389(2), which deals with the extension of time for commencing proceedings. The court was required to determine whether the delay was justified and if it had prejudiced the defendant.

The court considered several factors in its decision, including the reasons for the delay and the responsibility for it. It also examined whether the defendant had suffered prejudice due to the delay. The court applied the principles from Tyler v. Custom Credit Corporation Ltd [2000] QCA 178, which outlines the relevant factors in deciding whether to grant leave to proceed under r.389. The defendant argued that it had been prejudiced because an investigator, Mr. Hunter, who had made inquiries into the matter, had since disappeared and could not be located. This investigator had reported seeing one of the vehicles in question and had interviewed a person involved in valuing the vehicles. The plaintiffs denied that any of the vehicles had suffered damage prior to the fire.

After considering the evidence and arguments presented, the court found that the delay was not justified and that the defendant had indeed suffered prejudice due to the unavailability of Mr. Hunter. The court concluded that the missing investigator's testimony was crucial for the defendant's case, and the failure to locate him significantly impaired the defendant's ability to defend the claim. Based on these findings, the court dismissed the plaintiff's application for leave to proceed with the claim.

Orders

Orders of the court

Application dismissed with costs

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

A convenient and authoritative summary of most of the factors which were relevant to the determination of whether to give leave to proceed under r.389 may be found in the judgment of Atkinson J, with whom the other members of the court agreed, in Tyler v. Custom Credit Corporation Ltd [2000] QCA 178. The factors listed by Her Honour apply in the circumstances of this case in the following way: The remaining issue referred to by Her Honour was whether there had been prejudice to the defendant. The defendant relied on specific prejudice in that an investigator (Mr. Hunter) who made some inquiries into this matter has since disappeared and significant attempts to trace that person have been unsuccessful. Apparently this investigator was engaged by the defendant to conduct inquiries into the circumstances surrounding the claim. He apparently reported that he had seen one of the three vehicles referred to in the plaint and that he was of the opinion that it had been damaged prior to the fire, and that he had interviewed a person involved in valuing the vehicles previously who had said that he had not seen the vehicles but had relied on earlier valuations. The plaintiffs do not admit that any of the vehicles had suffered damage prior to the fire, but the defendant will obviously be seeking to prove at the trial that that was the case. It might not necessarily be readily apparent to a person on a casual inspection of the remains of fire damaged vehicles whether there were signs of damage which must have been present prior to the fire, so the fact that other witnesses were available who had seen the vehicles after the fire would not necessarily be of assistance to the defendant. This would be particularly the case if those witnesses had not been spoken to about that time, since I think it could be safely assumed that, unless a person had some particular reason for remembering this incident, that person would not now be able to recall reliably whether or not such damage was present. It is therefore, in my view, essentially unhelpful that there may be a number of firemen who attended the fire who can now be traced. No doubt they saw a lot of fires, and I would not expect them to have the sort of detailed recollection about this one which would be of any real assistance to the court. Furthermore, if the plaintiff is seeking to rely on the evidence of Mr. Hyland as to the value of the vehicles at the relevant time[4], and if Mr. Hyland gave evidence at the trial which was inconsistent with what Mr. Hunter reported he had said, that evidence might be relevant to the assessment of any valuation evidence given by Mr. Hyland. If his evidence was inconsistent with that statement he could be cross-examined about his prior statement, but since Mr. Hunter was not able to obtain a written statement from him to that effect, it would be necessary for Mr. Hunter to be present in person in order to be able to prove the prior inconsistent statement of Mr. Hyland. Mr. Hunter may also be able to give evidence in support of the allegation in para. 4I of the amended defence, of a failure to salvage and preserve damaged items and make them available for inspection by the defendant’s representative if required. That could well be an important matter at the trial. [4]I infer from the fact that Mr. Hunter reported this conversation that he thought that that would likely to be the case, and there is no evidence from the plaintiffs asserting to the contrary.