CEBAN and FINDLAY - [2022] FCWA 251

JURISDICTION : FAMILY COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
ACT: FAMILY COURT ACT 1997
LOCATION: PERTH
CITATION: CEBAN and FINDLAY [2022] FCWA 251
CORAM: O'BRIEN J
HEARD: 19, 20, 21, 23 & 30 SEPTEMBER 2022;
5 OCTOBER 2022;
7 NOVEMBER 2022.
DELIVERED : 30 NOVEMBER 2022
FILE NO/S: 6228 of 2017
BETWEEN: MR CEBAN
Applicant
AND
MS FINDLAY
Respondent

Catchwords:

PARENTING - Where the parties agree that an order for equal shared parental responsibility should be made - Where the mother seeks to relocate with the child to New Zealand - Where the father seeks to progress to an equal time arrangement in Perth - Where there is a lengthy history of family violence - Turns on its own facts.

Legislation:

Family Court Act 1997 (WA)

Category: Not Reportable

Representation:

Counsel:

Applicant	:	Mr S Jones SC
Respondent	:	Mrs R Oakeley

Solicitors:

Applicant	:	Carr & Co
Respondent	:	DCH Legal Group

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Banks & Banks (2015) FLC 93-637
Bondelmonte v Bondelmonte & Anor (2017) 259 CLR 662
Clanton & Lachman (No 2) [2022] FedCFamC1A 165
Jacks & Samson (2008) FLC 93-387
L v P [2022] WASCA 40
M and S (2007) FLC 93-313
Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705
McCall & Clark (2009) FLC 93-405
McGregor & McGregor (2012) FLC 93-507
MRR v GR (2010) 240 CLR 461
Oberlin & Infeld (2021) FLC 94-017
Shell v Armel (2022) 367 FLR 453
Stott & Holgar and Anor [2017] FamCAFC 152
Tibb v Sheean (2018) 337 FLR 149
U v U (2002) 211 CLR 238

WORDS IN SQUARE BRACKETS REPLACE WORDS USED IN THE ORIGINAL JUDGMENT – PARTIES' NAMES AND IDENTIFYING DETAILS HAVE BEEN CHANGED

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Ceban and Findlay has been approved by the Family Court of Western Australia pursuant to s 243(8)(g) of the Family Court Act 1997 (WA).

This copy of the Court's Reason for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 312(b) Family Court Rules 2021 (WA)), or to record a variation to the orders pursuant to r 311 Family Court Rules 2012 (WA).

1[Mr Ceban] ("the father") and [Ms Findlay] ("the mother") have been unable to agree the arrangements to be made for their only child [Child A] born [in] 2015. Central to their disagreement is the mother's desire to return to New Zealand, to live there with Child A.

Background

The parties

2The father was born in 1982 and is employed as [an electrician]. He was born and brought up in Western Australia. The mother was born in 1991 and is not presently employed outside the home. She was born and brought up in New Zealand.
3The parties met in New Zealand in May 2011 and very quickly began a relationship. At that stage, the father had been living and working in New Zealand for several years and had purchased a home there. In or about November 2011 the father expressed his desire to return to live in Perth. The mother agreed to accompany him and the parties began a de facto relationship in Perth in January 2012. They separated in June 2017.
4Both parties have re-partnered. The mother began living with [Mr B] in late 2018 and they married in May 2021. They have one child together, [Child C] born [in late] 2020. The father commenced a relationship with [Ms D] in late 2018 or early 2019 while working in [Australian State A], and they began living together shortly thereafter. They have lived together in Perth since June 2020.

Events around separation

5As earlier noted, the parties separated finally in June 2017, when the mother moved into rental accommodation. They had been separated under one roof for a brief period to that point.
6On 22 May 2017, at a time when the mother was in the process of making arrangements to move out of the home, the father was seated at a table with a plate of food in front of him. While repeatedly "stabbing" his dish with a knife, the father made threats to kill the mother and members of her family. He said that he would kill "everyone [the mother] loves" and everyone that "ever conspired against [him]". He expressed himself to be unconcerned about going to prison. He said:[1]
"If I'm to lose [Child A] and turn around and you take half my house, I will fly to [City A in New Zealand] and murder your father."
[1] A video recording of this incident formed part of the evidence at trial. The accuracy of the video recording was not disputed. Profanities from the recording as transcribed have been deleted in these reasons.

7He went on to say that "while I'm at it, I'll kill your sister".
8On 25 May 2017, on a referral from his general practitioner, the father attended on a psychologist [Dr E] for the first time. He expressed a desire to remain in the relationship. The following day, Dr E contacted the mother by telephone. She agreed to attend joint sessions with the father, while stating her goal was to work towards a separation as soon as possible, expressing the hope that the father would realise that was best for all concerned. In an individual session with the father on 9 June 2017, Dr E focused on his "build-up of anger and capacity to show [the mother] that he is able to manage his own feelings, without losing control, or becoming violent, or emotionally abusive".
9On the mother's evidence, which I accept, in late May 2017 she noted that Child A's passport was not in its usual storing place. When she asked the father about it, he retrieved the passport and cut it up in front of her.
10On Child A's birthday, [in mid] 2017, a further incident occurred. On the mother's evidence, which I accept, the father locked himself in a shed at the property. The mother found him slumped beside his workbench having placed two heavy duty cable ties around his neck. She cut them off. The father told her that he could not continue life without her.
11The mother moved with Child A into an apartment located a short distance from the home [later in mid] 2017.
12The father attended eight sessions with Dr E between 25 May 2017 and 1 September 2017. The mother participated in three sessions as requested, on 16 June 2017, 30 June 2017 and 1 September 2017. Dr E noted that therapy concluded when the parties reached agreement to separate and allow the father to have regular time with Child A.
13During the period in which the father was participating in therapy, the parties made arrangements to spend time together with Child A. On 29 June 2017, while at the mother's home, the father discovered on her phone a text message from [Mr F], an acquaintance from her gym with whom she had had a sexual encounter. He began to question the mother about the message, becoming angry. At trial, he admitted that Child A was present during those exchanges. The father took the mother's phone, used it to telephone Mr F, and left her home. He went to Mr F's place of employment and assaulted him, punching him eight times in the face, causing him to be hospitalised. He was subsequently convicted of assault occasioning bodily harm and fined $2,500. The father and Mr F had not previously met.

The commencement of proceedings

14The father commenced proceedings on 6 October 2017, seeking an urgent ex parte listing. In his case information affidavit filed with the application he said that Child A was in the primary care of the mother, spending two nights per week with him, although he would like more time with her. He said that the mother had made threats to take Child A to New Zealand and never return, and that he had recently received an alert from the New Zealand passport authorities to the effect that she had applied for a passport for Child A without his knowledge. While he acknowledged in his case information affidavit having a criminal conviction for assault for an assault on "the other man", he denied that the police had ever been involved in any incident between the parties. He admitted at trial, when confronted with documents produced by the police, that his evidence in that regard was false. The police had been called to the home by the mother on 5 March 2016 after an incident of family violence and he had been issued with a 72-hour police order.
15In his case information affidavit, the father also said that he did not consider that either party or Child A had been, or was at, risk of being subjected or exposed to abuse, neglect or family violence.
16He said further that neither party had any mental health issues which impacted on their capacity to care for Child A. He made that statement against the background of having been assessed by a clinical psychologist in April 2016 as displaying symptoms of extremely severe depression, extremely severe anxiety and severe stress. He had been referred to that psychologist for assessment and treatment for symptoms associated with childhood trauma and anger issues. He had reported to the psychologist that he had experienced reactive anger for a long time. His symptoms were assessed as being consistent with a diagnosis of PTSD and he was offered a treatment package, which he did not pursue. By the time he commenced proceedings, he had only recently completed sessions with Dr E for which he had presented after "experiencing a build-up of anger with underlying shame". None of those matters were disclosed in his case information affidavit.
17Orders were made on an ex-parte basis [in] October 2017 restraining the mother from removing Child A from Australia, placing Child A on the Family Law Watch List, and requiring the father to serve the documents on the mother as soon as practicable. The proceedings were adjourned to 4 January 2018.
18The father did not serve the documents. At trial, he said that he had chosen not to comply with the order for service as he was concerned that the mother might react to the commencement of proceedings by reducing his time with Child A. Thereafter, he said that he "put that on the back burner in my mind and didn't turn up" at the adjourned hearing.
19On 18 October 2017, unaware that proceedings had been commenced, the mother's lawyers wrote to the father seeking to commence negotiations in relation to financial matters, noting that the mother had already taken steps to initiate mediation in relation to parenting matters. The letter noted the mother's instructions that the father had "recently destroyed [Child A]'s passport", raised her intention to return to New Zealand for a holiday, and asked the father to consent to the issue of a new passport.
20The following day, the father attended at the mother's home, referred to the letter, and was abusive and aggressive. The mother called the police, who moved the father on.
21On 23 October 2017 the father replied to the lawyers' letter saying that his lawyer would be in touch shortly to confirm a date for mediation. He said that he was "happy to sign a passport immediately", but that it would need to be held by the court and any overseas travel by either party with Child A would need to be agreed. He did not rebut or dispute the lawyers' proposition that he had destroyed the existing passport. Earlier that morning, the father had sent the mother a Snapchat message in abusive terms, saying that if she took him to court, he would spend the next 16 years fighting her.
22The mother then applied for and was granted a family violence restraining order ("FVRO"). When the police contacted the father to arrange service, he left Perth and sent the mother a message saying "when I am served, I am going to slit my throat". He repeated that threat in a subsequent message to the mother on 9 November 2017. He was eventually served on 7 December 2017.
23Notwithstanding the FVRO, the parties made arrangements for the father to spend time with Child A including in the presence of the mother. There were further incidents of verbal abuse by the father and further messages indicating suicidal thoughts. On other occasions, the father blocked the mother's calls while Child A was in his care and on still other occasions he refused to return Child A from arranged visits.
24Neither party attended the hearing on 4 January 2018. At that point, the mother and her lawyers were still unaware that proceedings had been commenced.

Steps taken by the mother

25The mother sought to commence proceedings in relation to parenting and financial matters on 13 February 2018. She sought interim orders for Child A to spend supervised time with the father. The parties attended family dispute resolution on 27 March 2018 and agreed to a parenting plan, which included provision for family therapy, for Child A to spend unsupervised time with the father, and for the father to sign the necessary passport application to facilitate the mother travelling to New Zealand with Child A for a holiday before the end of the year. The father was largely working away from Perth at the time.
26At trial, the father acknowledged that it was "down to him" that the agreed family therapy did not take place, even though the parenting plan contemplated an increase in his time with Child A subject to that therapy occurring and no issues being identified by the family therapist.
27There were then further exchanges between the parties in which both were at times abusive. Nevertheless, the father continued to have video communication with Child A while he was away from Perth and spent some time with her when he was in Perth. During a video call with Child A on 25 May 2018 the father was abusive and threatening to the mother at a time when Child A was engaging with him during the call.
28There was a further incident on 1 June 2018 when the mother sought to deliver Child A to the father for a prearranged visit. On the mother's evidence, which I accept, the father threatened to retain Child A and not return her at the previously agreed time. He sought to shut his gate to exclude the mother and she put out her leg to prevent that; he then shut the gate with force on her leg. That incident took place in the presence of Child A who has subsequently referred to it unprompted when talking to family and friends. The mother was able to collect Child A and facilitated further time the next day. The father again retained Child A without the mother's agreement, returning her on the morning of 4 June 2018 and then departing to work away from Perth.

Interim orders by agreement

29Negotiations continued, and interim orders were made by consent [in] July 2018 providing for Child A to spend time with the father on specific dates and otherwise adjourning the matter for an interim argument [in] August 2018. [In] August 2018, a magistrate made interim orders (noting that the father was working on a roster whereby he spent one week in Perth and two weeks interstate) placing Child A on the Family Law Watch List, providing for equal shared parental responsibility with Child A living with the mother, and for Child A to spend time with the father during his rostered week off from 8.00 am Friday until 8.00 am Monday, and on other specific occasions. Interim orders were also made for the facilitation of Skype or video communication and for family therapy. Orders were made requiring the parties to do all things necessary to obtain a passport for Child A and permitting Child A to travel with the mother to New Zealand for a holiday in 2018 for a period of no more than 28 days on certain conditions. Other procedural orders were made which are not relevant for present purposes.
30At trial, the father admitted that notwithstanding the agreed terms of the parenting plan and the order made [in] August 2018, he consciously delayed executing the necessary documents for the issue of a passport for Child A in circumstances where he knew that from the mother's point of view there was some urgency to facilitate the planned holiday.
31There was then further and ongoing conflict between the parties. The father eventually signed the passport application on 12 October 2018. The mother did not receive it until 22 October 2018. On 26 October 2018 the parties attended mediation and, to their credit, reached agreement in the financial case.

Further incidents and suspension of orders

32On 11 November 2018, during a scheduled video call with Child A, the father referred to the mother as a "controlling bitch" and told Child A that the mother did not want to let her see him. On 16 November 2018, while making abusive comments to the mother, the father made derogatory comments about the magistrate and indicated that he would pay no regard to his orders. On 19 November 2018, during another telephone call, the father made threats to the mother, saying "it's coming for ya" (sic).
33On 23 November 2018, the mother went camping in [Region A in South Western Australia] with Child A and Mr B. She facilitated a FaceTime call between the father and Child A. When Child A excitedly explained where she was and what she was doing, the father became enraged at her mention of Mr B. He referred to Mr B in obscene terms and told the mother to tell Mr B that he was going to kill him. He said he would "smash [Mr B's] skull in real soon" and referred to the mother as a "slut". Child A overheard those statements; at trial the father acknowledged that he was "enraged…and yelled into the phone". At this point, the father and Mr B had never met. On 27 November 2018, Mr B was granted a Violence Restraining Order ("VRO").
34The mother then stopped facilitating contact and communication pursuant to the existing orders. On 7 December 2018 she filed an application seeking a variation of the existing orders such that the father's time with Child A would be supervised and that she be permitted to terminate any call in which the father became abusive. The father declined to take up any supervised time.
35An Independent Children's Lawyer ("ICL") was appointed by order made [in] February 2019. Legal Aid Western Australia subsequently withdrew funding, and the ICL ceased to act in January 2021.
36Also [in] February 2019, orders were made by consent requiring both parties to complete the Mums and Dads Forever Program, if assessed as suitable, and for the father to attend and complete the Family Abuse Integrated Response ("FAIR") Program. The mother was given liberty to immediately terminate any Skype/video communication between the father and Child A if the father conducted himself inappropriately, and the proceedings were adjourned for further interim hearing [in late] February 2019.
37On that day, the interim orders for Child A to spend time with the father were suspended until further order and the magistrate otherwise reserved his decision. Orders were subsequently made [in] April 2019 discharging previous orders and providing for the father to spend professionally supervised time with Child A during his rostered week off.
38In November 2019, [Ms G] was appointed as the Single Expert Witness ("SEW"). The parties attended on her in late November 2019 and her first report was filed with the court on 17 December 2019. The father foreshadowed plans to move back to Perth. He ceased working interstate in early 2020.

Further interim orders by consent

39[In] December 2019 still further interim orders were made by consent. The orders for supervised time were discharged. Interim orders were made for the father to spend unsupervised time with Child A on a progression such that by 11 July 2020 she would be spending time with him each alternate weekend from after school Friday, or 3.00 pm on a non-school day, to 3.00 pm Sunday. Specific orders were also made in relation to school holidays and special occasions.

40The report of the SEW had raised various issues as to the mental health of both parties. Consent orders were made requiring each party to attend on psychologists for treatment to address those issues. A further order was made again requiring the father to complete the FAIR Program.
41Despite being ordered to do so (twice) the father had not enrolled in, let alone completed, the FAIR Program by the commencement of trial in September 2022. In early 2020, an arranged intake session was cancelled for reasons to do with the pandemic and clearly beyond the father's control. Nevertheless, since the resumption of availability of the program the father has taken no steps to enrol in it despite the matter being consistently raised by the mother and her lawyers.

Progression towards trial

42[In late] December 2020 orders were made to progress the matter towards trial. A readiness hearing was initially scheduled for 15 April 2021 but was later vacated by consent and relisted for 6 July 2021. Neither party filed their documents as required. The relevant timeframes were further extended, and a further readiness hearing was listed for 2 December 2021. The mother filed her trial documents before that hearing, albeit late. The father required a still further extension of time, which was agreed by the parties.
43[In late] January 2022 further interim orders were made by consent providing for Child A to spend time with the father during the period 1 February 2022 to 1 May 2022 each alternate week from after school Friday until 5.00 pm Sunday, and on intervening Thursdays from after school until 5.30 pm. On 28 March 2022 the proceedings were listed for a trial to commence [in] September 2022. Notwithstanding earlier extensions of time, the father had still not filed his trial documents. It was not until the mother filed an application seeking to proceed undefended that he eventually did so.
44At the time of trial, the arrangements reflected in the orders made [in late] January 2022 continued in place.
45While the proceedings were commenced by the father, the parties agreed that for the purposes of trial the mother would have carriage of them. The trial commenced as scheduled. Both parties were represented. Based on the estimates of the lawyers, four days were allocated for trial. Regrettably, those estimates were inaccurate. The trial was not completed in the allocated time and had to be adjourned part heard. After seven days of hearing, the trial was completed on 7 November 2022, and I reserved my decision.

Orders that may be made by consent

46In compliance with orders made [in] September 2022, the parties conferred to consider what orders, if any, might be made by consent regardless of whether Child A is living in New Zealand or Australia and what orders might be made by consent on either alternative. That Minute was filed [in] September 2022 after the parties participated in a conference with a senior registrar of the court shortly prior to trial.
47To the credit of the parties, a number of agreements emerged.
48Regardless of where Child A is to live, the parties agree that they should have equal shared parental responsibility. They also agree specific orders for Skype communication between Child A and the parent with whom she is not living or spending time, and in relation to communication between themselves. They agree specific issues orders in relation to education and medical issues, including the exchange of information between them. They also agree that injunctions should be made restraining them from denigrating each other or other relevant persons, discussing the court proceedings or disagreements between them in Child A's presence or permitting her to view any documents or correspondence relating to the proceedings.
49In addition, the parties agree that if they are both to remain living in Perth, Child A will live with the mother. In those circumstances, they agree that initially during school term Child A will spend time with the father on alternate weekends from the conclusion of school on Friday until the commencement of school on Monday, extending to 3.00 pm if Monday is a non-school day. They agree further that Child A should initially spend time with the father on Wednesday in the intervening week, albeit the mother proposes that time should extend from after school until 5.30 pm, while the father proposes that it should extend from after school until the commencement of school on the Thursday. They also agree that Child A should spend half of each school holiday period with each parent, albeit they disagree as to the details. Otherwise, in circumstances where Child A remains living in Perth they have also agreed specific orders in relation to birthdays, Christmas and handover.
50As will be seen, the agreement of the parties in that regard is limited to circumstances where both parties remain in Perth and to the initial period after the determination of the proceedings. The parties differ as to the parenting arrangements that should be made in the medium to long‑term if Child A remains living in Perth.
51Other than matters which are agreed regardless of where Child A is to live, there is no agreement as to arrangements if she is living in New Zealand.

The proposals of the parties – the mother

52The mother proposed orders in terms set out in a minute lodged [in] September 2022 and by reference to the joint minute of agreed orders. She proposed that the parties have equal shared parental responsibility and that Child A live with her in New Zealand. If the father remains living in Perth, or moves to New Zealand but lives more than 45 km from the mother, she proposed:
(a)in the first year after relocation, Child A spend time with the father for up to seven days in each gazetted New Zealand school term holiday, and up to 14 days during the summer school holidays, with all such time to be spent in New Zealand;
(b)in the second year after relocation and presumably thereafter, Child A spend time with the father for the first 10 days of each gazetted New Zealand school term holiday, and for up to three weeks during the summer school holidays, provided Christmas Day is spent in alternating years with each parent, with such time to be spent in either New Zealand or Australia;
(c)that for the purposes of that time, the father accompany Child A on any flight between New Zealand and Australia until she is 12 years of age, or able to fly unaccompanied in accordance with the relevant practices of Qantas and Air New Zealand, whichever is the later;
(d)the mother notes an acknowledgement on her part that the father's obligation to pay Child Support should be reduced by the amount paid by him towards Child A's travel costs, to a cap of a $6,000 per annum reduction. By inference, she proposes he meet those costs, as her proposed orders expressly require him to provide her with an itinerary and copies of return tickets 21 days prior to the relevant travel; and
(e)that the father be at liberty to make arrangements to spend time with Child A in New Zealand on one occasion during each school term, for a weekend from after school Thursday to the commencement of school Monday, provided he gives the mother 28 days' notice of that intention and the nominated visits do not coincide with Child A's birthday in consecutive years.

53The mother's proposals also require the father to give her no less than 60 days' notice of the time he intends to spend with Child A, and require her to "use her best endeavours to accommodate [his] wishes, or provide him with similar alternative dates". When cross-examined, the mother said that her firm intention was to accommodate the dates proposed by the father unless there was specific good reason not to in the individual circumstance.
54The mother proposed that both parties be at liberty to attend school assemblies, parent teacher meetings, school sports carnivals and "any special event to which parents are usually invited", but that each be restrained by injunction from attending Child A's "extracurricular activities" that fall when she is in the care of the other parent other than for "grand final games", concerts and recitals. She proposed that the father be provided with all relevant information regarding Child A's education directly from the relevant school. She proposed that each party be restrained from enrolling Child A in extracurricular activities that will fall during Child A's time with the other parent, without agreement. In any event, she proposed that the father be restrained by injunction from approaching her, Mr B or Child C, or addressing them at any of the events just mentioned if he chooses to attend.
55She proposed orders compelling the father to complete the FAIR Program, and to continue to attend with Dr E or another clinical psychologist recommended by Dr E, for not less than one session per month "for treatment to address his PTSD and anger issues". She otherwise proposed orders restraining the parties from using Child A as a messenger, specific orders in relation to each party travelling with Child A, and orders for the maintenance of the currency of Child A's passport and that she retain it. She also proposed that she be required to register a copy of the final orders in the New Zealand Family Court.

The proposals of the parties – the father

56The father proposed orders in the terms of a minute handed up on the first day of trial. He proposed that Child A live with the mother in Perth. He proposed a progression in the time Child A would spend with him during school terms as follows:
(a)until the end of the 2022 school year,[2] on a fortnightly cycle from Friday afternoon until Monday morning in week one, and overnight on Wednesday in week two;
(b)from the commencement of term two in 2023, on a fortnightly cycle from Friday afternoon until Tuesday morning in week one, and from Wednesday afternoon until Friday afternoon in week two; and
(c)from the commencement of term four in 2023, on a week about basis with handover on Wednesdays.
[2] The father's minute was unclear in its terms and was clarified on my enquiry during the period in which judgment was reserved. The father in fact seeks that the arrangement described continue until the conclusion of term one 2023.

57He proposed that Child A spend half of all school holiday periods with each parent, with very specific provisions in that regard, and with specific orders proposed for special occasions including Christmas, Easter, Father's Day and Mother's Day. He also proposed that each party have the first option to care for Child A if the other is unavailable.
58He proposed that the mother have liberty to travel with Child A to New Zealand during periods when Child A would be in her care during school holidays in any event, subject to agreement and the provision of advanced notice and itinerary details.
59The father otherwise proposed specific issues orders in relation to handover, communication, participation in school and extracurricular events, the sharing of information between the parties, and interstate and international travel. He proposed detailed orders for the maintenance of Child A's passport.
60He proposed specific orders to require the mother to attend on her treating psychologist [Ms H], or another psychologist, for treatment and provide confirmation of her attendances not less than once each eight weeks to him or to his solicitors. He proposed that he be ordered to attend on his treating psychologist Dr E, or another psychologist recommended by Dr E, for treatment. Notably, he did not propose that he be required to provide confirmation of those attendances to the mother.
61The father sought injunctions restraining the mother from calling him by his given name in Child A's presence, encouraging or allowing Child A to call any other person "dad" or call the father by his given name, removing the father's authority to "communicate with institutions or people relevant to [Child A]" and from allowing Child A to ride with Mr B on any motorcycle.
62The father also sought orders for the parties and Child A to attend reportable family therapy, with an unidentified therapist to be agreed, with each bearing their own individual costs of therapy and sharing joint costs.
63As will be seen, no evidence or submissions were advanced in relation to several of the orders sought by the father.

The submissions of the parties as to the orders which should be made if not in accordance with their proposals

64Both parties set out the orders they would suggest should be made if orders were not made in the terms of their respective proposals as to the central issues. Both properly addressed that logical possibility, to ensure that I accurately understood what they would each submit should happen if I made orders contrary to their respective proposals. I do not construe that as any concession on the part of the father that Child A should live in New Zealand, nor as any concession on the part of the mother that she should not. Similarly, I do not in any sense regard either submission as representing an alternative proposal advanced by the relevant party.

The mother's submission

65In the event she remains in Perth, or for that matter both parties move to New Zealand and live within 45 km of each other, the mother submits that Child A should live with her and spend time with the father during school term as follows:
(a)until the end of the 2022 school year, on a fortnightly cycle from the conclusion of school on Friday until the commencement of school on Monday in week one (or Monday afternoon if a non-school day), and from the conclusion of school until 5.30 pm on Wednesday in week two;
(b)from the commencement of term one in 2023 until the conclusion of term two in 2023, in a fortnightly cycle from the conclusion of school on Friday until the commencement of school on Monday in week one, and overnight on Wednesday in week two;
(c)from the commencement of term three 2023 and ongoing, in a fortnightly cycle from the conclusion of school on Friday until the commencement of school on Monday in week one, and from the conclusion of school on the Wednesday until the commencement of school on Friday in week two.

66She otherwise submits that Child A should spend the first week of the "school term holidays" with her, the second week with the father and any remainder with her. She proposed Child A should spend half of each summer school holiday period with each parent, on an alternating week basis, and proposed specific arrangements for Child A's birthday, Mother's Day and Father's Day.
67If both parties remain in Australia, she submits she should be at liberty to travel with Child A internationally each year for one period of up to 28 days and a further period of up to 14 days upon her giving notice to the father, and the provision of detailed information regarding itineraries and the like. If both parties are in New Zealand she would submit that she should still be able to travel overseas with Child A for one 28-day period per year. She otherwise submits that specific orders should be made in relation to handover and the like.

The father's submission

68If the mother is permitted to relocate with Child A to New Zealand, the father says that he will remain in Perth. In those circumstances, he submits that an order should be made for Child A to live with the mother and to spend time with him as follows:
(a)in the first year after relocation, for the first nine nights of each of the short school term holidays, commencing at 5.00 pm on the last Friday of school term until 5.00 pm on the second Sunday;
(b)in the second year after relocation and thereafter, for the first 10 nights of each of the short school term holidays, commencing at 5.00 pm on the last Friday of school term until 5.00 pm on the second Sunday;
(c)during the Christmas school holiday period at the end of 2022, from 20 December 2022 until 20 January 2023;[3]
[3] Certain elements of those proposals fell away by virtue of consent orders made at the conclusion of the trial, covering the 2022 summer school holiday period.
(d)during the Christmas school holiday period at the end of 2023 and in alternate years thereafter, for four consecutive weeks from 8 January until 5 February or such other dates as might be agreed;
(e)during the Christmas school holiday period at the end of 2024 and in alternate years thereafter, for four consecutive weeks to include Christmas day, from 20 December until 17 January or such other dates as might be agreed;
(f)that he be at liberty to remove Child A from New Zealand and travel to Australia for the purposes of those holidays commencing from the school holiday period at the end of 2022;
(g)that if he travels to New Zealand to spend time with Child A during school term and stays for less than two weeks, she spend time with him from after school Tuesday until the commencement of school Thursday and from after school Friday until the commencement of school Monday in the first week, and then from after school Wednesday until the commencement of school Thursday on the second week;
(h)that if he travels to New Zealand spend time with Child A during school term and stays for more than two weeks, she spend time with him each alternate weekend from after school Friday until the commencement of school on Monday, and in the intervening week from after school Thursday until the commencement of school Friday;
(i)that when Child A is spending time with him in Perth during the school holiday periods, he pay Child A's return airfares in the first instance, with the mother to reimburse him for half of those costs within 14 days. His submission is predicated on Child A travelling as an unaccompanied minor;
(j)he otherwise submits that various specific issues orders should be made, including the orders for therapy and family therapy, referred to in his primary position above. It is not clear how he would submit family therapy should take place if he is living in Perth and the mother is living in New Zealand.

The legal principles

69The Court must be guided by the objects of Part 5 of the Family Court Act 1997 (WA) ("the Act") and the principles underlying them.
70Section 70A provides for a rebuttable presumption that it is in the best interests of children for their parents to have equal shared parental responsibility for them.
71If an order for equal shared parental responsibility is to be made as the parties jointly propose, I am required to consider whether Child A spending equal time with each of her parents would be in her best interests, and whether such an arrangement would be reasonably practicable. If so, I am then required to consider making such an order.
72Again, against the background of an order for equal shared parental responsibility being made, if I do not make an order for Child A to spend equal time with each parent, I am required to consider whether spending substantial and significant time (as that term is defined in the Act) with each parent would be in her best interests and reasonably practicable. If so, I am required to consider making such an order.
73In determining what is in a child's best interests, the court must consider the matters set out in s 66C. While those matters are divided in the legislation into primary and additional considerations, the primary considerations do not necessarily outweigh any combination of the additional considerations. The issues that are joined between the parties will dictate which s 66C factors are relevant.

74That said, the Act makes it clear that where there is tension between the primary consideration of the benefit to a child of having a meaningful relationship with both parents, and the need to protect the child from physical or psychological harm from being subjected to, or exposed to, abuse, neglect or family violence, greater weight is to be given to the latter consideration.
75Relevantly in cases such as these, and as the Full Court has pointed out, a "meaningful" relationship need not be optimal.[4]
[4] McCall & Clark (2009) FLC 93-405, [116]; therein citing M and S (2007) FLC 93-313, [33], [36].
76The requirement to consider each matter set out in s 66C does not mean that each factor must be expressly discussed in a judgment, where the factor in question has no sufficient relevance to displace the determinative significance of factors specifically discussed.[5]
[5] Banks & Banks (2015) FLC 93-637, [52; L v P [2022] WASCA 40, [14].
77In a parenting case where the proposals of one party involve the relocation of the child, there is no presumption against an order being made which permits relocation, nor is there a presumption in favour of a parent with whom the child predominantly lives at the time of or prior to the application. The parent wishing to move does not need to demonstrate "compelling" reasons to justify the proposed move, and the child's best interests must be weighed and balanced with the proposed relocating parent's right to freedom of movement. A court should not lightly interfere with that right of freedom of movement, save and except where it is contrary to the best interests of the child.
78While the parent proposing to relocate is not required to justify the desire to move (beyond the court being satisfied that the application is bona fide and not motivated by some ulterior consideration), it is appropriate for the court to have evidence as to the benefits which that parent says flow from the relocation. The welfare of the parents is to be considered and balanced with the best interests of the child; that exercise necessarily includes an examination of the likely benefits to the parent of the proposed move, and the likely detriments of an inability to move.
79It must not be assumed that the parent resisting the relocation cannot move; consideration must also be given to the possibility that he or she might also relocate to avail themselves of frequent and regular time with the child.[6] While in some cases there will be no such realistic possibility, and the consideration will accordingly be cursory, as will be seen this is not such a case.
[6] U v U (2002) 211 CLR 238 per Gaudron J at [35] and per Haynes J at [175].
80Ultimately, the making of a parenting order involves the exercise of judicial discretion. The primary considerations set out in the legislation are "matters to be borne in mind as consistent with the objects" of Part 5 of the Act. The additional considerations set out in the legislation:
… require assessments of the matters there listed by reference to the circumstances of the case. They involve value judgments in respect of which there may be room for reasonable differences of opinion, as does the overall assessment of what is in the best interests of the child.[7]

Legislative considerations which are not in issue

[7] Bondelmonte v Bondelmonte & Anor (2017) 259 CLR 662, [32].

81By the commencement of trial, the parties had agreed that a final order for equal shared parental responsibility should be made. Accordingly, it was not necessary to consider the application of the statutory presumption in s 70A.
82Neither party suggested that the extent to which either of them has fulfilled or failed to fulfil their respective obligations to maintain Child A was a relevant consideration. The father has paid child support as assessed, and the mother maintains Child A while she is in her care.
83Neither party suggested that the maturity, sex, lifestyle and background of the child or either party were a relevant consideration.
84Neither of the parties, or Child A, are persons of Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander heritage.
85While the mother asserts, and I accept, that there was significant family violence in the relationship, there is no current family violence order nor any other evidence of the nature described in s 66C(3)(k).
86Neither party suggested that a consideration of whether it would be preferable to make the order least likely to lead to the institution of further proceedings would inform the required determination.
87The evidence supports the common positions of the parties just described and I accept them.
88The mother did not suggest that there were any relevant facts or circumstances other than those addressed by the specific legislative considerations. The father submitted that what he would contend to be the mother's reluctance to facilitate and support his relationship with Child A is a relevant consideration, particularly in the context of her proposed relocation.

The evidence at trial

89The mother relied on the following affidavits filed on her behalf:
(a)her affidavit filed on 8 November 2021;
(b)her updating affidavit filed on 30 June 2022;
(c)her financial statement filed on 9 November 2021;
(d)affidavit of her clinical psychologist Ms H filed 1 September 2022;
(e)affidavit of her friend [Ms I] filed on 1 December 2021
(f)affidavit of her mother [Ms J] filed on 1 December 2021
(g)affidavit of her father [Mr K] filed on 1 December 2021; and
(h)affidavit of her husband Mr B filed on 29 November 2021.

90The mother called one witness under subpoena. [Ms L] is a former partner of the father. By agreement, she gave evidence by video link from [Region B in North Western Australia], where she lives.
91The father relied on the following affidavits filed on his behalf:
(a)his affidavit filed on 30 May 2022;
(b)his financial statement filed on 30 May 2022;
(c)affidavit of his partner Ms D filed on 31 May 2022;
(d)affidavit of his psychologist Dr E filed on 14 September 2022;
(e)affidavit of his friend [Mr M] filed on 31 May 2022;
(f)affidavit of his stepmother [Ms N] filed on 20 May 2022; and
(g)affidavit of his half-sister [Ms O] filed on 20 May 2022.

92[Mr M] was not required for cross examination.
93The SEW provided reports exhibited to affidavits filed on 17 December 2019 and 15 August 2022. In response to questions from the parties, she provided a brief clarification report exhibited to an affidavit filed on 8 September 2022. All three affidavits were in evidence. Her notes were subpoenaed and made available to the parties, and she presented for cross examination.

Observations as to the evidence at trial

The mother and her witnesses

94The mother presented as a calm witness, who rarely hesitated when responding to questions in cross examination. She was clear in her answers and impressed as an accurate historian, readily acknowledging when she was unable to remember a particular point. She made admissions against interest without apparent hesitation, including in relation to some aspects of her own behaviour in verbal arguments with the father. When she was asked whether she acknowledged that the father has a very important role to play in Child A's life, she answered affirmatively without hesitation. I regarded her as a truthful and reliable witness, and where her recollection differed from that of the father in relation to matters unable to be independently corroborated, I preferred her evidence. While she was questioned at some length about, for example, completing day care forms in the name of the father without his consent and falsifying his signature, the acts referred to do not alter my perception of the honesty of her evidence.
95Ms J and Ms I both gave evidence by video link. They were cross examined only briefly and their evidence was largely unchallenged.
96Mr K presented as being somewhat resentful of being cross examined and at one point sought to object to a question on his own behalf. That said, he was polite and readily took direction from me. His evidence was not significantly challenged and I accept that it was truthful.
97Mr B presented as a polite and straightforward witness. He answered questions openly and directly and I regarded him as an honest witness.
98Ms L clearly found it difficult to give evidence and was reluctant to be involved in the dispute between the parties. She asked that the camera in the courtroom be adjusted so that she could not see the parties. She did not present as being fearful of any consequences from giving evidence, but as being distinctly uncomfortable in recounting incidents of violence that occurred during her relationship with the father saying that she didn't "want to upset anyone".
99While Ms L was cross examined about friendly communications she had initiated with the father after they had separated, her evidence as to family violence in the relationship (which only emerged in detail in response to questions from me) was not challenged. It is set out in more detail later in these reasons. In short, I accept her evidence.

The father and his witnesses

100The father was cross examined at length. While he made various admissions in relation to acts of violence and the like, they were largely made in circumstances where there was irrefutable corroborative evidence. He professed on numerous occasions to be unable to recall whether he had taken certain actions or whether certain events had occurred. He was adamant that he had never choked or strangled the mother; as set out later in these reasons, I do not accept that evidence.
101More generally, the father did not impress as an accurate historian. In making that observation, I make it clear that I have not concluded that he was intentionally untruthful. The father experienced significant trauma during his childhood. The effect of that trauma has continued to the present. I accept that it is possible that his memory, particularly of subsequent traumatic events or occasions which exhibit a loss of control on his part, may have been affected. Without differentiating between the parties, the SEW expressed a clear opinion, which I accept, that where a person has suffered trauma, it is possible for them to disassociate and genuinely not recall certain behaviours, particularly shameful behaviours.
102Ms D was a cautious witness. She became upset when having to acknowledge the inaccuracy of certain parts of her affidavit. She readily acknowledged that other parts of her affidavit were no better than speculation. She had clearly endeavoured to make her evidence supportive of the father; that said, little turned on her evidence in any event. It was not suggested that she is other than genuine in her relationship with the father and her support of him. It was common ground that she is involved and comfortable with Child A, while strongly preferring not to interact at all with the mother.
103Ms N was also a cautious witness and unfortunately tended to be vague to a point of being unhelpful. She appeared to try very hard to ensure that she did not say anything that might harm the father's case. In cross examination she denied having ever been told by the father about any serious negative aspect of his childhood; on express instructions, Senior Counsel later confirmed that Ms N was aware of the father's childhood trauma. While I do not suggest that Ms N was dishonest in her evidence, it was of limited assistance.
104Ms O was a straightforward and direct witness, who was cross examined only very briefly. Her evidence, with no disrespect, went no further than to confirm her care for and support of the father.
105I will refer to the evidence of the professional witnesses the SEW, Ms H and Dr E separately later in these reasons.

Findings as to family violence

A preliminary matter

106As may be anticipated from the relevant history summarised above, issues related to family violence assume significance in this case. Before summarising my factual findings and considering the significance of those findings in the overall determinations to be made, there is a matter relating to the presentation of the case which is appropriately addressed.
107In her papers for the judicial officer filed on 1 September 2022, the mother listed authorities to which her counsel intended to refer, as required by the Case Management Guidelines. Those guidelines require both the court and the other party to be advised of relevant decisions of a court to which reference is to be made. In addition to references of that nature, the papers filed on behalf of the mother referred to various academic writings and to the National Domestic and Family Violence Bench Book produced by the Australian Institute of Judicial Administration ("the Family Violence Bench Book").
108At the commencement of the trial, Senior Counsel for the father queried the purpose of those references. Counsel for the mother indicated that she intended to put questions to the SEW based on the academic writings and refer to the Family Violence Bench Book primarily in relation to terminology. It was not suggested that those materials or any of them be received into evidence.
109As it transpired, only limited and general questions of that nature were put to the SEW.
110I record that, while proper and permissible direct reference to the materials listed in the mother's papers for the judicial officer may well have been helpful, the necessary steps to permit such reference were not taken.
111The scope and effect of s 202H of the Act is, it appears, sometimes misunderstood. Only certain of the rules of evidence are excluded from application in child related proceedings. Opinion formed by the application of expertise is potentially to be afforded weight by reference to ordinary principles and not otherwise.[8]
[8] Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705, 743 [85].
112Reliance by a judicial officer on any material without making that possibility known to the parties prior to the making of a decision, so that they may have the opportunity to "oppose reliance upon it, produce evidence in relation to it and make submissions about it" will breach the rules of procedural fairness.[9] Even if the appropriate notice and opportunity is given to the parties, reliance on any material not in evidence is an error of law.[10]
[9] McGregor & McGregor (2012) FLC 93-507, [59].
[10] Shell v Armel (2022) 367 FLR 453, [42].
113Accordingly, I have not referred either to the academic writings listed in the mother's papers for the judicial officer, nor to the Family Violence Bench Book.

Relevant findings

114The following findings are based on admissions by the father, recordings admitted into evidence, and my acceptance of the accuracy of the evidence of the mother over that of the father when that evidence was in conflict.
115My acceptance of the accuracy of the evidence of the mother is supported by, but not solely based upon, the unchallenged evidence of Ms L as to the similar behaviour of the father during their relationship. She described bursts of anger, with verbal arguments escalating. She described the father breaking furniture and other items when enraged and striking her. She said that he had grabbed her by the throat on multiple occasions, choking her, saying that "the main ones that I can think in my head were significant and they were, you know, a good five times". She almost blacked out on one occasion.
116My acceptance of the accuracy of the evidence of the mother is similarly supported by, but not solely based upon, the unchallenged evidence of Ms I as to the numerous occasions on which the mother made contemporaneous reports to her of individual incidents of violence, most particularly choking. A failure on the part of a victim to report acts of violence, particularly intimate partner violence, may occur for various reasons. Courts should be alert to that, if asked to discount the evidence of the victim because of any such failure to report. Nevertheless, the established making of contemporaneous reports can, as it does here, assist and tend to corroborate.
117My acceptance of the accuracy of the evidence of the mother is also supported by the largely unchallenged evidence of her mother, including as to admissions made to her by the father.
118I find that the father, on numerous occasions through the course of the relationship and after separation engaged in significantly violent and threatening behaviour, and other behaviour, that both caused the mother to be fearful and coerced or controlled her. Certain of those behaviours also caused Child A to be fearful. Others caused Mr B to be fearful.
119Those behaviours included, but were not limited to:
(a)multiple instances of verbal and written abuse, often in vile terms;
(b)threats to kill the mother and members of her family;[11]
[11] The video recording of an incident between the parties that occurred on 22 May 2017 was harrowing, and the mother's fear was palpable.
(c)a threat to kill the mother's new partner Mr B;
(d)multiple acts of physical violence towards the mother, including choking;
(e)threats to suicide if the mother did not comply with requests and demands;
(f)unpredictable explosions of anger expressed in both verbal and physical form;
(g)damage to property, throwing of items and similar;
(h)financial control, including limiting the mother's expenditure and cutting up a bank card through which she could access his account;
(i)other controlling behaviour, including cutting up Child A's passport;
(j)attending at the mother's home or unexpectedly "appearing" when she was, for example, walking the dog;
(k)tracking down and assaulting Mr F, whom he had never met, immediately upon finding out that he had been intimate with the mother, and informing the mother that he had done so; and
(l)insisting, after the parties had separated, that in his absence for work the mother look after the dogs that they had previously shared, when she could not have those dogs at her rental premises.

120It cannot be suggested that the violent behaviours occurred only during the period of the breakdown of the relationship, or the parties' separation. I accept the mother's largely unchallenged evidence that from a very early stage in the relationship the father was verbally abusive towards her and behaved in a jealous manner. In emails as early as September 2011, the father acknowledged he did "lose it" and apologised for "how it got out of hand". When the mother expressed her concern that the father's use of [an illicit substance] would "change [him] forever", the father responded that he had "tried to explain to [her] what [the illicit substance] does to [him]", saying that "I just get crazy angry on the [illicit substance] sometimes but it's never directed at you and it will get better and it won't last forever trust me".
121At trial the father denied ever using [this illicit substance]. I reject that evidence.
122After the parties moved to Perth early in 2012, the father's abusive behaviour continued. I accept the mother's evidence that his nightshift work arrangements led to him having disturbed sleep, he frequently used Valium and steroids, and he was short tempered. By this point, the father began to make verbal threats to kill the mother.

International travel if both parties are living in New Zealand
29.If both parties are living in New Zealand, then notwithstanding other provisions of these orders:
(a)the mother be at liberty to travel internationally outside New Zealand for a block of up to 28 consecutive overnights each alternate year, and this may be extended to any greater period or frequency with the father's consent, with such consent not to be unreasonably withheld;
(b)the father be at liberty to travel each year for a block of up to 14 consecutive overnights each year:
(i)this may be extended to any greater frequency or period with the mother's consent, with such consent not be unreasonably withheld; and
(ii)such travel may only occur over the Christmas period each alternate year.

(c)provided that:
(i)the travelling party give the non‑travelling party as much notice in writing as possible, and, in any event, no less than eight weeks written notice of their intention to travel outside of New Zealand with Child A;

(d)at the time of providing notice (insofar as reasonably practicable), the travelling party must provide to the non-travelling party a complete itinerary of the proposed travel, in writing, which includes the following information:
(i)departure and return destinations and dates;
(ii)flight numbers for all flights;
(iii)localities, including address and telephone contact information, that Child A will be travelling to;
(iv)contact telephone number(s) for Child A and the travelling party at each location for the trip; and
(v)mobile telephone number for one other passenger accompanying Child A, if applicable.

(e)the travelling party be restrained from travelling with Child A to any place with a ‘Level 4 do not travel' by smarttraveller.gov.au unless otherwise agreed between the parties in writing.
(f)the travelling party be restrained from travelling with Child A to any place that is not a party to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.
(g)the travelling party update the non-travelling party if at any time following provision of notice, or during the trip, dates, locations, and contact details included in the itinerary provided, change.

Therapy
30.The mother must engage with a psychologist and undertake EMDR therapy as recommended to address issues arising from the trauma she has experienced as a result of family violence.
31.The father must engage with Dr E, or another clinical psychologist recommended by Dr E, and undertake therapy as recommended to address issues arising from the trauma he experienced in his childhood.

Communication
32.Each party facilitate Child A having Skype (or telephone communication only if a Skype call is unavailable), with the party with whom she is not living/spending time:
(a)every second consecutive night when she is with the other party during school terms;
(b)every third consecutive night when she is with the other party during school holiday periods;
(c)on Child A's birthday, if they are unable to spend time with her as otherwise provided for in these orders;
(d)on the parties' respective birthdays;
(e)on Mr B and Ms D's birthdays'
(f)on Christmas Day;
(g)on Mother's Day; and
(h)on Father's Day.

33.For the purposes of the preceding paragraph:
(a)with the Skype (or telephone contact only if a Skype call is unavailable) is to be initiated by the party who has Child A in their care between:
(i)4.00 pm – 4.15 pm AWST if Child A is in Perth and the mother is in New Zealand;
(ii)4.00 pm – 4.15 pm NZST if Child A is in New Zealand and the father is in Australia; and
(iii)7.00 pm – 7.15 pm NZST if Child A and both parties are in New Zealand.

(b)each party facilitates such Skype (or telephone contact only if a Skype call is unavailable) by:
(i)ensuring Child A has access to a mobile telephone and internet; and
(ii)that the relevant accounts are paid by the party in whose name the mobile telephone account(s) is held as and when due.

34.Except in the event of an emergency, the parties do:
(a)maintain their subscriptions for the Our Family Wizard application, until or unless another method of communication is agreed upon between the parties in writing;
(b)communicate in writing regarding Child A through the Our Family Wizard application; and
(c)check the Our Family Wizard application in a minimum of three times per week.

35.In the event of an emergency, the parties do forthwith contact each other by a telephone call and text message if the phone call is not answered.

Education
36.The parties do sign all such documents and do all such acts and things as shall be necessary to authorise and request each educational institution and extra-curricular activity provider attended by Child A to release to each of the parties such information regarding the progress of Child A in their education and extra-curricular activity as may be reasonably requested from time to time.
37.The parties refrain from enrolling Child A in any sport or other extracurricular activity that requires Child A's attendance during periods Child A is in the other party's care without first obtaining the other party's written consent.

Medical
38.The party who has the care of Child A do advise the other parent by telephone, and as soon as practicable, of any significant issue concerning the health or welfare of Child A.
39.Each party keep the other informed of any referrals made and details of any medical health professionals including doctors, dentists, hospitals and therapists that Child A consults.
40.Each party authorise any health professional Child A consults, or who is responsible for administering medical treatment to Child A, to release to the other party copies of all reports, correspondence and information in relation to Child A when requested, and the parties do provide those health professionals with copies of the relevant parts of these orders.
41.In the event Child A is prescribed or given medication, or a particular form of treatment is required to continue into a period when the other party will be caring for Child A:
(a)the parent in whose care Child A was when the medication/treatment was prescribed, ensure that any prescribed medication or materials required for such treatment is sent with Child A to the other parent, as well as an explanation of the reason it is required and the appropriate dosage or method of treatment;
(b)the party who is caring for Child A do facilitate the administration of such medication and/or treatment prescribed in the preceding sub‑paragraph hereof, and ensure that any medication or materials for treatment be returned with Child A to the other parent.

Injunctions
42.On a without admission as to need basis, the parties be restrained by injunction and injunctions be granted restraining each of them, in the presence of Child A or causing or permitting any other person to do so, from:
(a)denigrating the other party, that party's partner, spouse, friends or relatives;
(b)discussing disagreements over parenting arrangements or issues relating to parenting or child support matters;
(c)permitting Child A to view any court documents or legal correspondence in relation to these proceedings; and
(d)discussing the Family Court proceedings or the contents of any documents produced or made available to the parties because of these proceedings, including but not limited to, affidavits, reports, correspondence and documents produced pursuant to any subpoenas;

Miscellaneous
43.The parties must keep each other informed at all times of their current residential addresses, contact telephone numbers and email addresses and promptly inform each other of any changes.
44.The parties must do all things necessary to ensure that Child A maintains a current passport and must each meet one half of any associated costs.
45.Child A's passport is to be retained by the mother, other than when it is required for the purposes of Child A travelling with the father or unaccompanied.
46.The parties are at liberty to provide a copy of these orders to Child A's school and to any medical practitioner with whom she is engaged.
47.Both parties are at liberty to attend Child A's school assemblies, parent teacher meetings, sports carnivals and other special school events to which parents are usually invited, on the condition that the father not approach or speak to the mother, the mother's husband, or Child C.
48.The parties must do all acts and things, give all consents and sign all documents necessary to give full effect to these orders.
49.The mother must register a copy of these orders in the relevant court in New Zealand.
50.All outstanding applications and responses be and are otherwise dismissed.

51.All documents produced by named persons pursuant to subpoena be returned or destroyed in accordance with the request from the named person on the expiration of 42 days from the date hereof.
52.In relation to material tendered as an exhibit into evidence in these proceedings:
(a)all parties must collect the exhibits tendered by them ("their exhibits"), from the Chambers of Justice O'Brien, at least 28 days, and no later than 42 days, from the date hereof;
(b)all parties must contact the Chambers of Justice O'Brien to arrange the collection of their exhibits;
(c)in default of compliance with subparagraph (a), all material tendered as an exhibit, save and except for material produced pursuant to subpoena, will be destroyed by the Court without notice to the parties.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Family Court of Western Australia.
KM
Associate
30 NOVEMBER 2022