CDP16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CDP16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 1054

Appeal from: CDP16 v Minister for Immigration and Anor [2018] FCCA 3708
File number(s): NSD 90 of 2019
Judge(s): ABRAHAM J
Date of judgment: 8 July 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court dismissing application for judicial review of the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority– whether the Immigration Assessment Authority failed to consider an integer of the applicant’s claim– where tribunal failed to consider membership of a particular social group– no jurisdictional error found– application dismissed.   
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5H(1), 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 473DD
Cases cited:

Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2003] HCA 26; (2003) 197 ALR 389

MZZTW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 475

SZNOE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 96

Date of hearing:  27 May 2019
Registry: New South Wales
Division:  General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 49
Counsel for the Appellant: Ms U Okereke-Fisher
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr J Smith
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ms A McCormick of MinterEllison
Counsel for the Second Respondent The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 90 of 2019
BETWEEN:

CDP16

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

ABRAHAM J

DATE OF ORDER:

8 JULY 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pays the costs of the first respondent to be agreed or taxed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

ABRAHAM J:

  1. The appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka who arrived in Australia as an unlawful maritime arrival on 26 August 2012. The appellant applied for a protection visa which was received by the Minister’s department on 19 August 2013. His claims for protection were set out in a witness statement attached to that application. He applied for a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa (SHEV) on 3 October 2015, which was received on 7 October 2015. On 8 June 2016, the Minister’s delegate refused the application. On 25 July 2016, the Immigration Assessment Authority (the Authority) affirmed that decision. This is an appeal from an order made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 14 December 2018 dismissing an application for judicial review of that decision: see CDP16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 3708.

  2. The appellant’s sole ground of appeal alleges jurisdictional error on the basis that the primary judge erred by failing to find the Authority had failed to address and register findings on an integer of the appellant’s claim. The ground alleges as follows:

    (1)that the Authority erred in not considering or making a finding in relation to the appellant’s claim that he is a member of a particular social group, namely, the Temple Group; and

    (2)the Authority…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 1054
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of CDP16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved an appeal by the appellant against a decision of the Federal Circuit Court dismissing an application for judicial review of the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA). The appellant claimed protection on the basis of being a Tamil Hindu, a supporter of the United National Party, and a member of a group threatened by Sinhala thugs, Rexy and Thushara, and their supporters. The IAA accepted the appellant’s ethnic and religious background, but found his claims of threats and fear of harm were not credible. The primary issue before the court was whether the IAA failed to consider the appellant’s claim of being a member of a particular social group, specifically the "Temple group," which was not directly addressed in the IAA’s decision.

The court held that the IAA had indeed considered the appellant's claims of threats and fear of harm from both specific individuals and a broader group of Sinhalese people. The court found that the IAA's findings were reasonably open to it based on the evidence presented and the reasoning provided. It was determined that there was no jurisdictional error in the IAA’s consideration of the appellant’s claims, as the IAA's findings on the appellant’s fear of harm were either rejected at the factual level or were not well-founded. The court rejected the appellant's argument that the IAA failed to consider his claim of being a member of a particular social group, finding that the appellant’s claims were in fact addressed in the context of threats from a broader group of Sinhalese people.

Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the first respondent. This decision underscores the importance of the IAA's assessment of the credibility of the applicant's claims and the need for a clear and thorough consideration of all relevant evidence in such cases.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pays the costs of the first respondent to be agreed or taxed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons set out below, the ground of appeal has not been established. Background This is taken from the judgment of the Court below (at [4] to [7]), there being no challenge as to the accuracy of the Court’s recitation. In summary, the appellant claimed protection on the following basis:The applicant claimed to be of Tamil ethnicity and of the Hindu faith. He claimed that he and his family are supporters of the United National Party. He claimed that, in 2008, his father decided to build a Hindu temple in their local area, which was completed in 2010. His father was allegedly once beaten by two “Sinhala thugs”, Rexy (“R”) and Thushara (“T”), who were supporters of the Public Alliance. The applicant claimed that, in 2011, R and T stopped him and warned him not to get involved in Hindu activities. In the applicant’s visa application, he stated that he did not take the threats seriously and continued to engage in the youth club activities.The applicant claimed that, in 2012, he was stopped and threatened by R and his friends who were carrying wooden poles and an iron bar. The applicant claimed that he escaped, and was not able to lodge a complaint at the police station the following day because there were no witnesses. He claimed that he later received phone calls and death threats from either R or T, and that he will be harmed by these “Sinhala thugs” and their supporters if he is returned to Sri Lanka. The applicant was interviewed on arrival in Australia by an officer of the Minister’s department. He stated that he had left Sri Lanka because he was perceived to be an LTTE supporter, as a result of delivering aid to the tsunami affected north (the Mullaitivu district). No mention was made of the “Sinhala thugs”.The decision of the Authority The following is taken from the summary provided by the respondent in his written submissions, it being accepted by the appellant as an accurate summary. The Authority accepted that the appellant is a Sri Lankan national of Tamil ethnicity and Hindu faith. It accepted that the appellant is a practising Hindu, and that he and his father faced opposition in relation to building the temple. It accepted as plausible that the appellant's father was beaten on one occasion, and found that a small Hindu temple was completed in the appellant's area by 2010. Hindu religion, temple activities and threats from thugs: After recounting the appellant's evidence given in the SHEV application and at the entry and delegate interviews, the Authority noted that it had significant concerns about the appellant's credibility and reasons he claims to fear harm if returned to Sri Lanka. While accepting that the appellant may have been stopped by two people in 2011 when he and a friend were on their way to or from the temple, it did not accept that he was threatened against involvement in temple activities by two thugs, it did not consider it credible that the appellant would not take such threats seriously and would not mention them in his arrival interview, and did not accept that he feared any harm as a result of the incident. The Authority also doubted that the June 2012 incident (as extracted above at [4]) occurred as the appellant stated in his SHEV application, but instead, accepted his account given at the SHEV interview. That is, that there was an incident in 2012 in which the appellant was slapped, but the Authority did not accept that any threat was made or that he was afraid for his life as a result. As the Authority did not accept that the appellant was threatened, it followed that it did not accept that he and his father went to the police the next day and that the police did not take action, nor that he received death threats on the phone. The Authority also did not accept that Sinhala men came looking for him after he left Sri Lanka.

Decision

Reasons for decision

This is taken from the judgment of the Court below (at [4] to [7]), there being no challenge as to the accuracy of the Court’s recitation. In summary, the appellant claimed protection on the following basis:The applicant claimed to be of Tamil ethnicity and of the Hindu faith. He claimed that he and his family are supporters of the United National Party. He claimed that, in 2008, his father decided to build a Hindu temple in their local area, which was completed in 2010. His father was allegedly once beaten by two “Sinhala thugs”, Rexy (“R”) and Thushara (“T”), who were supporters of the Public Alliance. The applicant claimed that, in 2011, R and T stopped him and warned him not to get involved in Hindu activities. In the applicant’s visa application, he stated that he did not take the threats seriously and continued to engage in the youth club activities.The applicant claimed that, in 2012, he was stopped and threatened by R and his friends who were carrying wooden poles and an iron bar. The applicant claimed that he escaped, and was not able to lodge a complaint at the police station the following day because there were no witnesses. He claimed that he later received phone calls and death threats from either R or T, and that he will be harmed by these “Sinhala thugs” and their supporters if he is returned to Sri Lanka. The applicant was interviewed on arrival in Australia by an officer of the Minister’s department. He stated that he had left Sri Lanka because he was perceived to be an LTTE supporter, as a result of delivering aid to the tsunami affected north (the Mullaitivu district). No mention was made of the “Sinhala thugs”.The decision of the Authority The following is taken from the summary provided by the respondent in his written submissions, it being accepted by the appellant as an accurate summary. The Authority accepted that the appellant is a Sri Lankan national of Tamil ethnicity and Hindu faith. It accepted that the appellant is a practising Hindu, and that he and his father faced opposition in relation to building the temple. It accepted as plausible that the appellant's father was beaten on one occasion, and found that a small Hindu temple was completed in the appellant's area by 2010. Hindu religion, temple activities and threats from thugs: After recounting the appellant's evidence given in the SHEV application and at the entry and delegate interviews, the Authority noted that it had significant concerns about the appellant's credibility and reasons he claims to fear harm if returned to Sri Lanka. While accepting that the appellant may have been stopped by two people in 2011 when he and a friend were on their way to or from the temple, it did not accept that he was threatened against involvement in temple activities by two thugs, it did not consider it credible that the appellant would not take such threats seriously and would not mention them in his arrival interview, and did not accept that he feared any harm as a result of the incident. The Authority also doubted that the June 2012 incident (as extracted above at [4]) occurred as the appellant stated in his SHEV application, but instead, accepted his account given at the SHEV interview. That is, that there was an incident in 2012 in which the appellant was slapped, but the Authority did not accept that any threat was made or that he was afraid for his life as a result. As the Authority did not accept that the appellant was threatened, it followed that it did not accept that he and his father went to the police the next day and that the police did not take action, nor that he received death threats on the phone. The Authority also did not accept that Sinhala men came looking for him after he left Sri Lanka.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The primary judge concluded that, properly read, the reasons of the Authority reflect that it considered both the fear of harm said to emanate from R and T (and a broader group of criminal thugs) as well as threats generally from Sinhalese people (at [52]-[63]). He observed that the applicant had not satisfactorily addressed that the Authority had found that his claims to fear harm were either rejected at the factual level, or were otherwise not well-founded (at [65]). His Honour ultimately concluded (at [68]) that: In the current case, there is no jurisdictional error in the IAA’s consideration and findings as to whether the applicant held a well-founded fear. The IAA’s findings at the factual level were all reasonably open to it, and for the reasons it gave, and which were probative of what was before it. Simply, there was no need in the current circumstances for the IAA to go on to consider whether any social group, let alone a particular social group, existed. In all, ground one is not made out.Consideration The appellant’s argument is that he has made a claim to being a member of a particular social group referred to as the Temple group and that a consideration of the Authority’s reasons reflects that claim has not been addressed. The appellant relied on Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2003] HCA 26; (2003) 197 ALR 389, in particular at [26] per Gummow and Callinan JJ, in support of this ground. It follows, so the appellant argues, that the primary judge was in error to reject ground 1 of his appeal. On the other hand, the respondent submits that the appellant’s claims in relation to fear of harm was in fact put on a more limited basis than the appellant contends, that the Authority addressed the claim that was in fact made, and that the reasoning of the primary judge in dismissing the appeal on that ground was correct. I accept the respondent’s contentions. First, as the primary judge recognised, to determine whether the Authority failed to consider the claim, it was first necessary to identify the evidence presented in support of the claim. The appellant accepted that the primary judge has accurately summarised that evidence (referred to above at [16], [17]). The appellant’s argument as to the Temple group relied heavily on his entry interview, which is referred to as the first item in the summary of evidence. That could properly be described as the high point of the evidence for the appellant’s argument. The appellant submitted that the answer in the entry interview necessitated the Authority assessing whether the Temple group was a particular social group. However, that evidence did not stand alone. In particular, as the primary judge observed (at [50], references omitted):Relevantly, the applicant himself summarised his claims in the Statutory Declaration as follows:What I fear may happen to me if I return to that country and whyI believe that I am at risk of being harmed and killed possibly by [R], [T] and their supporters. I also fear the Sinhalese in my area as I am a devout Hindu actively involved in Hindu religious activities.