FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
CDP16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 1054
Appeal from: CDP16 v Minister for Immigration and Anor [2018] FCCA 3708 File number(s): NSD 90 of 2019 Judge(s): ABRAHAM J Date of judgment: 8 July 2019 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court dismissing application for judicial review of the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority– whether the Immigration Assessment Authority failed to consider an integer of the applicant’s claim– where tribunal failed to consider membership of a particular social group– no jurisdictional error found– application dismissed. Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5H(1), 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 473DD Cases cited: Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2003] HCA 26; (2003) 197 ALR 389
MZZTW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 475
SZNOE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 96
Date of hearing: 27 May 2019 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 49 Counsel for the Appellant: Ms U Okereke-Fisher Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr J Smith Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ms A McCormick of MinterEllison Counsel for the Second Respondent The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs ORDERS
NSD 90 of 2019 BETWEEN: CDP16
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
ABRAHAM J
DATE OF ORDER:
8 JULY 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pays the costs of the first respondent to be agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
ABRAHAM J:
The appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka who arrived in Australia as an unlawful maritime arrival on 26 August 2012. The appellant applied for a protection visa which was received by the Minister’s department on 19 August 2013. His claims for protection were set out in a witness statement attached to that application. He applied for a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa (SHEV) on 3 October 2015, which was received on 7 October 2015. On 8 June 2016, the Minister’s delegate refused the application. On 25 July 2016, the Immigration Assessment Authority (the Authority) affirmed that decision. This is an appeal from an order made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 14 December 2018 dismissing an application for judicial review of that decision: see CDP16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 3708.
The appellant’s sole ground of appeal alleges jurisdictional error on the basis that the primary judge erred by failing to find the Authority had failed to address and register findings on an integer of the appellant’s claim. The ground alleges as follows:
(1)that the Authority erred in not considering or making a finding in relation to the appellant’s claim that he is a member of a particular social group, namely, the Temple Group; and
(2)the Authority…
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 1054
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court held that the IAA had indeed considered the appellant's claims of threats and fear of harm from both specific individuals and a broader group of Sinhalese people. The court found that the IAA's findings were reasonably open to it based on the evidence presented and the reasoning provided. It was determined that there was no jurisdictional error in the IAA’s consideration of the appellant’s claims, as the IAA's findings on the appellant’s fear of harm were either rejected at the factual level or were not well-founded. The court rejected the appellant's argument that the IAA failed to consider his claim of being a member of a particular social group, finding that the appellant’s claims were in fact addressed in the context of threats from a broader group of Sinhalese people.
Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the first respondent. This decision underscores the importance of the IAA's assessment of the credibility of the applicant's claims and the need for a clear and thorough consideration of all relevant evidence in such cases.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pays the costs of the first respondent to be agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The primary judge concluded that, properly read, the reasons of the Authority reflect that it considered both the fear of harm said to emanate from R and T (and a broader group of criminal thugs) as well as threats generally from Sinhalese people (at [52]-[63]). He observed that the applicant had not satisfactorily addressed that the Authority had found that his claims to fear harm were either rejected at the factual level, or were otherwise not well-founded (at [65]). His Honour ultimately concluded (at [68]) that: In the current case, there is no jurisdictional error in the IAA’s consideration and findings as to whether the applicant held a well-founded fear. The IAA’s findings at the factual level were all reasonably open to it, and for the reasons it gave, and which were probative of what was before it. Simply, there was no need in the current circumstances for the IAA to go on to consider whether any social group, let alone a particular social group, existed. In all, ground one is not made out.Consideration The appellant’s argument is that he has made a claim to being a member of a particular social group referred to as the Temple group and that a consideration of the Authority’s reasons reflects that claim has not been addressed. The appellant relied on Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2003] HCA 26; (2003) 197 ALR 389, in particular at [26] per Gummow and Callinan JJ, in support of this ground. It follows, so the appellant argues, that the primary judge was in error to reject ground 1 of his appeal. On the other hand, the respondent submits that the appellant’s claims in relation to fear of harm was in fact put on a more limited basis than the appellant contends, that the Authority addressed the claim that was in fact made, and that the reasoning of the primary judge in dismissing the appeal on that ground was correct. I accept the respondent’s contentions. First, as the primary judge recognised, to determine whether the Authority failed to consider the claim, it was first necessary to identify the evidence presented in support of the claim. The appellant accepted that the primary judge has accurately summarised that evidence (referred to above at [16], [17]). The appellant’s argument as to the Temple group relied heavily on his entry interview, which is referred to as the first item in the summary of evidence. That could properly be described as the high point of the evidence for the appellant’s argument. The appellant submitted that the answer in the entry interview necessitated the Authority assessing whether the Temple group was a particular social group. However, that evidence did not stand alone. In particular, as the primary judge observed (at [50], references omitted):Relevantly, the applicant himself summarised his claims in the Statutory Declaration as follows:What I fear may happen to me if I return to that country and whyI believe that I am at risk of being harmed and killed possibly by [R], [T] and their supporters. I also fear the Sinhalese in my area as I am a devout Hindu actively involved in Hindu religious activities.