FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
CCD16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection
[2018] FCA 343
Appeal from: CCD16 v Minister for Immigration [2017] FCCA 392 File number: NSD 401 of 2017 Judge: RARES J Date of judgment: 26 February 2018 Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act1976 (Cth) Part VB
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36, 473DD
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees
Cases cited: Date of hearing: 26 February 2018 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: No Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 15 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr B Zipser Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr T Reilly Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mills Oakley ORDERS
NSD 401 of 2017 BETWEEN: CCD16
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
RARES J
DATE OF ORDER:
26 FEBRUARY 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed
2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)RARES J:
The appellant filed a notice of appeal on 22 March 2017 from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court to refuse his application for Constitutional writ relief from the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority given on 1 July 2016 that affirmed the Minister’s delegate’s decision not to grant the appellant a protection visa: CCD16 v Minister for Immigration [2017] FCCA 392.
The appellant was represented by counsel before the Federal Circuit Court, but by different counsel on the appeal.
The draft amended notice of appeal
In his written submissions filed on 16 February 2018, the appellant’s current counsel abandoned all the grounds of appeal filed on 22 March 2017 and propounded a completely fresh draft amended notice of appeal that raised three new grounds. In those written submissions, the appellant accepted that there was no merit in the grounds originally raised and, having looked at the matter in the appeal book, I agree.
The new grounds sought to agitate a complaint about the way in which the Authority approached its task. During the course of argument, it became clear that there was no merit in either of the first two grounds on their face.
The first new ground had asserted that the Authority, in considering whether the appellant had been entitled to a protection visa under s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) in accordance with Australia’s complementary protection obligations, had failed to deal properly with a claim that the appellant faced a real risk of extortion were he to be returned to Sri Lanka, the country of his citizenship. However, on examination, the Authority’s reasons carefully dealt with, and affirmed, the delegate’s decision that found that the appellant was not at risk of extortion by reason of any matter that…
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 343
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court needed to determine whether the proposed new grounds for appeal had sufficient merit to warrant an amendment to the notice of appeal. The court also had to assess whether the appellant had abandoned the original grounds of appeal, and if so, whether the appeal should be dismissed. The court considered the principles governing amendments to notices of appeal and the circumstances in which such amendments should be allowed.
The court found that the proposed new grounds did not possess any substantial merit, and therefore, did not warrant an amendment to the notice of appeal. The court also determined that the appellant had abandoned the original grounds of appeal, leading to the conclusion that the appeal should be dismissed. The court ordered the appeal to be dismissed with costs, to be paid by the appellant to the respondent. The court relied on established principles and case law to reach this decision.
The court ordered that the appeal be dismissed, and that the appellant pay the first respondent's costs. The entry of these orders was in accordance with Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed
2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
CCD16 initially applied for a protection visa, which was refused by the Department of Immigration and Border Protection. He then appealed this decision to the AAT, which also dismissed his application. Dissatisfied with the outcome, CCD16 sought leave to appeal to the Federal Court. The Court was required to consider whether the proposed new grounds for the appeal had any substantial merit and if the appellant should be permitted to amend the grounds of his appeal.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In considering whether the proposed new grounds for the appeal had substantial merit, the court examined the arguments presented by the appellant. The court found that the new grounds did not present a valid legal challenge to the decision of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. The court noted that the appellant had effectively abandoned the original grounds of appeal, and the new grounds were not sufficient to warrant a continuation of the appeal process.
The court's reasoning was grounded in the principle that an appeal should only be entertained if it has a real prospect of success. Given the lack of substantial merit in the new grounds, the court concluded that the appeal should not proceed. Furthermore, the court applied the legal test for assessing the substantial merit of proposed new grounds, which requires a showing that the grounds are both legally sound and factually supported.
The court also considered whether the appellant should be permitted to amend the grounds of the appeal. The court noted that the appellant had abandoned the original grounds and sought to replace them with new grounds that were found to lack substantial merit. The court held that permitting the amendment would not serve the interests of justice, as the new grounds did not warrant further consideration. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal with costs.
The ratio decidendi of this decision is that an appeal will not be permitted to proceed if the proposed new grounds lack substantial merit and do not present a valid legal challenge to the decision under review. This decision also reinforces the principle that an amendment to the grounds of appeal is only permissible if the new grounds are both legally sound and factually supported, and if permitting the amendment would serve the interests of justice. In this case, the court found that neither condition was met, leading to the dismissal of the appeal.