CBZ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CBZ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1762

Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal: CBZ17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 1325
File number: NSD 965 of 2018
Judge: ROBERTSON J
Date of judgment: 14 November 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for leave to appeal from judgment and orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, summarily dismissing an application for judicial review of decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal refusing a protection visa – where certificates under s 438 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 438
Cases cited: Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc [1991] FCA 655; 33 FCR 397
Date of hearing: 14 November 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 36
Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person with the aid of an interpreter
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr S Valliappan of DLA Piper Australia
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent submitted save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 965 of 2018
BETWEEN:

CBZ17

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

ROBERTSON J

DATE OF ORDER:

14 NOVEMBER 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for leave to appeal is refused.

2.The applicant is to pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or assessed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

ROBERTSON J:

Introduction

  1. Before the Court is an application for leave to appeal from the judgment and orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia given and made on 23 May 2018. 

  2. That Court, pursuant to rule 44.12(1)(a) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), dismissed an application for judicial review of the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal made on 10 April 2017 on the basis that the applicant was unable to demonstrate an arguable case of jurisdictional error by the Tribunal. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister made on 28 July 2014 not to grant the applicant a protection visa.

  3. The applicant is a citizen of Nepal.  She arrived in Australia as the holder of a subclass 676 (visitor) visa on 28 November 2005.

    Short chronology

  4. The applicant made the current application, her second protection visa application, on 25 February 2014.

  5. The applicant appeared at a hearing before the Tribunal on 28 February 2017.  This was in circumstances where the Federal Circuit Court had, by consent, remitted the matter to the Tribunal on the basis that, contrary to the finding of the then Refugee Review Tribunal, the applicant was not barred from having her claims for protection assessed under the Refugees Convention criterion set out in s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act 1956 (Cth).

  6. Following the hearing on 28 February 2017, the Tribunal sent a letter to…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 1762
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, CBZ17, sought leave to appeal from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, which had dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) refusing a protection visa. The applicant argued that the Tribunal had erred in its handling of certificates issued under section 438 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and in failing to afford procedural fairness. The court needed to determine whether the Federal Circuit Court had erred in dismissing the application for judicial review and whether the applicant had grounds to appeal to the High Court.

The primary legal issue was whether the Federal Circuit Court correctly dismissed the applicant’s application for judicial review. Specifically, the court examined whether the Tribunal had erred in its handling of the section 438 certificates and whether the applicant had been denied procedural fairness. The court also assessed whether the Tribunal had overlooked or failed to properly consider the applicant’s claims related to domestic violence and her conversion to Christianity.

The court found that the four certificates in question were invalid and that the Tribunal had correctly treated them as such. The court concluded that the Tribunal had not acted upon the invalid certificates and had discussed them with the applicant during the hearing, thereby ensuring procedural fairness. The court further found that the Tribunal had thoroughly considered the applicant’s claims regarding domestic violence and her conversion to Christianity, rejecting them on the merits. The court held that the applicant had not demonstrated any arguable jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal. Consequently, the application for leave to appeal was refused.

The court ordered that the application for leave to appeal is refused, and the applicant is to pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or assessed. The entry of orders is governed by Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for leave to appeal is refused.

2. The applicant is to pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The primary judge also heard oral submissions from the solicitor for the Minister in relation to the issues concerning several s 438 certificates issued by the Minister’s Department.The decision of the primary judge As to the s 438 certificates, the primary judge said, at [20]-[21] and [27]-[28], it was plain that the four purported certificates were all invalid. It was also plain that the Tribunal treated the certificates as invalid at [56] of its reasons. The Tribunal was correct to do so. There was nothing to indicate that the Tribunal acted in any way on the invalid certificates. The primary judge examined the documents purportedly covered by the certificates and found they had only passing contextual relevance, if any, to the review conducted by the Tribunal. There was nothing in them enlivening an obligation of disclosure by the Tribunal. The Tribunal’s decision record revealed that the Tribunal discussed the certificates and covered documents with the applicant during the hearing. The primary judge accepted that it was apparent from [56] of the Tribunal’s reasons that the certificates were not “acted upon” by the Tribunal, were discussed with the applicant during the hearing, and that the applicant therefore had not been denied procedural fairness in relation to the certificates and the documents covered by them. In relation to ground 1, the primary judge said it was a broad and unparticularised allegation that the Tribunal failed to afford the applicant natural justice and procedural fairness. Absent further particulars this ground did not disclose any arguable case of jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal. In relation to ground 2, the primary judge said that absent further particulars this ground did not disclose any arguable case of jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal. Moreover, it was plain from the Tribunal’s decision record that the Tribunal considered all of the applicant’s claims and evidence. The Tribunal considered and rejected the applicant’s claims concerning: her purported conversion to Christianity; domestic violence and separation from her husband; harm by her husband upon her return to Nepal; difficulties reintegrating upon her return to Nepal; and difficulties posed by the community, due to the applicant’s purported conversion to Christianity, upon her return to Nepal. In relation to ground 3, the primary judge said it repeated the allegation that the applicant’s claims and evidence were overlooked by the Tribunal. Absent any particulars, this ground did not disclose any jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal. It was noted that the Tribunal plainly considered and rejected the applicant’s claims to have been the victim of domestic violence.Leave to appeal to this Court The application for leave to appeal to this Court contained two grounds, in the following terms:1.The Federal Circuit Court Judge erred by failing to find that the Tribunal Member deprived me of natural justice and procedural fairness because the Tribunal Member did not disclose me the existence certificate and notification in relation to the disclosure of certain information made to the Tribunal by the first respondent’s department in the course of the review by the Tribunal that this constituted a jurisdictional error found in MZAFZ -v- Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 243 FCR 1, Minister for Immigration and Border Protection -v- Singh (2016) 244 FCR305 and BEG15 -v- Minister for Immigration and Border Protection in circumstances where the delegate of the First Respondent issued certificate pursuant to section 438 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).2.It is contended that the Tribunal Member erred by ignoring or undermining my claims on the issue of my suffering as result of domestic violence and my conversion to Christianity as I believe that the Tribunal Member made its mind not to believe me and my answers were squarely dismissive in which my case was taken in breach of the rules of procedural fairness and natural justice.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Minister submitted that, to the extent that this ground was a reference to denial of procedural fairness based on the Tribunal’s treatment of the certificates, his submissions regarding the first ground of the application for leave to appeal applied. Consideration In my opinion, the judgment of the Federal Circuit Court was an interlocutory judgment, and the appellant therefore needs leave to appeal. As to ground 1, concerning the s 438 certificates, there is no reason to go behind or question what the Tribunal said at [56] as follows:As discussed during the Tribunal hearing, some of the documents on the Department files are subject to s.438 certificates. The certificates refer to internal working documents and business affairs and the Tribunal considers that they are invalid. Neither is there any reason to doubt the correctness of the treatment of this issue by the primary judge: see Decor Corporation. It is not arguable that the primary judge erred by failing to find that the Tribunal deprived the applicant of natural justice and procedural fairness because the Tribunal did not disclose to her the existence of the certificates and notification in relation to the disclosure of certain information made to the Tribunal by the Department. I would refuse leave to appeal in relation to ground 1. Ground 2 also has no substance. It does not suggest any reason to doubt the correctness of the primary judge’s judgment in this respect. There is no basis either articulated or at all for the contention that the Tribunal had prejudged the applicant’s domestic violence or conversion to Christianity claims. Certainly the Tribunal did not ignore those claims and dealt with them at substantial length. As found by the primary judge at [24], the Tribunal considered all of the applicant’s claims and evidence and specifically considered the applicant’s claims concerning her conversion to Christianity (at [30]-[37] of the Tribunal’s decision) and domestic violence (at [38]-[45] of the Tribunal’s decision). I would refuse leave to appeal in relation to ground 2. As to the ground in the Draft Notice of Appeal, insofar as it relies on the s 438 certificate point that is the basis of ground 1 of the application for leave to appeal, I have already considered it and found it to be not arguable. Insofar as it is an unparticularised allegation that the Tribunal failed to afford procedural fairness, absent further substance, it does not disclose an arguable ground of jurisdictional error. I would refuse leave to appeal in relation to this ground.Conclusion and orders The application for leave to appeal is refused. The applicant is to pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or assessed.