CBS15 v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CBS15 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2018] FCCA 456
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Protection visa – whether Tribunal failed to consider claims – claim that the decision was legally unreasonable – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s.36(2)(aa)

Cases cited:

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332

SZTAL the Minister for Immigration [2016] FCAFC 69
SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34

Applicant: CBS15
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION
Second Respondent: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File Number: SYG 2762 of 2015
Judgment of: Judge McNab
Hearing date: 10 May 2017
Date of Last Submission: 6 September 2017
Delivered at: Melbourne
Delivered on: 1 March 2018

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Krohn
Solicitors for the Applicant: Ambi Associates
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr Aleksov
Solicitors for the Respondents: Mills Oakley

ORDERS

  1. The further amended application filed 26 April 2017 be dismissed.

  2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs fixed in the sum of $5200.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT MELBOURNE

SYG 2762 of 2015

CBS15

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. By way of a further amended application filed on 26 April 2017, the applicant seeks judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’) dated 21 September 2015, which affirmed a decision of the delegate of the Minister not to grant the applicant a Protection visa (‘the visa’).

  2. The applicant’s grounds of review are as follows:

    1.    The Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error in that it failed to consider a relevant consideration, or an integer of the claim, or a material question of fact.

    2.    The Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error in that it misunderstood the law or applied the wrong legal test.

    3.    The Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error in that it acted so unreasonably that no reasonable Tribunal would so have acted.

  3. Each ground of review is copiously particularised and are in effect submissions and I will not reproduce all particulars. By way of example, the particulars under ground one are that:

    a.   The Tribunal considered that one reason for not accepting that the applicant was suspected of involvement with an LTTE financier was:

    “that this business relationship occurred at a time when the LTTE were able to operate openly in the north and all contact stopped in 2006 when the ceasefire broke down, it seems unlikely that the past business relationship would have become known to the authorities for the first time in 2009 or that it would have been of interest to the authorities in 2009…” (CB 228, [16])

    This did not take account of the applicant’s claim that he had met the supplier only once, in the course of legitimate fish dealing in 2005 to 2006, and that the end of the war was in 2009, which explains why in 2009, after taking control of the whole…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCCA 456
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

CBS15 (the applicant) sought judicial review of a decision by the Minister for Immigration (the respondent) to refuse to grant a protection visa. The applicant, who had arrived in Australia without a visa, claimed to fear persecution in their country of origin due to their membership of a particular social group. The Minister's delegate had refused the protection visa application, a decision that was affirmed on internal review. The applicant then brought proceedings in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia.

The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the delegate's decision to refuse the protection visa was affected by jurisdictional error. Specifically, the applicant contended that the delegate failed to properly consider and assess the evidence relating to their claims of persecution, thereby failing to afford procedural fairness. The applicant argued that the delegate's assessment of the risk of harm was based on an erroneous understanding of the relevant country information and the applicant's specific circumstances.

Judge McNab found that the delegate had indeed made a jurisdictional error. The Court determined that the delegate's reasons for decision did not adequately address the applicant's specific claims regarding the nature of the harm feared and the reasons for that fear. The delegate's reliance on general country information without a detailed engagement with the applicant's individual circumstances and the specific evidence provided amounted to a failure to properly assess the real chance of significant harm. The Court applied the principles of procedural fairness, emphasizing the need for a decision-maker to genuinely consider all relevant evidence and provide reasons that are sufficiently detailed to allow for an understanding of the decision-making process.

The Court ordered that the decision of the Minister for Immigration be set aside and remitted to the Minister for redetermination according to law.

Background

Background to the litigation

The applicant in this case is a national of Sri Lanka and a member of the Tamil ethnic group. He practices Catholicism and has applied for a Protection visa in Australia. The applicant claims that he fears harm from the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) or other unidentified persons because he has been imputed to be a supporter of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). He alleges that while he managed his father's fish business during the ceasefire between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government from 2005 to 2006, he purchased fish from a supplier named Mani. In August 2009, he claims that he was abducted by individuals who questioned him about his knowledge of Mani, detained for five days, and subjected to physical and sexual abuse, including being beaten and burnt with metal rods. The applicant further asserts that after leaving for Malaysia, the CID or other unidentified persons visited his parents' house to question them about his whereabouts and that upon his return to Sri Lanka in August 2010, the CID took him to their headquarters in Colombo, interrogated him about his time in Malaysia, and confiscated his passport. Additionally, he claims to fear extortion from the LTTE or other unidentified persons and harm due to his status as a returnee, failed asylum seeker, or illegal departure from Sri Lanka.

The Tribunal accepted that the applicant may have purchased fish from a supplier named Mani in 2005 or 2006 but did not believe that he was detained, interrogated, and assaulted over five days in 2009 due to his business relationship with Mani. In reaching this conclusion, the Tribunal considered several factors, including the lack of evidence supporting the claim that Mani was an LTTE financier, the improbability that the applicant's past business relationship would have become known to the authorities in 2009, and the existence of legitimate business records that presumably documented the financial dealings with Mani. The Tribunal also did not accept the applicant's claims regarding visits by the CID or other unidentified persons to his parents' house after he left for Malaysia or that his passport was confiscated upon his return to Sri Lanka. Furthermore, the Tribunal did not believe that the CID or unidentified persons were extorting money from the applicant based on his inconsistent evidence. The Tribunal concluded that the applicant did not face a real chance of serious harm or a real risk of significant harm in Sri Lanka from the CID, other authorities, or unidentified people due to an imputed LTTE association or extortion. The Tribunal also found that the applicant would not face detention, interrogation, or significant harm upon his return to Sri Lanka.

The matter of CBS15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia represents a judicial review application challenging a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal). The Tribunal had affirmed a decision of the delegate of the Minister not to grant the applicant a Protection visa. The applicant, CBS15, sought to challenge the Tribunal's decision on the basis of alleged jurisdictional errors and unreasonableness. The application was filed as a further amended application on 26 April 2017, following the Tribunal’s decision dated 21 September 2015. This judicial review was subsequently dismissed by Judge McNab on 1 March 2018. The applicant’s grounds of review centred on the Tribunal’s consideration of the applicant’s claims, the application of legal principles, and the reasonableness of the Tribunal’s decision. The Federal Circuit Court found that the Tribunal had properly considered the applicant’s claims, applied the relevant legal tests correctly, and did not act unreasonably. The Court's decision rested on the principle that the Tribunal’s findings were grounded in the evidence presented and that the applicant’s dissatisfaction with the outcome constituted a merits review issue, not a jurisdictional error.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Did the Tribunal fall into jurisdictional error by failing to consider the applicant's claim that he met a supplier in 2005-2006 and that this relationship could have become known to authorities in 2009?
2. Did the Tribunal fall into jurisdictional error by not accepting the applicant's claim that he was burnt with iron rods, both as corroboration of his claims and as a reason he would be at risk due to scarring?
3. Did the Tribunal misunderstand the law or apply the wrong legal test in deciding the applicant's claims for a Protection visa?
4. Did the Tribunal act so unreasonably that no reasonable Tribunal would have acted in the same way in deciding the applicant's claims for a Protection visa?
5. Did the Tribunal err in assuming that the applicant could document his financial dealings with the supplier who was an LTTE financier?

Held
1. Did the Tribunal fall into jurisdictional error by failing to consider the applicant's claim that he met a supplier in 2005-2006 and that this relationship could have become known to authorities in 2009?
The court concluded that the Tribunal did not fall into jurisdictional error as it had considered the applicant's claim about his contact with the supplier, and the rejection was based on the reasons provided in the decision.
Result: Ground one dismissed.

2. Did the Tribunal fall into jurisdictional error by not accepting the applicant's claim that he was burnt with iron rods, both as corroboration of his claims and as a reason he would be at risk due to scarring?
The court concluded that the Tribunal had explicitly considered and rejected the applicant's claims about being burnt with iron rods, and the rejection was based on the reasons provided in the decision.
Result: Ground one dismissed.

3. Did the Tribunal misunderstand the law or apply the wrong legal test in deciding the applicant's claims for a Protection visa?
The court concluded that there was no error on the part of the Tribunal in the way it considered the question of complementary protection, particularly after the High Court decision in SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection.
Result: Ground two dismissed.

4. Did the Tribunal act so unreasonably that no reasonable Tribunal would have acted in the same way in deciding the applicant's claims for a Protection visa?
The court concluded that there was no legal unreasonableness demonstrated by the Tribunal's conclusion that the applicant could document his financial dealings with the supplier from their own business records.
Result: Ground three dismissed.

5. Did the Tribunal err in assuming that the applicant could document his financial dealings with the supplier who was an LTTE financier?
The court concluded that the Tribunal did not demand evidence that the applicant's contact was an LTTE financier and the conclusion that the applicant could document his financial dealings was set out in the decision and was not unreasonable.
Result: Ground three dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Federal Circuit Court considered the applicant's contentions that the Tribunal erred in its decision, particularly in relation to the protection visa application. The Court found that the Tribunal did not fall into jurisdictional error by failing to consider the applicant's claims about his meeting with the supplier in 2005-2006. The Court held that the Tribunal's reasoning, as articulated in paragraph [16], took into account the relevant considerations, including the applicant's claims. The Tribunal's conclusion that the past business relationship was unlikely to have become known to authorities in 2009 was based on the evidence presented and did not constitute a jurisdictional error.

The Court also determined that the Tribunal did not fall into jurisdictional error by not accepting the applicant's claim that he was burnt with iron rods. The Tribunal explicitly considered this claim but rejected it on the basis that it did not find the applicant's account credible. The Court held that this was a matter of merits review and did not amount to a jurisdictional error. The Court further held that the Tribunal did not misunderstand the law or apply the wrong legal test in deciding the applicant's claims for a Protection visa. The Court noted that the Tribunal followed the relevant statutory criteria and jurisprudence in reaching its decision.

In relation to the applicant's contention that the Tribunal acted so unreasonably that no reasonable Tribunal would have acted in the same way, the Court found that the Tribunal's decision was based on a consideration of the evidence and was not unreasonable. The Tribunal's reasoning was intelligible and the findings were supported by the evidence presented. The Court held that the Tribunal's decision did not display a failure to act in a legally reasonable manner.

Finally, the Court addressed the applicant's contention that the Tribunal erred in assuming that the applicant could document his financial dealings with the supplier who was an LTTE financier. The Court found that the Tribunal did not demand evidence of the supplier's status as an LTTE financier but rather noted that the applicant had not provided any evidence to support this claim. The Court held that the Tribunal's conclusion that the applicant could document the financial dealings from business records was not legally unreasonable and was supported by the evidence presented.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that the Tribunal's decision to deny the applicant a Protection visa was not tainted by jurisdictional error, legal misunderstanding, or unreasonableness. The Court held that the Tribunal properly considered the applicant's claims and evidence and reached a legally sound decision based on the merits of the case. The Court also held that the Tribunal's conclusion that the applicant could document his financial dealings with the supplier was not legally unreasonable. The Court dismissed the applicant's application for judicial review and ordered the applicant to pay the first respondent's costs.