CBFC Limited v Honeyman
[2010] FMCA 602
•23 July 2010
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| CBFC LIMITED v HONEYMAN & ANOR | [2010] FMCA 602 |
| BANKRUPTCY – Creditor’s petition – whether debt relied on is owing – whether sufficient cause not to make a sequestration order. |
| Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), ss.41, 44, 46, 52 |
| Corney v Brien (1951) 84 CLR 343; [1951] HCA 31 Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Cumins (No.5) (2008) 6 ABC (NS) 82; [2008] FCA 794 Oliveri v Stafford and Others (1989) 24 FCR 413; [1989] FCA 486 Re Brink, Ex parte Commercial Banking Co of Sydney Ltd (1980) 30 ALR 433; [1980] FCA 78 Re Ling; Ex Parte Ling v Commonwealth of Australia (1995) 58 FCR 129; [1995] FCA 1410 Re Longo; Ex Parte Longo (1995) 57 FCR 523; [1995] FCA 1324 Re Sarina; Ex parte Council of the Shire of Wollondilly (1980) 43 FLR 163; [1980] FCA 66 Re Stokvis (1934) 7 ABC 53 Sarina v Council of the Shire of Wollondilly (1980) 48 FLR 372; [1980] FCA 138 Wolff v Donovan (1991) 29 FCR 480; [1991] FCA 222 Wren v Mahoney (1972) 126 CLR 212; [1972] HCA 5 |
| Applicant: | CBFC LIMITED ACN 008 519 462 |
| First Respondent: | GARRY JOHN HONEYMAN |
| Second Respondent: | CAROL LYNNDA HONEYMAN |
| File Number: | SYG 1044 of 2010 |
| Judgment of: | Barnes FM |
| Hearing dates: | 21, 22 and 23 July 2010 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 23 July 2010 |
REPRESENTATION
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Regency Lawyers |
| First and Second Respondents: | In person |
ORDERS
A sequestration order be made against the estates of Garry John Honeyman and Carol Lynnda Honeyman.
The applicant creditor’s costs (including any reserved costs) be taxed (in accordance with the Federal Court Rules) and paid from the estate of the respondent debtor in accordance with the Bankruptcy Act 1966.
Under the Bankruptcy Regulations a copy of these orders be given to the Official Receiver in Sydney within two (2) days by the applicant creditor.
THE COURT NOTES THAT:
The date of the act of bankruptcy by Garry John Honeyman is 30 April 2010.
The date of the act of bankruptcy by Carol Lynnda Honeyman is 30 April 2010.
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 1044 of 2010
| CBFC LIMITED ACN 008 519 462 |
Applicant
And
| GARRY JOHN HONEYMAN |
First Respondent
| CAROL LYNNDA HONEYMAN |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Revised from transcript)
The applicant creditor, CBFC Limited (CBFC), filed and presented a creditor’s petition on 12 May 2010 seeking that a sequestration order be made against the estate of the respondent debtors, Garry John Honeyman and Carol Lynnda Honeyman. The creditor’s petition claims that the respondent debtors owe the creditor the amount of $46,232.02 pursuant to a judgment/order obtained in the Local Court of New South Wales on 17 September 2009.
The creditor’s petition asserts that the respondent debtors each failed to comply on or before 30 April 2010 with the requirements of a Bankruptcy Notice served on each of them on 9 April 2010, or to satisfy the court that they had a counter-claim, set-off or cross demand equal to or exceeding the sum claimed in the Bankruptcy Notice that could not have been set up in the action in which the judgment was obtained. The creditor has filed the usual supporting affidavits in these proceedings.
Before considering the requirements of s.52 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (the Act), it is convenient to consider the grounds in the notice of opposition to the petition filed on 10 June 2010. Although the notice was filed by Mr Honeyman for Mr Honeyman, I have considered the grounds in relation to both Mr Honeyman and Mrs Honeyman.
The creditor’s petition relates to two debtors. Section 46 of the Act provides that:
(1) A creditor's petition may be presented against 2 or more joint debtors, whether partners or not.
(2) Where there are 2 or more respondents to a creditor's petition, the Court may make a sequestration order against one or more of them and dismiss the petition in so far as it relates to the other or others.
Hence, I have also had regard to the separate issues raised by Mr and Mrs Honeyman, who each filed affidavits in these proceedings. Each of them was cross-examined.
The first ground in the notice of opposition is that the judgment/order obtained in the Local Court on 17 September 2009 “has been opposed and a review of the default judgment is still undertaking (sic)”.
At the time that the notice of opposition was filed a review of the decision in the Local Court, in which the respondents had unsuccessfully sought that the default judgment of 17 September 2009 on which the Bankruptcy Notice was based be set aside, was on foot. However, on the evidence before the court there are now no current proceedings in the Local Court or on appeal from the Local Court in relation to the default judgment.
There are a number of documents before the court in relation to the Local Court proceedings, in particular those documents annexed to the affidavit of Krystle Lawrence sworn on 7 July 2010.
The Local Court proceedings in issue were commenced by the creditor on or about 26 June 2009 seeking recovery of the outstanding balance under a hire purchase agreement said to have been entered into by Mr and Mrs Honeyman in January 2003. In evidence before the court is a copy of a hire purchase agreement signed by Mr and Mrs Honeyman on 15 January 2003 as an application for hire purchase finance. Mrs Honeyman conceded that it bore her signature. It is apparent from the copy of the document annexed to Ms Lawrence’s affidavit that the Honeymans’ offer to hire specified goods under the hire-purchase agreement was accepted by CBFC on 23 January 2003.
CBFC had terminated the agreement on or about 29 May 2006 and had sought to mitigate its loss by repossession and sale of the equipment that was the subject of the agreement.
After those proceedings in the Local Court were commenced, a notice of motion for default judgment was filed by CBFC on or about 8 September 2009. Default judgment was ordered in favour of CBFC on 17 September 2009. A sealed copy of the order of the Local Court of that date in the amount of $43,990.32 naming Mr and Mrs Honeyman as defendants is annexed to the copy of the Bankruptcy Notice annexed to each of the affidavits of service of the Bankruptcy Notice sworn by Charles Gilbert Head on 13 April 2010.
In December 2009 or thereabouts, the respondents sought to have the default judgment set aside. The motion to set aside the default judgment was listed in the Local Court on 15 January 2010. An ex parte stay of proceedings was granted until the return date of the notice of motion.
The notice of motion was unsuccessful and on or about 18 January 2010 CBFC received a notice from the Local Court confirming that the application to set aside the judgment had been dismissed.
In about May 2010 the respondents filed a notice of motion in the Local Court seeking review of the decision of the Local Court. Copies of documents filed in relation to such review application are annexed to Ms Lawrence’s affidavit. The notice of motion to review the Local Court registrar’s decision to refuse the application to set aside the default judgment was itself refused by the Local Court on 11 June 2010, the day after the notice of opposition was filed in these proceedings.
According to Mr and Mrs Honeyman, the Local Court has not given them reasons for this decision. However what is clear is that two unsuccessful attempts were made by the respondents to seek to reverse, by setting aside and then review, the default judgment of the Local Court. Mr and Mrs Honeyman indicated that they did not appear in the Local Court on those occasions and there is nothing before the court to show whether or not the Local Court has considered all of the issues that Mr and Mrs Honeyman may have wished to raise. However they have had two opportunities to put those matters before that court and details of their concerns were included in the notice of motion filed in the Local Court in May 2010 and the accompanying affidavits.
In any event, it is no longer correct to say that a review of the default judgment is being undertaken. While Mr and Mrs Honeyman spoke of getting advice and intending to further pursue matters (apparently when and if they receive reasons from the Local Court), there is no evidence of any further steps having been taken in that regard, such as any other application to the Local Court or appeal from the judgment. Ground one in the notice of opposition is not made out.
Ground two in the notice of opposition asserted that the claim that a bankruptcy notice was served on 9 April 2010 at 4.35 pm was incorrect as Mr Honeyman was not at home at that time. Mr Honeyman appears to disagree with what he describes as the affidavit of Stephen John Wallis. There is no such affidavit before the court. It is apparent that this is intended to be a reference to the affidavit of service of the Bankruptcy Notice on Mr Honeyman sworn by Charles Gilbert Head on 13 April 2010. That affidavit was witnessed by a Justice of the Peace named Stephen John Wallis.
In any event, the substance of the contention is that Mr Honeyman was not at home at 4.35 pm on 9 April 2010 and therefore was not served on that date. However Mr Head was not required for cross-examination. There is uncontested affidavit evidence before me as to service of the Bankruptcy Notice on Mr Honeyman. In these circumstances I am not persuaded that it has been established that the Bankruptcy Notice was not served on Mr Honeyman.
It is not disputed that the creditor’s petition was served on Mr Honeyman and no issue is taken in relation to service on Mrs Honeyman in the notice of opposition.
It was also contended in ground two that “the annexed letter “A” being a true copy of the bankruptcy notice is not signed and dated by myself the receiver”. It appears from Mr Honeyman’s oral submissions that this may reflect a misunderstanding of the requirements for a bankruptcy notice. There is no requirement that the bankruptcy notice be signed and dated by the debtor. Rather, the requirement is that it bear a signature or stamp of the Official Receiver or delegate or authorised officer.
The Bankruptcy Notice annexed to the affidavits of Mr Head is in proper form and bears a copy of the stamp of the Official Receiver, having been issued on 29 March 2010. The Bankruptcy Notice also bears a signature of the person who applied for the notice to be issued, being the solicitor for the creditor who confirmed by that signature that he was the creditor’s authorised agent.
No other issue of substance was taken in relation to the Bankruptcy Notice, except insofar as it appeared to be disputed that a complete copy of the Bankruptcy Notice was served on either of Mr or Mrs Honeyman. I accept the unchallenged affidavit evidence of Mr Head in that respect. Each of his affidavits of service annexes a complete copy of the Bankruptcy Notice, including a copy of the judgment or order of the Local Court that formed the basis for the Bankruptcy Notice.
Ground two is not made out.
Insofar as ground three refers to a review of the registrar’s decision in the Local Court, there is no longer such a proceeding on foot. This ground also contains a “request to set aside this Bankruptcy Notice” on the basis that “because of a legal obstacle within the Local Court” Mr Honeyman could not have raised “that counter claim, set off or cross demand in defence of the creditors court action against me. At no point in time I simply neglected or overlooked the matter (sic)”.
These are not proceedings to set aside the bankruptcy notice. In any event, insofar as the debtors intend to contend that they had a counterclaim, set off or cross-demand that could not have been raised in CBFC’s action against them that resulted in the default judgment, the evidence before the court does not establish such a claim.
Even if there was a counter-claim, set-off or cross demand the matters that the debtors raise, including in the documents that they have filed in the Local Court, are not such as to establish that the concerns that they have in relation to their liability for the debt relied on by CBFC could not have been raised in the proceedings for recovery of that debt whether because of a “legal obstacle” or otherwise (see Re Brink, Ex parte Commercial Banking Co of Sydney Ltd (1980) 30 ALR 433; [1980] FCA 78; Re Stokvis (1934) 7 ABC 53 and Re Ling; Ex Parte Ling v Commonwealth of Australia (1995) 58 FCR 129; [1995] FCA 1410). This ground is not made out.
It was then contended in ground four (and Mrs Honeyman made the same submission) that neither of the Honeymans “owe the creditor the debt”. It was said that measures were being taken “to defend their claim through the Local Court”. As indicated, there are no current proceedings in that court. The notice of motion to set aside the default judgment and the review did not succeed.
More generally, in this ground and in much of what was said by each of Mr and Mrs Honeyman in submissions, the debtors raised a number of issues of concern in relation to their dealings with CBFC from 2003 onward. It appears that in their view these concerns justify the conclusion that they do not owe any part of the debt that forms the basis for the Bankruptcy Notice and is referred to in the creditor’s petition. Some of these concerns go to the calculation of the amount due, some to Mrs Honeyman’s liability and some to other issues such as the fact that the only copy of the hire purchase agreement that Mr Honeyman says he has in his possession is the copy that he and Mrs Honeyman signed. The Honeymans assert that they did not receive the copy executed on behalf of CBFC accepting their offer on 23 January 2003 which is annexed to Ms Lawrence’s affidavit.
Nonetheless, it is clear from the documents that the Honeymans seek to rely on that while they dispute when certain monthly payments were to be made or withdrawn from their bank account, whether certain payments had been made and the amount of such payments, as well as whether they received specific correspondence from CBFC and the manner in which they were treated by CBFC, from January 2003 the parties – and I include both of Mr and Mrs Honeyman – clearly proceeded on the basis that there was a hire purchase agreement with CBFC.
Insofar as they now seek to challenge that and say that no debt is owing, I note first in relation to Mrs Honeyman that while she expressed the view in submissions that she was not a party to the original hire purchase agreement, she conceded that it was her signature on the hire purchase agreement. I have considered her submissions. However whether or not she took possession of the equipment and whether or not she was living with her husband from 2003 onwards, the evidence before the court does not establish or even raise a prima facie case that she was not a party to the hire purchase agreement. The later offer from CBFC to refinance with a fresh transaction to which she would not be a party was not accepted and does not affect the underlying liability.
More generally, the Honeymans’ submissions are not such as to establish that this is a case in which the court should go behind the judgment of the Local Court rather than accepting it as proof of the debt owed by both Mr and Mrs Honeyman that is relied on to found the creditor’s petition.
I have borne in mind that the judgment was a default judgment. The court will more readily look behind a default judgment to see if, on investigation, it does represent a real debt (see Corney v Brien (1951) 84 CLR 343; [1951] HCA 31). It is also relevant to have regard to whether the debtors have attempted to have the judgment set aside as they did in this case on two occasions (see Wolff v Donovan (1991) 29 FCR 480 at 486; [1991] FCA 222), albeit their lack of success in this respect is not conclusive.
However, I am not satisfied on the evidence before the court that substantial reasons are given for questioning whether behind the judgment there was in truth and reality a debt due to the petitioner in the sense considered in Wren v Mahoney (1972) 126 CLR 212; [1972] HCA 5. It has not been established that special circumstances exist to warrant the court going behind the judgment. Of particular relevance in these circumstances is that the court will only reconsider or go behind a judgment in order to ascertain whether the petitioning creditor’s debt on which the proceedings are founded should be struck out altogether (see Oliveri v Stafford and Others (1989) 24 FCR 413; [1989] FCA 486 and Re Longo; Ex Parte Longo (1995) 57 FCR 523 at 530; [1995] FCA 1324). The court does not reconsider a judgment merely with a view to seeing whether the judgment debt should be reduced, at least in circumstances where there is nothing in the evidence before the court to suggest that even if Mr and Mrs Honeyman’s contentions in relation to the precise extent of their indebtedness were to be accepted the creditor did not have a debt that exceeded the minimum upon which a creditor’s petition could be founded in accordance with s.44 of the Bankruptcy Act.
There is no prima facie case of fraud or collusion or miscarriage of justice. Mrs Honeyman’s contentions that she should not have been a party to the hire purchase agreement do not, on the evidence before the court, meet that standard. I note in that respect that while issue was taken with subsequent events, including the fact that Mr Honeyman asked CBFC if his wife could be taken off the contract “as we separated over this and [she] no longer wants any part of this agreement”, that request is consistent with Mrs Honeyman being a party to the contract. Moreover, while CBFC responded to Mr Honeyman by letter of 7 July 2006 (sent after the agreement had been terminated for non-payment on or about 29 May 2006) indicating that it would be agreeable to refinance of the Agreement and upon refinance to discharge Mrs Honeyman from her obligations, there is no suggestion that such offer was accepted so that Mrs Honeyman was discharged from her obligations. I note that a copy of the letter was sent to Mrs Honeyman at the address provided to CBFC.
The existence of that correspondence does not change the underlying fact that both Mr and Mrs Honeyman were parties to the hire purchase agreement. The fact that, some years on, CBFC was prepared to “refinance… the Agreement” with a fresh loan to Mr Honeyman alone replacing the joint loan to Mr and Mrs Honeyman does not indicate that Mrs Honeyman had no liability. That offer was not accepted. Whether or not Mrs Honeyman received the copy of the letter of 7 July 2006 does not affect the underlying issue of whether the debt is still owing. I understand that one of the issues she raises is that on this and other occasions she failed to receive communications from CBFC or from the agent who, from 2008 on, was given responsibility to recover the debt. These issues are not such as to establish that if the court went behind the judgment it could be satisfied that there was no debt at all owed by Mrs Honeyman. Nor are these contentions a basis on which the discretion not to make a sequestration order should be exercised. This ground is not made out.
Ground five in the notice of opposition is “I am able to pay my debts.” This is claimed in relation to Mr Honeyman. Mrs Honeyman made the same submission. When this matter was first before the court I pointed out to Mr and Mrs Honeyman that it would be necessary to consider whether there was evidence before the court such as to satisfy me under s.52(2) of the Act that each debtor was able to pay his or her debts. However neither Mr Honeyman nor Mrs Honeyman has put affidavit evidence before me such as to satisfy me that either of them is able to pay their debts. Mrs Honeyman’s general assertions in that respect do not establish this requirement.
Mr Honeyman swore an affidavit in which he stated “I am able to pay my debts. I have assets and equity in property that I may use to pay debts where needed.” However there is no evidence as to what assets and equity in property that may be. He also stated he was hoping to return to work in the near future and hence to have an income. In cross‑examination he told the court that he had been ill but had worked for four hours on the day before he was cross‑examined.
In considering the requirements of s.52(2) I have borne in mind that a debtor who is in a position to pay all the debts he or she owes within a reasonable time ought not to be subject to a sequestration order and the principles discussed in Re Sarina; Ex parte Council of the Shire of Wollondilly (1980) 43 FLR 163; [1980] FCA 66 and Sarina v Council of the Shire of Wollondilly (1980) 48 FLR 372; [1980] FCA 138, including the fact that this does not necessarily require the debtor to have sufficient cash at hand or available on deposit to pay all creditors in full immediately if the debtor has other realisable assets. The difficulty in this case is that there is simply no evidence before the court as to the extent of any indebtedness of Mr and Mrs Honeyman, let alone evidence as to any assets or money available to meet such debts as either of them may have.
Insofar as Mr and Mrs Honeyman appeared to assert that they could pay the CBFC debt but did not think that they should because they did not regard it as a debt that they were obliged to pay, as discussed above, it has not been established that the court should go behind the judgment. While creditor’s petitions are not a method of debt collection if a debtor is able but not willing to pay a specific debt, the difficulty in this case is the absence of evidence from the debtors to satisfy me of the requirements of s.52(2)(a) of the Act.
I have also borne in mind that there is no policy in the Act to the effect that a creditor should be entitled to make a recalcitrant debtor bankrupt, but that is in circumstances where the debtor satisfies the court that he or she is plainly solvent and able to pay debts. I have not been so satisfied on the evidence before the court. Ground five is not made out in relation to Mr Honeyman and nor am I so satisfied in relation to Mrs Honeyman.
Ground six in the notice of opposition is somewhat confusingly expressed. Mr Honeyman appeared to concede that this may reflect some confusion in relation to the formal requirements applicable to service of creditor’s petitions. It is that the petition was “received 16 days after [the] issue date not 3 days”. However the rules in relation to the time of service of the creditor’s petition were met in this case. The creditor’s petition was served at least five days before the hearing of the creditor’s petition. The affidavits of service of the creditor’s petition of Charles Gilbert Head sworn on 31 May 2010 attest to service on each of the respondents of a copy of the creditor’s petition and other relevant documentation on 27 May 2010. There is no basis for any contention that there has been a failure to comply with any applicable requirements in relation to the time of service of the petition.
More generally, a number of other issues were raised or elaborated on in the affidavits relied on by Mr and Mrs Honeyman and in their submissions.
Insofar as they may be taken to suggest that there was an overstatement of the debt in the bankruptcy notice on the basis that they dispute the calculation of that debt, there is no suggestion or evidence that there was a notice given under s.41(5) of the Bankruptcy Act in relation to such an issue (see Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Cumins (No 5) (2008) 6 ABC(NS) 82; [2008] FCA 794). I reiterate what I said in relation to the inappropriateness of going behind the judgment if the amount said to be owed is said to be overstated, but nonetheless would still be an amount sufficient to support the petition.
Mr and Mrs Honeyman also raised issues about what they said had occurred in 2008 in a credit report in relation to Mr Honeyman and as to whether this suggested that there was some fresh loan from CBFC at that time. However it is not relevant in these proceedings to consider entries in such a credit report. The debt relied on in these proceedings is the judgment of the Local Court. It was not based on something that occurred in 2008.
Insofar as there are claims that the hire purchase agreement was not the contract of either Mr Honeyman or Mrs Honeyman, I have addressed this issue in relation to both Mr and Mrs Honeyman. It has not been established on the material before the court that Mr and Mrs Honeyman were not parties to the hire purchase agreement.
Mr Honeyman raised an issue about whether their ABN number on a direct debit form was correct. As indicated, they also claimed they had not received a copy of the signed copy of the hire purchase agreement dated 23 January 2003 by which their offer was accepted by CBFC by signature. However these concerns are not such as to establish that there was no contract.
At one time issues between Mr and Mrs Honeyman and CBFC were dealt with by the Banking and Financial Services Ombudsman in relation to an alleged error by CBFC. Again that is of peripheral relevance to these proceedings given the basis for the creditor’s petition. However I do note that it is apparent from the Ombudsman’s report that, contrary to suggestions that the bank had not sought to resolve the dispute, a number of different settlement offers were put forward by CBFC but were not accepted by Mr and Mrs Honeyman, apparently because there was not a complete statement of how their liability was calculated such as to satisfy their requirements.
However their concerns in this respect are not such as to establish that no debt was owed. I am satisfied on the evidence before the court, including the affidavit of final debt, that as required under s.44 of the Bankruptcy Act, there was owing and remains owing by each of the debtors to the petitioning creditor a debt that amounts to $2,000 and that that debt meets the requirements of s.44(1)(b) of the Act.
Insofar as there is some concern on the part of Mr and Mrs Honeyman about their obligations and dispute with CBFC, these matters are not such as to constitute sufficient reason not to make a sequestration order. To use the language of s.52, it has not been established for any or all of the reasons raised “that for other sufficient cause a sequestration order ought not to be made”. On the evidence before the court, it has not been established that Mrs Honeyman was in some way used as a weapon by CBFC, albeit I accept that she feels this way. There is nothing to establish fraud, an abuse of process, improper motive on the part of the creditor or malicious presentation of the petition.
Insofar as Mr and Mrs Honeyman might seek to rely on their ignorance of their obligations, I also note that the Ombudsman spelt out quite clearly that despite a financial service provider’s error in relation to the repayment amount, the customer remained liable to repay the loan amount within the terms of the loan at the applicable interest rate as these were moneys the customer was always required to repay. In other words, it is simply not open to Mr and Mrs Honeyman to say that nothing will be paid because of an error in calculation that was said to have been made by CBFC. Their legal liability for the outstanding debt under the hire purchase agreement arose from the terms of that agreement. There is no dispute that repayments of the loan were not maintained and hence CBFC was entitled to take action to recover the debt in accordance with its rights under the contract.
I note from the affidavit of Ms Lawrence that the creditor repossessed the hired equipment and sold it at auction. Insofar as issues are raised by the Honeymans in relation to the price obtained, it was sold at an auction and there is nothing in the evidence before the court to suggest any abuse of process or fraud. The amount received was taken into account in calculation of the amount which was sought to be recovered in the Local Court. The issues raised in this respect do not establish other sufficient cause.
While Mrs Honeyman expressed strongly held feelings of injustice, this is not such as to establish other sufficient cause within s.52(2). Nor are her claims about the fact that she was not “involved” because of separation from her husband during the relevant period.
None of the grounds in the notice of opposition, nor any of the other matters raised by the Honeymans taken individually or cumulatively are such as to establish other sufficient cause in s.52(2) of the Act.
In relation to the requirements of s.52(1) of the Act I am satisfied on the material before the court with proof of the matters stated in the petition and with the fact that the debt on which the petitioning creditor relies is still owing by both Mr and Mrs Honeyman.
In relation to subsection 52(2), I have not been satisfied by either of the debtors that he or she is able to pay his or her debts in the sense specified in s.52(2)(a) of the Act or that for other sufficient cause a sequestration order ought not to be made.
I am satisfied that each of the respondents committed the act of bankruptcy alleged in the creditor’s petition on 30 April 2010. I am satisfied with proof of the other matters required by s.52 of the Bankruptcy Act.
Accordingly, I consider it appropriate and will make a sequestration order against the estates of Garry John Honeyman and Carol Lynnda Honeyman with the usual order as to costs.
I certify that the preceding fifty-seven (57) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Barnes FM
Associate:
Date: 10 August 2010
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