Cawthorn, D.S. as Liquidator of Thermatec P/L v McCowatt, H.F.

Case [1994] FCA 434


439       'ict

JUDGMENT No. k

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

) )

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY ) No. NG 3018 of 1994

)

GENERAL DIVISION 1

BFIWEBH: DAVID SAXBY CAWTHORN as Liquidator o f THERMATEC PTY LIMITED (IN LIQUIDATION)

Applicant

AUD:  MlGH FRASER MeCOWATT

First Respondent

LILA ANN MeCOWATT

Second Respondent

C O W :  FOSTER J
DATE:  11 MARCH 1994
P W :  SYDNEY

12 JUL 1994

-

- (Extempore)

HIS HQHOUR: The Court has before it a notice of motion dated

There is, in fact, no contest that the notice of motion must succeed. The main proceedings have not been brought by a liquidator claiming damages pursuant to section
592 of the corporations law. It is properly conceded that the applicant, as liquidator, has no standing under the statute to bring that action.
The only question before the Court in those circuulstances is the question of an appropriate cost order. The respondents, as the applicants in the motion, seek that an order be made that the respondent to the motion, the applicant in the main proceedings, pay costs on an indemnity or at least on a solicitor/client basis.

7 Wrch 1994 seeking that the application, taken out by the applicant liquidator in the main proceedings, be dismissed and the statement of claim be struck out. The notice of motion also seeks an order that the applicant pay the respondent's

costs of the proceedinge.

This application is based upon material put before

e Court by way of an affidavit on the solicitor for the
, \ +
re-ndents indicating that when the application was served,

;\

; Xt was brought to the attention of the solicitor for the
, ,

. :I ' applicant liquidator, that the liquidator had no standing to

\ , bring the action and indicating that in the event of the

application not being withdrawn, a motion would be taken out

that it be dismissed.

It appears that a period in excess of a week was allowed to go by before the solicitor for the liquidator satisfied himself as to the correctness of the matter raised by the respondent's solicitors in relation to the standing of the liquidator. By the time that he formed the view that that approach was, in fact, correct, the motion had been taken out and costs incurred. Thereafter, it is apparent that the solicitor for the liquidator sought, so far as possible, to

contain further costs by, in fact, acceding to the proposition that the motion must necessarily succeed and also offering to appear and indicate that fact to the Court without the further costs of an appearance by the parties being incurred.

I have to conaider whether anything other than the ordinary coat order is appropriate in the circumstances. It in, of course, unfortunate that costs were incurred ae a result of the solicitor for the liquidator not reacting within the time set by the respondent8e solicitors in their first letter. However, I have to consider whether there has been domomtrated anything that one could call contumelious or high handed, to the extent that it would require that the Court visit upon the applicant liquidator, more than the ordinary order for costs.

The matter hae been very fully argued before me but I m, in the ultimate, not dissuaded that anything other than the ordinary coat order ie appropriate in this matter and that is the order that will be made. It is worth noting that the

motion itself makes no claim for anything other than the ordinary costs order. Accordingly I dismiee the proceedings

and I direct that the applicant pay the reepondentle coete in accordance with order two eought in the notice of motion and direct that thoee coete be taxed if not agreed.

I certify that the preceding three (3) pages are a true copy of the reasone for judpent herein of the Honourable Hr Justice M. L. Foster.

V

Date  11 MARCH 1994
A P P E A R A N C E S
SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT:  KR S. BEVERLY
INSTRUCTED BY:  STEVEN BBVERLY L ASSOCIATES
COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT:  MS V. SONEGO
INSTRUCTED BY:  CLAYTON U T Z
DATE OF HEARING:  11 MARCH 1994
DATE OF JUDGMENT:  11 MARCH 1994

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

) )

NEW SOUTR WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY ) No. NG 3018 of 1994

1

GENERAL DIVISION 1

BE'HBEHt DAVID SMBY CAWTHORN

as Liquidator o f THERMATEC PTY LIMITED (IN LIQUIDATION)

Applicant

AUD:  HUGH FRASER MeCOWATT

First Respondent

LILA ANN MCCOWATT

Second Reapondent

W M t POSTER J
DA!rEr 11 lIARCH 1994

PLACE: SYDNEY

1.    the proceedings be diemieeed.

2.   the applicant pay the respondentem coete in accordance with order two sought in the notice of motion and direct that thoee coete be taxed if not agreed.

&&Q:  Settlement and entry of ordere ie dealt with in
Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
Details
AGLC
Cawthorn, D.S. as Liquidator of Thermatec P/L v McCowatt, H.F. [1994] FCA 434
Case
[1994] FCA 434
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court of Australia, specifically within the New South Wales District Registry, the case of Cawthorn, D.S. as Liquidator of Thermatec P/L v McCowatt, H.F. was heard. The liquidator of Thermatec P/L, the applicant, sought damages under section 592 of the corporations law, which the respondents argued was not within the liquidator's standing to claim. The primary legal issue that arose was whether the liquidator had the standing to bring the claim and, if not, what the appropriate costs order should be.

The court found that the liquidator indeed had no standing to bring the claim as provided under the statute, and the motion to dismiss the application and strike out the statement of claim was properly conceded. The only remaining issue was the appropriate costs order. The court considered whether the liquidator's solicitor's delayed response to the respondents' initial notification of the lack of standing warranted a higher costs order than the ordinary one. Despite the delay and additional costs incurred, the court did not find the conduct to be contumelious or high-handed enough to warrant more than the ordinary costs order. Consequently, the court dismissed the proceedings and directed that the applicant pay the respondents' costs in accordance with the order sought in the notice of motion, with the costs to be taxed if not agreed.

The final orders of the court were that the proceedings be dismissed and that the applicant pay the respondents' costs in accordance with order two sought in the notice of motion, with instructions that those costs be taxed if not agreed.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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