Cavar v St Brigid's trading as Green Gate Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CAVAR v ST BRIGID’S trading as GREEN GATE PTY LTD [2015] FCCA 1993

Catchwords:
INDUSTRIAL LAW – Unlawful termination.

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Application for summary dismissal – no reasonable prospects of success.

Legislation:

Fair Work Act 2009, ss.65, 340, 342, 344, 349, 351, 355, 362, 368

Federal Circuit of Australia Act 1999, s.17A
Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986, s.46PO
Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001, rr.7.01, 13.10

Spencer v Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118
General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125
Rana v University of South Australia (2004) 136 FCR 344
SZQGE v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2011] FCA 1018
Wigan v Edwards (1973) 1 ALR 497
Applicant: CELIA CAVAR
Respondent: ST BRIGID’S T/A GREEN GATE PTY LTD
File Number: SYG 106 of 2015
Judgment of: Judge Cameron
Hearing date: 25 June 2015
Date of Last Submission: 25 June 2015
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 24 July 2015

REPRESENTATION

The Applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr T. Glover
Solicitors for the Respondents: FCB Workplace Law

ORDERS

  1. The name of the respondent be amended in the Court record to Greengate Management Services Pty Ltd.

  2. The applicant’s interlocutory application presented on 24 June 2015 be dismissed.

  3. Pursuant to rule 13.10 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 the proceeding be dismissed. 

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 106 of 2015

CELIA CAVAR

Applicant

And

ST BRIGID’S T/A GREEN GATE PTY LTD

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. On 16 January 2015 the applicant, Ms Cavar, lodged an application and related Form 2 claim form alleging that she had been dismissed in contravention of ss.340, 342, 344, 349, 351, 355 and 362 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (“FW Act”). References were also made to the Age Discrimination Act 2004, the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 and the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (“AHRC Act”). Ms Cavar also referred to her right as a person over 55 years of age to request flexible working arrangements pursuant to s.65 of the FW Act. On 5 March 2015 Ms Cavar filed a statement of claim.

  2. On 1 April 2015 the respondent filed an application in a case seeking summary dismissal of Ms Cavar’s application and these reasons principally concern that interlocutory issue.  For the reasons which follow, Ms Cavar’s application will be dismissed.

  3. It should be noted at this point that half-way through the hearing of the respondent’s interlocutory application Ms Cavar walked out of the courtroom, expressing exasperation at the address being made to the Court by counsel for the respondent.  Ms Cavar therefore did not exercise her right to address the Court herself and instead expressly relied on written submissions which she had filed and to which I have had regard.

  4. On 24 June 2015 Ms Cavar also lodged an interlocutory application seeking summary judgment in the present matter as well as relief in relation…

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Details
Case
[2015] FCCA 1993
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application by St Brigid's trading as Green Gate Pty Ltd (the respondent) for summary dismissal of proceedings brought by Cavar (the applicant). The applicant had initiated proceedings alleging unlawful termination.

The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the applicant's proceeding had no reasonable prospect of success, thereby justifying summary dismissal under section 17A of the *Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999* and rule 13.10 of the *Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001*. The Court was required to interpret the meaning of "no reasonable prospect of success" in the context of summary dismissal.

The Court considered the legislative intent behind section 17A, which was to strengthen the Court's power to deal with unmeritorious proceedings. It referred to the High Court's decision in *Spencer v Commonwealth*, which cautioned against paraphrasing the phrase "no reasonable prospect" and emphasised giving full weight to the expression as a whole. The Court also took into account the comments of Lander J in *Rana v University of South Australia*, highlighting the need for caution in summarily dismissing proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court, particularly given the potential for self-represented litigants and imprecisely articulated claims, and the Court's philosophy of providing inexpensive and streamlined justice. The Court noted that a proceeding need not be hopeless or bound to fail to have no reasonable prospect of success.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

Section 17A of the Federal Circuit of Australia Act 1999 relevantly provides:17A Summary judgment…(2) The Federal Circuit Court of Australia may give judgment for one party against another in relation to the whole or any part of a proceeding if:(a) the first party is defending the proceeding or that part of the proceeding; and(b) the Court is satisfied that the other party has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or that part of the proceeding.(3) For the purposes of this section, a defence or a proceeding or part of a proceeding need not be:(a) hopeless; or(b) bound to fail;for it to have no reasonable prospect of success.… Rule 13.10 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 provides:13.10 Disposal by summary dismissalThe Court may order that a proceeding be stayed, or dismissed generally or in relation to any claim for relief in the proceeding, if the Court is satisfied that:(a) the party prosecuting the proceeding or claim for relief has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or claim; or(b) the proceeding or claim for relief is frivolous or vexatious; or(c) the proceeding or claim for relief is an abuse of the process of the Court. For reasons which will become apparent, it is not necessary to consider whether the present proceeding is frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of the process of the Court. Section 17A was inserted into the Court’s statute by the Migration Litigation Reform Act 2005 which commenced on 1 December 2005. It was designed to have general application and to strengthen the power of the Court to deal with unmeritorious proceedings by broadening the grounds on which the Court can dispose of them summarily. The operation of that provision and the analogous provision in the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 has been discussed in several cases, most significantly in Spencer v Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118. In that case, the plurality held that no paraphrase of the expression “no reasonable prospect” can be adopted as a sufficient explanation of its operation let alone as a definition of its content, saying: … full weight must be given to the expression as a whole. The Federal Court may exercise power under section 31A if, and only if, satisfied that there is “no reasonable prospect” of success. (per Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ at 141 [60])Their Honours were of the view that the elucidation of the term would best proceed by decided cases giving it content over time, noting that it was already apparent that authorities such as General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125 at 129-130 could not be relied on to define the scope of the term. In the context of this Court, what their Honours said in Spencer v Commonwealth should also be considered in light of Lander J’s comments in Rana v University of South Australia (2004) 136 FCR 344, notwithstanding that his Honour was speaking prior to the introduction of s.17A, and thus of a different test, and the renaming of this Court: In my view, because the FMC Rules do not require pleadings; the parties are not obliged to tender all their evidence when the application and response is filed; there are few, if any, interlocutory processes available; and the Federal Magistrates Court is a low cost court, the Federal Magistrates Court should be very cautious about summarily dismissing an applicant’s proceeding. That course should only be adopted when it is clear, beyond any doubt, that the applicant has not, and cannot, articulate in writing a reasonable cause of action. As I have already said, the philosophy of the Federal Magistrates Court is to provide inexpensive justice and a streamlined dispute resolution process. Litigants will often be self-represented and the documents they rely on as founding their claim will no doubt often be imprecisely articulated. In those circumstances, there is even more reason for the Federal Magistrates Court to be cautious before summarily dismissing an applicant’s claim. (at 355 [75])

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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