Cavallaro and Tax Practitioners Board (Practice and procedure) - [2025] ARTA 2030

Cavallaro and Tax Practitioners Board (Practice and procedure) [2025] ARTA 2030 (29 September 2025)
Applicant/s:  Maria Cavallaro
Respondent:  Tax Practitioners Board
Tribunal Number:                2025/0375

Applicant/s:  Alliance Accounting & Business Consultants Pty Ltd
Respondent:  Tax Practitioners Board
Tribunal Number:                2025/0376
Applicant/s:  Tradie Troopers Pty Ltd
Respondent:  Tax Practitioners Board
Tribunal Number:                2025/0377

Tribunal:Senior Member M Harrowell
Place:Sydney
Date:29 September 2025

Decision:
(a)The application for an order to anonymise the name of the parties in these reasons and in the reasons for the decision determining each of the review applications dated 17 January 2025 made by each of the applicants is refused.

....................[SGD]....................................................
Senior Member Mark Harrowell
Catchwords
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE –Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 – suppression of parties’ names – principles applicable – s 70 Tribunal may restrict publication or disclosure of information – s 71 Requirements for Tribunal orders about hearings, publication and disclosure – circumstances of the parties to the proceedings and other persons connected to the proceedings – principles applicable
Legislation
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (repealed)
Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth)- ss 70, 71
Cases
Azzopardi and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social Services Second Review) [2019] AATA 105
Carter and Tax Practitioners Board (Practice and procedure) [2025] ARTA 632
Hanieh and Tax Practitioners Board [2024] AATA 3251
John Fairfax Group Pty Ltd v Local Court of New South Wales [1991] 26 NSWLR 131
M&A Corporate Accountants Pty Ltd and Tax Practitioners Board [2021] AATA 4523
Secondary Materials
Revised Explanatory Memorandum to the Administrative Review Tribunal Bill 2024
REASONS FOR DECISION

These reasons relate to applicants’ application for an order under s 70 of the Administrative Tribunal Review Act 2024 (Cth) (ART Act) to anonymise their names.
INTRODUCTION
In an email dated 26 May 2025, the lawyers for the applicants made the following application (some detail being unnecessary to reproduce):
We wish to make an application for the suppression of the applicants’ names and we have been informed by the Registry that the appropriate way to do this is by email to the Tribunal and copying the respondent to the email.
The Applicants kindly request that their names be suppressed in the decision when the Tribunal publishes its decision on these matters after the hearing.
The reason that the Applicants make this request is outlined as follows:
1These matters concern issues in relation to whether the First Applicant is a fit and proper person to hold a registration as a tax agent as in accordance with the Code of Professional Conduct (“the Code”) found within the Tax Agent Services Act 2009 (Cth) (“the TASA”).
2As part of this matter, the First Applicant has disclosed evidence in relation to:
(a)Traumatic events which she has experienced in her personal life including the misappropriation of funds by a close friend, the death of her friend and a family member and events relating to a domestic relationship and.
(b)Mental health issues that she experienced as a result of the above traumatic events including details of medication which she was prescribed, counselling which she received and personal details of what her life was like when her mental health was extremely poor and she was not able to properly manage her personal and financial affairs or take care of her son.
3The First Applicant regards the above information as extremely personal sensitive information which she would not ordinarily disclose but for the fact that she had to as part of these matters.
4The First Applicant considers:
(a)That where both the First Applicant’s name and the above information are disclosed as part of the Tribunal’s decision, this would be highly detrimental to her. It would significantly impair her ability to obtain alternative employment which would in turn affect her ability to manage her mental health, earn an income and otherwise support herself and her son. It would also cause her significant embarrassment with her friends and family and within her community as a whole.
(b)These consequences are very severe and go beyond what could be reasonably regarded as the intended consequences of a breach of the Code and the TASA. The intended consequences of a breach should not be so severe that the practitioner who breached the Code and the TASA is not able to move on with their life or properly support themselves and their family.
(c)The above information is personal in nature and does not relate to nor is it indicative of the First Applicant’s honesty and integrity. As such, disclosing this information would not be required to in order to protect the public from a practitioner who lacks honesty and integrity.
5As such, the First Applicant requests that in relation to the matter pertaining to herself, that her name be suppressed in the decision published by the Tribunal.
6By extension, the Second Applicant and Third Applicant also request that in relation to the matters that pertain to them respectively, that their names be suppressed in the decision published by the Tribunal given that it would readily reveal the identity of the First Applicant if their identities are published.
This application was heard on 2 June 2025, as part of the substantive hearing of the review applications. The form of order finally sought was in the following terms:
An order that disclosure of the applicants’ names and any identifying details be prohibited for the purpose of publication.
In addition to the email dated 26 May 2025, the parties provided written submissions and made oral submissions at a hearing of the application.
At that time, no medical witnesses were called to give oral evidence in connection with Ms Cavallaro’s current state of health. However, the following medical reports were attached to the statements of Ms Cavallaro:
(b)clinical psychologist report dated 25 February 2019 (2019 Report) at TB 2482;
(c)clinical psychologist report dated 24 May 2024 (2024 Report) at TB 2487; and
(d)General Practitioner medical report dated 16 May 2025 (2025 Report) at TB 2516.
These reports document conditions relating to anxiety and depression and post-traumatic stress disorder, as well as other issues.
The 2019 Report sets out the history of events which have affected Ms Cavallaro and her family and the diagnosis at that time. The detail of these events is not presently relevant. The report concludes:
Deterioration of Ms Cavallaro’s mental health condition can affect her efficiency in attending to business or financial matters such as delay in attending to them although I do not think her mental health condition significantly impacts on her ability to make sound financial decisions and judgements. Ms Cavallaro has not mentioned in her sessions any information relating to her struggles managing or attending to tax affairs. As mentioned, Ms Cavallaro tends to take on more demands than she can manage (unrelated to her mental health condition). When Ms Cavallaro experiences deterioration in her mental health (and having to attend to multiple personal and work demands) can further impact on her ability to attend to business matters promptly.
Ms Cavallaro has increased tendencies to withdraw from social activities although she will continue to be preoccupied with matters related to her business.
The 2024 report contains the opinions of a clinical psychologist who saw Ms Cavallaro whom she treated from 21 March 2022 until 11 December 2023. The report details her mental health issues. It recounts traumatic incidents in Ms Cavallaro’s recent life which have contributed to her symptoms and that she engaged in regular therapy in connection with these matters.
The 2024 Report concludes:[1]
As outlined above Maria presented with a complexity of symptoms and these will have impacted Maria's ability to concentrate and function at work and it is likely that they have had a significant impact on her ability to operate as a tax agent.
[1] TB 2488
The 2025 Report stated Ms Cavallaro ceased attending a clinical psychologist in 2024. The author of the report was unable to comment upon the effect traumatic personal circumstances suffered by Ms Cavallaro affected her ability to discharge her professional obligations.
Ms Cavallaro also gave oral evidence about her son and concerns she had as to his well-being and risk to him if a confidentiality order was not made. Again, it is not necessary to set out the detail of this evidence for the purpose of these reasons. Suffice to say, it relates to the traumatic events giving rise to the medical treatment which Ms Cavallaro has received and the circumstances of her son.
In written submissions, the applicants said:[2]
In the present circumstances, the applicants are not seeking a departure from a public hearing or suppression of the Tribunal’s reasons for decision. They are seeking a more limited order for the suppression of their names and any identifying details. In these circumstances, the following observations of the NSW Court of Appeal (Bathurst CJ, Leeming JA and Simpson AJA in [Council of New South Wales Bar Association v EFA (A Pseudonym)[3] ] are pertinent:
Against that has to be balanced the important consideration of open justice. More particularly, what has to be considered is the degree to which an order that would restrict identification of the respondent would encroach upon that principle. That encroachment would be minimal. Such an order would not restrict publication of the salient facts of the proceedings, that a barrister was the subject of disciplinary proceedings, the nature of the conduct that underlay the disciplinary proceedings, and the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings [Emphasis added].
[2] at paragraph 2.5
[3] 106 NSWLR 383 at [217]
In oral submissions, Counsel for the applicants said:[4]
We don’t have medical evidence to say the publication will cause a deterioration of her medical – mental condition. We don’t have that because we don’t say – that is not the harm which we say is at risk if her details are published. The harm we say is the distress to her and her son of having sensitive, personal information publicly available online forever. That is the harm we say she should not suffer because there is not a public interest for her to suffer that harm.
[4] transcript-2 June 2025 page 30 line 20 and following
Counsel for the applicants then continued:[5]
What we are saying is that this will cause her distress and, in my respectful submission, that is something that the tribunal, on a nuanced analysis does not need evidence of that. What the tribunal has to have regard to is the evidence of these circumstances, the extremely personal nature of them, the traumatic nature of them. I mean, you have that evidence because the medical reports say that they were traumatic. It’s difficult to see what evidence the tribunal needs beyond that in circumstances where we are not saying this is an EFA situation. I’m taking you to EFA, the statement of the principles there but I’m not taking you to EFA to say that what is put (audio malfunction) publication of this (audio malfunction).
[5] transcript-2 June 2025 page 31 line 38 and following
In reply, the respondent opposed any confidentiality order. In this regard it submitted:[6]
[6] written submissions dated 1 June 2025 paragraph 7 following
(e)“The general principle of open justice is a fundamental aspect of the administration of justice, the rule of law and public accountability”.
(f)The ART Act endorses the principle of open justice and is in similar terms to section 35 of the former Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (repealed) (AAT Act).
(g)Open hearings and maximum disclosure are the default position, reference being made to the decision of Deputy President McCabe in M&A Corporate Accountants Pty Ltd and Tax Practitioners Board [2021] AATA 4523 at [28]. There, the Deputy President said:
28. There is no doubt the Tribunal has the power to modify the usual features of a public hearing and review contemplated in s 35(1). But it is also clear the Tribunal will not depart from the usual practice simply because an applicant might feel embarrassment or discomfort at the prospect of his affairs being exposed in public in the course of the review: see Zivanovic v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2017] FCA 1633 at [29] per Gleeson J; see also Williams and Members of the Companies Auditors and Liquidators Disciplinary Board [2019] AATA 504 at [22]. While some reviewable decisions are dealt with differently, most applicants in the Tribunal are not entitled to expect the same level of privacy they enjoyed during the primary decision-making process. That may come as a shock, but it follows inevitably from the openness principle set out in s 35(5) which is the starting point for any discussion about orders under s 35. The application of the Australian Privacy Principles to the Tribunal’s review must be understood in that context.
(h)Applicants seeking a confidentiality order must have a sufficiently strong case “to take the case out of the ordinary”. Reference was made to the decision of Azzopardi and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social Services Second Review) [2019] AATA 105 (Azzopardi) at [5].
(i)The orders need to be in the public interest. In this regard, greater weight is to be given to the openness principle and ensuring decision-making is conducted in a transparent and open manner. Here, reliance was placed on the decisions of Hanieh and Tax Practitioners Board [2024] AATA 3251 at [46(iv)] and Azzopardi at [18].
(j)“The by-product of open justice is that extremely personal, damaging and confidential information may become public”. Reference was made to John Fairfax Group Pty Ltd v Local Court of New South Wales [1991] 26 NSWLR 131 at 142-3.
(k)“There is a particular interest in ensuring that regulatory matters of the type involved in this case are heard and determined in a public forum”.
(l)Lastly, the respondent said that, if the Tribunal affirmed the Board’s decision, it was required to make an entry into public register. In these circumstances, the respondent said it was “unclear” how the Board could comply with its statutory duty” imposed by regulations 25E(1) and (3) and regulation 25L(3) of the Tax Agent Services Regulations 2022 (Cth).
In relation to the last matter:
(a)reg 25E(3)(g)-(h) provides the following information is to be included in respect of a decision by the Board:
(g) the reasons for the order, suspension or termination;
(h) without limiting paragraph (g) of this subsection, if the reasons for the order, suspension or termination relate to particular conduct of the entity— details of that conduct.
and
(b)reg 25L, which relates to review of a decision by the Board by the Tribunal and what information is to be entered on the register of the Board, provides in reg 25L(3):
(3) If the ART makes a decision on review in relation to the reviewable decision, then:
(a) the Board must make any updates to the register that are needed, in light of the decision on review, to ensure compliance with the Act and this instrument; and
(b) in addition, but subject to subsections (4) and (5), if the Board considers that it is appropriate to enter on the register, in respect of the entity, any particular information relating to the reviewable decision, or to the review by the ART, then the Board must enter that information on the register in respect of the entity for such a period as the Board considers appropriate.
However, I note the submission concerning regs 25E and 25L was withdrawn by the respondent at the hearing on 2 June 2025.
CONSIDERATION
The power to make an order to anonymised the name of a party is found in s 70 of the ART Act. This section provides:
70 Tribunal may restrict publication or disclosure of information
Information about parties, witnesses and others
(1)       The Tribunal may, by order, give directions prohibiting or restricting the publication or other disclosure of:
(a)       information tending to reveal the identity of:
(i)        a party to or witness in a proceeding in the Tribunal; or
(ii)       any person related to or otherwise associated with any party to or witness in a proceeding in the Tribunal; or
(b)       information otherwise concerning a party, witness or other person mentioned in paragraph (a).
Note 1: The power must be exercised in accordance with section 71.
Note 2: Breach of a non‑publication or non‑disclosure order is an offence (see section 119).
Section 71(2) sets out the following relevant considerations in making such an order:
71 Requirements for Tribunal orders about hearings, publication and disclosure
…
Considerations
(2) In considering whether to make an order under subsection 69(3) or section 70 in relation to a proceeding, the Tribunal must have regard to the following:
(a) the principle that it is desirable that hearings of proceedings in the Tribunal are held in public;
(b) the principle that it is desirable that evidence given before the Tribunal is made available to the public;
(c) the principle that it is desirable that evidence given before the Tribunal and the contents of documents given to the Tribunal are made available to all the parties to the proceeding;
(d) any reasons in favour of making an order, including the following:
(i) in any case—the circumstances of the parties to the proceeding and other persons connected to the proceeding;
(ii) in any case—the harm (if any) that is likely to occur to a person if the order is not made;
(iii) in relation to an order under section 70—the confidential nature (if any) of the information;
(e) any other matters that the Tribunal considers relevant.
Previously, s 35(5) of the AAT Act specified the following consideration to be taken into account in considering whether to make an order for a private hearing, norm publication or nondisclosure order under s 35 of that Act:
(5) In considering whether to give directions under subsection (2), (3) or (4), the Tribunal is to take as the basis of its consideration the principle that it is desirable:
(a) that hearings of proceedings before the Tribunal should be held in public; and
(b) that evidence given before the Tribunal and the contents of documents received in evidence by the Tribunal should be made available to the public and to all the parties; and
(c) that the contents of documents lodged with the Tribunal should be made available to all the parties.
However (and without being required to seek the views of the parties), the Tribunal is to pay due regard to any reasons in favour of giving such a direction, including, for the purposes of subsection (3) or (4), the confidential nature (if applicable) of the information.
As is evident from the terms of the legislation, the provisions of the ART Act are similar to those in s 35 of the AAT Act.
Member Ross observed in Carter and Tax Practitioners Board (Practice and procedure) [2025] ARTA 632 at [18] (footnotes omitted):
The Explanatory Memorandum states that 71(2) is equivalent to s 35(5) of the AAT Act. However, the Explanatory Memorandum also states that refinements have been made to ensure there is an ‘adequate balance between the principle of open justice and the need to protect sensitive, confidential and/or personal information’. The Explanatory Memorandum provides examples of considerations that may favour the granting of an order such as the particular vulnerabilities of the parties, whether the information may cause reputational damage to the party and whether the safety of a party may be compromised.

In this regard, it is useful to set out the full text of the Explanatory Memorandum[7], referring to clause 71(2) (now s 71(2) of the ART Act), which states:
568. Subclause (2) requires the Tribunal to balance the principles of open justice and procedural fairness with the circumstances of the parties or any persons connected to the proceeding, the harm that could result to a person if an order is not made, the need to keep information confidential and any other relevant considerations. The Tribunal may need to consider factors such as the particular vulnerabilities of parties and persons connected to the proceeding, whether the disclosure of information may cause reputational damage to parties or persons connected to the proceeding, the need to keep sensitive personal information private and whether the safety of a party or person connected to the proceeding may be compromised (such as where there is family domestic violence) if the order is not made.
569. Subclause (2) is equivalent to subsection 35(5) of the AAT Act. Refinements have been made to clarify and modernise the drafting and to require the Tribunal to ensure an adequate balance between the principle of open justice and the need to protect sensitive, confidential and/or personal information.
[7] Revised Explanatory Memorandum to the Administrative Review Tribunal Bill 2024
It is not presently necessary to determine whether, on its proper construction, subs 71(2) is equivalent to subs 35(5) or the extent to which previous decisions under the AAT Act provide guidance in the application of s 71(2) ART Act.
As noted above, the application is based on harm and/or embarrassment to the applicant and her son. In short, it is the personal and traumatic nature of the events relied upon as explaining past conduct and the consequential harm to the applicant and her son if that information is published.
Both “harm (if any) which is likely to occur to a person” and “the circumstances of the parties to the proceeding and other persons connected to the proceeding” are matters to which the Tribunal must have regard under s 71(1) of the ART Act in deciding whether an order should be made under s 70. In doing so, the Tribunal is also to have regard to the principles of open justice set out in subs 71(2)(a)-(c).
In my opinion, reasons of embarrassment are generally not sufficient to justify an order restricting publication or disclosure of information. The possibility of embarrassment is an incident of a system of open justice, where people bring disputes before court or tribunal for determination and disclose their personal affairs by providing evidence in public hearings.
However, the application is not limited to circumstances of embarrassment. Rather, it is submitted that harm may occur to either the applicant or her son if the reasons for decision are published without redaction.
Harm is not defined in the ART Act. However, it should be given its ordinary English meaning. In this regard the ART Act speaks of harm to the person.
In submissions, the applicants said the harm was the distress to Ms Cavallaro and her son of having sensitive, personal information publicly available online forever. In saying so, as noted above, it was not suggested there was medical evidence to support a finding that the physical or mental health of Ms Cavallaro would be adversely impacted. On the other hand, the applicants submitted that the personal and traumatic nature of the events self-evidently should lead to the conclusion that distress will be suffered.
Against this submission, the respondent said there must be a strong case to displace the principle of open justice. In Azzopardi, the Tribunal said:[8]
It will be clear from the express terms of the Act that, unless there are clear reasons why confidentiality orders should be imposed, hearings and decisions should be open to the public or made public. It is from this point that any consideration of the issuing of confidentiality orders must proceed (Global Financial Markets Pty Ltd and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2017] AATA 1397 at [51]).
[8] Azzopardi at [5]
As to the publication of reasons, the Tribunal in Azzopardi continued:[9]
Once final determinations are made, there is a general public interest that they be published on the basis that their publication is unlikely to cause any additional damage to interests which have already been the subject of negative regulatory or Tribunal findings (Smart City Vocational College Pty Ltd v Australian Skills Quality Authority [2017] FCA 198 at [9]- [10] per Rangiah J.; Re Andy Soames and Secretary, Department of Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2012] AATA 107.)
[9] Azzopardi at [12]
In my opinion, the submission of the respondent that the must be a strong case to displace the principle of open justice diverts from the task imposed by s 71(2) of the ART Act.
As the Explanatory Memorandum states, s 71(2) requires an examination of relevant mandatory considerations and for an appropriate balancing process to be undertaken. In the present case the balance to be struck is between:
(a)on the one hand, the principles that it is desirable for hearings be held in public and evidence given before the Tribunal to be made available to the public; and
(b)on the other, the circumstances of the applicant and her son, the harm that is likely to occur to them if an order is not made and the confidential nature of the information in question.
For the purpose of s 70, this involves identifying the information sought to be restricted from publication or disclosure.
In undertaking this balancing process, it can be accepted that the public has an interest in having access to information necessary to understand the nature of the dispute between the parties, the reasons for the decision made and that the proceedings have been heard and determined fairly. It can also be accepted that, in seeking an order restricting publication or disclosure of information, the circumstances of and harm to a party or other person connected with the proceedings can be wide-ranging and variable in nature as can the confidential nature of the information in question.
Where, as in the present case, the order sought is limited to the reasons for decision and the de-identification of parties, and not an order restricting access to the hearing or evidence generally, it is also necessary to consider:
(a)whether the information in the reasons for decision is of a type requiring protection in order to achieve the purpose identified; and/or
(b)whether, insofar as protection of the identified information is required, it can be achieved by a less restrictive order, such as redaction.
In the present case, the publication of reasons, including the identification of the parties who have engaged in conduct warranting sanctions under the TAS Act, serves a protective purpose to members of the public with whom the tax agent engages or might engage.
As to harm, the applicants did not submit that there was medical evidence to support the proposition that the health or well-being of Ms Cavallaro or her son will be adversely affected. Rather, it is said that distress will be caused by publication of information of an extremely personal and traumatic nature.
In the case of Ms Cavallaro, it is difficult to see how the publication will cause harm. There is no medical evidence to support the view that the past trauma, already suffered and from which she has made a recovery, will re-occur in the future if a nonpublication order is not made.
As to her son, the evidence of Ms Cavallaro, is that he is unaware of some of the detail behind the trauma which Ms Cavallaro has suffered and for which she received medical treatment. She is, legitimately, concerned about the effect on her son if he was exposed to this information. However, it was not suggested that the detail of what occurred might not be communicated to her son at some time in the future, it being recognised that the events in question occurred many years ago when her son was much younger.
Despite the concern for her son, it seems to me that an order prohibiting the publication of the names of the parties is unnecessary. This is because the detail of the traumatic experiences which were suffered by Ms Cavallaro are not matters which are set out in the reasons for decision on review, the matter addressed in those reasons being the effect the traumatic events had on Ms Cavallaro’s ability to meet her obligations as a tax agent rather than the detail of those traumatic events.
It follows that I am not satisfied an order of the type sought should be made in the present circumstances.
Likewise, in these reasons for refusing the application for an order under s 70 of the ART Act, I have endeavoured to avoid any unnecessary detail as to the traumatic circumstances other than what would be known to the public.
ORDERS
The Tribunal makes the following order:
(a)The application for an order to anonymise the name of the parties in these reasons and in the reasons for the decision determining each of the review applications dated 17 January 2025 made by each of the applicants is refused.