Castro v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

Link copied
Case Copied 14 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Castro v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1676

MIGRATION – Colombian national holding subjective fear of persecution – Refugee Review Tribunal concluded persecution would not be for a Convention reason – no point of principle.

RAUL CASTRO v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
N773 of 1999

MOORE J
1 DECEMBER 1999
SYDNEY

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 773 OF 1999

BETWEEN:

RAUL CASTRO
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Respondent

JUDGE:

MOORE J

DATE OF ORDER:

1 DECEMBER 1999

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The application is dismissed with costs.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 773 OF 1999

BETWEEN:

RAUL CASTRO
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Respondent

JUDGE:

MOORE J

DATE:

1 DECEMBER 1999

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an application by Raul Castro ("the applicant") for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal ("the Tribunal") of 13 July 1999. The applicant is a 35 year old citizen of Colombia who arrived in Australia on 25 July 1997. On 1 September 1997 he lodged an application for a protection visa with the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (“the Department”). A criterion for the grant of such a visa is that the applicant is a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees done at Geneva on 28 July 1951 as amended by the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees done at New York on 31 January 1967 (“the Convention”): see s 36 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)(“the Act”). On 22 October 1997 a delegate of the Minister refused to grant a protection visa and on 27 October 1997 the applicant sought review of that decision by the Tribunal. After considering the circumstances of the applicant, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision that the applicant was not a refugee. Art 1A(2) of the Convention contains, for present purposes, the definition of refugee. It provides:

    “… the term ‘refugee’ shall apply to any person who;
    …
    owing to a well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality in being outside the country of his former habitual residence is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”

  2. The applicant was not legally represented in these proceedings. However he was assisted by an adviser at the hearing before the Tribunal. The application for an order of review filed by the applicant in this Court appears also to have been prepared with the…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Castro v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[1999] FCA 1676
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Castro v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs involved an applicant from Colombia who sought to appeal a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal. The Tribunal had determined that the applicant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution if returned to Colombia, based on the applicant’s experiences with guerilla forces and government military personnel. The applicant argued that the Tribunal failed to properly consider whether there was a real chance of persecution upon his return, and sought to challenge the Tribunal’s decision on the basis of alleged errors of law.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the Tribunal had erred in its assessment of the risk of persecution to the applicant if he were to return to Colombia. The court needed to determine if the Tribunal had properly applied the law in assessing the applicant’s claims and whether it had sufficiently reasoned its decision. Specifically, the court examined whether the Tribunal had failed to provide reasons for its conclusion that there was no real chance of persecution, as required by section 430(1)(b) of the relevant legislation.

The court found that the Tribunal had correctly focused on the issue of whether the risk of harm to the applicant would be due to his membership of a particular social group or political opinion. The Tribunal's analysis of the applicant’s evidence and its conclusion that there was no real chance of persecution were deemed to be unexceptionable. The court rejected the suggestion that the Tribunal had failed to provide adequate reasons for its decision, noting that the Tribunal had directly linked its findings to the evidence presented by the applicant. Consequently, the court found no legal error in the Tribunal's approach and dismissed the appeal.

In light of the above, the court dismissed the applicant's appeal with costs. This outcome reflects the court’s determination that the Tribunal had appropriately assessed the risk of persecution and correctly applied the relevant legal principles in reaching its decision.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application is dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

The applicant is from Cali, Colombia, where his father and sister continue to reside. The family previously lived in Acevedo Huila, where many of his relatives have money, houses, and coffee and cattle farms. Guerilla forces repeatedly demanded and extorted large sums of money from the family, which eventually led to threats of death when they could no longer pay. Members of the applicant's family, including his mother, uncle, and cousin, were assassinated, and his father was wounded in an assassination attempt. The applicant himself narrowly escaped assassination on one occasion. The guerillas would also take food and warn the family not to cooperate with government forces, who would subsequently accuse the family of collaborating with the guerillas. The government forces also verbally abused and imprisoned the applicant for 30 days when he attempted to leave the army to attend to his wounded father.

The matter was considered by the Tribunal, which heard the applicant's written submissions, oral evidence from the Department interview, written submissions to the Tribunal, and oral evidence at the Tribunal hearing. The Tribunal's decision was subsequently appealed, with the only ground of appeal being an alleged error of law in the Tribunal's approach. The appeal was dismissed by the court.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

What follows is a summary of the applicant’s evidence considered by the Tribunal derived from his written submissions to the Department, oral evidence given at the Department interview, written submissions to the Tribunal, and oral evidence given at the Tribunal hearing.The applicant's evidence as detailed by the Tribunal The applicant comes from Cali, Colombia, and his father and sister continue to reside in that area of the country. The family previously lived in Acevedo Huila, and most of his relatives living in that area have money, houses and coffee and cattle farms. Guerilla forces came to members of his family many times and ordered them to pay large sums of money. His family did not agree with giving the fruits of their labour to those who did not work, nor did they wish to support a cause with which they did not agree. However initially the guerillas had sought smaller sums of money and the family had acceded to those demands. The sums of money demanded soon became larger and the family were eventually unable to pay the large amounts of money demanded. When they refused to pay, the guerillas threatened the applicant and his family with death. The applicant’s mother, uncle and cousin have been assassinated and his father had been wounded in an assassination attempt. The applicant himself also narrowly escaped assassination on one occasion. When the guerillas came to his family they would take all the food they could find and would ask the family to prepare food for them. If their demands were refused the guerillas would mistreat the family. The guerillas would also warn the family not to talk to government forces. However the government forces themselves would sometimes come to the home and ask for food. Often by the time the government forces arrived, the guerillas had already been and taken everything. The applicant and his family would then be accused of cooperating with the guerillas. The government forces branded the applicant a guerilla collaborator, and asked him for information about the guerillas that he did not have. When the family could not give such information they would be verbally abused and on one occasion were locked in a room in the house. The applicant’s father had been wounded at a time when the applicant was serving in the army as part of his compulsory military service. The applicant had asked the army for leave to attend to his father and this was refused. The army told him that his father was well and accused the applicant of lying. The applicant then attempted to escape from the army but was caught and imprisoned for 30 days. The applicant’s mother had been assassinated in 1990 because she could not pay money to the rebel forces. This occurred at the family farm in Huila. When the Tribunal inquired whether the guerillas may have been interested in his mother for some other reason, the applicant stated that his mother had supported one of the two major traditional political parties in Colombia but to his knowledge had never expressed any particular political view in opposition to the guerillas. The applicant’s cousin had been killed in an attack in 1992.

Decision

Reasons for decision

MOORE J
In relation to the applicant’s imprisonment for 30 days at the hands of the army, the Tribunal held there was no evidence to suggest the punishment suffered by the applicant was not within the bounds of the relevant law and, in any event, the incident did not give rise to a well-founded fear of persecution in Colombia now or in the foreseeable future. In conclusion, the Tribunal stated that despite the applicant’s strong subjective fear of returning to Colombia, there was no real chance of him being persecuted for reasons of political opinion, membership of a particular social group, or for any other Convention reason if returned to that country.Conclusion As I noted earlier, the applicant is not represented. The only ground of appeal identified in the notice of appeal is, in terms, not a ground identified in s 476. Even if treated as raising an allegation of error of law, I can discern no legal error in the approach of the Tribunal. Given its acceptance of the applicant’s account of his past experiences, the Tribunal correctly focused on the issue of whether the risk of harm to which the applicant might be exposed were he to return to Colombia, would be by reason of membership of a particular social group or political opinion. Its consideration of these matters is, in my opinion, unexceptionable. This is not a case where the motives of the guerillas in extorting money was or may have been multifaceted: see Chokov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 823 and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Sarrazola [1999] FCA 1134. In a letter declining legal aid which the applicant handed up in the proceedings, a solicitor from the Legal Aid Commission of New South Wales suggested the Tribunal may have failed to comply with s 430(1)(b) in that it gave no reasons why there is no evidence which suggests that there is a real chance in the reasonably foreseeable future (of persecution). However the passage of the Tribunal’s decision referred to by the solicitor speaks of persecution for reasons of political opinion, membership of a particular social group or for any other Convention reason and is, in terms, directly linked to the evidence that had been given by the applicant which had been set out and analysed earlier by the Tribunal in its decision. There is, in my opinion, no failure to comply with s 430(1)(b). I dismiss the application with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MOORE J

The court considered the applicant's account of his experiences in Colombia, including extortion and threats by guerilla forces, and his family's refusal to support these forces. The court noted that the Tribunal had correctly focused on whether the risk of harm to which the applicant might be exposed if returned to Colombia would be by reason of membership of a particular social group or political opinion. The Tribunal's consideration of these matters was deemed unexceptionable by the court. The applicant's argument that the Tribunal failed to comply with s 430(1)(b) by not providing reasons for finding no real chance of persecution was rejected. The court found that the Tribunal's decision was directly linked to the evidence given by the applicant, which had been set out and analysed earlier in the Tribunal's decision. The court dismissed the application with costs, finding no legal error in the Tribunal's approach.