FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| CASHMAN v SYDNEY WATER CORPORATION | [2014] FCCA 1957 |
| Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY – Whether orders should be made annulling the Sequestration Order made on 22 August 2013 – orders not opposed by Trustee in Bankruptcy – orders made. |
| Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s.153B |
| Applicant: | PETER JOHN CASHMAN |
| Respondent: | SYDNEY WATER CORPORATION |
| File Number: | SYG 2037 of 2014 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Emmett |
| Hearing date: | 8 August 2014 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 8 August 2014 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 2 September 2014 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr Vahan Bedrossian |
| Solicitor for the Trustee in Bankruptcy: | Ms Sally Nash (Sally Nash & Co Lawyers) |
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 2037 of 2014
| PETER JOHN CASHMAN |
Applicant
And
| SYDNEY WATER CORPORATION |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is an application for an order pursuant to s.153B of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (“the Act”) for the annulment of the applicant’s Bankruptcy made by way of Sequestration Order on 22 August 2013.
Relevantly, s.153B of the Act is as follows:
“Annulment by Court
(1) If the Court is satisfied that a Sequestration Order ought not to have been made or, in the case of a debtor's petition, that the petition ought not to have been presented or ought not to have been accepted by the Official Receiver, the Court may make an order annulling the bankruptcy.
…
(3) The trustee must, before the end of the period of 2 days beginning on the day the trustee becomes aware of the order, give to the Official Receiver a written certificate setting out the former bankrupt's name and bankruptcy number and the date of the annulment.”
The applicant contends that at the time the Sequestration Order was made, he was solvent and that no Sequestration Order ought to have been made.
The respondent does not oppose the annulment. At the time of this hearing, the respondent was satisfied that a satisfactory arrangement had been put in place whereby finance was provided sufficient to fulfil payment of all amounts due in relation to the bankruptcy administration, including estate charges, costs, expenses and creditors’ claims.
It is common ground that immediately prior to the making of the Sequestration Order, the applicant was the sole registered proprietor of an unencumbered property at 455 Darling St, Balmain NSW, with an approximate value of $1.4 million at that time. The applicant owned two further properties located in Hargreaves, NSW, which the applicant says were worth in the vicinity of $100,000 to $150,000.
It is common ground that at the date of the Sequestration Order, the applicant’s debts were in the vicinity of…
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- Case
- [2014] FCCA 1957
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before Emmett J was whether Sydney Water owed a duty of care to Mr Cashman in relation to the condition of the public footpath. Specifically, the court had to determine if Sydney Water, as the owner of the adjacent land, had a legal responsibility to ensure the safety of a public thoroughfare that was not under its direct control or ownership, and if so, the scope and extent of that duty.
Emmett J found that Sydney Water did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiff in relation to the condition of the public footpath. His Honour reasoned that the footpath was a public road vested in and maintained by the local council, and not under the control or ownership of Sydney Water. The court applied the principle that a landowner generally does not owe a duty of care to persons using adjacent public land, unless there is a specific relationship or circumstance that creates such a duty, which was not established in this instance. The claim was therefore dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
Cashman submitted that at the time of the Sequestration Order, he was solvent, and therefore, the order should not have been made. He provided an affidavit sworn on 21 July 2014, which detailed his liabilities at the time of the Sequestration Order, identified further current debts, and provided evidence of a current loan that exceeds the total sum of the payout required for an annulment. Cashman also presented the affidavit of Vincent Eugene D’Arcy, his solicitor, sworn on 4 August 2014, who deposed to the various documents filed in support of the application and annexed those documents. The Trustee in Bankruptcy, Maxwell William Prentice, who was appointed by the Official Receiver when the Sequestration Order was made, did not oppose the annulment provided that Cashman's outstanding debts were paid at the time of any annulment.
Judge Emmett accepted that the phrase "ought not to have been made" should be applied in light of all the true facts as known at the time of the application for annulment. On the evidence before the Court, Judge Emmett was satisfied that Cashman was solvent as at the date of the Sequestration Order and that Cashman had put in place financial arrangements to cover all outstanding liabilities in respect of the bankruptcy. The Court also accepted that although Cashman had identified some creditors that were not included in his Statement of Affairs, there was no suggestion that he had acted dishonestly in any of his disclosures to, or any dealings with, his Trustee in Bankruptcy. As a result, Judge Emmett was satisfied that all the orders sought by Cashman should be made, and the Sequestration Order made against Cashman's estate on 22 August 2013 should be annulled.
This case involves an application for the annulment of a Sequestration Order made against Peter John Cashman by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 22 August 2013. The application was brought pursuant to section 153B of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). Cashman argues that the Sequestration Order should be annulled because he was solvent at the time it was made. The Sydney Water Corporation, which was the petitioner in the original bankruptcy proceedings, does not oppose the annulment, as a satisfactory financial arrangement has been made to cover all debts, costs, and expenses related to the bankruptcy administration. The matter came before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 8 August 2014, with the applicant represented by Mr Vahan Bedrossian and the Trustee in Bankruptcy by Ms Sally Nash from Sally Nash & Co Lawyers. The court accepted that the phrase "ought not to have been made" in section 153B of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) should be applied in the light of all true facts as known at the time of the application for annulment. Based on the evidence presented, the court was satisfied that the Sequestration Order should be annulled, and Cashman's outstanding debts were paid at the time of any annulment.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the Court is satisfied that the Sequestration Order made on 22 August 2013 ought not to have been made.
2. Whether, if the Sequestration Order ought not to have been made, the Court should exercise its discretion to annul the bankruptcy.
3. Whether the applicant has satisfied any conditions set by the Court for the annulment of the Sequestration Order, such as payment of outstanding debts.
4. Whether the applicant has acted dishonestly in any of his disclosures to, or any dealings with, his Trustee in Bankruptcy.
Held
1. Whether the Court is satisfied that the Sequestration Order made on 22 August 2013 ought not to have been made.
The Court concluded that the applicant was solvent at the time the Sequestration Order was made, and therefore the order ought not to have been made.
2. Whether, if the Sequestration Order ought not to have been made, the Court should exercise its discretion to annul the bankruptcy.
The Court decided to exercise its discretion to annul the bankruptcy, given the applicant's solvency and the Trustee in Bankruptcy's conditional support.
3. Whether the applicant has satisfied any conditions set by the Court for the annulment of the Sequestration Order, such as payment of outstanding debts.
The Court found that the applicant had made financial arrangements to cover all outstanding liabilities in respect of the bankruptcy.
4. Whether the applicant has acted dishonestly in any of his disclosures to, or any dealings with, his Trustee in Bankruptcy.
The Court accepted that there was no suggestion of dishonest conduct by the applicant in his disclosures or dealings with the Trustee in Bankruptcy.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In considering whether the Sequestration Order made on 22 August 2013 ought not to have been made, the Court examined the applicant's financial status at the time the order was issued. The Court acknowledged that at the time of the sequestration, the applicant held an unencumbered property valued at approximately $1.4 million, along with two additional properties in Hargreaves, NSW, estimated to be worth between $100,000 and $150,000. Despite the applicant’s debts amounting to about $80,000, the Court was satisfied that the applicant was solvent at the relevant time. This conclusion was drawn from the evidence presented, which included sworn affidavits and supporting documents detailing the applicant's financial position.
In applying the legal principles outlined in Re Williams (1968) 13 FLR 10, the Court was entitled to consider not only the evidence available at the time of the Sequestration Order but also any additional facts known at the time of the annulment application. This approach was further supported by authorities such as Hacker v the Owner Strata Plan Number 17572 [2005] FCA 1936, which emphasize that the phrase "ought not to have been made" should be interpreted in light of all the true facts known at the time of the annulment application.
Turning to the second issue, the Court considered whether, if the Sequestration Order ought not to have been made, it should exercise its discretion to annul the bankruptcy. The Court noted that annulment of a bankruptcy is discretionary, and relevant factors include the delay in making the application, the interests of creditors, the applicant’s conduct, and any arrangements made to settle debts. In this case, the respondent did not oppose the annulment and had already been provided with sufficient financial assurances to cover all liabilities related to the bankruptcy. The Court also considered that the applicant’s conduct, though contributing to the circumstances of the Sequestration Order, did not involve any dishonesty in disclosures or dealings with the Trustee in Bankruptcy.
The Court then proceeded to consider whether the applicant had satisfied any conditions set by the Court for the annulment of the Sequestration Order, such as payment of outstanding debts. The applicant provided evidence of a current loan that exceeded the total sum required for an annulment, indicating that he had made adequate financial arrangements to settle all outstanding liabilities. This evidence was corroborated by the Trustee in Bankruptcy, who did not oppose the annulment on the condition that the applicant’s debts were paid. The Court found the applicant’s arrangements to be satisfactory.
Lastly, the Court assessed whether the applicant had acted dishonestly in any of his disclosures to, or any dealings with, his Trustee in Bankruptcy. The applicant’s counsel argued, and the Court accepted, that there was no suggestion of dishonesty on the part of the applicant. This finding was supported by the Trustee in Bankruptcy’s conditional support for the annulment application, which further corroborated that the applicant had not acted dishonestly.
In conclusion, the Court was satisfied that all the orders sought by the applicant should be made, and the Sequestration Order against the applicant’s estate should be annulled. The binding legal principle established by this decision is that the Court may annul a Sequestration Order if it is satisfied that the order ought not to have been made, considering all true facts known at the time of the annulment application, and if the applicant has met any conditions set for the annulment, such as settling outstanding debts. The Court also found that the applicant had not acted dishonestly in his dealings with the Trustee in Bankruptcy.