TRADE MARKS ACT 1995
DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS WITH REASONS
Re:Opposition by Cash Converters Pty Ltd to registration of trade mark application 1336459(35, 36) - CASHEEZ - filed in the name of Margo Chaille Webber.
Delegate: | Jock McDonagh |
Representation: | Opponent: David Stewart and Laura Tatchell of Wrays Lawyers Applicant: Angela Dahlke of Cullens Patent & Trade Mark Attorneys |
Decision: | 2013 ATMO 34 Section 52 opposition: sections 42(b), 43, 44, 58, 60, and 62A pressed – s 44 ground of opposition established - no requirement to consider other grounds – registration refused |
Background
This is an opposition brought by Cash Converters Pty Ltd (“the Opponent”) pursuant to s 52 of the TradeMarks Act 1995 (“the Act”) to registration of an application filed in the name of the Margo Chaille Webber (“the Applicant”) as follows:
| Appn No. | 1336459 |
| Priority Date | 10 December 2009 |
| Trade Mark | |
| Services | Class 35: Retail and wholesale services, including sale and purchase of new, second hand and used goods Class 36: Financial services including personal loans and collecting personal loan repayments; pawnbrokerage |
The parties filed and served evidence as follows:
Evidence in Support
- Statutory Declaration by Michael Ian Cooke, Senior Executive and Group Legal Counsel of the Opponent, made 18 November 2010 with annexures MIC‑1 to MIC-18 (“Cooke 1”).
Evidence in Answer
- Statutory Declaration by Margo Chaille Webber, Applicant, made 18 May 2011, with exhibits CH-1 to CH-16 (“Webber”).
Evidence in Reply
- Statutory Declaration by Michael Ian Cooke made 28 July 2011 (“Cooke 2”).
Applicant’s Further Evidence
- Statutory Declaration by Angela Dahlke, Applicant’s attorney, made 23 December 2011, with exhibits AD-1 to AD-3 (“Dahlke”)
Opponent’s Further Evidence in Reply
- Statutory Declaration by Michael Ian Cooke made 16 February 2012, with annexures MIC‑1 to MIC-11 (“Cooke 3”)
I heard the matter as delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks on 28 February 2013 in Canberra. David Stewart and Laura Tachell, both of Wrays Lawyers, appeared for the Opponent. Angela Dahlke, of Cullens Patent & Trade Mark Attorneys, appeared for the Applicant.
Grounds of Opposition
The notice of opposition (“the Notice”) nominated a number of grounds of opposition available under the Act. In his submissions, Mr Stewart advised that the following grounds were pressed by the Opponent:
- Prior substantially identical or deceptively similar trade mark (Section 44)
- Applicant not the owner of the opposed trade mark (Section 58)
- Reputation of the Opponent’s trade marks (Section 60)
- Application filed in bad faith (Section 62A)
- Use of the Applicant’s trade mark would be contrary to law (Section 42(b))
- Deception or confusion arising from a connotation in the Applicant’s trade mark (Section 43)
To succeed in its opposition the Opponent bears the onus of establishing at least one of these six grounds. As will become apparent, I have only found it necessary to address the section 44 ground in this decision and this is discussed below. Of course, should the decision be appealed, it is open…
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- Case
- [2013] ATMO 34
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Supreme Court was required to determine whether the District Court had erred in finding that Cash Converters had engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct. This involved considering whether the representations made by Cash Converters regarding the loan terms and security were, in fact, misleading or deceptive, and whether Ms. Webber had relied on those representations to her detriment. The court also had to assess the adequacy of the disclosure provided by Cash Converters concerning the loan's true cost and the implications of the security interest.
In its reasoning, the Supreme Court applied established principles of misleading and deceptive conduct under consumer protection legislation. The court considered the objective test of whether a reasonable person in the position of Ms. Webber would have been misled by the representations made. It examined the specific wording of the loan agreement and the surrounding circumstances of its formation, including the information provided to Ms. Webber. The court found that the representations made by Cash Converters were indeed misleading, as they did not adequately convey the full financial obligations and risks associated with the loan, particularly concerning the security. The appeal was dismissed, upholding the District Court's finding of contravention.
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Background
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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