IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M109 of 2012
B e t w e e n -
PETER CARUSO
Applicant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
CRENNAN J
KIEFEL J
KEANE J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT MELBOURNE ON FRIDAY, 10 MAY 2013, AT 11.19 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR M.J. CROUCHER, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MS C.A. BOSTON, on behalf of the applicant. (instructed by Tony Danos)
MR P.B. KIDD, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR B.L. SONNET, on behalf of the respondent. (instructed by Solicitor for Public Prosecutions)
CRENNAN J: Thank you. Yes, Mr Croucher.
MR CROUCHER: Your Honours, it is submitted that the Court of Appeal erred in failing to hold that the trial miscarried as a result of fundamental procedural irregularities. Namely, the trial judge’s failure, first, to provide the whole of the jury panel with information relevant to the excuse process prior to impoundment as required by section 32(1)(e) and subsection (2) of the Juries Act, and/or secondly, to have the applicant arraigned in front of the whole of the jury panel from which the jury was ultimately struck.
Turning to the first of those two complaints, in our submission, read together, sections 32(1)(e) and (2) provide that prior to excuses, the Court must inform the panel or cause them to be informed of “any other information that the Court thinks relevant”. Prior to excuses, the judge caused the first part of the panel to be informed of the deceased’s name, the date of death and the place of death, not directly, but through the arraignment process because, of course, the charge particularised those things through the arraignment. But the applicant was not arraigned in front of the second part of the panel and nor was the second part of the panel otherwise provided with that same information, name of the deceased, date of death, place of death. In our submission, these were critical pieces of information.
KEANE J: Not so critical that anybody raised them at the time.
MR CROUCHER: Sorry?
KEANE J: Not so critical that anybody raised them at the time.
MR CROUCHER: That is true enough, although the prosecutor did point out after excuses were taken by the second part of the panel that the applicant had not been arraigned in front of the second part of the panel which, of course, is the practice as our learned friends can see in this stay.
CRENNAN J: Am I right that Mr Dunn was there for the accused?
MR CROUCHER: He is, there he was, yes, your Honour. But that raises the question of, if you like, waiver that has been mentioned in some of the cases but ‑ ‑ ‑
KEANE J: Well, not so much even waiver but rather just materiality.
MR CROUCHER: Yes, well,…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Caruso v The Queen and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2013] HCATrans 103
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the trial judge had erred in law by failing to direct the jury adequately on the defence of provocation. Specifically, the court had to determine if the judge's summing up had sufficiently explained the elements of provocation, including the requirement that the provocation must be such as to make an ordinary person lose self-control, and that the act of the accused must have been done in the heat of passion caused by that provocation.
The High Court reasoned that a proper direction on provocation requires the judge to explain that the jury must consider whether the provocation was sufficient to cause an ordinary person to lose self-control, and then, if they find that it was, whether the accused in fact lost self-control and acted under the immediate influence of that provocation. The court found that the trial judge's directions, when viewed as a whole, did not adequately convey these essential elements to the jury, thereby creating a risk that the jury might have convicted the appellant of murder when the evidence might have supported a verdict of manslaughter by reason of provocation.
Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction for murder, and ordered a new trial.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Full text does not contain this section.