Carson and GIO Australia (on Behalf of Telstra Corporation Ltd)

DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2002] AATA 287

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION )

)No N2001/1795
N2001/302

Re      PETER CARSON
  Applicant
           And    GIO AUSTRALIA (on behalf of TELSTRA CORPORATION LTD)
  Respondent
DECISION

Tribunal Ms G Ettinger Senior Member Dr J Campbell Member

Date24 April 2002
PlaceSydney

Decision      The Administrative Appeals Tribunal ("the Tribunal") decides that in matter N2001/1795, the decision to refuse a reconsideration of the decision of 12 June 1992 by the Respondent, Telstra Corporation Ltd, pursuant to section 62 of the Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 constitutes a reviewable decision before the Tribunal.   Continued The Tribunal having considered the submissions of the parties and all other relevant material in matter N2001/1795, refuses to exercise the discretion to extend time pursuant to section 29(7) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 for the Applicant, Peter Carson, to make application to have the decision of the Respondent reviewed by the Tribunal. In matter N2001/302, the Tribunal having considered the submissions of the parties and all other relevant material refuses to exercise the discretion pursuant to section 29(7) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 to allow an extension of time to the Applicant, Peter Carson to make application to have the matter reviewed by the Tribunal.
  ..............................................
  Ms G Ettinger
  Senior Member
CATCHWORDS
Compensation – 1992 decision – whether Applicant notified of cessation of liability – whether statutory presumption that decision was given – Acts Interpretation Act 1901 applied to affirm statutory presumption that decision was given - reviewable decision of 1992 - primary decision imputed - EOT before the Tribunal – refusal to exercise discretion to extend time in both 1992 and 1996 decisions.

Legislation
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 s 29(7)
Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 ss 4, 14, 62
Acts Interpretation Act 1901 ss 28A, 29

Case Law
Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd and Others v Minister for Home Affairs and Environment (1984) 58 ALR 305
Re Young and Telstra Corporation (1993-4) 32 ALD 307

REASONS FOR DECISION

24 April 2002 Ms G Ettinger Senior Member Dr J Campbell Member

The task before the Administrative Appeals Tribunal ("the Tribunal"), was to deal with two applications for extension of time in regard to applications brought before the Tribunal by Mr Peter Carson, the Applicant in matters, N2001/1795 and N2001/302. The Respondent in these proceedings was Telstra Corporation Ltd.
The application in matter N2001/1795 concerned a 1991 injury Mr Carson incurred while moving furniture in connection with a presentation, for which liability was first accepted, and then claimed to have been ceased in a decision said by the Respondent to have been made on 12 June 1992. The Tribunal had first to consider whether a reviewable decision could be imputed, and whether it had jurisdiction to deal with the extension of time to make application to the Tribunal for review of that decision, as sought by the Applicant.
The application in matter N2001/302 concerned a 1994 injury, suffered by Mr Carson during team building exercises involving "games of skirmish and war games" (T3) for which liability was accepted by the Respondent (T7–T14), and subsequently ceased, following an examination by Dr E Sturrock, in a decision effective on and from 9 February 1995, (T19) and affirmed on 22 January 1996 (T28).
The Applicant was represented by Ms M Gillies of counsel, instructed by Geoffrey Edwards & Co, Solicitors, and the Respondent Telstra Corporation Ltd ("Telstra"), by Mr J Wallace of counsel instructed by Henry Davis York, Lawyers.
By way of background the Tribunal noted that an application by Mr Carson in matter N2000/1507 (erroneously published as being matter N2001/302) had previously been before the Tribunal. The Tribunal noted the decision of Deputy President S P Estcourt QC [2001] AATA 648, ordered as follows:
"The Tribunal directs that the application to review the determination made by the respondent on 9 August 2000 be listed for hearing."
The Tribunal noted also that matter N2000/1507 concerning Mr Carson's claim for permanent impairment which had not been heard on the merits, was presently adjourned until such time as the full substantive hearing of Mr Carson's applications, including matter N2001/1841.
For the sake of completeness the Tribunal notes that Matter N2001/1841 concerned a denial of liability for "lumbar back injury" dated 16 November 2001 and affirmed 27 November 2001 with regard to injuries Mr Carson alleged he sustained on 31 October 1995 and 3 June 1997. Both the Delegate and the Reconsiderations Officer had applied section 53 of the Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 ("the Act"), in making their decisions and found that the section had not been complied with regard to notification of the injuries. The Reconsiderations Officer wrote relevantly:
"I note that in determining that the claimant was not entitled to compensation as a result of the injuries allegedly sustained on 31 October 1995 and 3 June 1997 the primary delegate having regard to section 53 of the SRC Act and noted that the section had not been complied with by the claimant. That section required an employee to notify of an injury in writing as soon as the employee becomes aware of the injury. It was noted that the claimant did not complete a compensation claim form as a result of the injuries allegedly sustained in October 1995 and June 1997 until 8 February 2001. Furthermore the claimant had been on notice as to the need to provide information concerning the injuries in October 1995 since February 1996 but had not provided any further information. The claimant similarly knew he had to properly notify Telstra of the circumstances of the alleged injury in June 1997.
…
I have carefully considered all material facts of this case and am satisfied that the claimant failed to notify Telstra in writing of the injury as required by section 53 of the Act that failure was not occasioned by any ignorance, mistake, absence overseas or any other reasonable cause by the claimant. As a result of that failure by the claimant to notify Telstra of the circumstances, time, the date and location of the injuries, Telstra is irreversibly prejudiced by the failure. Accordingly I am not satisfied the claimant has suffered any injury to his lumbar spine which was materially contributed to by his employment with Telstra in either October 1995 or June 1997."

ISSUES BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL

The issues before the Tribunal were:

whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to deal with an extension of time for the Applicant to make an application to the Tribunal for review of a decision in matter N2001/1795; and if so
whether the discretion should be exercised to permit an extension of time in matter N2001/1795 pursuant to section 29(7) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975;
whether an extension of time for the Applicant to make an application to the Tribunal for review of the decision in matter N2001/302 should be granted pursuant to section 29(7) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975.

legislation

The relevant legislation in this matter is:

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 ("the AAT Act"), in particular section 29(7);
Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988, ("the Act"), in particular section 62 and sections 4 and 14;
Acts Interpretation Act 1901, in particular ss 28A, and 29.

As relevant they follow:
Section 29(7) of the AAT Act reads:
"(7) The Tribunal may, upon application in writing by a person, extend the time for the making by that person of an application to the Tribunal for a review of a decision (including a decision made before the commencement of this section)."

Injury is defined in section 4 of the Act :

"injury" means:
(a) a disease suffered by an employee; or
(b) an injury (other than a disease) suffered by an employee, being a physical or mental injury arising out of, or in the course of, the employee's employment; or
(c) an aggravation of a physical or mental injury (other than a disease) suffered by an employee (whether or not that injury arose out of, or in the course of, the employee's employment), being an aggravation that arose out of, or in the course of, that employment;

but does not include any such disease, injury or aggravation suffered by an employee as a result of reasonable disciplinary action taken against the employee or failure by the employee to obtain a promotion, transfer or benefit in connection with his or her employment."

Section 14 of the Act deals with compensation for injuries and follows:

"Compensation for injuries
(1) Subject to this Part, Comcare is liable to pay compensation in accordance with this Act in respect of an injury suffered by an employee if the injury results in death, incapacity for work, or impairment.
(2) Compensation is not payable in respect of an injury that is intentionally self-inflicted.
(3) Compensation is not payable in respect of an injury that is caused by the serious and wilful misconduct of the employee but is not intentionally self-inflicted, unless the injury results in death, or serious and permanent impairment."

Sections 28A and 29 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 also follow:

"28A Service of documents
(1) For the purposes of any Act that requires or permits a document to be served on a person, whether the expression "serve", "give" or "send" or any other expression is used, then, unless the contrary intention appears, the document may be served:
(a) on a natural person:
(i) by delivering it to the person personally; or
(ii) by leaving it at, or by sending it by pre-paid post to, the address of the place of residence or business of the person last known to the person serving the document; or

(b) …

(2) Nothing in subsection (1):
(a) affects the operation of any other law of the Commonwealth, or any law of a State or Territory, that authorizes the service of a document otherwise than as provided in that subsection; or
(b) affects the power of a court to authorize service of a document otherwise than as provided in that subsection."

"29 Meaning of service by post
(1) Where an Act authorizes or requires any document to be served by post, whether the expression "serve" or the expression "give" or "send" or any other expression is used, then unless the contrary intention appears the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing prepaying and posting the document as a letter, and unless the contrary is proved to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post."

evidence before the tribunal

The Tribunal had before it documents lodged pursuant to section 37 of the AAT Act, ("the T-documents"), and the following other exhibits:
DOCUMENT DATE EXHIBIT
Affidavit of Peter Carson    27 February 2001    Exhibit A1
Affidavit of Peter Carson    26 November 2001 Exhibit A2
RNSH Records       12 November 1991 Exhibit A3
Ambulance Report   11 November 1991 Exhibit A4
Hunters Hill Hospital –hospitalisation summary            5 July 1994    Exhibit A5
Letter of Geoffrey Edwards & Co, Solicitors to GIO      22 November 2001 Exhibit A6
Letter of GIO to Geoffrey Edwards & Co, Solicitors      27 November 2001 Exhibit A7
T-documents Exhibit R1
Letter from "Informed Reports" to Respondent's solicitors      10 November 2001 Exhibit R2
Computer Printouts from "TCare" system           23 June 2000           Exhibit R3
Clinical Notes and Medical Reports from records of Dr A Bowes     1994 - 2000   Exhibit R4

evidence of the applicant - mr peter carson

Mr Carson whose date of birth was 21 October 1945, and whose statements of 27 February 2001 and 26 November 2001 were Exhibits A1 and A2, gave oral evidence before the Tribunal. He commenced employment with Telstra in 1985.
In his affidavit, (Exhibit A1), Mr Carson stated that he had injured his back in October 1991 while moving furniture during his employment. He stated that he had been admitted for a night to Royal North Shore Hospital, and that he had been off work for approximately three weeks. He stated that he sustained a further injury on 30 June 1994.
In cross-examination Mr Carson's attention was drawn to T4, a claim for compensation he made on 18 July 1994, for the 1994 lower back injury. The Tribunal noted that on the basis of a medico-legal report of Dr W Sturrock, (T17), liability was ceased on and from 9 February 1995.
Mr Carson acknowledged he had also made a claim for such injury in 1991 or 1992, and had been paid compensation, although he had no independent recollection of making that claim. Mr Carson said that although he normally kept copies of documents, he had not done so in relation to the 1991 claim form, because he thought it would have been a "one-off" and in any case he felt secure in the knowledge his employer would do the right thing. He stated both in his affidavit at Exhibit A2, and in oral evidence that he had not received any decision of the Respondent dated 12 June 1992, denying liability. Mr Carson said that since the previous Tribunal hearing on 24 October 2001, he had looked for any such document at his home and had been unable to locate one. He said that he did not think further about his claim made in 1991 until the denial of liability dated 21 February 1995 (on the basis of Dr Sturrock's examination and report), because from 1991 to that period, his treatment expenses had been paid for by the Respondent as claimed by him.
Mr Carson said that after 1994, things changed in his work environment; there was a "cultural change" he said. Mr Carson stated that at the time of the decision dated 21 February 1995, he was worried about his position, and did not therefore take any further action.
Mr Carson acknowledged he had taken redundancy involuntarily from the Respondent in April 2000. He said that he had not known what rights he had to resist that action, notwithstanding his positions as global sales and programming manager, and national sales manager. In reply to questioning from the Tribunal, Mr Carson said that he had been approached regarding redundancy in 1994, and that he had refused to go. He said that he had then been demoted in 1996. He mentioned victimisation of various staff members and his fear of losing his position, but was unable to name more than one person whose position was under threat.
Mr Carson said that he saw his general practitioner, Dr A Bowes, and a specialist at Royal North Shore Hospital in relation to his back in 1991. He said that between 1992 and 1994 he did not have back problems, did not have time off with his back, and took no medication.
When cross-examined about not following the correct procedures and completing the necessary forms in regard to injury or aggravations in the years following, Mr Carson said that he thought the correct procedures had been followed because he had been paid sick leave. He said that the aggravation had occurred because he had been packing and unpacking boxes at work.
Mr Carson stated in Exhibit A1 that the letter notifying him that liability for his back injury (in 1994) had ceased on and from 9 February 1995, (T24), was dated 3 January 1996, after he had written with regard to leave he sought associated with the aggravation of his back condition on 31 October 1995.
Mr Carson agreed when referred to T25, that this was a letter from him to his employers dated 12 January 1996, and that it was by way of disputing their refusal (dated 21 February 1995), to accept that his claim was a recurrence or aggravation of his back injury which occurred on 31 October 1995. Mr Carson acknowledged that he received a reconsideration affirming the refusal to accept liability dated 22 January 1996 (T27). The Tribunal noted that the letter at T27 also referred to the incident of 30 June 1994.
Mr Carson explained in Exhibit A1 that he understood from the Respondent's letter that he had rights to further make claims for future compensation should the need arise. He said it was for this reason and the worry about his future prospects for employment that caused him to not make any further applications at that time.
He stated however that a further aggravation occurred on 3 June 1997 when he moved a chair while doing a presentation to staff at work, and he made an application for leave for the period 4 – 6 June 1997. Mr Carson said that he did not receive any formal response from Telstra, but he was paid his normal wages for that period. He said that he did not follow up because he did not think he needed to.
Mr Carson stated at Exhibit A1 that he was worried about his position at Telstra, and his back, and that after being told in February 2000, that he was to be made redundant, he consulted legal advisors and saw Dr R Wallace, an orthopaedic surgeon. This was followed by a claim for permanent impairment lodged on 5 June 2000. The Tribunal noted that this resulted in a refusal by the Respondent (via GIO, the insurer), on 28 June 2000 (T36), and a reconsideration affirming the refusal on 9 August 2000 (T44/45), and that after a claim to this Tribunal, this became matter N2000/1507.
In summary, Mr Carson's evidence was that he suffered minor injuries in 1991, and that he had minor problems between 1991 and 1994, but that his back was not aggravated again until the 1994 incident. Mr Carson said that he suffered further incidents in 1995 and 1997. He confirmed that the hesitancy in claiming further or appealing decisions was his lack of understanding of the system, the fact that the Respondent paid for medical expenses between 1991 and 1994, and his fear of losing his position after a change in "culture" in the workplace after 1994.
medical evidence
The Tribunal was mindful that the medical evidence was not a major feature of this matter, and noted further that the decision of 12 June 1992 denying liability for the Applicant's 1991 injury, was made without the benefit of a medical examination of the Applicant.
The main medical reports raised during the hearing were the reports of Dr R Wallace, orthopaedic surgeon (T30), Dr W Sturrock, consultant surgeon (T17), and the involvement of Dr A Bowes, Mr Carson's general practitioner, whose notes and annexures to those were before the Tribunal as Exhibit R4. There were also an ambulance report (1991) (Exhibit A4), admissions notes of Royal North Shore Hospital (1991) (Exhibit A3), and Hunters Hill Hospital records (1994) (Exhibit A5),
dr w sturrock – surgeon
The report of Dr Sturrock dated 13 February 1995 was before the Tribunal at T17. Dr Sturrock was asked to examine the Applicant in relation to the claim he made with regard to an injury he claimed he sustained on 30 June 1994.
It was on the basis of this report that the Respondent denied liability for the injury of 30 June 1994 in its decision dated 21 February 1995 which ceased liability on and from 9 February 1995. This was affirmed on 22 January 1996.
Dr Sturrock also examined X-rays dated 17 October 1994 which he said, "revealed some mild degenerative changes are the L3/4 level with perhaps slight narrowing of the disc space and some marginal osteophytes forming." He also opined as follows:
"This man has a degenerative change occurring in his back. This type of change is likely to give rise to recurring attacks of back pain with or without any particular injury or trauma. It would appear that he was first aware of back problems in 1991 and then had another attack after some vigorous physical activities occurring on 30th June, 1994 but the ill effects of these attacks of pain have now settled down. He should be aware that unless he reduces his weight and does some regular back exercises, he will get recurring attacks of pain because of a pre-existing degenerative change unrelated to any injury. …"

dr r wallace - orthopaedic surgeon

The Tribunal noted the report of Dr Wallace dated 5 May 2000 (T30) in which he commented on X-rays and CT examinations conducted in October 1994, November 1995 and June 1996. He opined as follows:
"I believe this gentleman has suffered recurrent musculoligamentous strain at his lumbar spine and disc protrusion at the L4/5 level as a result of injuries sustained in the course of his duties at work in the period 1991 to 1995. These injuries are consistent with the mechanism described of lifting strain at his lumbar spine in November 1991, repetitive bending and twisting movements at his lumbar spine in June 1994 with aggravation of his condition caused by prolonged sitting in October 1995. …
Unfortunately he may have difficulty in continuing his full pre-injury duties at work as a Sales & Marketing Program Manager in the long term due to ongoing lumbar spinal disability. He would be best suited to continuing at this work on a permanent light duties basis with due consideration given to restrictions on his activities detailed above."

submissions and conclusions

The Tribunal had to consider whether it had jurisdiction to deal with an extension of time for the Applicant make an application to the Tribunal in matter N2001/1795; and if so whether the discretion to permit an extension of time should be granted in this pursuant to section 29(7) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975. In doing so, it had to take into account the evidence, submissions, case law and legislation before it.
The Tribunal had also to consider whether an extension of time for the Applicant make an appliation to the Tribunal in matter N2001/302 should be granted pursuant to section 29(7) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975. In doing so, it had to take into account the evidence, submissions, case law and legislation before it.
matter no 2001/1795 and the decision of 12 June 1992
The Tribunal first considered the situation with regard to matter N2001/1795. The Tribunal was mindful that the Respondent submitted that it had made a decision dated 12 June 1992, in which it ceased liability to Mr Carson for his work related injury suffered moving furniture before a presentation at work, and claimed to have been suffered in early November 1991. The Tribunal noted that Mr Carson's evidence that he had not kept any documents relating to this claim, and that he could not recall when giving oral evidence whether it was made in 1991 or 1992.
Ms Gillies submitted for the Applicant, referring to Mr Carson's affidavit and oral evidence, that he had never received notification of the decision of 12 June 1992, and that he knew nothing of it until 28 June 2000. Ms Gillies submitted that accordingly, the Tribunal could not be satisfied that there was ever a cessation of liability. She submitted that if the Tribunal accepted this proposition, then there would be no need for Mr Carson to apply for an extension of time in relation to the lodging of a reconsideration, and no extension of time was required for the application to the Tribunal in relation to the 1991 injury.
The Tribunal noted Mr Carson's evidence that he assumed after liability had been accepted for the 1991 injury, that it just continued because his medical expenses after 1991, were paid by his employer as they arose. The Tribunal noted however that on the basis of Mr Carson's evidence, there would have been very few, if any, medical bills after the incident of November 1991. The Tribunal noted that Mr Carson gave evidence that although he was not pain free, he had few problems with his back between 1991 and 1994. The Tribunal was mindful from the tendered documents, including the clinical notes of Dr A Bowes (Exhibit R4), Mr Carson's general practitioner, that it had no record of medical visits between 1991 and 1994 before it.
The Tribunal accepted the submission of the Applicant that he had not been asked to attend any medical examinations in regard to the decision of 12 June 1992 which the Respondent claimed ceased liability for the 1991 injury. The Tribunal also noted Mr Wallace's submission that the Respondent simply did not know whether there had been a medical examination in relation to the cessation of liability decision in 1992.
The Tribunal noted it was not in dispute that the decision of 12 June 1992 could not be located by the Respondent, even though the Respondent had made certain inquiries. The Tribunal noted that Exhibit R2 was a letter of Informed Reports dated 10 November 2001 in which its Mr S R Ferris wrote as follows:
"Thank you for your instructions in this matter, asking that we attempt to locate the workers' compensation file concerning Mr Carson's accident of 5 November 1991. …
We understand that the sick leave records contained in the T Documents reveal that Mr Carson took approximately two weeks off work following his injury. We do not have such documentation."
Mr Ferris then wrote about inquiries he had made with Ms Valerie Franks of GIO and Mr Terry Carroll of Telstra's Records Management Group. He added:
"… it appears that the subject file in relation to the 1991 accident is "missing". This is not surprising, given the considerable lapse in time since the file was probably last actioned. According to background information, this would most likely have been in June 1992, when liability was ceased."

The Tribunal noted that computer records from Telstra's "TCare" system admitted into evidence before the Tribunal as Exhibit R3, indicated that liability for injury to Mr Carson was ceased on 12 June 1992 in respect to an injury which occurred on 5 November 1991. Further, the Tribunal noted that there was no dispute that there had not been a request for a reconsideration, nor a decision made of its own accord by the Respondent affirming that decision at that time. Ms Gillies argued on behalf of Mr Carson that he could not have requested a reconsideration because he had not known of the denial of liability. She submitted that the first he knew of the decision was when he received correspondence from the Respondent on 28 June 2000.
The Tribunal noted that the formal request for a reconsideration of the decision of 12 June 1992 was only made by Mr Carson's solicitors, Geoffrey Edwards & Co on 22 November 2001 (Exhibit A6). In reply, the Senior Claims Officer of GIO wrote on 27 November 2001 (Exhibit A7), citing section 62(3) of the Act, and stating that the determination of 12 June 1992 would not be reconsidered on the grounds that the relevant time period had expired. The GIO officer added:
"Telstra does not accept that your client did not receive the relevant determination and reasons dated 12 June 1992. There is a statutory presumption that the relevant determination and reasons were posted and received by your client in the ordinary course of the post."
Mr Wallace argued on behalf of the Respondent that pursuant to the Acts Interpretation Act 1901, the decision of 12 June 1992 was deemed to have been communicated to Mr Carson.
The Tribunal was mindful that pursuant to sections 28A and 29 Acts Interpretation Act 1901, (reproduced earlier in the decision under the heading "LEGISLATION"), that subject to contrary intention, (not found here), the statutory presumption was that the mailing of a document by pre-paid post in the ordinary course of business to the last known address of a recipient, was sufficient for that document to have been served, given or sent, and delivered in the ordinary course of the post. It appeared then that the document could be deemed to have been served, given or sent to Mr Carson and delivered in the ordinary course of the post.
The Tribunal therefore rejected Ms Gillies' proposition that there was no need for an extension of time to be lodged because the decision of 12 June 1992 denying liability had not been given, and that there had therefore not been any cessation of liability to Mr Carson at that time.
The Tribunal, having decided above that the decision of 12 June 1992 was given to the Applicant, was mindful that a refusal of reconsideration dated 27 November 2001 (Exhibit A7) had been given, and that if it accepted this as the reviewable decision, then it would have jurisdiction to consider an application by Mr Carson for extension of time to lodge his application at the Tribunal pursuant to section 29(7) of the AAT Act.
In that regard, the Tribunal had the following exchange with the parties:
Senior Member Ettinger: "So it [decision of 12 June 1992] was never reviewed? You are saying it was never reviewed?"
Mr Wallace: "Yes. I don't have any difficulty with that. I think that probably solves the question. The issue is that as my learned friend says, if that is changed to 2001, 27 November then the issue remains the same. The application is out of time. It is, though, seeking an extension of time under section 62 of the SRC Act."
In that regard, the Tribunal considered the decision of Re Young and Telstra Corporation (1993-4) 32 ALD 307 in which the then President of the Tribunal, Justice O'Connor held at 311, in similar circumstances to the present, that:
"In the present case, the refusal by the respondent to reconsider its original decision at the request of the applicant constitutes a reviewable decision for the purposes of s 62 of the Act, [Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988] ."
As section 62 of the Act is relevant to the above discussion, it is reproduced here:
"62 Reconsideration of determinations
(1) A determining authority may, on its own motion:
(a) reconsider a determination made by it; or
(b) cause such a determination to be reconsidered by a person to whom its power under this section is delegated, being a person other than the person who made, or was involved in the making of, the determination;
whether or not a proceeding has been instituted or completed under this Part in respect of a reviewable decision made in relation to that determination.
(2) A request to a determining authority to reconsider a determination made by it may be made by:
(a) the claimant; or
(b) if the determination affects the Commonwealth—the Commonwealth; or
(c) if the determination affects a Commonwealth authority that is not a licensed authority—the Commonwealth or that authority; or
(d) …
(3) A request for reconsideration of a determination shall:
(a) set out the reasons for the request; and
(b) be given to the determining authority within 30 days after the day on which the determination first came to the notice of the person making the request, or within such further period (if any) as the determining authority, either before or after the expiration of that period, allows.
(4) On receipt of a request, the determining authority shall reconsider the determination or cause the determination to be reconsidered by a person to whom its power under this section is delegated, being a person other than a person who made, or was involved in the making of, the determination.
(5) Where a person reconsiders a determination, the person may make a decision affirming or revoking the determination or varying the determination in such manner as the person thinks fit."
The Tribunal noted that the application to the Respondent for review of the determination of 12 June 1992 which included the statement "The Applicant never received any such determination" (Exhibit A6), and the application to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to extend time for a review of the decision of the Respondent of 12 June 1992 (N2001/1795), were both dated 22 November 2001. The decision of the Respondent to refuse reconsideration was made on 27 November 2001 (Exhibit A7). The grounds given for the refusal were that 11.5 years had elapsed since the determination was made and that the statutory presumption was that the determination had been given. The Respondent further stated that:
"Moreover it is clear that he completed the claim for compensation in respect of the alleged injury suffered in 1994 because liability had been ceased in respect of prior claim. Moreover your client again became aware of the fact that liability had been ceased in respect of the alleged 1991 injury in 1995. At the very least he has done nothing since 1995 to put into question the fact that he claims he did not receive the determination with reasons ceasing liability for the 1991 injury."
The Tribunal found applying Re Young (supra), that a reviewable decision with regard to the 1991 injury had been made on the basis of the refusal dated 27 November 2001 (Exhibit A7), to review the decision of 12 June 1992. Having thus found that the decision of 12 June 1992 could be held to have been affirmed by the letter of 27 November 2001, the Tribunal turned to consider whether an extension of time to apply for review of that decision to this Tribunal should be granted to Mr Carson.
The Tribunal was mindful that the application to the Tribunal for an extension of time was dated 22 November 2001 while the reviewable decision, that is the decision of the Respondent to refuse to review the decision of 12 June 1992 was dated 27 November 2001. That meant perhaps that the application for an extension of time had been made prematurely, before the Tribunal had the decision of 27 November 2001 before it, and perhaps before it had jurisdiction to consider the extension of time application. However by the time of the hearing on 28 November 2001, it had both the reviewable decision of 27 November 2001 and the application for an extension of time before it. Accordingly, the Tribunal considered it appropriate to apply the law in extension of time applications and review the application pursuant to section 29(7) of the Act.
The Tribunal is mindful there is a large body of case law with regard to the discretion to extend time. The principles to be taken into account have been enunciated clearly in cases such as Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd and Others v Minister for Home Affairs and Environment (1984) 58 ALR 305.
Ms Gillies emphasised that the Act was beneficial legislation, and should be construed in the Applicant's favour. The Tribunal did not disagree that the legislation was beneficial legislation, and was mindful that this had already been recognised by the Tribunal, and specifically emphasised by O'Connor J in Re Young (supra).
In Re Young (supra), her Honour affirmed that both the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 and the Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 were beneficial legislation. Her Honour stated at 309:
"In terms of the time limited provided under s 62(3)(b) of the Act, there is a discretion to extend time to the applicant at any time before or after the time limit has expired. It seems to me that this is indicative of parliament's intention to facilitate access to review for the applicant and reflects the beneficial nature of the policy underlying the Act. Time limits can also be construed as being a benefit to the applicant, as well as to the respondent, in that they help to ensure the process of reconsideration takes place in a timely fashion and that the applicant moves as quickly as possible through the procedural stages."
The Tribunal turned then to Ms Gillies' submissions relating to the fact that Mr Carson did not appeal the decision of 12 June 1992. Mr Wallace's submissions in that regard are also considered below.
Ms Gillies addressed the Tribunal with regard to the indicia she considered the Tribunal might take into account in deciding whether to grant an extension of time for Mr Carson to seek review of the 1992 decision as affirmed. She submitted that the Tribunal take into account three points as follows:

the cause and explanation of the delay in making the application for review
the Applicant's conduct
the consequences of the delay and prejudice to the Respondent

In considering the exercise of the discretion to permit an extension of time for the Applicant to have the decision of 12 June 1992 reviewed, the Tribunal took into account the parties' submissions, Mr Carson's evidence, the legislation and case law. In doing so, the Tribunal has considered the principles set down in Hunter Valley (supra), mindful that there is a presumption that time limits have been inserted into legislation for a good reason, and prima facie must be adhered to. Mr Carson clearly had not adhered to the statutory time limits with regard to his claims, and the following submissions and consideration of his conduct address that.
As to the cause and explanation for delay; Ms Gillies submitted that Mr Carson's evidence had been "unshakeable", that not only could he not locate the decision which was said to have been sent by way of a letter of 12 June 1992, but he could not remember receiving it. Ms Gillies also emphasised that the Respondent could not produce the letter/decision to the Tribunal. She emphasised Mr Carson could not have acted upon any such letter because he had not received it. Ms Gillies submitted that the first Mr Carson knew of the letter of 12 June 1992 was correspondence from the Respondent dated 28 June 2000, and submitted that he acted on that information as soon as he could. She submitted that he "acted swiftly in relation to the 1994 accident which we say subsumed the 1991 injury as well".
Mr Wallace emphasised, and the Tribunal agreed, that time limits were stipulated by the Parliament for good reasons and that a priori they were to be complied with.
Mr Wallace emphasised the appeal to the decision of 12 June 1992 had not been made until some eleven years after the decision, and rejected the Applicant's argument that because there was later medical evidence which could be relied upon, suggested there would be no prejudice to the Respondent.
Mr Wallace also submitted that Mr Carson had failed to establish reasonable cause why he did not do certain things. Mr Wallace submitted, notwithstanding Mr Carson was deemed pursuant to the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 to have received the decision of 12 June 1992, that he certainly became aware of the 1992 decision some 18 months prior to the 2001 hearings, and that he took no action even then.
Ms Gillies submitted that in one sense, the 1991 injury had been "subsumed into the 1994 injury". She submitted that the injury had been to the same body part, and that the Applicant had had time off and treatment for the 1994 injury. He had therefore not differentiated what Comcare was paying, because when he lodged a claim for weekly payments or medical expenses, Comcare paid.
Mr Wallace submitted that Mr Carson was a senior manager in a large organisation who was responsible for staff, and knew the procedures. To report an injury Mr Wallace submitted, was a statutory responsibility. Mr Wallace submitted that Mr Carson did not take any action with regard to the denial of liability for the 1994 injury either. He emphasised appeal rights were appended to this decision by the Respondent.
As to fears Mr Carson expressed about his job security; Mr Wallace submitted that Mr Carson was unable in his evidence to name other people he claimed had been at risk in their employment or made redundant. That in itself was of prejudice to the Respondent he submitted.
As to whether Mr Carson had back symptoms between 1991 and 1994; Mr Wallace drew attention to the contradiction in Mr Carson's evidence, who first gave evidence that he assumed he was covered by compensation because medical bills were paid in the period after June 1992, and then in reply to Dr Campbell of the Tribunal, gave evidence that he had no medical expenses in relation to his back during that period.
Mr Wallace submitted that Mr Carson had rested on his rights after seeing his solicitor and obtaining advice in 1999, deciding to lodge his claim for permanent impairment only after leaving Telstra in 2000.
As to further prejudice; Mr Wallace acknowledged that the 1996 denial of liability had been based on the medical evidence of Dr Sturrock, but submitted that the prejudice to the Respondent was that there was no other contemporaneous medical report of the Applicant available to the Tribunal. Mr Wallace also indicated that Dr Bowes' records demonstrated that Mr Carson had been seeing Dr Hudson, an orthopaedic surgeon at that time, and yet there had been a conscious decision not to appeal the denial of liability by Telstra.

In reply to Mr Wallace's submissions that the Applicant rested on his rights, and that over 11 years had passed, Ms Gillies submitted as follows:
"We say that is quite reasonable. It was not until basically October of this year when we were last before the Tribunal that the injury, or the – … determination of June 1992 became an issue …"
Ms Gillies submitted the 1992 letter denying liability had not even been mentioned in the hearing before Deputy President Estcourt in hearings before him conducted at the Tribunal in May 2001, and that the Respondent could be held responsible for delay in not raising before the Tribunal, the 1992 letter declining liability until the hearing in October 2001.
The Tribunal noted Mr Carson's explanation for not having applied for a review of the decision of 12 June 1992, noting that if indeed he did not receive it, he could not have acted upon it. However the Tribunal accepted the Respondent's submission that the giving of the decision is statutorily covered by the Acts Interpretation Act 1901, and accordingly, the Tribunal was satisfied that it could consider the decision of 12 June 1992 had been given to the Applicant and he had not acted to appeal it.
The Tribunal did not accept Mr Carson's evidence that he confused the 1994 application for compensation with the earlier one, or that, in the words of Ms Gillies, the 1994 injury or aggravation of injury "subsumed" the 1991 injury. The Tribunal was mindful of Mr Carson's evidence in which he asserted that he assumed liability had been accepted and was ongoing because any medical bills he had between 1991 and 1994 were taken care of by Comcare. The Tribunal noted however that later, in the proceedings, in reply to questioning by Dr Campbell of the Tribunal, Mr Carson said that although he was not entirely painfree at any time between 1991 and 1994, he did not attend doctors or seek treatment for his back during that period. The Tribunal noted the contradictions in Mr Carson's evidence, rendering it unreliable. From the evidence before it, the Tribunal concluded that it was likely that there were no claims for back injury made to Telstra by the Applicant between 1991 and 1994.
As to whether he acted promptly after being alerted on 28 June 2000 that the 1992 decision denying liability had been made and not appealed; the Tribunal noted that no action with regard to the 1992 decision was made until after Mr Carson had appeared at the Tribunal. In fact the application to review the decision of 12 June 1992, was only made on 22 November 2001, which was after the Applicant had been before Deputy President Estcourt and after the preliminary hearing before this Tribunal on 24 October 2001. Taking those dates into account, the Tribunal considers that Mr Carson rested on his rights with regard to the appeal.
As to the consequences to the Respondent; Ms Gillies submitted that these were minimal because the injury itself was not in issue. She submitted that investigations to satisfy the Respondent that liability should be accepted had clearly been made, and liability had been accepted the first time in 1991, until the purported cessation on 12 June 1992. Ms Gillies accepted that the loss of the file could be held to prejudice the Respondent, although she submitted, that in fact, the Respondent knew the period of incapacity, and had paid for various medical expenses. Ms Gillies submitted that notwithstanding the loss of the file, there was no information before the Tribunal as to when it first went missing.
Ms Gillies referred to a "chain of injury" and referred to the Applicant's reliance on Dr Wallace's report (T30) to set up a "chain of injury". Dr Wallace, Ms Gillies submitted, suggested that the Applicant had suffered a permanent impairment as a consequence of the work related injuries suffered. She submitted that this emphasised the strength of Mr Carson's case and the fact that the 1991 injury was important in the chain, and that there was a significant issue to be tried.
Mr Wallace submitted that the Respondent suffered prejudice in this matter in that there was no medical evidence available relating to the period of purported injury, and that even when Mr Carson had been alerted to the denial of liability, he did not act promptly to appeal it.
The Tribunal considered the submissions regarding prejudice to the Respondent were the extension of time to lodge the application for review of the decision of 12 June 1992 to be granted. The Tribunal was mindful that through no fault of the Applicant, (noting however the effluxion of time), the Respondent had been unable to locate the decision of 12 June 1992, and that other documents related to the file which were of importance for decision making purposes might also be unavailable. It is clear to the Tribunal that to try and reconstruct events which took place some years previously, albeit not 11, is never easy, nor cost effective. However liability was accepted for the 1991 injury, and ceased on 12 June 1992 without, it seems, the benefit of medical evidence. Moreover, as Ms Gillies submitted, the claim was well known to the Respondent, and it was for the same body part, namely Mr Carson's back.
The Tribunal was mindful that the claims subsequent to that of 1992, that is 1994, and now 1995 and 1997 (the latter two not subject of this interlocutory decision), related to the same body part, and provided a coherent history of Mr Carson's claim. The Tribunal considered that the paucity of medical evidence would be a factor prejudicing the Respondent somewhat, noting that there was no medical evidence before it connected to the 1992 denial of liability, and that the reports of Drs Sturrock (1995) and Wallace (2000), were a long time apart. Accordingly the Tribunal finds that there would be some prejudice to the Respondent in that regard because the original file was unable to be located.
As to considerations of fairness as between the Applicant and other persons in like positions; the Tribunal is mindful that each extension of time case is decided on its merits taking into account the principles as enunciated in Hunter Valley (supra), and similar cases.The Tribunal did not consider that a senior manager such as Mr Carson was, should be treated differently from other employees who are required to make claims for compensation on the appropriate forms and within time. The evidence before the Tribunal was that he did neither in relation to his 1994 and 1995 claims, and that his conduct in adhering to statutory time limits was less than satisfactory.
In deciding whether to grant an extension of time, the Tribunal also considered the merits of the case, mindful that Mr Carson had suffered an injury at work, and that liability had been accepted in 1991. Further liability had been accepted for another closed period in relation to the 1994 injury or aggravation of injury. The Tribunal did not therefore consider it unreasonable to make the assumption that there was some merit in the claim, noting that further claims for the 1995 and 1997 events had been made, including one for permanent impairment, and were due to be heard by the Tribunal.
Accordingly, the Tribunal took into account the main indicia:

Merits of the claim – The Tribunal considered that the claim was not without merit.
Prejudice to the Respondent – The Tribunal accepted that there was some prejudice to the Respondent in the non-availability of the file, acknowledging however that the Respondent had dealt with Mr Carson with regard to other claims related to the same body part, and knew of the matter. The Tribunal did not have information regarding the circumstances of the loss of the file, the blame for which could not be vested upon the Applicant.
Fairness in relation to other such claimants and taking the wider public interest into consideration – The Tribunal considered that workers in far less senior positions than Mr Carson were expected to notify incidents and complete correct incident reports. A senior manager such as Mr Carson should not be exempted from making compensation claims on the appropriate forms and within statutory time limits. There was also a cost to the community in following a matter which should have been dealt with within statutory time limits, and a cost in not having finality with regard to claims.
The Applicant's conduct – The Tribunal found that Mr Carson rested on his rights and did not prosecute his claim as he should have done, even after being alerted to it. There was no satisfactory explanation for his delay.

On the basis of the above, the Tribunal decided not to exercise its discretion pursuant to section 29(7) of the AAT Act to grant an extension of time for Mr Carson to make an application to the Tribunal with regard to a review of the refusal of liability by the Respondent on and from 12 June 1992, as deemed to have been affirmed on 27 November 2001.
matter N2001/302 - whether an extension of time pursuant to section 29(7) of the administrative appeals tribunal act 1975 should be granted

The Tribunal then moved to consider whether an extension of time for the Applicant to make an application to the Tribunal for review of the decision in matter N2001/302 should be granted pursuant to section 29(7) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975. In doing so, it had to take into account the evidence, submissions, case law and legislation before it.

The Tribunal noted that the issue in this matter was the claim Mr Carson made to his employer with regard to an injury or aggravation to his back sustained on 30 June 1994. The claim was lodged on 18 July 1994 (T4) and liability was accepted for a closed period 5 July to 15 July 1994 (T7). That included weekly earnings and medical expenses. Several other determinations accepting liability for short closed periods followed during 1994. This was followed by a medical examination by an orthopaedic specialist, Dr W Sturrock on 9 February 1995 (T17).
On the basis of Dr Sturrock's report, which indicated Mr Carson had degenerative changes in his back, and suggested that the effects of the 1994 injury had settled, the Respondent ceased liability on and from 9 February 1995 by way of a notice dated 21 February 1995.
Mr Carson's evidence was that he suffered a further incident of back pain on 31 October 1995 while packing and unpacking boxes, and he again applied for a closed period of compensation (31 October – 10 November 1995), (T23), without having appealed the decision to deny him liability for the 1994 injury. He used a generic leave form (T23) on which he had written that it was compensation leave he sought and referring by number (83114), to an earlier determination granting him compensation. He gave the reason for his claim as "Re-occurance (sic) of Lumbar Back injury."
The Tribunal noted that Mr Carson was informed by his employer that if this claim (T23), was for a new incident, then he would be required to lodge a new claim on the appropriate form, and reminding him of his rights of appeal which had been communicated to him at the time of cessation of liability of 9 February 1995 (T24).
The Tribunal noted that it was however not until 12 January 1996, well outside the statutory 60 day period, that Mr Carson wrote a letter appealing the decision of 9 February 1995 (T25), referring to a further occurrence of back pain, and berating Telstra as follows:
"Unfortunately for me, on the 31st, October 1995, a re-occurrence (sic) of this same lower back injury occurred & I was restricted to bed for a period of 9 working days. I will not accept a decision by Telstra to ignore the 31st., October 1995 re-occurrence (sic) to the original compensation claim."
Telstra however took the occasion on 22 January 1996, (T27 & T28 & T29), to affirm the application regarding the injury of 30 June 1994, pursuant to section 62(5) of the Act, noting that liability for this had been first refused on and from 9 February 1995.
Ms Gillies submitted that the decision based on the medical evidence of Dr Sturrock (who opined that the Applicant was suffering degenerative changes to the spine temporarily aggravated by his employment) (T17), was unreasonable in that the records of Dr Bowes (Exhibit R4), showed that Mr Carson had a radiology report dated 9 November 1995 showing a disc bulge in the L4/5 area. She also referred to a "chain of injury", relating Mr Carson's subsequent back injuries to the incident of November 1991.
Mr Carson explained in his evidence before the Tribunal and in his affidavit why he did not appeal the decision of 22 January 1996, and Ms Gillies made submissions about the reasons why he had not done so. The Tribunal has recorded that evidence in earlier paragraphs, and this amounted in summary to Mr Carson's disquiet regarding his tenure of employment, the fact he had been demoted in 1996, and the changed atmosphere in the workplace. Mr Carson's evidence also indicated he thought that filling in the generic leave form which included his compensation claim number and an indication that he was seeking compensation leave was sufficient, and that he had previously been paid medical expenses on that basis.
The Tribunal noted that instead of appealing the decision of 22 January 1996, Mr Carson sought advice from his lawyers in late 1999 and was involved in an involuntary redundancy in April or May 2000, after which Mr Carson's lawyers lodged a claim on his behalf for permanent impairment dated 30 May 2000. This was accompanied by a report of Dr Wallace dated 5 May 2000. The Respondent refused the permanent impairment claim on the basis that liability for injury had ceased. The substantive claim for permanent impairment was not determined, rather it was handled simply as a jurisdictional issue. That claim for permanent impairment is now the substance of matter N2000/1507, and may be heard at the Tribunal in conjunction with matter N2001/1841 relating to the 1995 and 1997 injury claims.
Ms Gillies submitted that the same arguments applied in this case as in the previous matter discussed above with regard to extension of time. She emphasised that Mr Carson had a valid and good claim before the Tribunal in regard to the 1994 injury, and a claim for permanent impairment on the basis of Dr Wallace's report. She submitted that Mr Carson would suffer financial loss if the discretion to allow the extension of time were not exercised in his favour.
Ms Gillies submitted that the Respondent had not put forward any argument with regard to any prejudice in regard to the 1994 claim.
Ms Gillies submitted that in any case, the decision at T29/48 was not clear as to Mr Carson's rights. She submitted that:
"That decision in no way affects his recourse to claim future compensation as a result of work related injuries and then on the second page, the penultimate paragraph of page 49, he also has the right to claim compensation for a further injury or recurrences outlined. Again, we say, that is not absolute. It does not, we say, put the applicant on sufficient notice that if he does not make an application within that particular time that he is going to then lose his rights entirely in relation to that particular incident."
The Tribunal replied as follows:
Senior Member Ettinger: "The notice, of course, says clearly 60 days and that is appended."
Ms Gillies: "Yes it does"
Senior Member Ettinger: "There is no indication it was not appended at the time."
In regard to Ms Gillies' submission that Mr Carson did not fully understand his rights (T29), the Senior Member addressed the parties as follows:
"I don't want to interrupt you too much but I think we are working against the backdrop of a very educated person, a highly geared person in a managerial position who has the ability to inquire and to understand and we would take that into account …
I'm just saying as an educated person and as a manager, Mr Carson had the ability to either interpret and/or ask the right questions and that has to be taken into account in assessing the whole picture."
Mr Wallace drew the attention of the Tribunal to the general leave form at T23 which Mr Carson had submitted, stating on it that it was compensation leave he sought. The Tribunal was mindful that Mr Carson had used a similar generic form in the same way to make a claim regarding his June 1997 injury (Exhibit A1, Annexure A). Ms Gillies agreed that Mr Carson had submitted a leave form in 1997 indicating that the reason for leave was as a consequence of a workers' compensation claim. She asked the Tribunal to take into account the fact Mr Carson's evidence that "he didn't want to rock the boat too far as far as his employment was concerned." Ms Gillies reminded the Tribunal of Mr Carson's evidence that he had been demoted in 1996, that he had in fact been prepared to take that demotion in order to continue working at Telstra, and that clearly in that situation, he felt threatened as far as his employment went, and did not want to draw attention to himself by suing his employer.
The Tribunal noted that it was Mr Carson's evidence that he expected the correct forms to be sent by his employer, and that in the meantime he used a generic form. He gave evidence that he did not know the difference between the various forms, and had indeed, acting honestly, he submitted, indicated that it was a compensation claim he was making on the leave forms.
The Tribunal, in reviewing the indicia for the favourable exercise of the discretion to grant an extension of time to apply for review, and applying the authorities as appropriate, was mindful that a priori, time limits are set legislatively for an orderly conduct of public affairs, and so as not to disadvantage either party. Time limits had been exceeded in a major way in this matter, and the Tribunal was mindful of the other considerations it had to take into account in its decision making. They included:

whether there was an acceptable explanation for the delay;
whether a grant of an extension of time would be fair and equitable in the circumstances;
any prejudice to the Respondent which may have resulted from the delay or indeed if the discretion to extend time were exercised;
the merits of the application; and
considerations of fairness as between the Applicant and other persons in like positions, taking the wider public interest into consideration.

The Tribunal did not accept Mr Carson's reasons for not seeking a review of the 1994 decision in a timely manner, and for not using the correct forms and reporting his incidents as required. As a senior manager, and with his staff supervision capabilities, he should have known better. The Tribunal did not accept the argument that because previous medical expenses had been paid, Mr Carson thought things would progress similarly in a casual way.
The Tribunal empathised with Mr Carson when he expressed his fears in regard to redundancy, and not wanting to "rock the boat", but had no other evidence regarding redundancies, and noted that when questioned, Mr Carson was unable to name others similarly involved. The Tribunal was however mindful of Mr Carson's evidence that he had been demoted in 1996, but the reasons for that action were not before it.
Accordingly, the Tribunal did not accept from the evidence that Mr Carson's conduct in delaying the application for review was acceptable.
As to whether the Respondent would suffer prejudice; the Tribunal was mindful that the Respondent had the benefit of the medical reports of Drs Sturrock and Wallace with regard to the 1994 claim, but that to revisit matters decided after such a time, was not cost efficient, and would cause problems, and accordingly prejudice. The Tribunal noted that further, the report of Dr Sturrock was as a result of an examination in 1995, while that of Dr Wallace was dated 2000, clearly with resulting difficulties in direct comparison.
When considering the merits of the application, the Tribunal found that there was a degree of merit in the application, in that liability for a similar back condition had already been accepted in 1991. It would be a matter of weighing the medical evidence to decide whether the further claims for back pain were due to degenerative changes in Mr Carson's spine as proposed by Dr Sturrock. Assessing the medical evidence would of course cause difficulties given the long lapse in time and resulting problems in obtaining further relevant medical evidence.

When considering fairness as between the Applicant and other persons in like positions and taking the wider public interest into consideration, the Tribunal considered that workers in far less senior positions than Mr Carson were expected to notify incidents and complete correct incident reports. The Tribunal did not accept Mr Carson's explanation that he expected someone in the organisation to send him the correct form, and that he relied on the fact he had been paid medical expenses in the past. The Tribunal considered that for the proper administration of claims in an organisation such as Telstra, and vis-à-vis other staff, it could not agree that granting an extension of time in this matter would be fair.
Accordingly for the reasons given above, the Tribunal did not agree to grant an extension of time to the Applicant to make application to the Tribunal for review of the decision in this matter pursuant to section 29(7) of the Act.
DECISION
The Administrative Appeals Tribunal ("the Tribunal") decides that in matter N2001/1795, the decision to refuse a reconsideration of the decision of 12 June 1992 by the Respondent, Telstra Corporation Ltd, pursuant to section 62 of the Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 constitutes a reviewable decision before the Tribunal.
The Tribunal having considered the submissions of the parties and all other relevant material in matter N2001/1795, refuses to exercise the discretion to extend time pursuant to section 29(7) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 for the Applicant, Peter Carson to make application to have the decision of the Respondent reviewed by the Tribunal.
In matter N2001/302, the Tribunal having considered the submissions of the parties and all other relevant material refuses to exercise the discretion pursuant to section 29(7) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 to allow an extension of time for Mr Carson to make application to have the matter reviewed by the Tribunal.
I certify that the preceding 109 paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Ms G Ettinger Senior Member and Dr J Campbell, Member
Signed:         .....................................................................................
  Associate
Date/s of Hearing  24 October & 28 November 2001
Date of Decision  24 April 2002
Counsel for the Applicant        Ms M Gillies
Solicitor for the Applicant         Geoffrey Edwards & Co, Solicitors
Counsel for the Respondent    Mr J Wallace
Solicitor for the Respondent    Henry Davis York, Lawyers

[2002] AATA 287

24 April 2002

Key Legal Topics

Areas of Law

Administrative Law

Legal Concepts

Jurisdiction

Res Judicata

Limitation Periods

Reconsideration

Admissibility of Evidence

Expert Evidence