Carr v The Queen

[1973] HCA 37

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Menzies, Walsh, Gibbs, Stephen and Mason JJ.

CARR v. THE QUEEN

(1973) 127 CLR 662

17 September 1973

Criminal Law

Criminal law—Evidence—Fingerprints of accused person taken with his consent—Legality—Admissibility—Crimes Act, 1900 (N.S.W.), s. 353A (3).

Decision

The judgment of the COURT was delivered by MENZIES J. : -
The applicant was convicted of stealing upon evidence that his fingerprints were found in two houses which had been broken into and from which goods had been stolen. The stealing occurred a long time ago, in July 1960, and the fingerprints were found about that time. They were identified as those of the applicant, but he was not then found. (at p663)

2. He was, however, arrested in 1971 upon another charge of theft, and his fingerprints were taken. He was acquitted of that charge but, being then charged with the offences committed in 1960, he was, upon request but without any warning, fingerprinted. So far as appears, he consented to this. (at p663)

3. The contention is that the fingerprints then taken were not admissible or, alternatively, that in the exercise of the learned judge's discretion they ought to have been rejected. The Court of Appeal decided to the contrary, and the applicant seeks special leave to appeal. Mr. Houlihan has said what can be said in support of that application. (at p663)

4. Both contentions rest upon the submission that the taking of the fingerprints, in the circumstances which we have stated, was unlawful. The Court of Appeal decided it was not so (1972) 1 NSWLR 608 . With this we agree. There is nothing unlawful in asking a person, even if he be in custody, to provide fingerprints and, with his agreement, taking those fingerprints. That appears to be the position here. (at p663)

5. Furthermore, s. 353A of the Crimes Act (N.S.W.) confers an authority to take the fingerprints, when a person is in lawful custody for an offence punishable in indictment. It has been submitted that s. 353A cannot apply on two grounds ; first of all, that it is limited to the cases where a person has already been convicted. This depends upon the particular construction of the language "in lawful custody for any offence" which, when contrasted with the language of the earlier sections, "in lawful custody upon a charge of committing an offence", is said to indicate that the charge has already been disposed of and the person has been convicted and that the identification is merely for the purpose of records of conviction or prison records. (at p663)

6. The second limitation that is sought again depends upon the same notion, namely, that the identification is for the purpose of identifying the person fingerprinted as a person who has been convicted and not for the purpose of identifying him with the offence. The Court of Criminal Appeal correctly rejected these contentions (1). (at p663)

7. It is unnecessary, therefore, to consider how any discretion which the learned judge had to reject admissible evidence, unlawfully obtained, should have been exercised. It appears to us, however, that no basis has been shown upon which it could be said that whatever discretion there might have been in other circumstances could have been exercised to reject the evidence of the fingerprints. (at p664)

8. Accordingly, in our opinion, special leave to appeal should be refused. (at p664)

Orders

Special leave to appeal refused.