Carr v The King - [2023] NSWCCA 269

Court of Criminal Appeal

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Summary available
Amendment notes

Medium Neutral Citation: Carr v R [2023] NSWCCA 269
Hearing dates: 16 October 2023
Date of orders: 1 December 2023
Decision date: 01 December 2023
Before: Davies J at [1]
Fagan J at [80]
Dhanji J at [102]
Decision:
1. Dismiss the appeal.

Catchwords:
CRIME – appeals – appeal against conviction – judge-alone trial – multiple carjacking, firearm and assault with intent to rob in company offences – where offending occurred over 18-hour time period and covered more than 1000km – where appellant in coercive control relationship with co-offender – duress – where trial judge determined that duress had not been established – whether trial judge erred by failing to consider that duress sufficiently raised to be considered by tribunal of fact – held trial judge’s ruling clearly a final determination as the tribunal of fact – whether there must be evidence of a particular request or demand to commit the offences charged – no direct or implied evidence of a demand or request to commit any of the offences – trial judge correctly concluded that the Crown had negatived the issue of duress – appeal dismissed

Legislation Cited:
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) ss 97, 154A, 154B
Criminal Appeal Act (1912) NSW s 5
Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) s 191
Firearms Act 1996 (NSW) s 62

Cases Cited:
Clarkson v R (2007) 209 FCR 387; [2007] NSWCCA 70; (2007)171 A Crim R 1
Filippou v The Queen (2015) 256 CLR 47; [2015] HCA 29
Nguyen v R [2008] NSWCCA 22; (2008) 181 A Crim R 72
R v Abusafiah (1991) 24 NSWLR 531
R v Dawson [1978] VR 536
R v Hurley and Murray [1967] VR 526
R v Lorenz (1998) 146 FLR 369
R v Runjanjic (1991) 56 SASR 114
Rowan (A Pseudonym) v The King [2022] VSCA 236
Taiapa v The Queen (2009) 240 CLR 95; [2009] HCA 53
The King v Rowan [2023] HCATrans 90

Texts Cited:
Nil

Category: Principal judgment
Parties: Krystal Carr (Applicant)
The King (Respondent)
Representation:
Counsel:
S McGee (Applicant)
E Nicholson (Respondent)
Solicitors:
Legal Aid NSW (Applicant)
Solicitor for Public Prosecutions (NSW) (Respondent)

File Number(s): 2021/92619 & 2021/221872
Publication restriction: Nil
Decision under appeal

Court or tribunal:

District Court of NSW

Jurisdiction:

Criminal

Citation:

Nil

Date of Decision:

01 December 2022

Before:

M Williams SC DCJ

File Number(s):

2021/92619 & 2021/221872

HEADNOTE

[This headnote is not to be read as part of the judgment]

The appellant, Krystal Carr, was found guilty after a judge-alone trial of seven offences including one firearm offence, two carjacking offences and three assault with intent to rob offences. Ms Carr was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 4 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 22 months.

The overall offending took place over an 18-hour period and covered more than 1000km from Molong to Cooma and from Cooma to Sydney. During this time, Ms Carr and Aiden Osbourne committed a series of carjacking and robbery offences. Four of the seven counts involved the possession or use of a weapon, namely a .22 calibre rifle. Mr Osborne pointed the firearm at victims so they would leave their cars or, in one instance, hand over “drugs and money”. At various points, Ms Carr and Mr Osbourne were pursued by police along the Hume Highway.

The primary issue before the trial judge was whether Ms Carr was acting under duress from Mr Osborne, with whom she was involved in an intimate relationship. The appellant submitted that the initial demand by Mr Osborne in Dubbo that she leave with him set the tone and, in the context of the coercive control relationship, was sufficient evidence of an implied demand for each of the offences.

The appellant appealed against her conviction on one ground as follows:

The learned trial judge erred in determining that in order for the defence of duress to be available, there must be evidence of a specific, direct and overt demand or request made by the threatener to the accused in relation to the specific offence charged.

The appellant submitted that the judgment was a preliminary determination of whether duress had been sufficiently raised to be left to the tribunal of fact, that the primary judge had determined that it was not sufficiently raised because there was no evidence of a “specific, direct and overt demand” to commit each of the offences charged, and in so finding, the primary judge erred.

The Court held (per Davies J, Fagan J agreeing with additional observations, Dhanji J in dissent), dismissing the appeal:

Per Davies J, Fagan J agreeing:

Taken together, the transcript, parties’ written submissions to the trial judge and the trial judge’s judgment satisfactorily demonstrate that his Honour’s ruling was not a preliminary determination that duress was not raised sufficiently to be left to the tribunal of fact; his Honour was deciding the matter as the tribunal of fact: [31], [46] (Davies J), [80], [100] (Fagan J).
The common law of duress requires a particular demand or request to commit the specific offence charged. In some circumstances, the demand or request to perform the unlawful act may be inferred. This is separate from the requirement of a threat of harm that is made to induce compliance with the demand. Both the demand and the threat must be conveyed to constitute duress: [64] (Davies J) [83], [86], [93] (Fagan J).

R v Hurley and Murray [1967] VR 526; R v Dawson [1978] VR 536; Nguyen v R [2008] NSWCCA 22; (2008) 181 A Crim R 72; R v Lorenz (1998) 146 FLR 369; Rowan (A Pseudonym) v The King [2022] VSCA 236, considered.

Taiapa v The Queen (2009) 240 CLR 95; [2005] HCA 53; R v Abusafiah (1991) 24 NSWLR 531; Clarkson v R [2007] NSWCCA 70; (2007)171 A Crim R 1, cited.

Nothing in any of the evidence discloses any direct evidence of a demand or request to commit any of the offences. There is also nothing from which it could be inferred that a demand or request was made to the appellant to commit the respective offences. Indeed, the appellant’s solicitor at trial conceded the absence of direct evidence and made no submission that there was any circumstantial evidence from which an implicit demand could be inferred: [65], [77] (Davies J); [88], [94], [100] (Fagan J).

Rowan (A Pseudonym) v The King [2022] VSCA 236, cited.

Per Dhanji J (dissenting):

While there must be a demand that the accused engage in the conduct constituting the specific offence alleged under threat of the relevant harm, such a demand may be implied: [106], [108] (Dhanji J).

Nguyen v R [2008] NSWCCA 22; (2008) 181 A Crim R 72; Rowan (A Pseudonym) v The King [2022] VSCA 236, applied.

Reading the reasons of the trial judge as a whole, reveals that his Honour failed to consider whether a demand or request to commit the particular offence charged could be inferred. Accordingly, his Honour erred in determining that direct evidence of a demand or request was required to satisfy the evidentiary burden to raise the defence of duress: [124] (Dhanji J).

Nguyen v R [2008] NSWCCA 22; (2008) 181 A Crim R 72; Rowan (A Pseudonym) v The King [2022] VSCA 236; R v Hurley and Murray [1967] VR 526; R v Dawson [1978] VR 536; Clarkson v R (2007) 209 FCR 387; [2007] NSWCCA 70; R v Runjanjic (1991) 56 SASR 114; (1991) 53 A Crim R 362, considered.

In determining whether the relevant demand was made, a close scrutiny of the evidence as to the inference that may be drawn with each offence is required. A review of the evidence, at least in respect to the first offence in time, suggests that an inference was available that the implied demand was made under the earlier threat. Considering this Court has not had the benefit of seeing and hearing that evidence and, significantly, duress was the only issue raised at trial, the proviso to s 6 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW) should not be applied and a new trial ordered: [125]–[128] (Dhanji J).

Judgment

DAVIES J: After a judge-alone trial presided over by Judge M Williams SC, the appellant was convicted of the following offences:

Count 1: Be carried in a conveyance taken without the consent of the owner, contrary to s 154A(1)(b) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). The maximum penalty for this offence is 5 years’ imprisonment.

Count 2: Assault with intent to rob whilst armed with a dangerous weapon contrary to s 97(2) of the Crimes Act. The maximum penalty for this offence is 25 years’ imprisonment.

Count 3: Assault with intent to rob in company contrary to s 97(1) of the Crimes Act. The maximum penalty for this offence is 20 years’ imprisonment.

Count 5: Assault with intent to rob in company.

Count 7: Take and drive a vehicle whilst armed with an offensive weapon contrary to s 154C(2) of the Crimes Act. The maximum penalty for this offence is 14 years’ imprisonment and there is a standard non-parole period of 5 years.

Count 8: Possess unauthorised shortened firearm pursuant to s 62(1)(b) of the Firearms Act 1996 (NSW). The maximum penalty for this offence is 14 years’ imprisonment.

Count 9: Take and drive vehicle whilst armed with an offensive weapon.

Counts 4 and 6 were alternative counts to counts 3 and 5 respectively.
On 8 December 2022 Judge M Williams SC sentenced the applicant to an aggregate sentence of 4 years’ imprisonment commencing 3 October 2021 and expiring 2 October 2025 with a non-parole period of 22 months expiring 3 August 2023.
The appellant now appeals against her conviction on one ground only as follows:

The learned trial judge erred in determining that in order for the defence of duress to be available, there must be evidence of a specific, direct, and overt demand or request made by the threatener to the accused in relation to the specific offence charged.

The trial was largely conducted on the basis of agreed facts. The issue of duress was raised by the appellant with the result that the Crown had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant was not acting under duress when committing the offences. She asserted that she was acting under duress from Aiden Osborne, with whom she was involved in an intimate relationship. Mr Osborne was charged with the same or similar offending.
In addition to the agreed facts, evidence was led from Jessica Muir about the events at the place she lived in Cooma with her partner David Sizmur. The appellant also gave evidence, not all of which was consistent with the agreed facts.

The offending

The appellant gave evidence that Mr Osborne wanted to leave Dubbo on 1 April 2021. The appellant said that she did not want to leave but Mr Osborne threatened her with a firearm, saying that if she did not leave with him he would shoot everyone in the house at her mother’s place. She then agreed to leave with him.

Count 1

On 1 April 2021 Mr Osborne and the appellant travelled from Dubbo to Molong in a motor vehicle. Tyler Webb, the victim of this offence, arrived at a friend’s place in Molong in his motor vehicle, a Hilux Utility.
Mr Osborne took the Hilux Ute from Molong shortly after midnight on 2 April 2021. The appellant in the agreed facts acknowledges that at the time that she was a passenger in the vehicle, and she knew it had been taken without the consent of the owner. They travelled from Molong to Sydney and from Sydney to Cooma.
They met up with a person called Daniel Campbell who Mr Osborne knew from gaol. He drove with them to another person’s place in order to find out where they could obtain more drugs. Along the way at a service station at Cooma CCTV footage depicts the appellant and Mr Osborne in the company of Mr Campbell. It shows Mr Osborne putting fuel in the car, and the appellant getting out of the car and cleaning the windscreen.

Counts 2, 3 (in the alternative to count 3, count 4), count 5 (in the alternative to count 5, count 6)

Mr Campbell then took them to premises at Sharp Street in Cooma which were occupied by Mr Sizmur, Ms Muir, and their three children, HS aged 12, and two others.
The appellant knocked on the door and said to HS that she was there to see David Sizmur. She said she had been sent by someone. Mr Sizmur then came to the door and asked the appellant, "What did they send you here for?" She said, "They said I could get on here." Mr Sizmur assumed that she wanted to buy drugs and he said, "Get on what?" He opened the door to let her in, and as she stepped into the hallway, Mr Osborne came running in behind her with his face covered by a bandana and armed with a shortened .22 calibre rifle.
He yelled out, "Give me all your drugs and money?" Mr Sizmur said, "What drugs and money?” There was a struggle and the gun was fired. Mr Sizmur stood up and saw Mr Osborne operating the bolt to load another round. Ms Muir had overheard Mr Osborne's demands for drugs and money and came from her bedroom into the lounge room. As she was halfway down the hall, she heard the gunshot and smelt gun powder. As she was entering the lounge room, she saw HS on his back on the lounge with one leg in the air telling the appellant to "Fuck off."
Ms Muir yelled, "Oi", and this startled the appellant who turned and came towards Ms Muir preventing her from entering the lounge room. Ms Muir formed the opinion that the appellant was drug affected because she seemed very jumpy and nervous. The appellant gave evidence disputing that particular part of the agreed facts, but the trial judge accepted the Crown submission that the agreed facts should be preferred to that evidence given by the accused.
Mr Osborne and the appellant ran out, got back into the stolen Hilux and left Cooma travelling north. They stopped early the next morning in the car park at Canberra Hospital, and CCTV footage showed the appellant getting out of the car with Mr Osborne at some stage and walking into the hospital, and Mr Osborne sitting by himself outside the hospital for some time.
There were then a number of police pursuits along the Hume Highway. Police positioned themselves behind the stolen car at a safe distance looking for a suitable location to drop spikes in an attempt to stop the speeding vehicle.

Counts 7, 8 and 9

The first of the carjackings took place at Marulan. Joshua Fanning with his wife and child were in a Ford Territory motor vehicle. He looked over his shoulder and he saw Mr Osborne coming in their direction carrying a firearm. Mr Osborne pointed the firearm at Mr Fanning’s wife, Charlotte Lanigan, through a closed window of the vehicle and yelled at her to get out of the car. Mr Fanning got out of the car and removed his child. Mr Fanning saw the appellant walking towards the vehicle and Ms Lanigan heard the appellant yelling at them to get out of the car. Ms Lanigan also got out of the vehicle which was then driven away by Mr Osborne with the appellant in the front passenger seat.
About 20 minutes later, Mr Osborne drove the car at considerable speed into the Coles Service Station at Sutton Forest, failed to negotiate a roundabout and collided with the guardrail. Mr Osborne got out of the driver's side of the car and jumped over the guardrail. The appellant got out of the passenger side. The footage shows that Mr Osborne was not carrying the firearm at that stage, but the trial judge accepted that, while briefly out of the sight in the footage, the appellant had taken the rifle out of the vehicle and given it to Mr Osborne, because he was then seen running towards Layce Riley, who was fuelling her car, a Ford Focus, with her children in the vehicle.
The appellant told one of her daughters to "get out of the fucking way” before she got into the passenger seat of the car. Mr Osborne got into the driver's seat and they sped off back onto the Hume highway. They stopped at Mittagong and stole some registration plates, put them on the stolen Ford Focus and continued to drive towards Sydney.
There was a further police pursuit at Yerrinbool and at Mount Annan. The car was ultimately followed through the streets of Paramatta. They stopped about 6.45pm on 2 April 2021. The appellant and Mr Osborne were seen to leave the car and run through the streets. Before they left the car, they set fire to the back seat. They were ultimately arrested in the street shortly afterwards.
The firearm was identified as a shortened .22 long rifle calibre Birmingham Small Arms manufactured repeating bolt action rifle.

Submissions

The appellant submitted that the principal error made by the trial judge was his failure to consider that the issue of duress had been raised sufficiently that it was required to be considered by the tribunal of fact in the matter.
The appellant submitted that, although she had conceded that there was no direct evidence of a specific demand by Mr Osborne to take part in any offences, her case was that she knew what Mr Osborne wanted her to do at the time of each offence, and that he did not need to say what it was, expressly or overtly, for her to follow and comply.
The appellant submitted that the principle that emerges from the authorities in relation to a demand or request to do the particular offence is a requirement that there be evidence from which the jury could reasonably conclude that the threatener intended the accused be coerced to commit the act comprising the alleged offence. Such evidence may arise from the threat itself (whether direct or implied), or from a direction, request or demand (whether direct or implied), such as the particular facts and circumstances of the case may reasonably permit. This, the appellant submitted, is a different and lesser requirement than what was found by the trial judge.
The appellant submitted that the requirement or demand by Mr Osborne in Dubbo that the appellant leave with him in the car set the tone for what occurred and, in the context of the coercive control relationship, was sufficient evidence of an implied demand for the particular offences. That was because those events were all so closely related to the circumstances in which the appellant was required to leave Dubbo prior to the offending.
The Crown submitted that the trial judge was not considering the preliminary issue of whether duress was sufficiently raised that it could be considered by the tribunal of fact. Rather, his Honour proceeded on the basis that duress had been raised, and his Honour was determining as the tribunal of fact that the Crown had negatived it because there was no evidence of a request or demand to commit the various offences.

Consideration

Although the appellant’s written submissions in this Court appeared to be directed to the substantive issue of whether there must be evidence of a specific, direct and overt demand or request to commit the offence charged, the appeal was argued on a somewhat different basis orally. Counsel for the appellant said:

[T]he ground of appeal as cast really seeks to expose that the trial judge erred otherwise said [sic] in finding that duress was not available to be relied upon or otherwise it was not properly raised because there was no evidence of a specific demand or request directed to the appellant on the basis that that is an essential element of the defence of duress.
…
[T]he appellant’s position is that what was done by the trial judge was not to accept that the defence had been properly raised and was available to be considered but rather translating [sic] to had it been a jury case he decided that because of this issue of the directional [scil. direction or] demand element that the defence was not available to be relied upon and so it would not have been put before a jury…
It is a question of availability at the outset…
So that was really it’s what we say how the trial judge approached the decision was looking at that really that preliminary threshold question of whether there was evidence to meet this element. Whereas I understand the Crown says that his Honour went further and did find that the defence was properly raised and nevertheless rejected it.
So I simply wish to make that point that we don’t say that that’s - we say that the judge simply did not think that the evidence was sufficient to properly raise the defence based on his Honour’s interpretation of that element.

The Crown, on the other hand, as noted earlier, submitted that his Honour regarded the issue of duress as having been properly raised (in the sense that it should go to the jury) and that his Honour’s judgment was his verdict as the tribunal of fact.
It appears to me unsatisfactory to decide the appeal simply on the basis of whether his Honour considered the issue in the preliminary sense only or in a final sense as the tribunal of fact. A finding that his Honour had finally determined the issue would mean that the substantive question concerning the nature of the demand or request to constitute duress, and whether there was any evidence of such, would remain unanswered. Accordingly, three questions will be answered:

(1)    Did his Honour deal only with the preliminary issue of whether duress had been raised sufficiently to go to the tribunal of fact?
(2)   Was his Honour in error in concluding that there is a need for a particular request or demand in relation to the specific offence charged?
(3)   Was there any evidence of a demand or request to commit the offences charged?

The nature of his Honour’s ruling

It should be said at the outset that the trial was conducted in such a way that it is understandable that there is now a lack of clarity about the decision that was made. The parties and the trial judge, no doubt to conduct the trial as efficiently and economically as possible, did not take care to follow the procedure that would have been followed had there been a jury.
However, a reading of the transcript of the trial, the parties’ written submissions to the trial judge, together with the trial judge’s judgment, satisfactorily demonstrates that the judgment appealed from is not a determination that duress was not raised sufficiently to be left to the tribunal of fact but, rather, was his Honour’s final determination as the tribunal of fact that the appellant was guilty of the offences because the Crown had successfully negatived one of the elements of duress. That element was the demand or request to commit the offences charged.
At the outset, counsel for the appellant, in answer to the judge’s enquiry, “The issue is duress, isn’t it?”, said, “That’s right, your Honour, yes. Essentially all of the physical acts attributed to my client are admitted and agreed…”.
The agreed facts were tendered, Jessica Muir gave evidence, her statement was tendered and she was briefly cross-examined. Ms Muir did not agree with the few matters that were put to her by counsel for the appellant. Thereafter, a number of videos were played. They had been recorded at various places along the route that Mr Osborne and the appellant had driven. That constituted the Crown case.
The appellant then gave evidence. Her evidence was interrupted by the evidence from the expert, Dr Breckenridge, who had prepared a report concerning the appellant and the coercive relationship the appellant was in with Mr Osborne. There was argument about aspects of the report, and what was ultimately admitted was a redacted version after evidentiary rulings by the trial judge. The appellant then concluded her evidence. That evidence departed at times from what was contained in the agreed facts.
The trial was then adjourned for approximately three weeks to enable counsel to prepare written submissions. Detailed submissions were prepared on both sides. The trial judge sought clarification from counsel for the appellant, because his written submissions elided the two matters of the threat to the appellant and the demand or request to her to commit the offences. Counsel thereafter prepared supplementary written submissions. Finally, both counsel addressed their submissions. At the conclusion of addresses, the trial judge delivered his verdict with reasons.
A number of matters are significant in assisting an understanding of what was taking place, in terms of the issue now raised by the ground of appeal.
First, nowhere in the written submissions is there any notion that what was being considered was confined to whether duress was sufficiently raised. The submissions proceeded on the basis that whether duress was established (or, more correctly, whether the Crown had failed to negative it) was now for determination by the judge as the tribunal of fact. For example, in the Crown’s submissions at par 20, attention is drawn to the Criminal Trials Bench Book jury direction about duress. Thereafter, the submissions read:

22. There is no evidence upon which it could be concluded that the accused was required to commit the offences under threat if she failed to do so. Put another way, the Crown has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was not forced to do what she did because of threats of death or really serious injury to herself or a family member. Or, she was not, in the language of Smith J in R v Hurley "induced thereby to commit the crime charged".

That makes clear that the Crown was putting the submission as part of a closing address to the tribunal of fact; it was not submitting that something should not “go to the jury” because it was not open to the tribunal of fact to find duress.
Similarly, the defence submissions read:

Ms Carr has raised the defence of duress to each of the charges. The Crown must prove beyond reasonable doubt any one of the elements of duress. That is, the Crown must prove:
a.   That Ms Carr was not forced to do what she did by threats or serious injury to herself or a family member or another person; or
b.   That the threat was not of a nature that as a reasonable person of the same sex and maturity of the [sic] Ms Carr, and in the same circumstances that Ms Carr was in, would not have given in [sic] the threats and do what she did; or
c.   That Ms Carr could have rendered the threat ineffective by doing something else other than what she did.

Those submissions are not dealing with whether the issue of duress was such that it could be left to the tribunal of fact. They are addressed to the tribunal of fact, pointing out what the Crown has to establish to negative duress.
Secondly, no voir dire was conducted to determine whether the issue was sufficiently raised to be left to the tribunal of fact. The likely explanation for that is that both parties accepted from the outset that the trial judge was required, as the tribunal of fact, to consider if the “defence” was made out.
Thirdly, the exchanges between the trial judge and counsel during discussion of the submissions focused on what the Crown had to prove beyond reasonable doubt to negative the elements of duress. That was an issue clearly raised in the written submissions on behalf of the appellant made to the trial judge.
Fourthly, a reading of the trial judge’s judgment as a whole provides clear indications that his Honour considered that the issue was sufficiently raised for consideration by the tribunal of fact. In par 10 his Honour said:

The Crown must proof [sic] beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused, having raised the issue of duress, did not act under duress as it is essential for the Crown to prove the elements or ingredients of each offence charged before I could be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the accused’s guilt.

That is the language of ultimate proof by the Crown, not language considering whether there is enough for an issue to be left to the tribunal of fact.

In similar vein, the trial judge said at par 13:

The accused has raised the issue of duress and the Crown has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was not acting under duress…

His Honour then immediately goes on in pars 13, 14 and 15 to give himself the standard directions where the issue of duress is left to the jury. If the only matter being considered was whether the issue was properly raised to be left to the tribunal of fact, such directions would have been entirely otiose.

His Honour’s conclusion at par 73 is:

[M]y view is that the duress raised by the accused in relation to each count has not been established.

Again, that is a conclusion of the ultimate issue, not whether the evidence was sufficient for the tribunal of fact to consider.

I am entirely satisfied that his Honour’s judgment is dealing, as the tribunal of fact, with the question of whether the Crown had successfully negatived the issue of duress. In that way, these matters demonstrate that the trial judge did not fail to leave the issue of duress to the tribunal of fact. The issue was considered by his Honour as the tribunal of fact in reaching a conclusion that the Crown had successfully negatived that element of duress which required there to be a particular request or demand in relation to the specific offences charged.

The nature of the demand or request

The trial judge held at par 71:

This is a difficult area of the law about which there is no clear factual analogous or comparable case. However, in my view, the line of authorities to which I have referred clearly establishes that there is a need for a particular request or demand in relation to the specific offence charged before the doctrine of duress can be enlivened. If that were not so, in my view, it would be open to an accused person to a raise duress in relation to any offence committed while under a continuing threat, such as is accepted here, extending over a considerable period of time.

The leading authority on the elements of the common law defence of duress is the judgment of Smith J in R v Hurley and Murray [1967] VR 526 where the following appears:

Where the accused has been required to do the act charged against him
(i) under a threat that death or grievous bodily harm will be inflicted unlawfully upon a human being if the accused fails to do the act and
(ii) the circumstances were such that a person of ordinary firmness would have been likely to yield to the threat in the way the accused did and
(iii) the threat was present and continuing, imminent and impending … and
(iv) the accused reasonably apprehended that the threat would be carried out and
(v) he was induced thereby to commit the crime charged and
(vi) that crime was not murder, nor any other crime so heinous as to be excepted from the doctrine and
(vii) the accused did not, by fault on his part when free from the duress, expose himself to its application and
(viii) he had no means, with safety to himself, of preventing the execution of the threat,
then the accused, in such circumstances at least, has a defence of duress.
(emphasis added)

In R v Dawson [1978] VR 536 Harris J said of Smith J’s judgment in Hurley and Murray (at 542):

In my opinion, his Honour used the word “required” in the sense of “ordered” or “enjoined”; that is, he was speaking of a situation in which someone had demanded of the accused that he should do the act charged against him, for one meaning of the word “require” is “demand”. I would paraphrase the opening words of Smith J’s proposition by saying: “Where it has been demanded of the accused by some other person or persons that he do the act charged against him”. (The demand, or the requiring, does not have to be in any particular form.)

In the same case, Anderson J said (at 438):

In all of the cases relating to duress of which I am aware, the offence which the accused person has been constrained to commit has been a particular offence nominated by the person making the threats.

In Nguyen v R [2008] NSWCCA 22; (2008) 181 A Crim R 72 Hodgson JA (Kirby and Buddin JJ agreeing) said at [36]:

I accept, on the basis of this and other decisions, that the defence of duress in this case would require that the threats in question were made to coerce the accused to cultivate cannabis. I understand that this would require that what was said and done by the threateners actually manifested an intention to coerce the appellant, not merely not to leave, but also to go on working; and that the appellant so understood them. The question then is, was the evidence capable of supporting a reasonable possibility that this could have been the case.

It should be noted in relation to the last sentence of that extract that this was an appeal from a determination of the trial judge not to leave duress to the jury.

In R v Lorenz (1998) 146 FLR 369, Crispin J said (at 376):

Finally and in my view most importantly, the Crown pointed to the obvious fact that Mr Henshaw did not ask her to commit the offence with which she is charged or in any way suggest that she should do so. In R v Dawson [1978] VR 536 at 538 the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria held that a defence of duress was not open to a defendant who had escaped from lawful custody in order to avoid threats of violence. Anderson J, with whose reasons for judgment Starke J agreed, observed that in all of the cases relating to duress of which he was aware the offence which the accused person had been constrained to commit had been nominated by the person making the threats. His Honour took the view that that was an element of the defence. Harris J also expressed the view, at 542-543 that the defence was limited to cases in which the threats had been made to coerce the accused into committing the act which was the basis of the offence with which he was charged. Mr O'Donnell was not able to refer me to any authority to the contrary.
There are theoretical and public policy reasons for confining the defence of duress in this manner. The theoretical basis of the defence of duress is that if a person has carried out an act because his or her will has been overborne by threats then that act cannot be said to have been committed voluntarily. If the threat was related to a more generalised demand such as one for the production of money then whilst the accused may have acted under a significant compulsion his or her will would not have been overborne in relation to the particular act chosen in order to satisfy the demand and it could not be regarded as involuntary. As a matter of public policy it is important to ensure that the ambit of the defence is not expanded to relieve people from criminal responsibility for offences to which the coercion was not directed. The fact that a person has acted in response to such a pressing need will obviously be regarded as a strong mitigating factor. However, pressing needs arise for reasons unrelated to threats. It would not be practicable to effectively excuse criminal behaviour in every case in which it was so motivated.
…
For the reasons previously given I am satisfied that Mr Henshaw's conduct in threatening to kill the accused when she was pregnant with his third child imposed enormous emotional pressure, the affect of which was aggravated by the history of violence and intimidation and the emotional sequelae described by Dr Saboisky. Nonetheless, he did not direct her to commit the offence with which she is charged and in these circumstances, I am obliged to find that no defence of duress is available.

In Rowan (A Pseudonym) v The King [2022] VSCA 236 the joint judgment of Kyrou and Niall JJA said at [63]:

The defence of duress is limited to cases where a threat is made to coerce the accused to commit the act which was the basis of the offence with which he or she was charged. Accordingly, where the accused is threatened with physical harm but the person making that threat does not identify any particular offence for the accused to commit, the defence will not apply.

Whilst none of these decisions is binding on this Court, the approach taken in those cases, chiefly in reliance on what was said by Smith J in Hurley, may be taken to state the law in respect of the requirements for duress to be successfully established. The High Court has noted that Smith J’s statement of the elements has been frequently cited as authoritative: Taiapa v The Queen (2009) 240 CLR 95; [2009] HCA 53 at [25]. This Court has referred with approval to Hurley: R v Abusafiah (1991) 24 NSWLR 531 at 537; Clarkson v R [2007] NSWCCA 70; (2007)171 A Crim R 1 at [73]-[77] and [86]; Nguyen v R at [34].
Although the appellant argued before the trial judge that the threat and the demand were one and the same, that was not the basis of the argument in this Court. In many cases, the two features of the duress will be separate. Certainly, the Victorian Court of Appeal in Rowan regarded them as distinct: see [173] and [174].
As to the matter of the threat, the Victorian Court of Appeal held in Rowan (at [156] that:

[A] continuing or ever present threat which is subsisting at the time an accused committed the charged offence can suffice if, in all other respects, the defence of duress can be made out. We cannot think of any reason in principle or policy that requires exclusion of a continuing or ever present threat where, due to the threat, the accused has lost his or her freedom to choose to refrain from committing the charged offence.

The Crown said in written submissions to the trial judge,

Accepting the correctness of Rowan and accepting that threats made to the accused at Dubbo were still on the accused’s mind, there is still no evidence that Osborne demanded or even requested that the accused engage in any criminal behaviour.

The trial judge said in his judgment (at par 43):

Given the concessions by the Crown in short, to the effect that the evidence of the accused and Dr Breckenridge was sufficient to establish that there was a threat to the accused present and continuing, imminent and impending, at the time of the commission of each of the offences. That is consistent with the view expressed on that particular issue recently by the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria in Anna Rowan (a pseudonym) v The King [2022] VSCA 236.

His Honour then correctly identified that the one matter left for determination (at par 50) was:

whether there is a need for evidence of a specific direction or request by the threatening person to the accused to commit the particular offence.

However, the appellant relied both before the trial judge and this Court on what was said in Rowan at [174] in the joint judgment:

We are also of the opinion that it is not fatal in this case that there is no direct evidence that JR told the applicant shortly prior to each offence that, unless she performed the acts that constitute each of the charged offences, he would physically and sexually abuse her. That is because it would be open to the jury to infer that this was a reasonable possibility based upon the history of the relationship between JR and the applicant as set out in the Matthews 2019 report and, in particular, the complainants’ evidence. It must be borne in mind that the offending conduct of the applicant for all but charges 1, 11 and 13 constituted being present during JR’s offending. For all of the offences, it would be open to the jury to conclude that there was a reasonable possibility that the applicant would not have been present or undertaken the specific acts that constituted the offending had it not been for an unstated demand from JR that she do so, otherwise he would physically and sexually abuse her. In relation to the offending the subject of charge 1, the existence of such a reasonable possibility is supported by the applicant’s statement to Ms Matthews that she ‘tried to say no, but [JR] made [her]’.

Two related things are clear from that part of the judgment. First, the appeal in Rowan was against the refusal of the trial judge to leave the issue of duress to the jury. As Rowan at [174] makes clear, the question being discussed there was whether it was open to the jury to infer that there was a reasonable possibility that there was such a demand or request to commit the acts that constituted the offences. Secondly, by reason of the factual context of that case, it was open to the jury so to infer “based upon the history of the relationship”.
That is not the position in the present matter. The trial judge was not considering whether the issue should be left to the tribunal of fact because inferences were capable of being drawn; his Honour was deciding the matter as the tribunal of fact.

In any event, all that was being said in Rowan, was that the absence of “direct evidence” of the demand or request was not fatal in the circumstances of that case. It was sufficient that it was open to the jury to infer such a demand or request even if it was an “unstated demand”.
In my opinion, the authorities are clear that a particular request or demand in relation to the specific offence charged is required even if, in some circumstances it can be inferred as Rowan suggests at [174]. The trial judge’s conclusion at par 71 (set out at [46] above) about what was required was correct.

Evidence of demand or request

The evidence does not disclose a particular request or demand to carry out any of the acts concerned. The only evidence of that nature given by the appellant was her evidence that Mr Osborne demanded she leave Dubbo with him, coupled with the threats to her and her family if she did not. Although the appellant submitted that that threat, in effect, carried forward to the events in Molong and Cooma, and subsequently on the trip back to Sydney because it “sets the tone” and in the context of what occurred there was not a long period between that threat and the offending, that submission must be rejected.

Count 1 – the Molong offence

The appellant said that Mr Osborne threatened her and demanded she leave Dubbo with him. When they got to Molong, she gave the following evidence :

Q. At Molong we’ve heard and there are agreed facts that a car was taken?
A. Yes.
Q. You knew that car was taken without the consent of the owner and you
rode in that car?
A. Yes.
Q. Why did you do that?
A. Before I was still following them. The keys was in the car. Kenny found the
keys in the car and said, “The keys are in this car. Let’s go,” and we jumped in
the car and Aiden’s still there with me. He had the gun on him the whole time.
When we packed the car up he did not leave that. That’s the only thing he
took with him out of the Commodore.

In cross-examination, the appellant gave this evidence about the theft of the car :

Q. No, the car that was taken without the consent of the owner. Where did
that come from?
A. Which one?
Q. The one you drove to Sydney and then to Cooma in.
A. From Molong?
Q. Yes, from Molong, sorry?
A. That was at a front - it was parked in the front of a house in Molong.
Q. How did it come to be in Aiden's possession?
A. We were walking down that street. Kenny's looked in the window, seen the
keys in the vehicle, jumps in and says, "Let's take this," and we took that.
Q. Kenny was the one who got into it?
A. But he didn't get in the - he's looked and seen the keys and then said to
Aiden, "The keys are in the car". Aiden jumps in the driver's seat of that.
Kenny's in the passenger side.
Q. And he says, "Let's go"?
A. He said, "There's keys in the car, let's go". Like, "We'll take this car. We're
getting out here".
Q. You then jumped in?
A. Yes, I jumped in.
Q. You knew at that time, obviously, it wasn't Kenny's car, was it?
A. Yes.
Q. It wasn't Aiden's car?
A. Yes.

Even if what is said in Rowan at [174] is correct, there is nothing in the present case from which it could be inferred that a demand or request was made to the appellant by Mr Osborne concerning Count 1.

Counts 2, 3 and 4 – the Cooma offences

When the appellant and Mr Osborne arrived at Cooma, they went to see a person Mr Osborne knew from gaol. Mr Osborne asked if he knew where they could get methamphetamine. They were taken to a dealer’s house. The appellant then gave this evidence :

Q. That property that he showed you that you understood to be [a] dealer’s was
the place in Cooma that was--
A. We went back there. We, ‘cause Dan said, “Drop me off first ‘cause they
can’t see me.” So we went and dropped - I don’t know why ‘cause we were
only going there to get on. He, and he didn’t want to be in the car, so we went
and dropped him back to his mum’s house and then we went back to the, to
the house, the flat in Cooma and I went in to get on.
Q. When you say “get on” you mean buy drugs?
A. I went to get ice. We are told to get ice, ice, yeah.
Q. Methamphetamine?
A. Yes.
HIS HONOUR: Is this the Sharp Street unit?
TOWNSEND: Yes.
Q. This Cooma place you’re talking about where you went to get on is the one
where the shot was fired eventually; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. So the agreed facts are that you went to the door, knocked on the door and
you made inquiries, I think, about getting on or drugs or whatever; that’s right.
A. Yes.
Q. You were told to come inside while the fellow whose name I now -
Mr Sizmur made a phone call to Kylie Davis to find out. Is that what you
understand?
A. Yes. He did say he was ringing up.
Q. You were inside at that point?
A. Yes.
Q. You'd come inside and he was going to make a call, as you understood it?
A. Yes.
Q. What happened then?
A. I was standing in just in the door and then out of nowhere Aiden come
behind me, he come in, he had a, he had a mask on his face, come in with the
gun, I, I don't even know why he got out of the car but he come in and there
was a, the guy run at him and there was like a little bit of a scuffle in the front
door bit. I was standing over near the lounge more into where I was standing
because he was ringing up to, to see if I was right to score to say that Kylie
could tell him that I was right to score and just I heard the gun, I started
freaking out because I heard that it had discharged, I heard it fire. I didn't
know where, which way, whether it was coming my way or where, I did not
know where that went or whether he got shot. I walked a little bit out and then
I seen a lady run out of the hallway and I told her to get back in the room and
there was a kid and a man standing over near the lounge room and they were
all screaming and just everyone was screaming. It was just a big thing. They
were still - they were still fighting with and Aiden still had the gun and then
when I seen her I run out and then--
Q. You understand that the woman you saw was Jessica Muir. She gave
evidence yesterday?
A. I - that night I wouldn't remember if I seen her but.
Q. You disagree with some of her evidence about what she said, where she
went. Is that right?
A. Yeah. She did not leave the hallway. When I yelled at her she turned
around and went straight back into the room.
Q. What did you yell at her?
A. I said, "Get the fuck in there," something along them lines. I don't know
exactly what I said. It was all in the moment. When she opened the door I
seen a cot and it pretty much freaked me out because and then, so she turned
around and run back in and I run the other way out.

That account by the appellant does not sit easily with her plea to the offences because it suggests that there was no joint criminal enterprise to rob the occupants of the house. Nevertheless, no demand or request is disclosed.
The appellant relied on what she said in cross-examination as follows :

Q. …Did you and Aiden discuss that you were going to a place to see a
drug dealer, in the car?
A. I was sent up there with the money to get on.
Q. And what do you say happened thereafter?
A. After I walked in?
Q. Yes?
A. I was in there, the man was getting a phone, he was ringing. I was under
the understanding that he was ringing her to say that - and she would say that
it was okay to sell it to me, because we just left there. And then, that's when
he come and it just all happened so fast. He come in, there was - the guy
walked towards him as he's come in.

The appellant submitted that the demand was that she “was sent up there with money to get on”. This account differed from what appeared in the agreed facts, and appeared to be in support of her evidence that Mr Osborne thereafter unexpectedly appeared with the gun demanding the drugs from the occupants of the house. At no point did the appellant give any evidence to suggest that she had been told to go to the door asking for drugs with the intent that Mr Osborne would then arrive to threaten and rob the occupants. Indeed, her assertion that she was sent there “with money to get on” is inconsistent with a demand to commit the offences.
When the difficulty was raised with counsel for the appellant at the hearing of the appeal, counsel suggested that the joint criminal enterprise to rob may have been made after Mr Osborne came in with the gun. However, there is then no evidence that the appellant was told or required to do anything at all.

Counts 7, 8 and 9 – the carjacking offences

In relation to what occurred at the two service centres, the appellant gave this evidence :

Q. You told [scil. took] part in a number of carjackings where people were pulled
up in a car and were forced to get out of the car and you and Aiden got in the
car and drove away, right?
A. Yes.
Q. Why did you get involved in those?
A. I just followed him.
Q. Why?
A. I felt there was nowhere I could go. I was going with him. He wasn't going
to let me leave. If I didn't go with him someone was getting hurt. I don't know
whether it would be me but someone was. There was no way he was not
going to let me go with him. He made a point of that at Dubbo. There was no
way he was going to do anything unless I was there.
Q. At the time of those carjackings is that what was on your mind?
A. Just follow him. I stayed back until he had control of each car - had--
Q. And then you went obviously off in the cars with him?
A. Yes. I jumped in with him.
Q. Did you think at any time of trying to escape?
A. No.
Q. Why not?
A. I just need to follow him. I didn't even try.
Q. Did you think at any time of trying to contact police?
A. No.
Q. Why not?
A. He's got a loaded gun on him. I know that he's got bullets. I know he's
going to use it. He's that obsessed with me. He doesn't want me to leave. I
just followed him.
Q. After the first time he put the gun and pressed it into your cheek and made
the threats to shoot everyone in the house or you, did he ever point the gun at
you again?
A. No.
Q. Did he make any threats to you to shoot you or anyone else after that
point?
A. He just said that he's not going back to gaol. He'll have a shoot out with the
police. I said, "Please don't do that because we will both die. Don't. If you pull
the gun on the police we are going to die." That's - other than that, no.

In cross-examination, the appellant gave this evidence :

Q. And you saw him get out with the gun, didn't you?
A. Yes.
Q. You knew because he carried it all the time? Did you have a conversation
with him before he got out of the car?
A. No it just all happened, the car crashed, seen the car, and he jumped out
and run to the car.
Q. There was no conversation between you and him about what was
happening or going to happen?
A. No. Just the car crashed and he was out of the car.
…
Q. At this time as this is happening you walk casually over to the vehicle, don't
you?
A. I walked toward, no, after he's already got the baby, he already had the
baby standing in the yard on the phone when I walked over into the car.
Q. Did you run over to the car or did you walk?
A. I don't know what speed I used to get to the car. I just went to the car.
…
Q. In relation to both of those carjackings - I'll deal with the first one, you were
part of that crime with Aiden weren't you?
A. I got in the car after--
Q. You were there ready--
A. I followed him.
Q. Sorry, I didn't mean to interrupt. I apologise. Go on.
A. I followed him.
Q. I suggest you were there ready, willing and able to assist him in the
commission of that offence, weren't you?
A. No. When he got control of the car is when I jumped in the car.

At the commencement of the addresses, the following exchanges occurred between the trial judge and counsel for the appellant:

HIS HONOUR: … Now, Mr Townsend, am I right in assuming that there is no
dispute about the elements of each of the offences?
TOWNSEND: That’s correct.
HIS HONOUR: The only issue to be determined is whether the accused is not
guilty of any or all of the charges by reason of duress.
TOWNSEND: That’s correct, your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: And it really must be all or one, because you concede, in
relation to each count, that there’s no direct evidence of a direction to do that.
TOWNSEND: That’s correct.
HIS HONOUR: So it all stands or falls on that.
TOWNSEND: Exactly.
HIS HONOUR: So you take all the agreed facts as setting out the elements?
TOWNSEND: Yes.

The concession was properly made. There is nothing in any of the evidence to demonstrate any direct evidence of a demand or request to commit any of the offences. Nor, if what is said in Rowan at [174] is correct, is there anything from which an inference could be drawn that there was a reasonable possibility of such demand or request.
The trial judge was correct in concluding that the Crown had successfully negatived the element of duress which required a demand or request to commit the particular offences.

Conclusion

I would make the following order:

Dismiss the appeal.

FAGAN J: I agree with Davies J. I gratefully adopt his Honour’s summary of the charges and of the evidence at trial, on the basis of which I add the following observations.
The trial was conducted substantially on the basis of facts agreed pursuant to s 191 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW). The solicitor advocate who represented the appellant adduced from her evidence that was in some respects contradictory of the agreed facts. The most significant differences concerned count 2, the armed robbery at Cooma. The appellant participated by attending the premises where the robbery was carried out, in company with Osborne. He entered after her carrying a shortened firearm and demanded “drugs and money” from the occupants. The detail of the appellant’s actions in the agreed facts supported an inference that she was present in furtherance of a joint criminal enterprise. In oral evidence the appellant gave different details, which her solicitor submitted in closing argument were more consistent with her having aided and abetted Osborne in the commission of the offence as an accessory at the fact (or principal in the second degree). This difference was immaterial, as were the other discrepancies between the oral evidence and the agreed facts, because in closing submissions the appellant’s solicitor conceded that all elements of each count were established.

Conduct of the defence case at trial

After the close of the case for the accused on 8 November 2022, written submissions were exchanged and the trial was relisted for supplementary oral argument on 1 December 2022. The written submissions for the appellant show that the defence case was founded upon a misapprehension of the law.
As Davies J has explained at [47]-[64], the authorities establish that in the common law of duress a demand by the threatener to the accused, requiring that he or she commit the offence charged, is a concept distinct from a threat of harm that is made to the accused to induce compliance with the demand. Of course, the demand and the threat would commonly be communicated at the one time, in words to the effect: “Commit this offence, or I will harm you.” But both aspects must be conveyed to constitute duress. In the present case, assuming that the Crown failed to exclude beyond reasonable doubt the other circumstances that the common law requires should be present for the defence to operate, the trial judge would return verdicts of not guilty only if there remained on the evidence a reasonable possibility of the following two matters: first, that Osborne demanded of the appellant that she perform the acts constituting each offence and, secondly, that Osborne threatened the appellant with harm if she did not perform those acts.
In evidence and in submissions at trial the appellant’s solicitor dwelt upon a contention that his client was in an abusive relationship with Osborne and that she was subject to ongoing threat of violence from him. The appellant’s closing written submissions of 29 November 2022 contained the following:

3 The Crown concedes in written submissions that “there was a threat to the accused present and continuing, imminent and impending at the time each offence [was] committed” … . The Crown case is that despite that present and continuing threat, Ms Carr cannot rely on duress because Mr Osborne did not make specific demands or requests that she engage in each or any of the crimes … . The Crown cites a number of classic cases on duress to support this proposition. This does not accord with human experience, [nor with the] evidence of the nature of the relationship Ms Carr had with Mr Osborne, nor the nature of the threats, nor other case law.

That was followed in par 4 of the defence submissions with a reference to the judgment of Kyrou and Niall JJA in Rowan (A Pseudonym) v The King and a contention that their Honours had rejected “the proposition that a demand or request to commit each offence is required to make out duress”. Paragraphs [155]-[156] of the joint judgment were cited but they do not contain any such rejection. Those paragraphs are concerned with what may suffice as a threat of harm, on which subject their Honours said this:

[156] In our opinion, a continuing or ever present threat which is subsisting at the time an accused committed the charged offence can suffice if, in all other respects, the defence of duress can be made out.

Kyrou and Niall JJA accepted that a demand made of the accused that he or she should commit the offence in question is one of the essential constituents of duress, by the disproof of which the Crown may defeat the defence. Their Honours were of the view that this constituent is not necessarily excluded by an absence of evidence of explicit demand: the defence may succeed if there is circumstantial evidence from which the reasonable possibility an implicit demand by the threatener to the accused to perform the relevant acts could be inferred. Their Honours said this at [174]:

We are also of the opinion that it is not fatal in this case that there is no direct evidence that JR [the threatener] told the applicant shortly prior to each offence that, unless she performed the acts that constitute each of the charged offences, he would physically and sexually abuse her. That is because it would be open to the jury to infer that this was a reasonable possibility based upon the history of the relationship between JR and the applicant as set out in [a psychologist’s] report and, in particular, the complainants’ evidence. It must be borne in mind that the offending conduct of the applicant for all but charges 1, 11 and 13 constituted being present during JR’s offending. For all of the offences, it would be open to the jury to conclude that there was a reasonable possibility that the applicant would not have been present or undertaken the specific acts that constituted the offending had it not been for an unstated demand from JR that she do so, otherwise he would physically and sexually abuse her. …

At pars 11-17 of the written submissions of 29 November 2022 the appellant’s solicitor put to the trial judge a summary of the circumstances of each count. Those paragraphs were expressed in terms that failed to recognise the need for evidence of demands made to the appellant by Osborne that she commit the respective offences. In relation to count 1 (riding in a conveyance without consent) and counts 2-6 (concerning the robbery at Cooma) pars 11 and 12 of the submissions commenced as follows:

11 While it is true that there is no evidence of a specific threat by Mr Osborne to Ms Carr to be carried in the conveyance without the consent of the owner …
12 Again, it is true that there is no evidence of a specific threat by Mr Osborne to Ms Carr to take part in the offences in the flat at Cooma. (Emphasis added).

It was inaccurate to speak of “threats … to [act]”. However, it was plainly intended by these submissions to acknowledge that there was no evidence of Osborne having made to the appellant any demands to act, that is, to commit the offences. In the balance of each of the above paragraphs it was submitted that the appellant was in a constant state of fear and that it could be inferred she took part in the crimes because of that fear. On the authorities discussed in Davies J’s judgment, such a causal connection would not suffice in the absence of demands to commit the unlawful acts. Paragraphs 14-16 of the submissions of 29 November 2022, concerning counts 7-9, did not purport to identify any evidence of demands from Osborne that the appellant commit those three matters. Subsequently, in oral submissions on 1 December 2022, the appellant’s solicitor conceded “in relation to each count, that there’s no direct evidence of a direction” to commit the offences. The appellant had not testified that she received express demands. Nor was there evidence from any other source that express demands had been made upon her. The solicitor did not submit to the trial judge that there was circumstantial evidence from which he could infer implicit demands by Osborne. There was no circumstantial evidence that could have been pointed to.

In an email from the trial judge’s associate to the representatives of both parties dated 30 November 2022, his Honour communicated the following:

On my preliminary reading, it seems there is a distinction between two concepts, which may have been elided in [4] of the submissions for accused.
The first concept is the issue raised in Rowan at [66], namely whether element 1 of [R v Hurley and Murray] requires a specific, overt threat or whether a continuing and ever present threat suffices. Rowan, at [156], found that her continuing threats would suffice, and the Crown submissions seemed to accept that … .
The second concept is whether there must be a specific demand or request that the accused engage in the particular offence. This is a matter on which I would appreciate focus in submissions … . In Rowan at [174] it was not fatal that there was no direct evidence that [the threatener] told the accused shortly prior to each offence that, unless she performed the acts constituting the offences, he would physically harm her, and that it would have been open to the jury to infer that there had been an “unstated demand” that she should do so.

This drew from the appellant’s solicitor supplementary written submissions dated 30 November 2022, in which the following appeared:

2 To me, in this case, the two concepts are not distinguishable. … My submission is that the authorities of [R v Rujanjic] by implication and Rowan by express statement say that for element 1 a specific demand or request is not required, so long as there is a continuing and ever present threat at the time the accused committed the offence, and, in all other respects, the defence of duress can be made out – Rowan [156].

By that submission the solicitor continued his misconception regarding the constituents of duress, as in pars 3 and 4 of the original closing submissions of 29 November 2022 quoted above. Throughout the oral submissions on 1 December 2022 the appellant’s solicitor steadfastly maintained that in the law of duress there is no requirement of a demand that the relevant unlawful act be carried out, separate from the requirement of a threat of harm. Translating that position into language that reflects the burden of proof, the appellant’s solicitor maintained that if the Crown should exclude any reasonable possibility that the threatener made demand upon the appellant to carry out the relevant acts, that would not defeat the defence.
The position taken by the applicant’s solicitor in closing is exemplified in the following extract from the transcript of argument:

HIS HONOUR: … this is again getting back to my problem that I alluded to in my note to counsel, whether that elides the distinction between the continuing threat point and the direct demand point.
[APPELLANT’S SOLICITOR]: Well, I don’t think there is a distinction between those things because the threat must involve either a demand or a demand that's understood, maybe not overtly said. So, the discussion in the case of Rowan was about the use of the word threat or under threat in element 1 in the old case of Hurley, that all the cases refer to. They say in [Rowan] threat there does not necessarily mean an overt, specific threat. It can be an ongoing ever-present threat. …

Further on in the oral submissions, after discussion of the authorities, this exchange took place:

[APPELLANT’S SOLICITOR]: And Rowan says that … “continuing an ever-present threat which is subsisting at the time an accused committed the charged offence can suffice if in all other respects the defence of duress can be made out”.
HIS HONOUR: Yes, but “in all other respects” means, on the Crown case and on the list of authorities, there has been a demand. Step 1 is there has to be a demand.
[APPELLANT’S SOLICITOR]: Well, I say step 1 is the threat is the demand. The threat and the understanding of the threat is the demand.

The contention that “the threat is the demand” was a constant refrain of the solicitor’s oral closing submissions. It was and is contrary to the authorities. The demand that the crime be committed and the threat that is made to induce compliance with the demand are different things, albeit that they would usually be conveyed at the same time and be components of a single, composite communication.

The appellant’s written submissions on the appeal include the following:

5 It had been accepted for the appellant [at trial] that there was no direct evidence of Mr Osborne having made a specific and direct demand or request to her to commit each of the specific offences charged. (Emphasis in original).

As already mentioned, in addition to conceding the absence of direct evidence, the solicitor made no submission that there was any circumstantial evidence from which the tribunal of fact could infer an implicit demand by Osborne for her to commit any of the offences – and there was no such evidence because the defence case had been conducted on the basis that to maintain duress all that was needed was evidence of a reasonable possibility that the appellant was under an ever-present, continuing, imminent and impending threat of harm.

The defence position led to the following paragraphs of the trial judge’s decision:

[70] [The appellant’s solicitor] concedes that there is no evidence of a specific threat by Osborne to Ms Carr to take part in any of the offences charged, but he submits for the reasons that I have outlined, in summary, that particularly in the light of what was said by the Court in Rowan, it is not necessary to have such a direct request or demand to commit a particular offence.
[71] This is a difficult area of the law about which there is no clear factual analogous or comparable case. However, in my view, the line of authorities to which I have referred clearly establishes that there is a need for a particular request or demand in relation to the specific offence charged before the doctrine of duress can be enlivened. If that were not so, in my view, it would be open to an accused person to a raise duress in relation to any offence committed while under a continuing threat, such as is accepted here, extending over a considerable period of time.

The issue on appeal

A few quotations from the transcript of oral argument in the appeal will identify the sole issue that was raised in this Court. It was put to counsel for the appellant that the trial judge appeared to have decided that there was no evidence that the appellant received from Osborne “a demand, request, requirement or the like” to commit any of the offences. Counsel responded as follows:

McGEE: … really the error that we say in his Honour’s consideration of that issue …[is] that the trial judge proceeded on the basis that the defence using proper language had not been properly raised because of the concession by the defendant’s counsel that there was no direct evidence of a specific request. So that was really … we say how the trial judge approached the decision was looking at that … preliminary threshold question of whether there was evidence to meet this element.
… we say that the judge simply did not think that the evidence was sufficient to properly raise the defence based on his Honour’s interpretation of that element.
…
… the error we say the trial judge took in this case was to narrow the form of evidence that was required to evidence that intention to coerce.

A further relevant exchange was as follows:

FAGAN J: … as I understand what you’re saying, all it is really is that the proof of a specific threat that the acts that constitute the offence, participation that constitutes the offence must be done or else the threat will be carried through. That maybe conveyed other than in expressed words, and it may be by implication and it maybe that the implication of the threat could be found by the tribunal of fact on the basis of inference from circumstances, that’s all you’re saying isn’t it?
MCGEE: Yes, I think in nut shell.

Later Ms McGee submitted this:

… I appreciate his Honour has used the language that duress raised by the accused has not been established in my submission that’s not on the basis of a full consideration of all of the evidence, it’s really limited to concluding that what was required was evidence of a specific and direct demand or request for each offence and the appellant’s counsel having conceded there was no direct evidence of such things that as a matter of course he had to find her guilty. So not by reason of actual consideration of the defence accepting it having been raised.

The substance of the argument, encapsulated in the above extracts, is that the learned trial judge did not decide, by reference to all relevant evidence, whether the Crown had excluded beyond reasonable doubt that Osborne made any demand upon the appellant that she should commit any of the offences charged. The argument is that the judge accepted the appellant’s solicitor’s concession that there was no direct evidence of such a demand and proceeded to hold that there was therefore no evidence for him to consider on the point, erroneously concluding that it would not be sufficient for there to be circumstantial evidence from which the reasonable possibility of implicit demands might be inferred.
That argument cannot be accepted. His Honour’s judgment is not directed to any such question of what kinds of evidence might be relied upon to support a reasonable possibility of demands by Osborne, explicit or implicit, that the appellant perform the unlawful acts. I find it quite clear on the record of the proceedings that his Honour’s reasons are concerned with deciding, as the tribunal of fact, whether any such reasonable possibility remained on all the evidence. There was no evidence, of any kind, direct or circumstantial, to found a reasonable possibility that demands were made of the appellant to commit the offences. His Honour so found. The appellant’s solicitor having conceded that, apart from excluding duress, the Crown had otherwise proved all elements of each offence, the findings of guilt inevitably followed. On the appeal there has been no suggestion of any error affecting those findings, apart from what has been argued with respect to the issue of duress.
The appeal should be dismissed.
DHANJI J: I have had the considerable benefit of reading in draft the judgments of Davies and Fagan JJ. I have come to a different to view to that of their Honours. My reasons for that view, which follow, assume familiarity with the judgments of Davies and Fagan JJ.
As is clear from the reasons of Davies and Fagan JJ, in order to satisfy the evidentiary burden to raise the defence of duress, there must be (together with the other requirements) evidence of “a threat which is made to coerce the accused to commit the act which was the basis of the offence with which he or she was charged” such that the defence will not apply in the absence of identification by the person making the threat of the “particular offence for the accused to commit”: Rowan (A Pseudonym) v The King [2022] VSCA 236 at [63] (“Rowan”), set in the reasons of Davies J at [53].
In Rowan, the plurality in the Victorian Court of Appeal, in upholding an appeal against conviction, accepted that there is no need for a specific threat to be made preceding the relevant (otherwise criminal) conduct. Their Honours held that “a continuing or ever present threat which is subsisting at the time an accused committed the charged offence can suffice if, in all other respects, the defence of duress can be made out”: at [156]. Following that decision, special leave to appeal to the High Court was granted to the Crown to challenge what it described as “duress of circumstances”: see The King v Rowan [2023] HCATrans 90. The expression refers to a line of authority in the United Kingdom. The appeal was argued on 14 November 2023 ([2023] HCATrans 159), and judgment is, at the time of writing, reserved.
The present matter, at first instance and in this Court, proceeded on the basis that a “standing threat” of the nature discussed in Rowan is sufficient. Further, the matter was contested at trial, and determined by his Honour, on the basis that there was, in existence at the time of each of the offences, such a threat, which was described as a “present and continuing, imminent and impending” threat to the appellant (paragraph 43 of his Honour’s verdict judgment). There was no challenge to his Honour’s finding in this regard. In these circumstances, despite the outstanding challenge to the decision in Rowan, I am of the view this Court should approach the matter on the same basis.
As has been explained by Davies and Fagan JJ, and is clear from Rowan at [63], the presence of a continuing threat did not obviate the need for evidence linking the threat to the particular conduct such that “what was said and done by the threateners actually manifested an intention to coerce the appellant” to perform the relevant acts making up the offence charged: Nguyen v R [2008] NSWCCA 22; (2008) 181 A Crim R 72 at [36], set out more fully by Davies J at [51]. On the other hand, it is clear from that decision that the demand to perform the relevant acts may be implied: see Nguyen v R at [36]-[37]; Rowan at [174].
In the context of the above, the present appeal falls to be determined by the terms of the single ground of appeal:

“The learned trial judge erred in determining that in order for the defence of duress to be available, there must be evidence of a specific, direct, and overt demand or request made by the threatener to the accused in relation to the specific offence charged.”

The ground is amenable to being understood as involving a question of law alone – that is, in order for the defence to be raised, does duress require “evidence of a specific, direct, and overt demand or request made by the threatener to the accused in relation to the specific offence charged”. If the ground is understood as such, leave is not required: Criminal Appeal Act, s 5(1)(a). The parties appear to have proceeded on the basis that leave is not required. While the ground raises this question of law, the answer to the question is straightforward. The evidentiary burden to raise the defence of duress does not require evidence of “a specific, direct, and overt demand or request made by the threatener to the accused in relation to the specific offence charged”, at least insofar as that formulation suggests the demand must be “direct” and “overt”. As discussed above, while there must be a demand that the accused engage in the conduct constituting the specific offence alleged under threat of the relevant harm, such a demand may be implied. In my view, the real question to be determined on this appeal is not the requirements of duress, but rather, whether his Honour determined that the requirements for raising duress are as stated in the ground of appeal. This is a question of fact.
As has been explained in the reasons of Davies and Fagan JJ, the submissions on behalf of the appellant at first instance, to the extent they may have suggested that there was no need for evidence of a demand to commit the particular crime charged, were incorrect. That does not, however, answer the ground of appeal. If his Honour determined, as the ground of appeal asserts, that a direct and overt demand was required, he was wrong to do so. Whether his Honour might have received greater assistance is not to the point, at least at this stage of the analysis.
Fagan J (at [88]) points out that the appellant’s representative at first instance conceded an absence of “direct evidence of a direction” to commit any of the offences charged. As his Honour’s discussion of the proceedings demonstrates, there appears to have been a degree of confusion at first instance as to what was required in order to properly raise the defence. His Honour notes that there was no submission that there was circumstantial evidence from which an inference could be drawn that demands were implicitly made. It is unfortunate that the issue was not directly grappled with at first instance. However, insofar as both Davies J (at [77]) and Fagan J (at [88]) go on to find that there was no circumstantial evidence from which an inference of a demand could be drawn, this seems to me, with respect, to be relevant to the application of the proviso (cf Filippou v The Queen (2015) 256 CLR 47; [2015] HCA 29 at [48]), or, were it necessary, the granting of leave. As discussed above, leave is not required. If it were, I would not refuse leave, given the issue of leave was never raised, let alone the prospect of refusing leave on this basis.
It is necessary to return to the reasons of the trial judge in order to determine whether, as the appellant argues, his Honour proceeded on an incorrect basis. The ground of appeal, to some extent, mimics words used by the trial judge. His Honour, at paragraph 46, observed that while the Court in Rowan accepted that a continuing threat may be sufficient, the decision nonetheless proceeded on “the assumption that there was, consistent with the authorities … a specific order, direction or requirement to do the criminal act in question”. The terms of the ground are, however, different in important respects. In contrast to the terms of the ground of appeal, his Honour did not say that the threat must be “direct” or “overt”. Further, his Honour’s use of “or” rather than “and” (that is, “a specific order, direction or requirement”) in contrast with the terms of the ground of appeal, postulated alternatives, rather than cumulative requirements. This leaves an ambiguity in that it is not clear whether the adjective “specific” qualifies only the word “order” or also qualifies the words “direction” or “requirement”. As noted above, to require an overt or direct demand would be contrary to Nguyen v R at [36]-[37] and Rowan at [174], which allow for the possibility that the demand to engage in the relevant conduct might be implied (see Davies J at [63]-[64]; Fagan J at [86]). Despite the parallel with the ground of appeal, it is not clear from this passage alone whether his Honour did require evidence of a “specific” demand in the sense of a “direct” or “overt” demand.
Further analysis is required to determine whether, reading his Honour’s reasons as a whole, it should be concluded that his Honour failed to consider whether a demand to commit the particular offence charged could be inferred. That reading is not to be done as if construing the words of a statute.
The reasons of the trial judge were, to a significant extent, and as might be expected, framed by the submissions of the parties. His Honour noted, referring to Rowan, that while a continuing threat may be sufficient, there was an issue between the parties as to what was required to constitute a relevant demand. His Honour expressed the issue, at paragraph 50 of the verdict judgment, as follows:

“The precise matter to be determined in the light of the positions of the parties is whether there is a need for evidence of a specific direction or request by the threatening person to the accused to commit the particular offence.”

While not expressly denying the potential for the demand to be implied, the formulation does appear to articulate a dichotomy between there being no demand and direct evidence of a demand. That his Honour might have so considered the issue is not altogether surprising given that, as Fagan J makes clear, he was not assisted by submissions pointing to the possibility that the demand to commit the particular offence might be implied.
His Honour referred to what he described as the assumption in Rowan that “a specific order, direction or requirement to do the criminal act in question” is required before proceeding to a discussion of the authorities with respect to the nature of that demand requirement. His Honour noted that in R v Hurley and Murray [1967] VR 526, Smith J stated duress would apply “[w]here the accused has been required to do the act charged against him” and the remaining elements of the doctrine were satisfied. His Honour, at paragraph 47, then set out the following explication of Smith J’s formulation from the reasons of Harris J in R v Dawson [1978] VR 536 at 542:

“His Honour used the word ‘required’ in the sense of ‘ordered’ or ‘enjoined’; that is, he was speaking of a situation in which someone had demanded of the accused that he should do the act charged against him, for one meaning of the word ‘require’ is ‘demand’. I would paraphrase the opening words of Smith, J.'s proposition by saying: ‘Where it has been demanded of the accused by some other person or persons that he do the act charged against him’.”

Having set out the above, the trial judge referred to the facts of various cases including R v Lorenz (1998) 146 FLR 369 and R v Dawson [1978] VR 536. His Honour noted that, in those cases, the absence of a demand to commit the particular offence was fatal to the defence of duress. That proposition is uncontroversial. The absence of any such demand was also easily demonstrated in those cases. In R v Lorenz, the accused determined to commit an armed robbery to obtain money in response to threats from her abusive partner. In R v Dawson, the applicant made the decision to escape prison to avoid the realisation of threats made by other prisoners. In both cases, the accused determined the particular crime to be committed in response to the threat. This necessarily excluded the making of any demand by the threatener that she or he commit the particular offence charged. These cases are readily distinguishable from the present case in that here there was no issue that Mr Osborne decided upon the offences to be committed. The issue is whether he, intending to coerce the appellant by means of the continuing threat, required that she participate in those offences.
Clarkson v R (2007) 209 FLR 387; [2007] NSWCCA 70 was also referred to as case in which duress was not raised as there was no evidence “the appellant was required to commit the offences under threat if he failed to do so”. His Honour also referred to R v Runjanjic (1991) 56 SASR 114; (1991) 53 A Crim R 362 as a case in which duress was raised, but noted that the case was decided “against the background of an assumption of a specific request”. Nothing in the discussion of these cases dealt with the question of whether a demand to commit the particular offence might be inferred, and if so, whether it could be inferred in this case.
The one case dealt with by his Honour which was directly concerned with the issue of an implied demand was this Court’s decision in Nguyen v R. In Nguyen v R the appeal was upheld on the basis that the trial judge was wrong to hold that duress was not available. There, the appellants had been engaged to tend to a crop on a rural property. On their case, on realising the crop they were tending was cannabis, they sought to leave, whereupon they were threatened and told they were to remain at the property. There was no direct demand to continue tending the crop. Hodgson JA (with whom the other members of the Court agreed) found that a demand to continue the acts constituting the offence charge could be implied: at [36]-[37]. That is, given the absence of any other purpose, implicit in the demand that the appellant’s remain at the property was a demand they continue with the acts of cultivation.
While, as noted above, Nguyen v R was the one decision discussed by his Honour that dealt with an implied demand, his Honour’s treatment of this decision is telling. His Honour said, at paragraph 67 of the verdict judgment:

“67 In [Nguyen v R] [2008] NSWCCA 22, the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal held that duress was not available in the case of a man who was subject to threats while working on a property cultivating cannabis. Hodgson J said at [36],
‘I accept, on the basis [R v Dawson [1978] VR 536] and other decisions, that the defence of duress in this case would require that the threats in question were made to coerce the accused to cultivate cannabis. I understand that this would require that what was said and done by the threateners actually manifested an intention to coerce the appellant, not merely not to leave, but also to go on working; and that the [appellant] so understood them.’”

Two features of his Honour’s treatment of Nguyen v R, are noteworthy. First, the passage set out by his Honour does little more than restate the need for evidence of a demand that the accused commit the acts constituting the particular offence charged. The real significance of Nguyen v R in the present context is in its acknowledgment that such a demand might be implied, a matter not averted to by his Honour. The second significant feature of his Honour’s discussion of this case is his Honour’s statement that this Court held duress was not available. This was wrong. Those two matters together strongly suggest a failure to appreciate the significance of the decision in Nguyen v R to the present case.
A further feature of his Honour’s reasons is of note. As discussed, what is required is a demand to commit the particular offence charged. The evidence, while likely to overlap in a case such as the present, will be different as to each charge, or, at the least, the analysis will be. There was, for example, a stronger case for drawing an inference of a demand that the particular offence be committed under the continuing threat with respect to the first offence in time, that being the offence of being carried in a stolen vehicle. In relation to that offence, the appellant’s evidence was that, on locating the vehicle, Mr Osborne said, “Let’s take this” and then “Let’s go”, in response to which she got in the car. The concession that there was no demand that the appellant commit the offence appears to have been wrong. The words, “Let’s take this” and “Let’s go”, to my mind, imply a demand that the appellant get in the vehicle. For present purposes, they were, at least, capable of doing so. Given the nature and proximity of the earlier threat, the use of the gun coupled with the words, “You’re coming with me”, made in the context of the controlling relationship, an inference was available that the implied demand that the appellant get in the vehicle was made under the earlier threat.
Despite the need to analyse the circumstances of each charge to determine whether a relevant demand was made, his Honour considered the issue globally. Thus, his Honour never considered, in relation to the first charge, the import of the words, “Let’s take this” and “Let’s go”, which, as I have observed, are capable of supporting an inference of a demand made under the earlier threat. This was, in fairness, the result of the manner in which the case was argued. Towards the end of his reasons, after the discussion of the various authorities, his Honour, at paragraphs 70-72, said:

“70   [the representative for the appellant] concedes that there is no evidence of a specific threat by Aiden Osborne to Ms Carr to take part in any of the offences charged, but he submits for the reasons that I have outlined, in summary, that particularly in the light of what was said by the Court in Rowan, it is not necessary to have such a direct request or demand to commit a particular offence.
71   This is a difficult area of the law about which there is no clear factual analogous or comparable case. However, in my view, the line of authorities to which I have referred clearly establishes that there is a need for a particular request or demand in relation to the specific offence charged before the doctrine of duress can be enlivened. If that were not so, in my view, it would be open to an accused person to a raise duress in relation to any offence committed while under a continuing threat, such as is accepted here, extending over a considerable period of time.
72   One must bear in mind the policy reasons for closely confining the doctrine of duress such as those set out by Crispin J in R v Lorenz (1998) 146 FLR 369.”

The appellant’s representative’s approach appears to have led to a confusion which underpins this matter. First, as noted by Fagan J (at [87]), the use of the expression “specific threat” came from the written submissions of the appellant’s representative and is more properly understood as a reference to the absence of a specific demand. Further, the absence of evidence of “specific” demand appears to have been a reference to an absence of “direct” evidence of this. As has been made clear, the threat and the demand are separate requirements. That is not to deny that an inference as to a demand to commit a particular offence might be drawn from the same or substantially the same body of evidence as that with respect to the threats. The submissions, unfortunately, set up a false issue on which the appellant necessarily failed.
A complete reading of his Honour’s reasons leads me to the conclusion that his Honour did determine the matter on the basis that direct evidence was required of a demand that the appellant commit the particular offence charged. In doing so, his Honour did not consider whether an inference could be drawn of a demand, made under the pre-existing threat, to commit any of the particular offences charged. It follows that his Honour erred.

The proviso

For the reasons given above, in my view, his Honour erred in determining that direct evidence of a demand to commit the particular offence is required in order to satisfy the evidentiary burden to raise the defence of duress. The question then arises as to whether the proviso can be applied.
On the appellant’s case, Mr Osborne, by the use of a gun, coupled with threats to the appellant and to her family, demanded that she leave Dubbo, using the words “You’re coming with me”. Whether this instruction, together with the history of the relationship, and importantly, the events surrounding the individual offences, support an inference of a demand in the sense of an instruction to commit the particular offence under the ongoing threat, requires, with respect to each offence charged, close scrutiny of the evidence. As discussed, the inference to be drawn may be different with respect to particular offences. As also discussed above, it might be stronger in relation to the first offence which involved the transfer from the vehicle used to leave Dubbo to the use of the stolen vehicle the subject of that count.
It is relevant to note that Ms Muir, Ms Breckenridge, and the appellant all gave evidence at first instance. This Court has not had the benefit of seeing and hearing that evidence. However, even without the misgivings I might have in applying the proviso as a result of these matters, significant to the application of the proviso is that duress was the only issue raised at trial. Application of the proviso would amount to substitution of trial by this Court for trial at first instance. I cannot be satisfied that there has been no substantial miscarriage of justice where there has been a failure to determine the only issue at trial.
I would uphold the appeal, quash the convictions, and order a new trial.

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Amendments

01 December 2023 - Typo on title page amended

Decision last updated: 01 December 2023

Medium Neutral Citation:	Carr v R [2023] NSWCCA 269
Hearing dates:	16 October 2023
Date of orders:	1 December 2023
Decision date:	01 December 2023
Before:	Davies J at [1] Fagan J at [80] Dhanji J at [102]
Decision:	1. Dismiss the appeal.
Catchwords:	CRIME – appeals – appeal against conviction – judge-alone trial – multiple carjacking, firearm and assault with intent to rob in company offences – where offending occurred over 18-hour time period and covered more than 1000km – where appellant in coercive control relationship with co-offender – duress – where trial judge determined that duress had not been established – whether trial judge erred by failing to consider that duress sufficiently raised to be considered by tribunal of fact – held trial judge’s ruling clearly a final determination as the tribunal of fact – whether there must be evidence of a particular request or demand to commit the offences charged – no direct or implied evidence of a demand or request to commit any of the offences – trial judge correctly concluded that the Crown had negatived the issue of duress – appeal dismissed
Legislation Cited:	Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) ss 97, 154A, 154B Criminal Appeal Act (1912) NSW s 5 Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) s 191 Firearms Act 1996 (NSW) s 62
Cases Cited:	Clarkson v R (2007) 209 FCR 387; [2007] NSWCCA 70; (2007)171 A Crim R 1 Filippou v The Queen (2015) 256 CLR 47; [2015] HCA 29 Nguyen v R [2008] NSWCCA 22; (2008) 181 A Crim R 72 R v Abusafiah (1991) 24 NSWLR 531 R v Dawson [1978] VR 536 R v Hurley and Murray [1967] VR 526 R v Lorenz (1998) 146 FLR 369 R v Runjanjic (1991) 56 SASR 114 Rowan (A Pseudonym) v The King [2022] VSCA 236 Taiapa v The Queen (2009) 240 CLR 95; [2009] HCA 53 The King v Rowan [2023] HCATrans 90
Texts Cited:	Nil
Category:	Principal judgment
Parties:	Krystal Carr (Applicant) The King (Respondent)
Representation:	Counsel: S McGee (Applicant) E Nicholson (Respondent) Solicitors: Legal Aid NSW (Applicant) Solicitor for Public Prosecutions (NSW) (Respondent)
File Number(s):	2021/92619 & 2021/221872
Publication restriction:	Nil
Decision under appeal	Court or tribunal: District Court of NSW Jurisdiction: Criminal Citation: Nil Date of Decision: 01 December 2022 Before: M Williams SC DCJ File Number(s): 2021/92619 & 2021/221872