FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Carr v Commins Hendriks Pty Limited
[2016] FCA 1282
File number: NSD 238 of 2016 Judge: RARES J Date of judgment: 12 August 2016 Legislation: Australian Consumer Law ss 23, 24, 25, 236
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 33N, 33P
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 82
Cases cited: Blomley v Ryan (1956) 99 CLR 362
Commercial Bank of Australia Limited v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447
Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corp (1984) 156 CLR 41
John Alexander’s Tennis Clubs Pty Ltd v White City Tennis Club Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 1
Pilmer v Duke Group Ltd (In Liq) (2001) 207 CLR 165
Tanwar Enterprises Pty Limited v Cauchi (2003) 217 CLR 315
Wingecarribee Shire Council v Lehman Bros Australia Ltd (In Liq) (2012) 301 ALR 1
Date of hearing: 12 August 2016 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: Commercial Contracts, Banking, Finance and Insurance Category: No Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 30 Solicitor for the Applicant: Mr J O’Brien of O’Brien Laywers Counsel for the Respondent: Mr JM Ireland QC Solicitor for the Respondent: Yeldham Price O’Brien Lusk ORDERS
NSD 238 of 2016 BETWEEN: RODNEY CARR
Applicant
AND: COMMINS HENDRIKS PTY LIMITED
Respondent
JUDGE:
RARES J
DATE OF ORDER:
12 AUGUST 2016
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Pursuant to s 33N of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), these proceedings no longer continue as representative proceedings under Part IVA.
2.The proceedings be stood over to Monday, 26 September 2016.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)RARES J:
Rodney Carr commenced these proceedings as representative proceedings against his former solicitors, Commins Hendriks Pty Limited, on 18 February 2016 by filing an originating application under Pt IVA of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (Federal Court Act). Mr Carr claimed damages, aggravated damages and exemplary damages or, alternatively, equitable compensation or statutory compensation pursuant to s 82 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and s 236 of the Australian Consumer Law in Sch 2 to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) that renamed the Trade Practices Act. The issue is whether an order should be made pursuant to s 33N of the Federal Court Act that the proceedings not continue as representative proceedings.
The legislative scheme
Relevantly, ss 33N(1) and 33P in Pt IVA of the Federal Court Act provide:
33NOrder that proceeding not continue as representative proceeding where costs excessive etc.
(1)The Court may, on application by the respondent or of its own motion, order that a proceeding no longer continue under this Part where it is satisfied that it is in the interests of justice to do so because:
(a)the costs that would be incurred if the proceeding were to continue as a representative proceeding are…
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- Case
- [2016] FCA 1282
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the Court involved the assessment of whether the proceedings should continue as representative proceedings, considering the potential costs and complexities involved. The Court also had to evaluate the likelihood of identifying a relevant class of affected parties and the appropriateness of the requested remedies within the representative proceeding framework. Additionally, the Court needed to decide whether the relief sought by Mr Carr could be adequately addressed in a separate inter partes proceeding.
In its reasoning, the Court found that continuing the proceedings as representative proceedings would likely incur significant costs and complexities that would exceed the reasonable costs associated with individual proceedings. The Court also noted that the nature of the solicitor-client relationship is best assessed on an individual basis, taking into account specific circumstances and contractual terms. Furthermore, the Court concluded that all the relief sought by Mr Carr could be pursued in a separate inter partes proceeding. Based on these considerations, the Court determined that the proceedings should no longer continue as representative proceedings.
Accordingly, the Court ordered that the proceedings no longer continue as representative proceedings under Part IVA of the Federal Court Act. The Court also ordered the proceedings to be stood over to a specific date, as noted in the order.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Pursuant to s 33N of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), these proceedings no longer continue as representative proceedings under Part IVA.
2. The proceedings be stood over to Monday, 26 September 2016.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Mr Carr argued that one remedy to which he would be entitled would be an order setting aside the costs agreement(s) on the basis of it containing an unfair term or terms, and a finding that he should have been charged only for what the fair and reasonable costs for the work done were. (I note that s 23 of the Australian Consumer Law makes an unfair term void but otherwise continues the contract in force as binding the parties.)Consideration In my opinion, these proceedings are ones that, in the interests of justice, should no longer continue as representative proceedings. First, the costs that would be incurred, if the proceedings were to continue as a representative proceeding, are likely to exceed significantly the costs that would be incurred if each group member conducted a separate proceeding. Moreover, Mr Carr is entitled to have his own costs assessed on a solicitor-client basis, and to have that done at no cost, as are each of those clients of Commins Hendriks who might fall within the asserted group and who have rights to a costs assessment of the kind I have described for work or bills rendered in New South Wales. Secondly, if it be the fact, as on the evidence it appears to be, that the difference between the costs actually paid by Mr Carr and those which might be assessed are in the order of $15,000, the costs of running a representative proceeding involving the highly complex issues that I have described would by far exceed anything that was reasonable. Thirdly, I am not satisfied that there is a sufficient degree of likelihood that a class of the kind vaguely described in the originating application and statements of claim ultimately would be identified so as to give rise to relevant common questions. In my opinion, the nature of the relationship between a solicitor and a client is, in a case like the present, better assessed by reference to the particular situation pertaining between those two individual parties. In this case, Mr Carr’s particular circumstances at the time that each of the two costs agreements was entered into, and the circumstances of the solicitors in acting for him on, among others, a no-win no-fee basis, are all factors to be taken into account in arriving at an overall evaluation of what the particular relationship was at the time each contract was made and what the duties, obligations and rights of each of the parties were when that occurred. Those factors include whether there was any unfairness in the terms of the costs agreements, what, if any disadvantage Mr Carr (or any particular client) may have been under at the time he entered into each costs agreement and any misuse of a fiduciary or other position. Fourthly, all the relief sought by Mr Carr here can be sought in an ordinary inter partes proceeding, of the kind envisaged in s 33P(a) of the Federal Court Act, between him and his former solicitors to the extent that a costs assessment as between solicitor and client is not able to resolve any of the outstanding issues.