Carnarvon Electric Light and Power Co Ltd v Boor

Case [1915] HCA 70


21 CLR 106

CARNARVON ELECTRIC LIGHT AND

POWER CO. LTD.

DEFENDANTS, BOOR

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF

WESTERN AUSTRALIA. Practice wream High Court-Appeal from Supreme Court of a State - Special leave

Supply of Electricity.. - Implied Contract--Breach-Electric Lighting Act 1892 PERTH,

(W.A.) (55 Vict. No. 33), secs. 2, 29.

Sec. 29 of the Electric Lighting Act 1892 (W.A.) provides that " Where a supply of electricity is provided in any locality for private purposes, all persons within such locality shall on application be entitled to a supply on

21 CLR 107

the same terms as the terms on which any other person in such locality is under similar circumstances entitled to a corresponding supply."

In an action brought against an electric light and power company for damages for breach of contract and statutory obligation to supply the plaintiff with electric current in respect of certain premises, the presiding Magistrate, who awarded the plaintiff damages, held that there was an implied contract between the parties for the supply of current by the defen- dants to the plaintiff, and that there had been a breach of such contract by the defendants. The Supreme Court of Western Australia, on appeal, upheld the decision of the Magistrate. On application to the High Court for special leave to appeal from the decision of the Supreme Court,

Held, that such application should not be granted. Special leave to appeal from the decision of the Supreme Court of Western

APPLICATION for special leave to appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.

An action was brought in the Carnarvon Local Court by John Arthur Boor against the Carnarvon Electric Light and Power Co. Ltd. for damages which the plaintiff alleged were caused by the defendants' neglect or refusal to supply him with electric current in respect of premises occupied by him at Carnarvon, and known as " Boor's Theatre," in breach of their contract with him for the supply of the same, and in neglect of their statutory obligation to supply the same under or by virtue of sec. 29 of the Electric Lighting Act 1892, whereby he was prevented from working his biograph machine at such theatre for some time prior and up to the issue of the summons herein, and also for damages for tres- pass by reason of defendants' servants or agents unlawfully breaking and entering the said premises for the purpose of cutting electric wires thereon.

From the evidence it appeared (inter alia) that the Company's manager had, at the plaintiff's expense, installed certain electric appliances and fittings in the plaintiff's theatre, and that after electricity had been supplied for some time thereto, for which the plaintiff had paid, the Com- pany's servants had cut the wires above referred to and had dis- connected the electric current at the theatre. The presiding Magistrate held that there was an implied contract for the supply of the electric current by the defendants to the plaintiff and that there had been a breach of such contract, and also that there was

21 CLR 108

an obligation upon the defendants under sec. 29 of the above-

mentioned Act to supply the plaintiff with the current; and he awarded the plaintiff £82 damages and costs.

An appeal by the Company from this decision was dismissed by the Supreme Court on the ground that the Magistrate was right in concluding that there was an implied contract between the parties, and there was nothing in the evidence to show that the circumstances were such as to justify the defendants in putting an end to it.

The Company now applied for special leave to appeal from the decision of the Supreme Court.

Pilkington K.C. (with him Hale), for the applicants. The importance of this case depends upon the fact that the question of the relationship of supplier and consumer under such an Act as the Electric Lighting Act 1892 is involved. The matter affects or may affect a considerable number of persons, as sec. 29 has reference to all persons within the locality where a supply of electricity is provided. Looking at the evidence before the Magistrate as a whole, he was not justified in finding that an implied contract existed between the parties. [Counsel referred to Hoddesdon Gas and Coke Co. v. Haselwood 1; Addison on Contracts, 11th ed., p. 38; Halsbury's Laws of Englund, vol. XV., p. 307, note (a); Michael and Will on the Law relating to Gas and Water, p. 27.]

GRIFFITH C.J. We do not see any reason to grant leave to appeal in this case, and, as for myself, I see no reason at all to doubt the correctness of the decision.

Special leave to appeal refused. Solicitors for the applicants, Northmore &Hale.

16 C.B. (N.S.), 239
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AGLC
Carnarvon Electric Light and Power Co Ltd v Boor [1915] HCA 70
Case
[1915] HCA 70
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

John Arthur Boor (the plaintiff) brought an action in the Carnarvon Local Court against the Carnarvon Electric Light and Power Co. Ltd. (the defendant) seeking damages for breach of contract and statutory obligation. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had refused to supply him with electric current for his theatre, preventing him from operating his biograph machine, and also claimed damages for trespass. The presiding Magistrate found in favour of the plaintiff, awarding damages, and this decision was upheld on appeal by the Supreme Court of Western Australia. The defendant then sought special leave to appeal to the High Court.

The legal issues before the High Court were whether the Supreme Court of Western Australia had erred in upholding the Magistrate's finding that an implied contract existed between the parties for the supply of electricity, and whether the defendant had breached this contract or its statutory obligations under section 29 of the Electric Lighting Act 1892 (W.A.). Section 29 stipulated that where electricity was supplied in a locality for private purposes, all persons within that locality were entitled to a supply on the same terms as others in similar circumstances.

The High Court, comprising Griffith C.J., considered the application for special leave to appeal. The Court noted that the Supreme Court had affirmed the Magistrate's conclusion that an implied contract for the supply of electricity existed and that the defendant had not provided sufficient justification for terminating this supply. Griffith C.J. expressed that he saw no reason to doubt the correctness of the Supreme Court's decision.

Consequently, the High Court refused the application for special leave to appeal.

Orders

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Background

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Evidence

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