Carmen Utting v Ben Clarke and Insurance Australia Limited T/A NRMA Insurance
[2016] ACTSC 168
•14 July 2016
SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
Case Title: | Carmen Utting v Ben Clarke & Insurance Australia Limited T/A NRMA Insurance |
Citation: | [2016] ACTSC 168 |
Hearing Dates: | 11 July 2016, 12 July 2016 |
DecisionDate: | 14 July 2016 |
Before: | Elkaim J |
Decision: | See [89] – [90] |
Catchwords: | DAMAGES – personal injury – motor vehicle collision – assessment of damages – impairment of earning capacity – no issue of principle |
Legislation Cited: | Civil Law (Wrongs) Act2002 (ACT), s 99 |
Cases Cited: | Container Terminals Australia Ltd v Huseyin [2008] NSWCA 320 Mason v Demasi [2009] NSWCA 227 |
Parties: | Carmen Utting (Plaintiff) Ben Clarke (First Defendant) Insurance Australia Limited T/A NRMA Insurance (Second Defendant) |
Representation: | Counsel Mr Ian Roberts SC, Mr A Muller (Plaintiff) Ms Christine Allan (Defendants) |
| Solicitors United Legal (Plaintiff) HWL Ebsworth (Defendant) | |
File Number: | SC 468 of 2014 |
ELKAIM J:
Judgment
The plaintiff was born in Canberra in 1981. On 19 May 2013 she was involved in a motor vehicle accident. The first defendant’s vehicle drove into the rear of her motor car.
The plaintiff was injured in the accident and has sued the defendants for damages arising from her injuries. The defendants have admitted liability but have challenged the nature and extent of the injuries suffered by the plaintiff.
The plaintiff has claimed damages under the following heads: general damages, past and future economic loss, past and future medical expenses, and past and future domestic assistance. Most of the controversy in the case revolves around the calculation of economic loss.
The assessment of damages is subject to the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act2002 (ACT).
The plaintiff’s background
The plaintiff completed Year 10 at Ginninderra High School. She then attended Hawker College until the end of Year 12. This was in 1999.
The plaintiff’s first job was as a telemarketer for a pest control company. She did not enjoy this employment and soon obtained fresh work as a room attendant at the Hyatt Hotel. This was initially on a part-time basis.
In 2002 the plaintiff moved to Quest Apartments, again as a room attendant but a little later as a receptionist.
The plaintiff was a regular attendant at the Fernwood Gymnasium (“Fernwood”), which she attended “to be fit and healthy”. In about 2004, she started to do some cleaning work at the gym in exchange for membership. This work was done concurrently with her job at Quest Apartments.
The plaintiff later became a full-time receptionist at Fernwood, usually working from 1pm to 9pm. In 2005 the plaintiff contracted Meningococcal Septicaemia. She was off work for two weeks and fully recovered.
On 8 August 2006 the plaintiff, while on her way home from work, slipped in a car park and fell on her buttocks. She felt pain particularly over her left buttock. She did not make any workers compensation claim nor did she initially see a doctor. The plaintiff was able to carry on working as before the fall.
The plaintiff continued to suffer from pain over her left buttock from time to time, but in particular when she gained weight.
The plaintiff fell pregnant in March 2007. During the course of her pregnancy she felt some lower back pain but this was different to the buttock pain that had arisen after the fall.
In January 2008 the plaintiff gave birth to a daughter. The child’s father initially took no interest in her although it appears that, under duress, he has been paying some maintenance and seeing her during the last year.
The plaintiff returned to work after the birth of her daughter, initially on a part-time basis, but by May 2008 she was working full-time.
In August 2009 the plaintiff was diagnosed with glandular fever which left her with a sense of malaise. She consulted a doctor and was given medication which she felt was helpful. She was soon able to concentrate and feel better motivated.
In January 2010 the plaintiff dropped a statue on her leg. This resulted in a large bruise but little else. At about the same time, however, the plaintiff began to feel that she was being harassed at work. As I understand it, this mostly revolved around demands for her to work a split-shift, which would have caused considerable problems with childcare. Unless the plaintiff was able to place her child in childcare, she needed to rely on the assistance of her parents. Because they worked during the week, their assistance was limited to weekends.
The plaintiff consulted a Dr Wessell about the harassment and was advised to give up the employment. She had felt anxious and experienced some panic attacks. She consulted a lawyer.
The plaintiff did not think she had made a workers compensation claim. She thought she had claimed only outstanding holiday entitlements. It is clear however, from Exhibit 1, that a workers compensation claim was made. Exhibit 2 is a Deed of Release which shows the matter was resolved for an amount very similar to what the plaintiff believed was the extent of her leave entitlements. No issue of credit arises from her lack of appreciation that the claim had been made in the style of a workers compensation application.
The plaintiff stopped working at Fernwood in early 2010.
At the end of April 2010 the plaintiff started working at the Ginninderra Medical Centre as a receptionist. She initially worked for two or three days a week depending on the amount of the childcare she was able to secure. I gathered the medical centre, which employed 15 doctors, was a particularly busy enterprise.
In October 2010 the plaintiff consulted one of the doctors at the medical centre about pains over her left buttock and was referred for X-rays and a CT scan. Going through into 2011, the plaintiff continued to consult Dr Wessell about anxiety and stress. She was prescribed antidepressant medication. She did however continue to work through to 2011.
By early 2012 the plaintiff’s mood was improved and she felt happy. In addition, her daughter commenced at preschool which restricted the plaintiff’s capacity to work. This was because there was no facility for before and after care so that the plaintiff could not work on days when her daughter was at the preschool.
In 2013 the plaintiff’s daughter started kindergarten and the plaintiff was able to organise family day care before and after school. This enabled the plaintiff to work full-time if such work was available.
On 30 March 2013 the plaintiff saw a doctor about neck pain but the evidence of the severity or origins of this pain is not clear. It does not seem to have inhibited the plaintiff’s capacity to work.
In March or April 2013 the plaintiff saw an advertisement for the position of ‘2 IC’ at the medical centre. She spoke to the relevant person indicating that she was interested in the position. She was later informed that she had successfully obtained the post and was due to start the new job on 20 May 2013. This is the day after the accident which is the subject of these proceedings.
It is important to note that immediately before the accident the plaintiff was not working full-time. She was closely cross-examined on this point and, in particular, taken to histories given to various doctors which suggested that she had told them that she was working full-time immediately before the accident. The plaintiff denied these histories.
It is also evident from the histories that they are not themselves consistent. For example, in the history given to Dr Champion it is initially stated that the plaintiff was working full-time in a managerial capacity but yet, in the very next sentence, it is stated that she was being trained to be a manager. In another example, Dr Patrick has recorded a history of her working nearly full-time hours and then later, in the same report, refers to her working the full 40 hours per week.
It was put to the plaintiff that she had amended her evidence because she had found out that the records produced to the court contradicted her earlier assertions. She rejected the suggestion. I accept the plaintiff’s evidence. She produced payslips to her solicitor of her own accord and it is clear that the records were produced earlier than originally suggested by the defendant. In addition, her evidence is broadly consistent with the Statement of Particulars filed in the proceedings on 2 October 2015.
Another point that would have given rise to some confusion is that the plaintiff was due to increase to full-time work on the day following the accident. The term “at the time of the accident” is therefore open to some confusion.
The difficulty with the attack on the plaintiff is that her oral evidence recognises that she was working part-time before the accident, which is more to her disadvantage than advantage. More importantly, the attack does not take into account the warnings given by Basten JA in Container Terminals Australia Ltd v Huseyin [2008] NSWCA 320 and Mason v Demasi [2009] NSWCA 227, in particular in paragraph 2.
In my view the plaintiff’s credit was not affected by the inconsistencies between her evidence and recorded histories in the medical reports.
The accident
The plaintiff was travelling along Commonwealth Avenue in Canberra. She came to a stop because of a red light. Her daughter was also in the vehicle. The defendant’s vehicle, travelling behind her, failed to stop and collided with the rear of the plaintiff’s vehicle. The plaintiff felt her body go forwards and backwards.
The plaintiff’s immediate concern was for her daughter. Fortunately her daughter was not hurt. The plaintiff, however, felt pain through the entire length of her back as well as her shoulders and shoulder blades.
The plaintiff’s vehicle was driveable. She drove to the medical centre where she worked and saw a doctor.
After the accident
The plaintiff presented for work the following day, this being the day she was due to commence her new position as 2 IC. She was able to work reduced hours that week but suffered from pains in her back as well as from headaches. The plaintiff was adamant that the low back pain that she suffered was entirely different to the left buttock pain that was associated with the 2006 injury. She did however accept that the buttock pain had continued, intermittently, through to 2013.
The plaintiff relied on pain relief to continue working full-time. However the pain was unbearable by the end of the week and was also severe when she carried out cleaning chores at home or tried to pick up her daughter.
The plaintiff persevered with full-time work, subject to time off when she was feeling too unwell, until October 2013 when she reduced her hours. She made this change on medical advice. At this time she was having physiotherapy and remedial massages. The latter treatment was particularly helpful.
Once the plaintiff stopped working full-time she was demoted from her position back to being a receptionist. Although there was no change in the pay rate, she took the demotion as a significant setback. She had seen herself as having worked up from a cleaner to a position of some importance. The plaintiff’s reduced hours were down to 20 to 30 hours per week.
After some time, in order to relieve the plaintiff from working in the busy reception area, the plaintiff was assigned to the physiotherapy section which was under the charge of a physiotherapist named Melisa.
The plaintiff consulted a Dr Speldewinde, a rehabilitation specialist, in 2013 and 2014. His reports are in Exhibit 3. The plaintiff followed his recommendations and by January 2014 she was reporting some improvement in her “intensive back pain.”
Somewhat inconsistently with the defendant’s case, Dr Speldewinde said the plaintiff’s further recovery was “likely to continue steadily over the next several years...”
Some of the treatment he recommended was not approved of by the relevant insurer. During 2014 the plaintiff’s daughter was in first-class which enabled the plaintiff to try to do more work. She preferred to work on the weekend because she received more pay for fewer hours.
Towards the end of 2014 the plaintiff started to consult Mr Eastwood, a psychologist. At this time she felt under stress and also felt hopeless. She gained assistance from Mr Eastwood and she said that she was now “on top” of these issues.
In 2015 Melisa, the physiotherapist, set up her own practice known as the SportsTec Clinic. She invited the plaintiff to join her as a receptionist. The plaintiff started on a part-time basis but still worked some weekends at the medical practice. At the present time she works up to five hours on Tuesdays, 10 hours on Wednesdays and nine hours on Thursdays. The Tuesday work is more recent and is designed to cater for the practice being busier due to injuries sustained by football players during the winter months. The medical practice hours she works are 6 hours on each of Saturday and Sunday, but only on every second weekend.
The plaintiff said that she would like to work on a full-time basis but did not think she was capable of doing so. Although her neck and shoulder injuries had improved she still had some pains in these areas. Her mid-back was painful all of the time and her low-back pain was persistent. She said her headaches were much improved but were aggravated when her neck was painful. It was put to the plaintiff that on every second weekend she was effectively working a 38 hour week. She agreed with the calculation but said she was only able to do so because of the longs breaks between her two jobs.
The plaintiff said she continued to have the left buttock pain but it was not an issue of any significance. She was currently taking an antidepressant medication called Luvox, a painkiller called Celebrex and also Nexium to confront stomach issues that had arisen from the taking of other medication. She also consumed Metamucil to “keep her regular” and Panadol Osteo, sometimes up to 6 a day, for pain relief.
The plaintiff said she found heavier domestic chores difficult and she would pay for assistance if she was financially able to do so. The plaintiff said that her father mowed the lawn but he had done so before the accident as well. Her father was now 65 years of age.
Medical reports
The plaintiff’s medical reports are in Exhibit A. The defendant’s reports are in Exhibit 3. If there is a common theme to the reports, it is that the plaintiff’s physical injuries are of a soft tissue nature. The doctors reporting for the respective sides have reached very different conclusions on the effects of these injuries and the prognosis for the future.
Dr Champion is a physician. He has seen the plaintiff on one occasion although he has prepared supplementary reports in response to reports that have come from the defendant. Writing in 2014, he described the plaintiff’s then current position as follows:
Putting together the history, medical documentation and imaging investigations, I conclude that as a consequence of the accident, Miss Utting has the following diagnoses and problems:
· There are headaches which are quite severe 2 or 3 times a week and are the consequence of her cervical spinal injury involving deep somatic referred pain and disordered somatosensory processing in the central nervous system.
· She has a chronic multilevel cervical spinal pain disorder of the whiplash associated disorder category with prominent deep somatic referred pain to the upper back and shoulder regions and in her arms where there were prominent gain of function type indications of disordered somatosensory processing (unpleasant allodynia phenomena elicited not only form her upper limbs but neck and face). I did not find any definite evidence of radiculopathy, but given the severity of the disordered somatosensory possessing, she might well have a contribution form hyperexcitability of lower cervical nerve roots/cervical plexus. Imaging investigations have not revealed significant pathology.
· There is also a relatively minor thoracic spinal pain disorder.
· There is a chronic lumbosacral spinal pain syndrome which might include aggravation of some pre-existent left sacroiliac joint pain. There was quite extensive deep somatic referred pain but no indications of radiculopathy. The pain was arising mainly from L4/5 and L5/S1. There was no imaging evidence of pathology provoked by the motor vehicle accident. That is a common circumstance even in relatively severe chronic spinal pain disorders. (The chronicity is determined by disordered somatosensory processing and with genetic factors that are difficult to determine in an individual and also psychological inputs).
· There are important psychological consequences including some weight gain which is unfavourable to her back pain, and considerable difficulty with the care of her home and daughter as well as sustaining her work.
Dr Champion thought the plaintiff should consult an occupational therapist to assist her at work and also to assess her needs for domestic assistance. He also thought the plaintiff’s depression needed to be assessed. He generally recommended a comprehensive multidisciplinary management system to address her assorted needs.
Dr Stubbs, an orthopaedic surgeon, saw the plaintiff in December 2014. He thought the plaintiff needed further investigation but he did accept that her “restrictions and treatment needs to back, neck and shoulders are at least partly attributable to the motor vehicle accident....”
Dr Stubbs thought the plaintiff was capable of working 40 hours per week although, perhaps inconsistently, he also stated that “returning to normal hours or work is likely once the correct diagnosis and treatment programme is mapped out.”
Dr Stubbs’s report was sent to Dr Champion who found it “thoughtful and interesting”.
Dr Champion took a somewhat different view to the report of Dr Dias, an occupational physician. Not surprisingly Dr Champion thought that Dr Dias was simply wrong. Dr Dias’s opinion, as expressed in his initial report, is very difficult to accept. Having taken a history of all her complaints and conducted an examination of the plaintiff, the doctor, without rejecting the plaintiff as an unreliable historian, says that her current symptomology is not related to the accident. He says that she would have sustained acute soft tissue injuries but yet, he then states that they would have resolved within 12 months of the accident. As Dr Champion points out there is simply no basis for this conclusion.
Somewhat exceeding his role as a medical examiner, Dr Dias also stated “her present condition is non-compensable in nature and not related to the motor vehicle accident of 19 May 2013”.
Dr Dias was asked to see the plaintiff on a second occasion in May 2016. The plaintiff again informed him of her current difficulties and once again, without finding her to be an unreliable historian, he somehow maintained his opinion that the plaintiff’s motor vehicle related injuries should have resolved within 12 months of the accident. He says that her current injury is not attributable to the accident but he does not provide any rational opinion as to what they are attributable to.
Dr Stubbs also saw the plaintiff for a second time, in May 2016. I note that while Dr Stubbs refers to the opinion of Dr Dias, he does not express any specific agreement with it. In Dr Stubbs’ opinion the diagnosis is still not certain and he thinks there should be further investigation. He does however think that “there is strong evidence that Ms Utting is suffering from an inflammatory condition in her sacroiliac joints, and the accident is merely coincidental”.
The difficulty with Dr Stubbs’ strong suspicion is that it does not take into account what may be described as a ‘before and after’ scenario. Although the plaintiff did have some complaints of spinal pain before her accident, they do not compare in severity or chronicity to her complaints after the accident. Dr Stubbs does however accept that the plaintiff requires ongoing treatment and that she has, at least until a definitive diagnosis has been reached, an incapacity for work.
In my view Dr Stubbs, while believing that there is a coincidental cause for the plaintiff’s symptoms, does not necessarily exclude the accident as the cause of the plaintiff’s problems. Dr Stubbs recommended that the plaintiff consult a rheumatologist. The defendant did not however arrange for an opinion by a rheumatologist.
The plaintiff has been seen by Dr Patrick, a general and vascular surgeon. He saw the plaintiff, as arranged by her solicitors, on 27 July 2015. His report is important because of the view taken by Dr Stubbs about his belief in the probable nature of the plaintiff’s injuries.
Dr Patrick did not have Dr Stubbs’ reservations. He stated:
I do believe that Carmen Utting’s complaint of continuing symptoms as she describes now are genuine, consistent with and significantly consequent upon injury sustained at the time of this motor accident of 19 May 2013.
Dr Patrick emphasised that the plaintiff was “genuine”. This view accords with my impression of the plaintiff.
A doctor that was cross-examined is Dr Le Leu, an occupational physician. His report is somewhat pessimistic as to the plaintiff’s future although I think is arguably consistent with the reports of Drs Champion and Patrick. I also note however, that he endorses the recommendation of Dr Stubbs for further investigation. He was questioned about an earlier report he had written in which he said the plaintiff “should not suffer a loss of earning capacity”. (Exhibit B, answer to Question 7 in report of 2 December 2015).
He was also cross-examined about his answer to Question 6. He said “foreseeable future” referred to 5 to 10 years, but more likely to the former. His explanation of this answer in re-examination was somewhat confused. My impression is that the doctor was benignly attempting to ameliorate the effect of his earlier answer.
The defendant arranged for an examination by a psychiatrist, Dr Samuell, who saw the plaintiff on 23 April 2015. I do not see a great deal of relevance in Dr Samuell’s opinion. He states that the plaintiff did not present as having a mental illness. She does not however allege such an illness. Neither side referred to this report in their final submissions.
I have already stated my rejection of the views of Dr Dias. I should add here that learned counsel for the defendants did not press acceptance of his report.
I think Dr Stubbs’ reservations have been dealt with. In addition, as a general statement, I prefer the opinions of Drs Champion and Patrick. Their views also accord with my acceptance of the plaintiff as a witness of truth. I felt she did not exaggerate her symptoms and at times made concessions against her interest. Like Dr Patrick, I think she presented in a genuine fashion. On this basis, the conclusion must follow that her spinal problems are a product of the motor accident. They did not exist before the accident and they have remained consistent since it occurred. For this reason, and the reasons I have expressed above, I am of the view that although the plaintiff’s spinal injuries are of a soft tissue nature, they are real, they were caused by the accident and will continue to affect the plaintiff for some years into the future.
I have already referred to Dr Speldewinde above and his prognosis of several more years of recovery. His reports clearly infer a connection between the motor vehicle accident and the plaintiff’s condition. He seems to have seen the plaintiff on three occasions. His observation that she was benefitting from remedial massage is consistent with the plaintiff’s evidence. I also accept her evidence that this doctor advised her to reduce her work hours. Her evidence is consistent with the clinical notes in Exhibit 3 at page 75 (entry for 17 October 2013).
An area of particular contention was the expected time during which the plaintiff is likely to continue to suffer from her injuries. The plaintiff essentially said her problems should be regarded as life-long. The defendants suggested about 5 years. The importance of the issue is reflected in the effect it has on damages. For example, there is a large difference between future economic loss for 5 years and for 31 years (to age 65).
While I generally accept the plaintiff’s medical opinion, I do not think it supports the plaintiff’s claim. Dr Champion foresaw improvement with the assistance of rehabilitation. He suggested domestic assistance for at least 12 months. Dr Patrick’s views are similar. I have already referred to Dr Le Leu’s statement regarding problems for the “foreseeable future”. Notably, Dr Speldewinde referred to “several years” of recovery.
I think the plaintiff should be provided with funds for rehabilitation but this should be on the basis that it is likely to be successful and she will recover over a period of about 10 years.
Damages
The plaintiff suggested general damages should be assessed at $100,000.00. The defendant said $50,000.00. Although the parties referred me to various authorities (in accordance with s 99 of the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), they were not sufficiently comparable to be of assistance. Rather, I think the parties’ submissions reflect the appropriate range of damages.
The plaintiff has now had more than 3 years of significant pain and suffering. She has had to amend her work regime and been deprived of activities such as picking up her daughter. Although she has continued to work and do domestic chores, this has been because she has had no choice. She has endured a good deal of pain in order to maintain her independence and support her daughter.
I do think there has been some improvement, as noted by Dr Speldewinde, but it has been relatively minor. Based on my finding of a gradual improvement and resolution over a period of about 10 years I assess general damages at $75,000.00. Interest on half this sum at 2% for 3 years is $2,250.00.
The plaintiff’s claim for past economic loss is $29,692.00. This is based on a comparison of her actual earnings with her rostered times as set out in Exhibit F. The defendants suggested $9,100.00 as a buffer reflecting a loss of $100.00 per week between October 2013 and June 2015. It was during this period that there was, according to the defendants, a discernible reduction in hours.
I suggested a simpler and more logical approach which was ultimately adopted by the plaintiff. The role of the court is to place the plaintiff in the position she would have been but for the accident. The parties agreed the following figures: The net weekly wage of a receptionist as at the date of the accident was $720.00. The current figure for the same position is $760.00. The average of these two amounts is $740.00.
There have been 164 weeks since the accident. Over this period the plaintiff has received net wages of $93,207.00. Had the plaintiff worked as a full time receptionist, which I accept she would have done but for the accident, then on the average of $740.00 per week her earnings would have been $121,360.00. Accordingly her loss is $121,360.00 less $93,207.00. This is $28,153.00.
Interest on past economic loss at 4% for 3 years is $3,378.36. Lost superannuation benefits at 11% are $3,096.83.
Turning now to the future, the plaintiff claimed $150.00 per week for the balance of her working life ($140,250.00 on the 3% tables). The defendant suggested a buffer of $25,000.00.
The plaintiff is currently working about 22 hours a week at the clinic and 12 hours every second weekend at the medical centre. Approached on an average basis the plaintiff is working about 28 hours a week. This is a loss, compared to a 38 hour week, of 10 hours per week. On the current wage of a receptionist this equates to a loss of $200.00 per week.
The plaintiff, on my findings must be regarded as being likely to be able to steadily increase her working hours over the next 10 years. On this basis I think the plaintiff’s figure of $150.00 per week is appropriate. Over 10 years, on the 3% tables, less 15% for vicissitudes, the calculation is: $150.00 x 451.8 x 0.85 = $57,604.50.
Lost superannuation benefits, again at 11%, are $6,336.49.
The plaintiff’s claim for past medical expenses was somewhat short of supporting documentation. The plaintiff pointed out that she was taking medication costing $13.95 per week and had received treatment such as remedial massages over a period of time. She had also consulted Dr Speldewinde on 3 occasions and there were a number of visits to a general practitioner. The plaintiff suggested an allowance of $6,000.00. The defendants said $1,000.00. It is difficult to calculate expenses where there is no base material. However accepting that there has been a steady accumulation of costs I will allow a global figure of $3,000.00.
For the future, the plaintiff asked for expenses for the rest of her expected life. I have already rejected this approach. The defendants suggested $5,000.00. As I have already stated I think the plaintiff should be provided with rehabilitation expenses. Generally adopting Dr Patrick’s suggested regime (Exhibit A, page 62), and also factoring in Dr Speldewinde’s suggested gym membership (Exhibit 3, page 91) I think a weekly allowance (including medication) of $40.00 should be made. On the 3% tables for 10 years the calculation is: $40.00 x 451.8 = $18,072.00.
The plaintiff claimed $1,000.00 for past gratuitous domestic assistance. This was derived from very little evidence and certainly not enough to establish the claim. It seemed to be based on assorted acts of gardening. I think the defendants’ submission that there should be no allowance is correct.
For the future, the plaintiff sought 2 hours per week at the agreed rate of $35.00 per hour for the rest of her life. The defendants recognised a need for assistance but said 1 hour per week for 5 years was sufficient.
The plaintiff said she had never had a cleaner and could not estimate the precise time the “heavy” cleaning would take. She conceded that 1 hour might be enough. It was pointed out that no evidence had been called from her parents to assist her case for domestic assistance. The plaintiff’s mother is a cleaner.
While I think there is some scope for an inference to be drawn that her parents’ evidence would not have assisted the plaintiff, I do not think any inference would be very consequential. I intend to follow my general approach of allowing a future loss for 10 years but to restrict the time to 1.5 hours per week, consistent with the views of Dr Patrick. On the 3% tables the calculation is: $35.00 x 1.5 x 451.8 = $23,719.50.
A summary of the damages I have assessed is as follows:
General Damages $75,000.00 Interest on General Damages $2,250.00 Past economic loss $28,153.00 Interest on past economic loss $3,378.36 Lost superannuation benefits $3,096.83 Future economic loss $57,604.50 Lost superannuation benefits $6,336.49 Past medical expenses $3,000.00 Future medical expenses $18,072.00 Past domestic assistance $0.00 Future domestic assistance $23,719.50 Total $220,610.68
Orders
I make the following orders:
(a)Judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of $220,610.68.
(b)The defendants are to pay the plaintiff’s costs of the proceedings.
(c)The exhibits may be returned.
I will hear the parties if any special costs orders are sought.
| I certify that the preceding ninety [90] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of his Honour Justice Elkaim Associate: Date: 14 July 2016 |
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