FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1)
Carlyon & Graham [2022] FedCFamC1F 228
File number(s):
SYC 6554 of 2019
Judgment of:
CAMPTON J
Date of judgment:
8 April 2022
Catchwords:
FAMILY LAW – CHILDREN – Unacceptable risk of sexual and emotional harm – Where the mother alleges the father has sexually interfered with the child – Where the father specifically denies ever behaving in a sexually inappropriate way with the child – Where the mother does not present sufficient evidentiary foundation for her beliefs – Where it is found that the father does not pose an unacceptable risk of harm to the child – Where it is found that the mother poses an unacceptable risk of emotional and psychological harm to the child.
Legislation:
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 140(2)
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 60CA, 60CC, 61DA, 65D, s 60B
Cases cited:
B & B (1993) FLC 92-357
Blann & Kenny [2021] FamCAFC 161
Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336; [1938] HCA 34
Deiter & Deiter [2011] FamCAFC 82
G & C [2006] FamCA 994
Johnson & Page (2007) FLC 93-344; [2007] FamCA 1235
Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298; [1959] HCA 9
Langmeil & Grange (2010) FLC 93-427; [2010] FamCAFC 12
M v M (1988) 166 CLR 69; [1988] HCA 68
Mazorski & Albright (2007) Fam LR 518; [2008] FamCA 520
McCall & Clark (2009) FLC 93-405; [2009] FamCAFC 92
Napier & Hepburn (2006) FLC 93-303 [2006] FamCA 1316
Stott & Holgar and Anor [2017] FamCAFC 152
Number of paragraphs:
379
Date of hearing:
15 March 2022
Place:
Sydney
Counsel for the Applicant:
Mr MacPherson
Solicitor for the Applicant:
Bridges Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent:
Mr Schroder
Solicitor for the Respondent:
Metta Legal
Counsel for the Independent Children’s Lawyer:
Ms Carr
Solicitor for the Independent Children’s Lawyer:
Legal Aid NSW
ORDERS
SYC 6554 of 2019 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
BETWEEN: MR CARLYON
ApplicantAND: MS GRAHAM
RespondentAND: INDEPENDENT CHILDREN'S LAWYER
ORDER MADE BY:
CAMPTON J
DATE OF ORDER:
8 APRIL 2022
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.All previous parenting orders in relation to the child, X, born 2013 are discharged.
Parental Responsibility
2.The father shall have sole parental responsibility for X, subject to the following:
(a)In the event the father intends to make a decision in accordance with this Order, the father shall advise the mother as soon as practicable of the decision and invite and consider the mother’s views and input in relation to the decision;
(b)The father shall advise the mother of the outcome of his decision within seven (7) days of making the decision.
Living Arrangements
3.X shall live with the father from the date of these orders.
Moratorium of Time with the Mother
4.From the date of these orders for a period of three consecutive months, X shall have no time or contact with the mother and during this period the mother is restrained from:
(a)Contacting X, including by way of…
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to determine whether the father had sexually abused X, and if so, whether this constituted an unacceptable risk to X. Additionally, the court had to assess the mother’s allegations of family violence and decide on the appropriate parenting orders for X, considering his best interests.
In reaching its decision, the court considered the evidence presented, including expert reports and affidavits from both parties. The court found that it was not satisfied to the requisite standard that the father had sexually abused X, based on various factors such as the mother’s unsubstantiated allegations and her tendency to draw conclusions from unrelated pieces of evidence. The court also concluded that the father did not pose an unacceptable risk to X arising from sexual abuse. Regarding the mother’s allegations of family violence, the court found that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of family violence by the father.
According to s 65D of the Act, the court was required to make parenting orders that were considered proper. Under s 60CA, the court must regard the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration. The primary considerations under s 60CC(2) include the benefit to X of having a meaningful relationship with both parents and the need to protect X from harm. The court found that it needed to give greater weight to the need to protect X from harm than to the benefit of a meaningful relationship with both parents.
The court ultimately decided that it was in X’s best interest to live with the father, with supervised visits to the mother for a period of six months before transitioning to unsupervised visits. The father was granted sole parental responsibility for X.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Section 65D of the Act compels the Court to make such parenting orders that are considered proper. According to s 60CA of the Act, in deciding whether to make a particular parenting order in relation to a child, a Court must regard the best interests of a child as the paramount consideration. Best interests considerations Section 60CC sets out the primary considerations and additional considerations to be considered by a Court in determining what is in a child's best interests. The primary considerations (under s 60CC(2)) are:-(a)The benefit to X of having a meaningful relationship with both of X’s parents; and(b)The need to protect X from physical or psychological harm, from being subjected to or exposed to abuse, neglect or family violence. I am required to give greater weight to the need to protect X from harm than to the benefit to X of having a meaningful relationship with both parents. The meaning of the phrase “meaningful relationship” is not defined in the Act. The Full Court in McCall & Clark (2009) FLC 93-405 (“McCall & Clark”) has approved the interpretation of the phrase by Brown J in Mazorski & Albright (2007) Fam LR 518 (“Mazorski & Albright”) and has also agreed with the reasoning of Bennett J in G & C [2006] FamCA 994 (“G & C”). Brown J in Mazorski & Albright said at [26], after setting out the definition of “meaningful” and “meaning”:What these definitions convey is that “meaningful”, when used in the context of “meaningful relationship”, is synonymous with “significant” which, in turn, is generally used as a synonym for “important” or “of consequence”. The word “meaningful” is qualitative rather than quantitative and the phrase has not been interpreted as requiring the Court to craft orders to support an optimal relationship.[1] Further, in accordance with the Objects of Part VII of the Act the best interests of children are met by ensuring they have the benefit of both of their parents having meaningful involvement in their lives to the maximum extent consistent with the best interests of the child.[1] Godfrey & Sanders [2007] FamCA 102 at 36 The Full Court said in McCall & Clark at [117]:Bennett J discussed the terminology in G & C [2006] FamCA 994 and said the enquiry was a “prospective” one which requires a Court to evaluate the extent to which a meaningful or significant relationship with both parents is going to be of advantage a child (sic). The Full Court in McCall & Clark continued at [122]:No doubt in the majority of cases there will be a positive benefit to a child of having a significant relationship with both parents, but there will also be some cases where there will be no positive benefit to be derived by a child by a Court attempting to craft orders to foster a relationship with one parent if this would not be in the child’s best interests. Bennett J discussed the terminology in G & C and said “the enquiry was a ‘prospective’ one which requires a Court to evaluate the extent to which a meaningful or significant relationship with both parents is going to be of advantage a child (sic).”