Carey-Hazell v Getz Bros & Co (Aust) Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Carey-Hazell v Getz Bros & Co (Aust) Pty Ltd
(ACN 005 932 654) [2001] FCA 703

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – summary dismissal – proceedings frivolous or vexatious – abuse of process – cause of action allegedly outside limitation period – effect of limitation provisions as bar to remedy – Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ss 74J and 75AO – causes of action not extinguished – proceedings neither abuse of process nor frivolous or vexatious solely on basis that out of time – motion to dismiss action dismissed
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS  - bar to remedy or extinguishment of cause of action – question of construction – action commenced out of time – whether frivolous or vexatious or abuse of process – without more action not susceptible to be dismissed on those bases
TRADE PRACTICES – consumer protection – product liability – prosthetic heart valve – not reasonably fit for purpose – defect causing injury – commencement of action – whether barred by time limitation provisions – Trade Practices Act 1974(Cth) s 74J and s 75AO – nature of limitation provisions – whether proceeding frivolous or vexatious or abuse of process – motion to dismiss action dismissed.

Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ss 74B, 74J, 75AD, 75AC, 75AO

Australian Iron & Steel Ltd v Hoogland (1962) 108 CLR 471, cited
McKain v RW Miller & Company (South Australia) Pty Limited (1991) 174 CLR 1, cited
White v Eurocycle Pty Ltd (1995) 64 SASR 461, followed
Fibreglass Pool Works (Manufacturing) Pty Ltd v ICI Australia Pty Ltd (1997) 146 ALR 120, cited
Commonwealth v Mewett (1995) 59 FCR 391, cited
Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394, cited
Ronex Properties Ltd v John Laing Construction Ltd [1983] QB 398, cited
F v Wirral Metropolitan Council (1990) 2 WLR 1132, cited
Wardley Australia Ltd v The State of Western Australia (1992) 175 CLR 514, cited

McGee, Limitation Periods, 3rd Edition, Sweet & Maxwell (1998) p 29

KAREN CAREY-HAZELL v GETZ BROS & CO (AUST) PTY LTD
(ACN 005 932 654), PETER THOMPSON and TREVOR NICHOLLS
W75 of 2001

FRENCH J
PERTH
12 JUNE 2001


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

W75 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

KAREN CAREY-HAZELL
APPLICANT

AND:

GETZ BROS & CO (AUST) PTY LTD (ACN 005 932 654)
FIRST RESPONDENT

PETER THOMPSON
SECOND RESPONDENT

TREVOR NICHOLLS
THIRD RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

FRENCH J

DATE OF ORDER:

12 JUNE 2001

WHERE MADE:

PERTH

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The First Respondent’s Motion filed 11 April 2001, and amended on 8 June 2001, is dismissed.

2The First Respondent is to pay the Applicant’s costs of the amended motion.

3.The documents produced under the subpoena dated 15 May 2001 are to be returned to Paynes Solicitors.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

W75 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

KAREN CAREY-HAZELL
APPLICANT

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Details
Case
[2001] FCA 703
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Carey-Hazell v Getz Bros & Co (Aust) Pty Ltd, the plaintiff, Ms Carey-Hazell, sought compensation from the defendant, Getz Bros, due to injuries she allegedly suffered from a defective heart valve implanted by the defendant. Ms Carey-Hazell claimed damages for physical injuries, medical expenses, and other related losses. Getz Bros argued that the plaintiff's claim was filed beyond the statutory limitation period, rendering it invalid.

The central legal issue in this case was whether the statutory limitation periods set out in sections 74J and 75AO of the relevant Act extinguished the plaintiff's cause of action upon their expiration or merely barred the remedy. The court had to determine the effect of the expiry of these limitation periods on the plaintiff's right to seek compensation. Additionally, the court needed to assess whether Ms Carey-Hazell was aware of her cause of action within the stipulated time limits.

The court concluded that neither section 74J nor section 75AO of the Act extinguished the plaintiff's cause of action upon the expiry of the limitation periods. Instead, the limitation periods only barred the remedy. This interpretation was based on the statutory construction, where neither section explicitly stated that the expiry of the time limit extinguished the cause of action. The court also noted that the long-stop provisions in the Act did not have an extinguishing effect. As a result, the plaintiff's claim was not time-barred, and the motion by Getz Bros to dismiss the claim on limitation grounds was dismissed.

In summary, the court ruled that the statutory limitation periods under sections 74J and 75AO of the Act did not extinguish the plaintiff's cause of action, thereby allowing Ms Carey-Hazell's claim to proceed. Getz Bros was ordered to pay the plaintiff's costs related to the motion, and the documents produced under the subpoena were to be returned to the plaintiff's solicitors.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The First Respondent’s Motion filed 11 April 2001, and amended on 8 June 2001, is dismissed.

2 The First Respondent is to pay the Applicant’s costs of the amended motion.

3. The documents produced under the subpoena dated 15 May 2001 are to be returned to Paynes Solicitors.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In the alternative she alleges that by reason of the various facts pleaded relating to the valve it was not reasonably fit for its purpose as it caused her injuries and symptoms and had it not been removed might have caused her death or, at least, further serious injury. By reason of the defects in the valve Ms Carey-Hazell says she has suffered injuries; splinter haemorrhages, the kidney and spleen infarctions, the stroke, the dissected and partially occluded vertebral arteries, loss of life expectancy resulting from the surgery necessary to remove the valve, scarring associated with the surgery and permanent visual injury. The statement of claim sets out various heads of damage said to have been suffered by her and then claims, as against Getz Bros, compensation pursuant to s 74B of the Act and, alternatively, pursuant to s 75AD together with interest.Evidence Relating to the Times at which the Limitation Periods Commenced In support of its contention that the application was commenced out of time, Getz Bros relies upon: (a)the allegations in the statement of claim;(b)Ms Carey-Hazell’s account of her medical history; (c)four letters which Ms Carey-Hazell received before 13 March 1998; and (d)two letters which Ms Carey-Hazell wrote before 13 March 1998.The submissions for Getz Bros referred first to a copy of a booklet which was provided to Ms Carey-Hazell in hospital following the implantation of the mitral valve. This booklet is referred to in par 23 of the statement of claim. Getz Bros pointed to a passage from the booklet warning of the need for recipients of the St Jude mitral heart valves to take preventive measures against formation of blood clots on or around the implanted heart valve. The relevant passage of the booklet was in the following terms: “ANTICOAGULANTSYour doctor may prescribe an anticoagulant medication to prevent blood clots from forming on or around your St Jude Medical heart valve. The dosage will be closely monitored by blood tests. To maintain proper levels of anticoagulation, take your medication as prescribed and follow up with blood tests as scheduled. Take only those medications your physician prescribes. Check with your doctor before taking any other medication, including over-the-counter products such as aspirin.Always inform your dentist and physicians that you are on an anticoagulant medication. Adjustments in your medication may be needed prior to any procedure.” The booklet also contained advice about the interaction between diet and anticoagulants and the need to obtain medical advice about dietary habits. The reader of the booklet is also warned to consult a physician in relation to anticoagulants and if any of the following symptoms develop: · Excessive bruising· Excessive bleeding· Blood in your urine· Bloody or black, tarry bowel movements· Unusual nosebleeds· Bleeding gums As appears from Ms Carey-Hazell’s affidavit she suffered severe pain on her left side on or about 13 October 1996 and was readmitted to Sir Charles Gairdner Hospital where she remained until 27 October 1996. She was treated by Dr Jeffrey Hamdorf, a general surgeon at the hospital. A Computer Tomography scan showed that she had suffered infarctions in her left kidney and spleen. Dr Kermode, a neurologist, told her that the infarctions had been caused by blood clots forming on the valve, flying off the valve and travelling through her blood stream to her left kidney and spleen where they caused a blockage in a blood vessel within that organ and, in turn, caused the surrounding tissue to die from lack of blood supply. She understood that the process which caused the infarction was called thromboembolism.

Decision

Reasons for decision

FRENCH J

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: FRENCH J

In the circumstances, according to Getz Bros, it was submitted that the action should fail because it was brought outside the three year limitation period set by ss 74J and 75AO of the Act. On that basis, it was said, the appropriate course would be to dismiss her claim as against Getz Bros. The Operation of the Limitation Period The question whether a statutory limitation provision operates to extinguish the cause of action once the time limit has expired or whether it only bars the remedy, is a matter of statutory construction. Statutory time limit provisions “take different forms and have different purposes” – Australian Iron & Steel Ltd v Hoogland (1962) 108 CLR 471 at 488 (Windeyer J). See the general review of the topic by Mason CJ in McKain v RW Miller & Company (South Australia) Pty Limited (1991) 174 CLR 1. The three year limitation period imposed by s 74J expressly assumes the existence of a cause of action under Division 2A of Part V of the Act. It defines the time limited by reference to the day “on which the cause of action accrued”. Section 75AO(1) does not use that explicit terminology but like s 74J has a facultative operation providing that “..a person may commence a liability action at any time within 3 years…”. In each case the liability for compensation is defined in distinct provisions without reference to the time limitation – the relevant liability-creating provisions in this case being s 74B and 75AD. Neither of the limitation provisions, s 74J or s 75AO, in terms makes compliance with the time limit an element of the cause of action to which it applies. The expiry of the time limit is not said to extinguish the cause of action. And the matters of awareness or constructive awareness addressed by these provisions are not logically congruent with the matters constituting the elements of the cause of action. In each case the expiry of the time limit leaves the cause of action intact. As a matter of construction therefore neither s 74J nor s 75AO operates to extinguish the causes of action to which it applies. The like conclusion in respect of s 74J was reached by the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia in White v Eurocycle Pty Ltd (1995) 64 SASR 461 at 467-470 (Duggan J, King CJ and Nyland J concurring). The question was left open by Moynihan J in Fibreglass Pool Works (Manufacturing) Pty Ltd v ICI Australia Pty Ltd (1997) 146 ALR 120. For the reasons I have already expressed, in my opinion the conclusion in White was correct and applies also to s 75AO. It is also doubtful whether the “long-stop” limitations in s74J(3) and s 75AO(2) have an extinguishing effect. The question does not arise in this case save to illustrate, by way of contrast with s 11A(3) of the Consumer Protection Act 1980 (UK), the general point that it is a matter of statutory construction. The UK section provides that the expiry of a like ten year long-stop period shall operate to extinguish the plaintiff’s right of action where that right has not accrued at that time. The expiry of the three year period defined under that Act in a scheme similar to that in s 74J and s 75AO does not use the formula used for the long-stop provision. It would seem therefore, like the provisions of the Trade Practices Act, merely to bar the remedy – McGee, Limitation Periods, 3rd Edition, Sweet & Maxwell (1998) p 29.