FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Carey-Hazell v Getz Bros & Co (Aust) Pty Ltd
(ACN 005 932 654) [2001] FCA 703PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – summary dismissal – proceedings frivolous or vexatious – abuse of process – cause of action allegedly outside limitation period – effect of limitation provisions as bar to remedy – Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ss 74J and 75AO – causes of action not extinguished – proceedings neither abuse of process nor frivolous or vexatious solely on basis that out of time – motion to dismiss action dismissed
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS - bar to remedy or extinguishment of cause of action – question of construction – action commenced out of time – whether frivolous or vexatious or abuse of process – without more action not susceptible to be dismissed on those bases
TRADE PRACTICES – consumer protection – product liability – prosthetic heart valve – not reasonably fit for purpose – defect causing injury – commencement of action – whether barred by time limitation provisions – Trade Practices Act 1974(Cth) s 74J and s 75AO – nature of limitation provisions – whether proceeding frivolous or vexatious or abuse of process – motion to dismiss action dismissed.Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ss 74B, 74J, 75AD, 75AC, 75AO
Australian Iron & Steel Ltd v Hoogland (1962) 108 CLR 471, cited
McKain v RW Miller & Company (South Australia) Pty Limited (1991) 174 CLR 1, cited
White v Eurocycle Pty Ltd (1995) 64 SASR 461, followed
Fibreglass Pool Works (Manufacturing) Pty Ltd v ICI Australia Pty Ltd (1997) 146 ALR 120, cited
Commonwealth v Mewett (1995) 59 FCR 391, cited
Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394, cited
Ronex Properties Ltd v John Laing Construction Ltd [1983] QB 398, cited
F v Wirral Metropolitan Council (1990) 2 WLR 1132, cited
Wardley Australia Ltd v The State of Western Australia (1992) 175 CLR 514, citedMcGee, Limitation Periods, 3rd Edition, Sweet & Maxwell (1998) p 29
KAREN CAREY-HAZELL v GETZ BROS & CO (AUST) PTY LTD
(ACN 005 932 654), PETER THOMPSON and TREVOR NICHOLLS
W75 of 2001FRENCH J
PERTH
12 JUNE 2001
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
W75 OF 2001
BETWEEN:
KAREN CAREY-HAZELL
APPLICANTAND:
GETZ BROS & CO (AUST) PTY LTD (ACN 005 932 654)
FIRST RESPONDENTPETER THOMPSON
SECOND RESPONDENTTREVOR NICHOLLS
THIRD RESPONDENTJUDGE:
FRENCH J
DATE OF ORDER:
12 JUNE 2001
WHERE MADE:
PERTH
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The First Respondent’s Motion filed 11 April 2001, and amended on 8 June 2001, is dismissed.
2The First Respondent is to pay the Applicant’s costs of the amended motion.
3.The documents produced under the subpoena dated 15 May 2001 are to be returned to Paynes Solicitors.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
W75 OF 2001
BETWEEN:
KAREN CAREY-HAZELL
APPLICANT
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- Case
- [2001] FCA 703
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue in this case was whether the statutory limitation periods set out in sections 74J and 75AO of the relevant Act extinguished the plaintiff's cause of action upon their expiration or merely barred the remedy. The court had to determine the effect of the expiry of these limitation periods on the plaintiff's right to seek compensation. Additionally, the court needed to assess whether Ms Carey-Hazell was aware of her cause of action within the stipulated time limits.
The court concluded that neither section 74J nor section 75AO of the Act extinguished the plaintiff's cause of action upon the expiry of the limitation periods. Instead, the limitation periods only barred the remedy. This interpretation was based on the statutory construction, where neither section explicitly stated that the expiry of the time limit extinguished the cause of action. The court also noted that the long-stop provisions in the Act did not have an extinguishing effect. As a result, the plaintiff's claim was not time-barred, and the motion by Getz Bros to dismiss the claim on limitation grounds was dismissed.
In summary, the court ruled that the statutory limitation periods under sections 74J and 75AO of the Act did not extinguish the plaintiff's cause of action, thereby allowing Ms Carey-Hazell's claim to proceed. Getz Bros was ordered to pay the plaintiff's costs related to the motion, and the documents produced under the subpoena were to be returned to the plaintiff's solicitors.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The First Respondent’s Motion filed 11 April 2001, and amended on 8 June 2001, is dismissed.
2 The First Respondent is to pay the Applicant’s costs of the amended motion.
3. The documents produced under the subpoena dated 15 May 2001 are to be returned to Paynes Solicitors.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: FRENCH J
In the circumstances, according to Getz Bros, it was submitted that the action should fail because it was brought outside the three year limitation period set by ss 74J and 75AO of the Act. On that basis, it was said, the appropriate course would be to dismiss her claim as against Getz Bros. The Operation of the Limitation Period The question whether a statutory limitation provision operates to extinguish the cause of action once the time limit has expired or whether it only bars the remedy, is a matter of statutory construction. Statutory time limit provisions “take different forms and have different purposes” – Australian Iron & Steel Ltd v Hoogland (1962) 108 CLR 471 at 488 (Windeyer J). See the general review of the topic by Mason CJ in McKain v RW Miller & Company (South Australia) Pty Limited (1991) 174 CLR 1. The three year limitation period imposed by s 74J expressly assumes the existence of a cause of action under Division 2A of Part V of the Act. It defines the time limited by reference to the day “on which the cause of action accrued”. Section 75AO(1) does not use that explicit terminology but like s 74J has a facultative operation providing that “..a person may commence a liability action at any time within 3 years…”. In each case the liability for compensation is defined in distinct provisions without reference to the time limitation – the relevant liability-creating provisions in this case being s 74B and 75AD. Neither of the limitation provisions, s 74J or s 75AO, in terms makes compliance with the time limit an element of the cause of action to which it applies. The expiry of the time limit is not said to extinguish the cause of action. And the matters of awareness or constructive awareness addressed by these provisions are not logically congruent with the matters constituting the elements of the cause of action. In each case the expiry of the time limit leaves the cause of action intact. As a matter of construction therefore neither s 74J nor s 75AO operates to extinguish the causes of action to which it applies. The like conclusion in respect of s 74J was reached by the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia in White v Eurocycle Pty Ltd (1995) 64 SASR 461 at 467-470 (Duggan J, King CJ and Nyland J concurring). The question was left open by Moynihan J in Fibreglass Pool Works (Manufacturing) Pty Ltd v ICI Australia Pty Ltd (1997) 146 ALR 120. For the reasons I have already expressed, in my opinion the conclusion in White was correct and applies also to s 75AO. It is also doubtful whether the “long-stop” limitations in s74J(3) and s 75AO(2) have an extinguishing effect. The question does not arise in this case save to illustrate, by way of contrast with s 11A(3) of the Consumer Protection Act 1980 (UK), the general point that it is a matter of statutory construction. The UK section provides that the expiry of a like ten year long-stop period shall operate to extinguish the plaintiff’s right of action where that right has not accrued at that time. The expiry of the three year period defined under that Act in a scheme similar to that in s 74J and s 75AO does not use the formula used for the long-stop provision. It would seem therefore, like the provisions of the Trade Practices Act, merely to bar the remedy – McGee, Limitation Periods, 3rd Edition, Sweet & Maxwell (1998) p 29.