Carey Brookes v Heath Langlands
[2012] ACTSC 194
•13 December 2012
CAREY BROOKES v HEATH LANGLANDS
[2012] ACTSC 194 (13 December 2012)
EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT
ON APPEAL FROM THE MAGISTRATES COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
No. SCA 69 of 2012
Judge: Higgins CJ
Supreme Court of the ACT
Date: 13 December 2012
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE )
) No. SCA 69 of 2012
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY )
ON APPEAL FROM THE MAGISTRATES COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
BETWEEN:CAREY BROOKES
Appellant
AND:HEATH LANGLANDS
Respondent
ORDER
Judge: Higgins CJ
Date: 13 December 2012
Place: Canberra
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
The appeal be upheld to the extent that the verdict is reversed and the appellant is therefore not guilty.
It does seem to me that the version given by the appellant to both police and the Court was a possible version of events. The only evidence which contradicted it was the evidence of the complainant which similarly might well have been accepted also.
The problem then is when you have got two pieces of evidence which give opposed versions. In this case the versions are opposed to some extent because there is a great correlation between the two versions of events, save for the blow struck on the appellant, which clearly there was, whether it was inside or outside the residence.
The bloodstains were consistent with either version of events to an extent and are perhaps more consistent with being struck inside than out. However, it is not enough simply to have a version that is more consistent. The question is whether it is sufficient to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt.
What does create a reasonable doubt in my mind is the objective circumstance that the door, after the event and after police arrived, was clearly unlocked. Now, clearly, if it had been locked during the incident it would not have been unlocked as a result of it. So either somebody, in between the time when police took their photographs and the event occurred, had unlocked it, which is possible, but there was no evidence that would support that proposition.
The difficulty then is that you cannot dismiss the hypothesis raised by the appellant, that having been struck with the bat outside and deprived of his security licence, he focused his mind on regaining his property which he was, as a matter of law, entitled to do, and as a result came forward and either as a result of stumbling or otherwise, unintentionally broke the door.
I have to say that is certainly a possible version of events, without it being necessary to say it is probable or that it is more likely than the version given by the complainant. I think the learned magistrate, uninformed as he was about the type of glass it was, made an unacceptable leap of logic in saying that the damage must have been effectively either deliberate or reckless because the glass door would have required considerable force to break. It would have required some force obviously, but how much we do not know.
For those reasons, and given that the appellant was in any event slightly intoxicated, so one would expect that he would be a little bit clumsy, and clumsiness is not to be equated with recklessness, it seems to me that his appeal should be upheld to the extent that the verdict of guilty should be reversed and a verdict of not guilty substituted. The conviction and penalty are therefore set aside. I reserve the question of costs in respect of the appeal and hearing at first instance.
I certify that the preceding seven (7) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of his Honour, Chief Justice Higgins.
Associate:
Date: 4 January 2013
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr J Lawton
Solicitor for the Appellant: Ben Aulich & Associates
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr M Fernandez
Solicitor for the Respondent: ACT Director of Public Prosecutions
Date of hearing: 13 December 2012
Date of judgment: 13 December 2012
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