Cardenas v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Cardenas v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 17

MIGRATION – ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Business (Long Stay) visa – applicant and Australian sponsor entered into employment contract in Chile – sponsor nominated applicant – applicant was granted visa – applicant migrated to Australia with his family and commenced employment with sponsor – sponsor unsuccessfully attempted to impose wage and other conditions inconsistent with relevant award – sponsor then terminated applicant’s employment – applicant obtained similar position with another employer (“the second employer”) – second employer extremely satisfied with applicant’s standard of work – second employer applied for and was granted business sponsorship on basis that it might nominate applicant for the activity he was undertaking – respondent cancelled applicant’s visa – Immigration Review Tribunal set aside that decision – second employer did not nominate applicant, but continued his employment until terminating it on instructions from respondent – respondent forthwith again cancelled applicant’s visa – applicant applied to Migration Review Tribunal (the successor to the Immigration Review Tribunal) for review of that decision – Migration Review Tribunal affirmed the decision because “grounds did exist for” such cancellation – whether Tribunal exercised its discretionary power without regard to the merits of the particular case – Tribunal based its decision on a finding that applicant had “been without a sponsor for almost 20 months” – whether that was a fact which did not exist – whether termination of employment brought first employer’s obligations as a sponsor to an end – whether any evidence or other material to justify the making of the decision – Tribunal’s decision set aside.

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 116(1)(a), 476(1)(g), 476(4)
Migration Regulations 1.20, 1.20B, 1.20C, 1.20D, 1.20G, 1.20H, Schedule 2 Cl 457.22

Brehoi v Attorney-General of the Commonwealth of Australia [2000] FCA 1747 referred to
Tour Gul v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1537 applied

CARDENAS v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND
MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

W 78 of 2000

CARR J
18 JANUARY 2001
PERTH


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

W 78 OF 2000

BETWEEN:

BENEDICTO ALEXIS CARDENAS CARDENAS
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Respondent

JUDGE:

CARR J

DATE OF ORDER:

18 JANUARY 2001

WHERE MADE:

PERTH

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The decision of the Migration Review Tribunal, dated 27 April 2000, be set aside and the matter be remitted to the Tribunal (differently constituted) for decision according to law.

2.The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the application.

Note:   Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

W 78 OF 2000

BETWEEN:

BENEDICTO ALEXIS CARDENAS CARDENAS
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND
MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Respondent

JUDGE:

CARR J

DATE:

18 JANUARY 2001

PLACE:

PERTH

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

  1. This is an application for an order of review of a decision, made on 27 April 2000 by the Migration Review Tribunal, to affirm the…

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Details
Case
[2001] FCA 17
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Cardenas v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs involved an application for a judicial review of a decision made by the Migration Review Tribunal on 27 April 2000. The Tribunal had affirmed a decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs on 19 October 1999 to cancel the applicant's Business (Long Stay) visa. The applicant, a Chilean national, had his visa cancelled due to the cessation of his employment with the sponsoring company, Cervantes Electrical Engineering Pty Ltd. The applicant sought to challenge the decision on the grounds that it was an improper exercise of power and lacked sufficient evidence to justify the cancellation.

The central legal issues in this case revolved around the interpretation and application of the Migration Act 1958 and the Migration Regulations 1994. Specifically, the applicant argued that the Tribunal's decision was flawed because it did not consider the merits of his particular case and was influenced by prejudicial representations from the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs. Furthermore, the applicant contended that the decision was not supported by evidence as it was based on an incorrect assumption about the existence of certain facts.

In delivering the judgment, the court found that the Tribunal had erred in its decision-making process. It was determined that the Tribunal did not adequately consider the merits of the applicant's case, particularly in light of the Department's policy that the revocation of business sponsorship does not automatically lead to the cancellation of the visa. The court also found that there was insufficient evidence to support the Tribunal's conclusion that the applicant had been without a sponsor for a significant period, as the applicant had made efforts to find new employment and sponsorship. Consequently, the decision of the Tribunal was set aside, and the matter was remitted to the Tribunal for reconsideration in accordance with the law.

In light of the findings, the court made an order that the decision of the Migration Review Tribunal dated 27 April 2000 be set aside. The matter was to be remitted to the Tribunal, constituted differently, for redetermination according to law. Additionally, the respondent was ordered to pay the applicant's costs of the application.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The decision of the Migration Review Tribunal, dated 27 April 2000, be set aside and the matter be remitted to the Tribunal (differently constituted) for decision according to law.

2. The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the application.

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an application for an order of review of a decision, made on 27 April 2000 by the Migration Review Tribunal, to affirm the decision of a delegate of the respondent, on 19 October 1999, to cancel the applicant’s Business (Long Stay), Class UC, Subclass 560 visa (“the Business Visa”).FACTUAL BACKGROUND The applicant, who is now aged 44, is a citizen of Chile. In August 1997 the applicant was employed as a senior electrical motor rewinder for a company known as Codelco Chile (“Codelco”) in Chile. The applicant had by then worked for Codelco for 21 years. That long-term employment history, plus his interest in working with high-powered electrical motors, would, so one might think, have entitled him to more sympathetic treatment as a business migrant than the respondent’s Department decided to mete out to him. On 5 August 1997 a company called Cervantes Electrical Engineering Pty Ltd (“Cervantes”) of Port Hedland in Western Australia placed an advertisement in a Chilean newspaper seeking to induce electrical motor rewinders to come to Port Hedland to work for it. The applicant responded to the advertisement by forwarding his resumé to Cervantes by facsimile. The next day Mr Miguel Cervantes telephoned the applicant and told him that he had been successful in gaining employment with the company. There ensued numerous telephone calls between Mr Cervantes and the applicant in some of which Mr Cervantes sought the applicant’s advice in relation to problems which had arisen in Cervantes’ workshop. At one stage Mr Cervantes forwarded to the applicant photographs of electrical motors which, so it was implied, he could reasonably expect to be working on for the company. The photographs were of high-powered electrical motors, which caught the applicant’s interest. His unchallenged evidence is that he joined Cervantes to re-wind high-powered motors, but when eventually he came to work at Cervantes he only saw and worked on small electrical motors. There were other disappointments which I shall describe later in these reasons. On 20 November 1997 an officer of the respondent’s Department (Ms Maria Bradford), acting as a delegate of the respondent, issued an instrument under Regulation 1.20H of the Migration Regulations 1994. That instrument, known as an “Approval of Nomination of Business Activities” approved the nomination of a business activity, namely “Motor Rewinder” (proposed by Cervantes) as a “key activity”. One significant consequence of that approval was that Cervantes was relieved of the requirement of “labour market testing” – see Reg 1.20G(4). Labour market testing is defined in Reg 1.20B as testing the Australian labour market to demonstrate that a suitably qualified Australian citizen or Australian permanent resident is not readily available to fill the position. Another significant consequence of that approval was that it satisfied criteria 4(a) and (b) of the criteria set out in Clause 457.22 for the grant to an applicant of a Business Visa of the above-mentioned subclass. From a notation at the foot of Ms Bradford’s letter of 20 November 1997 to Cervantes, with which the approval instrument was enclosed, I infer (and so find) that Cervantes had previously applied for and obtained approval from the respondent to be a standard business sponsor, as referred to in Regulations 1.20B, 1.20C(1)(b) and 1.20D, for four proposed employees. The notation read:“Sponsorship details: SBS (4 nominations)Proposed period of employment: Four (4) years.”I refer below to further details of the relevant regulatory regime.

Decision

Reasons for decision

CARR J
In its reasons the Second Tribunal recited the history of the matter. It referred to the Department’s “Procedures Advice Manual” (“the PAM”) and to s 116 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”). It then said this:“15. Section 116 of the Act empowers the Minister to cancel a visa in certain circumstances. The Review Applicant’s subclass 457 visa was cancelled under s 116(1)(a), which states that the Minister may cancel a visa if satisfied that ‘any circumstances, which permitted the grant of the visa no longer, exist’. According to (PAM), an example (among others) of where s 116 (1)(a) may be used to cancel a visa is: where a temporary business visa holder ceases to be employed by his/her sponsor or the sponsor withdraws his/her support16. It is clear from the material before the Tribunal that grounds did exist for the cancellation of the Review Applicant’s subclass 457 visa. The Review Applicant has been without a sponsor since 29 July 1998. In the event of the relationship between a subclass 457 visa holder and the business sponsor breaking down, the Tribunal considers it perfectly plausible to allow for a reasonable ‘period of grace’ during which a new sponsor might be found for the visa holder. The Tribunal recognises that it is unfortunate for the Review Applicant that although D & M did get approval as a business sponsor on 4 March 1999, the company then decided not to proceed with sponsoring him. At the hearing the Review Applicant indicated that he has made other attempts to find an employer/sponsor but without any success. He has thus been without a sponsor for almost 20 months.Conclusion 17. Having carefully considered the whole of the evidence in this matter the Tribunal finds on balance, that grounds did exist for the cancellation of the Review Applicant’s subclass 457 visa on 17 May 1999.”THE APPLICATION FOR REVIEW In his amended application, the applicant relied upon two grounds, which were as follows:“1.The decision of the Migration Review Tribunal dated 27 April 2000 (“Decision”) was an improper exercise of the power conferred by the Migration Act 1958 and Migration Regulations 1994 in that it involved the exercise of a discretionary power without regard to the merits of the particular case. 2.There was no evidence or other material to justify the making of the Decision as the Decision was based on the existence of a particular fact and that fact did not exist.”GROUND 1 In further and better particulars of his amended application, filed on 3 July 2000 in anticipation of the relevant amendment being allowed, the applicant gave the following relevant further and better particulars of Ground 1:“(iv)Dowding & Mills were influenced in their decision by prejudicial representations made to them by DIMA. (v)It is Departmental policy that revocation of a business sponsorship does not necessarily trigger an automatic cancellation of the Business Visa concerned.” It seems reasonably clear in relation to this ground that the applicant is relying upon s 476(1)(d) of the Act, when read with s 476(3)(c). Those sub-paragraphs provide for judicial review where a decision was an improper exercise of power manifested by an exercise of a discretionary power in accordance with a rule or policy without regard to the merits of the particular case.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: CARR J

The court considered the first ground of appeal, which alleged that the decision of the Migration Review Tribunal was an improper exercise of power. The court found that the Tribunal had not exercised its discretionary power without regard to the merits of the particular case, as it had considered the whole of the evidence and found that grounds did exist for the cancellation of the applicant’s visa. The court referred to the authority of s 476(1)(d) of the Act, when read with s 476(3)(c), which provides for judicial review where a decision was an improper exercise of power manifested by an exercise of a discretionary power in accordance with a rule or policy without regard to the merits of the particular case. However, the court found that the Tribunal had not exercised its power in such a manner, and the appeal on this ground was dismissed.

The court then considered the second ground of appeal, which alleged that there was no evidence or other material to justify the making of the decision. The court found that the Tribunal had correctly identified that the applicant had been without a sponsor for almost 20 months and had made unsuccessful attempts to find a new employer or sponsor. The court referred to the authority of s 116(1)(a) of the Act, which allows for the cancellation of a visa where the circumstances which permitted the grant of the visa no longer exist. The court found that the Tribunal had correctly applied this provision and that there was evidence to justify the making of the decision. The appeal on this ground was also dismissed.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that the Migration Review Tribunal did not improperly exercise its power in deciding to affirm the cancellation of the applicant’s visa, and there was evidence to justify the making of the decision. The court found that the Tribunal had considered the whole of the evidence and applied the relevant legal principles correctly. The decision of the Tribunal was therefore upheld.