Carden v Dragojevic
[2025] WASCA 47
•9 APRIL 2025
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)
CITATION: CARDEN -v- DRAGOJEVIC [2025] WASCA 47
CORAM: MAZZA JA
ARCHER JA
SMITH AUJ
HEARD: 3 FEBRUARY 2025
FURTHER SUBMISSIONS FILED 17 FEBRUARY & 4 MARCH 2025
DELIVERED : 9 APRIL 2025
FILE NO/S: CACR 8 of 2024
BETWEEN: CILLA LOUISE CARDEN
Appellant
AND
ANDREJ DRAGOJEVIC
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram: HOWARD J
Citation: CARDEN -v- WA POLICE [2023] WASC 462
File Number : SJA 1003 of 2023
Catchwords:
Criminal law - Appeal against convictions - Appeal dismissed by single judge - Further appeal to Court of Appeal - Appeal against assault conviction misconceived - Appeal against breach of bail conviction - Alleged defects in prosecution notice - No merit
Legislation:
Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA), s 222
Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA), s 23, s 178
Result:
Application for extension of time refused
Application to adduce fresh evidence refused
Leave to appeal refused
Appeal dismissed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
| Appellant | : | In person |
| Respondent | : | J Berson |
Solicitors:
| Appellant | : | In person |
| Respondent | : | State Solicitor for Western Australia |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Calandra v Civil Aviation Safety Authority [2015] WASCA 31
Carden v WA Police [2023] WASC 462
Fisher v O'Hehir [2023] WASCA 19
Gors (by his Plenary Administrator Janet Christine Gors) v Tomlinson [2020] WASCA 164; (2020) 56 WAR 144
Kelly v The State of Western Australia [2024] WASCA 116
Parfenova v Diss [2021] WASCA 50
Tabloid Pty Ltd v Pringle [2024] WASCA 152
Wharton v The Queen [No 2] [2017] WASCA 164
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT:
On 9 December 2022, after trial in the Magistrates Court, the appellant was convicted of an unlawful assault and breaching a bail undertaking. The appellant sought leave to appeal against those convictions to a single judge of the Supreme Court. On 19 December 2023, Howard J refused leave to appeal and dismissed the appeal.[1] The appellant now seeks leave to appeal against the decision of the primary judge.
[1] Carden v WA Police [2023] WASC 462.
The complainant in the assault conviction was a Liquorland store employee. The prosecution case was as follows.
On 1 February 2022, the appellant approached staff (including the complainant) at the entrance to the Liquorland store and began to belligerently criticise the COVID‑19 safe practices that were then in place. The staff repeatedly asked the appellant to leave. When she did not, the complainant called the police on a Liquorland mobile phone.
The complainant saw the appellant walking towards a car in the car park across the road. The complainant, still on the Liquorland phone to the police, walked out to the pathway outside the store. She took a photo of the appellant's car using her own mobile phone and began walking back to the store.
The appellant ran back across the road to confront the complainant,[2] blocking the complainant's path to the store entry. The appellant pushed the complainant with both hands, causing the complainant to stumble backwards. After a brief struggle, the appellant was able to take the complainant's phone out of her left hand. The appellant began walking back to her car. As she did, she tried to delete the photo from the complainant's phone. She was not able to do so. After a short interaction with another member of the public, the appellant placed the mobile phone on the ground and left the scene.
[2] Green Appeal Book (GAB) 166.
The next day, the appellant was arrested in her home on suspicion of assault and theft. She was granted bail on her undertaking to appear at the Magistrates Court on 2 March 2022. She failed to appear on that date. An arrest warrant was issued, and the appellant was subsequently arrested and charged with breaching a requirement of her bail undertaking.
The trial on both charges took place on 22 November 2022. A number of witnesses, including the complainant, gave evidence in the trial. The prosecution also tendered CCTV footage of the alleged assault.
The appellant advances two grounds of appeal in relation to the assault conviction. Ground 1 alleges that the magistrate erred in finding that the appellant had pushed the complainant with two hands. Ground 2 alleges that the magistrate erred in finding that the appellant had assaulted the complainant, in circumstances where the prosecution had not proved that the complainant had suffered any injury or personal discomfort.
During the hearing of the appeal, the appellant was given leave to apply to add grounds of appeal in relation to the bail conviction. Her proposed grounds of appeal relate to the power of the police to arrest her and alleged deficiencies in the prosecution notice.
The appellant also seeks an extension of time within which to appeal and to adduce further evidence in the appeal.
For the reasons that follow, the appeal should be dismissed.
Applications in the appeal and orders made
Application to adduce fresh evidence and to appeal out of time
The evidence the appellant sought to adduce was still shots of the CCTV footage and what she described as an expert opinion on that footage.
Many of the still shots from the video footage are distorted. Some are out of focus due to having been zoomed in. In any event, the still shots represent a single moment in time and do not provide the context offered by the moving footage. We would not give leave for the still shots to be adduced in evidence. The CCTV footage is the best evidence and can be watched at reduced speeds.
The 'expert opinion' is a letter from a person claiming to be an experienced 'digital media professional' and saying he won an award for a documentary in 1998. He watched the video at one quarter speed and made statements as to what he could and could not see. Even if it could be found that he is a person who possesses specialised knowledge or experience which is sufficiently organised or recognised to be accepted as a reliable body of evidence, there is nothing in his report to suggest that a finder of fact could not form their own opinion without his assistance. The court is able to watch the footage at reduced speed. As such, his evidence is inadmissible.[3]
[3] Kelly v The State of Western Australia [2024] WASCA 116 [179] (Buss P), [332] (Mazza & Hall JJA agreeing) and the authorities cited.
For these reasons, the application to adduce further evidence should be dismissed.
As for the appellant's application for an extension of time within which to appeal, the delay is short and explained. If there had been any merit in the appeal, we would have granted the extension of time. As there is no merit in the appeal, we would dismiss this application.
Application for McKenzie friend and spelling of name
The appellant also filed an application, with an affidavit, seeking two orders.
The first order she sought was that she be permitted to have a McKenzie friend in the hearing. The appellant is self‑represented, as she has been throughout the proceedings.
The second order she sought was:
Appellants' [sic] and Respondents' [sic] name be spelt according to Australian Government Styles Manual, the 'Supreme Court of Western Australia: Factsheet: Criminal appeals from the Magistrates Court; pg5, minus the underline; eg. 'Cil' Cilla Louise Carden and the Respondent, Andrej Dragojevic according to his legal capacity of the natural person acting as the prosecuting issuing officer concurring with Tey v Plotz (2010) SCWA 163, honouring High Court rulings, in line with Public Governance Performance and Accountability Act 2013 s 11(b) where the Appellant is a non‑corporate Commonwealth entity that is not a body corporate. (italics in original)
Mazza and Archer JJA made orders in relation to that application prior to the hearing of the appeal. It was ordered that the application for a McKenzie friend would be considered in the hearing and the application was otherwise dismissed. In these proceedings, the parties' names are already described as 'Cilla Louise Carden' and 'Andrej Dragojevic'.
Mazza and Archer JJA also ordered that the affidavit not be accepted for filing. The affidavit was scandalous and irrelevant to the applications.
At the start of the hearing, the appellant explained that, in making an application for a McKenzie friend, she just wanted someone to sit next to her for support. The court permitted this.
Permission to advise of page reference
During the hearing, the appellant referred to the complainant's evidence as to their respective positions in relation to the CCTV footage. This was, in effect, that the appellant was between the CCTV camera and the complainant (as was the case at the time of the alleged assault). The appellant was unable to find the transcript page reference and was given permission to provide it by email to the court.[4] Later during the hearing, the appellant provided the page reference and was told that, as a result, she did not need to provide it by email.[5] Nevertheless, later that day, the appellant sent an email to the court containing that page reference and also making further observations. While the appellant may have believed that she still had leave to provide that page reference by email, the further observations went beyond the grant of leave, and we have ignored them.
[4] Appeal ts 39 ‑ 40.
[5] Appeal ts 55 ‑ 56.
Further, the next day, the appellant sent another email containing multiple transcript page references that did not deal with the positions of the appellant and complainant in relation to the camera. The email also contained further submissions. This email went beyond the grant of leave, and we have ignored it.
Application to add grounds of appeal
The appellant's grounds of appeal to this court, and the submissions she filed in support of those grounds, did not refer to her conviction for breaching her bail undertaking. Despite this, during the hearing of the appeal, the appellant sought to argue that the bail conviction should be set aside. The respondent did not object to the appellant being given leave to amend her grounds to include a challenge to the bail conviction. The court gave the appellant leave to file an application to amend her grounds of appeal to add any grounds in respect of that conviction, with submissions in support. The appellant filed a document containing proposed new grounds and submissions, but did not comply with the requirement to file an application to amend her grounds of appeal. Nevertheless, the court resolved to accept the document and to treat it as including an application to amend her grounds.
Assault conviction
Appeal against assault conviction is misconceived
This is an appeal from a single judge of the Supreme Court under pt 2, div 3 of the Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA). In such appeals, this court's power is to be exercised only where it is shown that the single judge erred or that a miscarriage of justice arose in the context of the intermediate appeal.[6] Neither of the appellant's grounds of appeal in relation to the assault conviction allege that the primary judge erred or that a miscarriage of justice arose in the context of the appeal before the primary judge. On the contrary, both grounds allege an error by the magistrate.
[6] Parfenova v Diss [2021] WASCA 50 [54] ‑ [55].
Accordingly, leave to appeal should be refused on each ground, and the appeal is taken to be dismissed.[7]
[7] Criminal Appeals Act, s 9(3) read with s 18(a).
Even if this court were to treat the grounds of appeal as alleging that the primary judge erred in failing to find that the magistrate erred, we would dismiss the appeal against the assault conviction. As we will explain, we consider it was well open to the magistrate to convict the appellant of assault.
Did the magistrate err in finding that the appellant pushed the complainant?
By ground 1, the appellant alleges that the magistrate erred in finding that she had pushed the complainant (with two hands), because she contends that the CCTV footage showed that she did not push the complainant.
We have watched the CCTV footage at normal speed and reduced speed. The CCTV footage was also played during the hearing of the appeal. At the time of the alleged push, the appellant was positioned with her back towards the CCTV camera. For that reason, the CCTV footage does not provide vision of all that transpired between her body and the complainant's body. However, we do not accept that the CCTV footage shows that the appellant did not push the complainant. On the contrary, the footage is entirely consistent with, and strongly corroborates, the complainant's evidence that the appellant did push her, and with two hands.
The CCTV footage relevantly shows the complainant walking back towards the shopping centre entrance after taking the photo of the appellant's car. The appellant runs up from behind the complainant and positions herself between the complainant and the entry door into the shopping centre. The appellant faces the complainant, with her feet planted shoulder width apart. The complainant changes direction, turning her body away from the appellant so that the appellant is on her left. The complainant walks towards the wall of the shopping centre, away from the appellant (who is still on her left).
The appellant steps to her left, maintaining her position between the complainant and the entry door. At this point, the appellant's back is to the camera. The complainant is partially visible behind the appellant. She is taller than the appellant. The top of her head and her ponytail can be seen above the level of the appellant's head. She is still positioned such that the left side of her body is closest to the appellant.
The appellant raises both of her arms and steps towards the complainant. The complainant's body moves further away from the appellant, and the heels of her feet (which by this point are side‑on to the appellant) lift off the ground. The complainant's feet move away from the appellant's position and her body moves down to the point that her head is entirely below the level of the appellant's head before she stands up straight again. This occurs next to what appears to be a trolley of pallets.
In our view, the CCTV footage shows that the complainant experienced an application of force to her upper body which caused her to stumble away from the appellant's position before regaining her balance and standing upright again. The force came from the direction of the appellant. At the time the complainant stumbled, the appellant's raised arms were straightening towards the complainant and the appellant was stepping towards the complainant.
Further, the complainant gave evidence that the appellant pushed her with two hands.[8]
[8] GAB 89 ‑ 91.
The magistrate found the complainant to be a credible and reliable witness.[9] Her Honour correctly noted that the CCTV footage was entirely consistent with the complainant's evidence.[10]
[9] GAB 43 ‑ 44, 46.
[10] GAB 38.
Where a factual finding is likely to have been affected by impressions as to witness credibility having seen and heard the witnesses give evidence, an appeal court will not interfere with the finding unless it is demonstrated to be wrong by reference to 'incontrovertible facts' or 'uncontested testimony', or because the finding is 'glaringly improbable' or 'contrary to compelling inferences', or because the magistrate failed to use, or palpably misused, his or her advantage as a fact finder.[11]
[11] Tabloid Pty Ltd v Pringle [2024] WASCA 152 [99].
The appellant relies on the CCTV footage to demonstrate that the magistrate erred. The CCTV footage does not demonstrate any error. The footage was consistent with, and strongly supportive of, the complainant's evidence.
Having regard to the evidence adduced in the trial, it was well open to the magistrate to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant had pushed the complainant with two hands.
For that reason, even if ground 1 is treated as alleging an error by the primary judge, it is not reasonably arguable. We would refuse leave to appeal on this ground.
Does an assault require an injury or discomfort?
By ground 2, the appellant asserts that the magistrate erred because the complainant did not suffer any injury nor experience personal discomfort. In essence, the appellant submits that, for there to be an assault, the alleged victim must have suffered an injury or experienced personal discomfort. The appellant says that this follows from s 222 of the Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA).
Section 222 provides:
222. Term used: assault
A person who strikes, touches, or moves, or otherwise applies force of any kind to the person of another, either directly or indirectly, without his consent, or with his consent if the consent is obtained by fraud, or who by any bodily act or gesture attempts or threatens to apply force of any kind to the person of another without his consent, under such circumstances that the person making the attempt or threat has actually or apparently a present ability to effect his purpose, is said to assault that other person, and the act is called an assault.
The term applies force includes the case of applying heat, light, electrical force, gas, odour, or any other substance or thing whatever if applied in such a degree as to cause injury or personal discomfort.
The section defines an 'assault' more broadly than what might ordinarily be thought of as an assault. It includes where a person, without[12] the consent of the alleged victim,
1.strikes, touches, or moves, the alleged victim; or
2.otherwise applies force of any kind to the alleged victim; or
3.attempts or threatens to apply force to the alleged victim.
[12] Or with consent, if the consent is obtained by fraud.
The definition of the term 'applies force' in the second paragraph of s 222 further broadens the meaning, by defining an assault to include the application (or attempted or threatened application) of substances and things such as heat and electricity. It is unnecessary to consider the extent to which the term extends the meaning of 'assault'. It is sufficient to observe that the requirement that the conduct cause an injury or discomfort does not apply to striking, touching or moving an alleged victim. It applies only where the alleged assault was the application of some substance or thing.
Here, it was alleged that the appellant used her hands to push the complainant. It was therefore not necessary for the prosecution to prove that the complainant suffered an injury or experienced personal discomfort. This is not an element of an assault involving the striking, touching or moving of the alleged victim.
For that reason, even if ground 2 is treated as alleging an error by the primary judge, it is not reasonably arguable, and we would refuse leave to appeal on this ground.
Bail conviction
The day after the events outside the shopping centre, the appellant was arrested in her home on suspicion of assault and theft. She was granted bail at the Warwick Police Station on her undertaking to appear at the Magistrates Court in Joondalup on 2 March 2022. She failed to appear on that date. An arrest warrant was issued, and the appellant was subsequently arrested and charged with breaching a requirement of her bail undertaking. The appellant was convicted of that charge (and the assault charge) after trial.
At the time of the alleged bail offence, s 28(2) and s 51(1) of the Bail Act 1982 (WA) provided relevantly:
28.Bail undertaking, when required and nature of
…
(2) A bail undertaking is an undertaking in writing by an accused in the prescribed form -
(a) that he will appear at a time and place specified, or deemed by section 31(3) to be specified, in the undertaking; and
…
51.Failing to comply with bail undertaking, offence
(1)An accused who, without reasonable cause, fails to comply with the requirement of his bail undertaking mentioned in section 28(2)(a) commits an offence.
In the trial, the appellant did not dispute that she had entered into a bail undertaking and had failed to appear as required. She argued, however, that she had signed the bail undertaking under duress and had reasonable cause for not attending.
The magistrate said that the claim of duress appeared to be that she had to sign the bail undertaking, or she would not be released from custody. The magistrate said (correctly) that this could not raise a defence of duress.[13]
[13] Trial ts 23; GAB 51.
The magistrate said that the appellant's claim of reasonable cause for not attending was, in essence, that the court did not have jurisdiction, largely based on sovereign citizen ideology.[14] The magistrate said (correctly) that this assertion could not raise a defence of reasonable cause.[15]
[14] Trial ts 24; GAB 52.
[15] Trial ts 23; GAB 51.
As noted earlier, the primary judge dismissed the appellant's appeal against both convictions.
Was the prosecution notice invalid due to not being signed?
Proposed bail ground 1 alleges that the primary judge erred in failing to find an error in the prosecution notice, because the prosecution notice was not signed.
By s 23(2)(d) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA), a prosecution notice must be signed by the person who is commencing the prosecution.
The respondent points out that a prosecution notice is required to be lodged with the Magistrates Court by means of the courts' electronic management system, ECMS.[16] By various legislative provisions,[17] a prosecution notice lodged electronically is taken to be signed by or on behalf of the person who lodged it if:
1.the ECMS records the identity of the person who lodges the document; and
2.the name of the person who lodges the document is stated in the electronic version of the document in the place where the person's signature is required.
[16] Magistrates Court (General) Rules 2005 (WA), r 45(1).
[17] Magistrates Court (General) Rules, r 13A(3); Courts and Tribunals (Electronic Processes Facilitation) Act 2013 (WA), s 6(l)(g), s 10(1); Criminal Procedure Regulations 2005 (WA), reg 4B, sch 1, Form 3. See also Fisher v O'Hehir [2023] WASCA 19 [33] ‑ [40] (Buss P, Mazza & Mitchell JJA).
In Fisher v O'Hehir,[18] this court rejected a contention that the prosecution notice in that case was invalid because the signature of the respondent (the person who had issued the notice) did not appear on the notice. In Fisher, the respondent's name had been recorded in the electronically lodged prosecution notice, in the box in which to record the name of the person issuing the notice. The court held that, pursuant to the legislative provisions, the requirement that the respondent sign the prosecution notice was satisfied.
[18] Fisher [33] - [40] (Buss P, Mazza & Mitchell JJA).
In this case, as in Fisher, the respondent's name was recorded in the electronically lodged prosecution notice, in the box in which to record the name of the person issuing the notice.[19] Accordingly, the prosecution notice must be taken to be signed by the respondent by operation of the relevant provisions. We further note that, in the box on the prosecution notice in which to record the date on which the notice was signed, the date of 4 March 2022 is written.
[19] Blue Appeal Book 24.
Accordingly, there is no defect in the prosecution notice.
It follows that we would refuse leave to add this proposed ground to the appellant's grounds of appeal.
In any event, s 178(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that any objection by an accused to a prosecution notice on the ground that it is defective must be made before the prosecutor's opening address. Further, by s 178(3), if a prosecution notice is defective in substance or form, the court (on an application by a party or on its own initiative) must order that the document be corrected if the defect is not material to the merits of the case (and may order that the document be corrected in any other case). The appellant did not object to the prosecution notice on the ground it was unsigned before the prosecutor's opening address.
In Calandra v Civil Aviation Safety Authority,[20] Martin CJ, with whom Mazza JA and Hall J agreed, said that a magistrate's power under s 178 is a broad one, and extends to the replacement or substitution of a defective prosecution notice. Martin CJ also expressed the view that the jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court did not depend on the existence of a valid prosecution notice.[21]
Did it matter if the police did not have the power to arrest her?
[20] Calandra v Civil Aviation Safety Authority[2015] WASCA 31 [25] ‑ [38] (Martin CJ, Mazza JA & Hall J agreeing).
[21] Calandra [30] (Martin CJ, Mazza JA & Hall J agreeing). Whether the jurisdiction of a superior court depends on the existence of a valid indictment has not yet been definitively determined - see Wharton v The Queen [No 2][2017] WASCA 164 [104] (Buss P & Mazza JA).
Proposed bail ground 2 alleges that the primary judge erred in finding that the police had the power to arrest the appellant on 2 February 2022 because the police could not have had a reasonable suspicion that she had committed an offence.
The lawfulness of the arrest was not an element of the breach of bail offence. Therefore, this ground is not reasonably arguable, and we would refuse leave to add this proposed ground to the appellant's grounds of appeal.
Were there other deficiencies in the prosecution notice?
Proposed bail grounds 3 and 4 allege that the primary judge erred in [65] of his Honour's reasons in finding that the appellant's complaints as to alleged deficiencies in the prosecution notice did not have reasonable prospects of succeeding.
In [64] of the primary judge's reasons, Howard J set out the deficiencies alleged by the appellant as follows:
1.no common seal;
2.no WAPOL logo;
3.no Magistrates Court of Western Australia logo;
4.no court registry location;
5.not witnessed by a Justice of the Peace or prescribed Court Officer;
6.no record of date lodged;
7.the appellant's name was misspelled;
8.no witness signature;
9.no Australian Business Number(s);
10.no Department of Justice logo; and
11.both prosecution notices received by the appellant had the same ID and brief numbers.
By s 23(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act, a prosecution notice must:
(a)be in writing in a prescribed form; and
(b)comply with Schedule 1 Division 2; and
(c)contain any information prescribed; and
(d)be signed by the person who is commencing the prosecution.
Schedule 1 div 2 deals with the contents of prosecution notices. Regulation 8 of the Criminal Procedure Regulations 2005 (WA) prescribes the form and content of prosecution notices, including that they must be in the form of Form 3. Regulation 5 prescribes how forms must be completed.
With the exception of the appellant's seventh point, none of the matters raised by the appellant before the primary judge are required by the legislation.
As for the seventh point, by cl 4(1)(a) of sch 1 div 2 of the Criminal Procedure Act, a prosecution notice must identify an accused who is an individual by means of the accused's full name. Regulation 5(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Regulations requires that, when completing a form such as Form 3, the name of a party must be capitalised according to the preference of the party. Regulation 5(1)(b) requires the family name to be underlined. The note below reg 5(1) states, 'Examples: Vincent van Gogh; Wong Hei; Mary Jane Citizen'.
The prosecution notice in relation to the breach of bail undertaking referred to the accused as 'Cilla Louise CARDEN'. The appellant argues that this was incorrect as her name is 'Cilla Louise Carden'.[22] It appears, therefore, that her contention is based on the formatting of her surname.
[22] Appellant's grounds of appeal PE 8642 [sic]/2022 bail breach filed 17 February 2025 [30].
If the appellant's complaint is that all of her family name was capitalised, this would not breach the legislative requirements. The ordinary meaning of reg 5(1)(a) is to ensure that, if not every name of a person is capitalised, that is reflected in the form. That this is the ordinary meaning is confirmed by the examples given.[23] Regulation 5(1)(a) was not breached by the capitalisation of all of the appellant's surname, even if she would prefer that only the first letter be capitalised. The regulation is directed to whether the first letter of a name is capitalised.
[23] While the examples do not form part of the written law, they are capable of assisting in the meaning of the regulation, and may be considered to confirm that the meaning is the ordinary meaning conveyed by the text, taking into account its context and the purpose or object of the law - see Interpretation Act 1984 (WA), s 19(1)(a), s 19(2)(a), s 32(2) and Gors (by his Plenary Administrator Janet Christine Gors) v Tomlinson [2020] WASCA 164; (2020) 56 WAR 144, fn 59.
If the appellant's complaint is that her family name was in bold, this would not breach the legislative requirements.
If her complaint is that her family name was underlined, it was required to be underlined by reg 5(1)(b).
These proposed grounds are not reasonably arguable, and we would refuse leave to add these proposed grounds to the appellant's grounds of appeal.
In any event, if the appellant wanted to assert that the prosecution notice was defective because of the way her surname was written, she needed to make that assertion before the prosecutor's opening address at the trial.[24]
[24] Criminal Procedure Act, s 178(2).
The appellant did not make that assertion before the prosecutor's opening address. The formatting of an accused person's surname is not material to the merits. If a formatting error had been drawn to the magistrate's attention, her Honour would have required the formatting to be corrected. Any formatting error would not have invalidated, and did not invalidate, the notice.
In our view, the appellant is precluded from making this complaint now.[25]
Other submissions
[25] Wharton [109].
The appellant's submissions went well beyond the grounds of appeal she proposed to add in relation to the bail conviction. In any event, to the extent they can be understood, her submissions were misconceived.
Conclusion
None of the grounds of appeal in relation to the assault conviction have a reasonable prospect of succeeding. The applications for leave to adduce additional evidence, an extension of time and leave to appeal in relation to the assault conviction should be refused.
None of the proposed grounds in relation to the bail conviction have a reasonable prospect of succeeding. The application to add the proposed grounds in relation to the bail conviction to the grounds of appeal should be refused.
The appeal should be dismissed.
I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
NC
Research Associate to the Hon Justice Archer
9 APRIL 2025
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