Carden v City of Wanneroo

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CRIMINAL

CITATION:   CARDEN -v- CITY OF WANNEROO [2025] WASC 54

CORAM:   COBBY J

HEARD:   7 OCTOBER 2024

DELIVERED          :   26 FEBRUARY 2025

FILE NO/S:   SJA 1019 of 2024

BETWEEN:   CILLA LOUISE CARDEN

Appellant

AND

CITY OF WANNEROO

Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

For File No:   SJA 1019 of 2024

Jurisdiction              :   MAGISTRATES COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram:   MAGISTRATE M HARRIES

File Number            :   JO 9235/2021


Catchwords:

Criminal law - Statutory interpretation - Meaning of 'structure' in Planning and Development Act 2005 (WA) and Building Act 2011 (WA) - Appellant convicted of failing to remove screen as directed - Application to set aside conviction dismissed - Extension of time in which to appeal conviction required

Legislation:

Building Act 2011 (WA)
Building Regulations 2012 (WA)
Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA)
Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA)
Criminal Procedure Regulations 2005 (WA)
Dividing Fences Act 1961 (WA)
Interpretation Act (WA)
Limitation Act 2005 (WA)
Local Government Act 1995 (WA)
Magistrates Court (General) Rules 2005 (WA)
Planning and Development Act 2005 (WA)
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA)

Result:

Leave to appeal refused
Extension of time to appeal refused
Appeal dismissed

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant : In person
Respondent : T L Beckett

Solicitors:

Appellant : In person
Respondent : McLeods

Cases referred to in decision:

Allmark v City of Stirling [2013] WASC 122

Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin [1990] HCA 21; (1990) 170 CLR 1

Ballina Shire Council v Joblin [2022] NSWLEC 90

Fazio v St John‑Ayre [2017] WASC 62

Glew v The Governor of Western Australia [2009] WASC 14

Glew v The Governor of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 123

JS v The State of Western Australia [2014] WASCA 177

Kelly v Fiander [2023] WASC 187

Lancaster v R [1989] WAR 83

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Kurtovic (1990) 21 FCR 193

Nelson (in his capacity as trustee of the property of Douglas, a bankrupt) v Greenman [2024] VSC 704

R v City of Munno Para; Ex parte John Weeks Pty Ltd (1987) 46 SASR 400

Re Magistrate M M Flynn; Ex parte McJannett [2013] WASC 372

SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA (2017); 262 CLR 362

Tey v Plotz [2010] WASC 163

Wimbridge v The State of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 196

COBBY J:

  1. The appellant was convicted in her absence in the Magistrates Court of Western Australia on 5 November 2021 for failing to comply with a direction given under s 214(3) of the Planning and Development Act 2005 (WA) (Planning Act) to remove a screen within the time specified, contrary to s 214(7) of the Planning Act.

  2. The appellant was fined $2,500 and ordered to pay costs of $1,409.70.

  3. Well over two years later, on 2 February 2024 the appellant filed an application to set aside that decision pursuant to s 71 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) (CPA).[1]  On 1 March 2024 a different magistrate dismissed that application, taking into…

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Details
Case
[2025] WASC 54
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Carden v City of Wanneroo involved the appellant, who was convicted of contravening a development direction by failing to remove a screen from their property. The matter was heard in the Supreme Court of Western Australia, where the appellant sought to set aside their conviction. The central issue was whether the construction of the screen constituted 'development' under the Planning and Development Act 2005 (WA) and required approval, or if it was exempt from such requirements. The court needed to interpret the term'structure' in the context of the Act to determine if the screen was a 'structure' that required development approval.

The court examined the statutory definition of 'development' and the ordinary meaning of 'structure'. It considered the purpose of the Planning Act, which is to ensure orderly and public interest-compliant land development. The court found that the term 'structure' should be given its natural and ordinary meaning, which includes anything built or constructed, such as buildings, bridges, or frameworks. Given that the screen in question was not a building but a constructed item, it fell under the definition of a'structure'. The court rejected any attempt to read down the ordinary meaning of 'structure' to exclude screens, emphasising the public interest in planning controls over privacy screens.

The court concluded that the appellant's screen constituted a 'structure' and thus required development approval. This interpretation was supported by the reasoning in Allmark v City of Stirling, where the court held that the construction of a fence constituted development. The appellant's application to set aside their conviction was dismissed, but the court granted an extension of time for the appellant to appeal the conviction. The court's decision highlighted the importance of adhering to planning laws to protect public interests and ensure orderly development.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

CORBOY J

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: CORBOY J

In SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection,[19] the plurality set out the modern approach to statutory interpretation as follows: The starting point for the ascertainment of the meaning of a statutory provision is the text of the statute whilst, at the same time, regard is had to its context and purpose. Context should be regarded at this first stage and not at some later stage and it should be regarded in its widest sense. This is not to deny the importance of the natural and ordinary meaning of a word, namely how it is ordinarily understood in discourse, to the process of construction. Considerations of context and purpose simply recognise that, understood in its statutory, historical or other context, some other meaning of a word may be suggested, and so too, if its ordinary meaning is not consistent with the statutory purpose, that meaning must be rejected.[19] SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA (2017); 262 CLR 362 [14]. The evident purpose of the Planning Act is to ensure that land is developed in accordance with proper planning principles, in a way which is both orderly and compatible with the public interest.[20][20] See R v City of Munno Para; Ex parte John Weeks Pty Ltd (1987) 46 SASR 400, 406. The Macquarie Online Dictionary defines the word 'structure' to mean, relevantly, '1. mode of building, construction, or organisation; arrangement of parts, elements or constituents. 2. something built or constructed; a building, bridge, dam, framework, etc'. Similarly, the online version of the Oxford English Dictionary defines 'structure' to mean 'something constructed or having organisation', including 'II.6 Any framework or fabric of assembled material parts; a (typically large) man-made construction'. Having regard to the use of the word 'building' in contradistinction to 'structure' in the statutory definition of the word 'development', the word 'structure' is to be given its natural and ordinary meaning, such that the construction of an edifice other than a building upon land constitutes 'development' for the purposes of the Planning Act. That construction is supported by the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in Allmark v City of Stirling,[21] where the court held that a provision in a town planning scheme to the effect that the construction of a fence did not require development approval did not apply where the walls in question came within the scope of exclusions to that provision, it being implicit in the court's reasoning that the construction of a fence constituted development within the meaning of s 4 of the Planning Act. [21] Allmark v City of Stirling [2013] WASC 122 [27] - [33]. The appellant therefore required development approval for the construction of the screen. There is no reason, in my view, to read down the ordinary meaning of the word 'structure' so as to exclude screens of the type at issue in this ease. There is an obvious public interest in there being planning controls over privacy screens, given the potential for a screen to impact upon views and amenity generally.