CAO & HONG - [2015] FamCA 884

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CAO & HONG

[2015] FamCA 884

FAMILY LAW – PROPERTY – Interim – Where the parties have significant business and property interests in Australia and Country D – Where the totality of their wealth is in excess of $200,000,000 – Where both parties seek competing interim orders – Where orders are sought in relation to variation of previous Orders, injunctions, the wife’s access to funds for living expenses, the parties’ access to funds for payment of legal fees and orders for disclosure.

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)

Mullen and De Bry (2006) FLC 93 – 293

APPLICANT:

Ms Cao

RESPONDENT:

Mr Hong

FILE NUMBER:

BRC

5044

2015

DATE DELIVERED:

22 October 2015

PLACE DELIVERED:

Brisbane

PLACE HEARD:

Brisbane

JUDGMENT OF:

Forrest J

HEARING DATE:

15 October 2015

REPRESENTATION

COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT:

Mr Hackett

SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT:

AHL Legal

COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT:

Mr Alexander

SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT:

Hillhouse Burrough McKeown

Orders

IT IS ORDERED UNTIL FURTHER ORDER

That for the purposes of these Orders, the term "the B Group" means all of the Australian corporate and/or trust entities which the Wife and the Husband have an interest in, including but not limited to the following entities:
(a)B Australia Pty Ltd ACN …;
(b)B Australia Holdings Pty Ltd ACN …;
(c)B Constructions Pty Ltd ACN …;
(d)B Property Pty Ltd ACN …;
(e)B Realty Pty Ltd ACN …;
(f)B International Holdings Pty Ltd ACN …;
(g)Hong Enterprises Pty Ltd ACN …;
(h)B Finance Pty Ltd ACN …; and
(i)C Australia Pty Ltd ACN ….
That for the purposes of these Orders, the term "their Country D interests" means all of the Country D corporate and/or trust entities which the Wife and the Husband have an interest in, including but not limited to the following entities:
(a)B City Development Incorporated;
(b)E Incorporated;
(c)C Industrial Incorporated;
(d)B Industrial Limited;
(e)B Industrial Incorporated;
(f)C Entertainment Incorporated;
(g)B Development Incorporated; and
(h)F Co. Ltd.
(i)G Pty Ltd;
(j)B Enterprises Pty Ltd;
(k)H Incorporated;
(l)I Co;
(m)J Pty Ltd.
That paragraphs 3 – 9 of the Order of Judge Coates of the Brisbane Registry of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia of 7 August 2015 are discharged.
That each party is restrained, whether by themselves or through their servants or agents or by corporate entities controlled by them, from removing themselves or the other party from any office held by him or her in any of the entities within the B Group or their Country D interests, without firstly obtaining the written consent of the other party or an order of the Court.
That each party is restrained, whether by themselves or through their servants or agents or by corporate entities controlled by them, from dealing with, disposing of, transferring or selling any shares held in his or her name in any entity within the B Group or their Country D interests, without firstly obtaining the written consent of the other party or an order of the Court.
That save as otherwise provided for in paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 hereof, each party is restrained, whether by themselves or through their servants or agents or by corporate entities controlled by them, from withdrawing funds in excess of ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00) per transaction from any bank account held by him or her personally or by any entity of the B Group or their Country D interests, held in Australia, Country D or any other country, without firstly obtaining the written consent of the other party or an order of the Court.
That save as otherwise provided for in paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 hereof, each party is restrained, whether by themselves or through their servants or agents or by corporate entities controlled by them, from dealing with, disposing of, transferring or selling any assets, stock or shares held by each of them or by any entity within the B Group or their Country D interests, without the written consent of the other party or an order of the Court.
That each party is restrained, whether by themselves or through their servants or agents or by corporate entities controlled by them, from increasing any liability held by each of them or by any entity within the B Group or their Country D interests, beyond the current level, without firstly obtaining the written consent of the other party or an order of the Court.
That each party is restrained, whether by themselves or through their servants or agents or by corporate entities controlled by them, from increasing any salary, director’s fee or dividend received by him or her or any third person who is his or her son, daughter, former spouse, former de facto spouse, current partner, or the former spouse, de facto spouse or current partner of his or her son or daughter, from any entity within the B Group or their Country D interests, without firstly obtaining the written consent of the other party or an order of the Court.

Exceptions to the preceding injunctions

This order does not prohibit either party from:
(a)dealing with or disposing of any of their assets or the assets of any of the entities of the B Group or their Country D interests in the ordinary and proper course of business, including paying business expenses bona fide and properly incurred; and
(b)in relation to matters not falling within (a), dealing with or disposing of any of their assets in discharging obligations bona fide and properly incurred under a contract entered into before this order was made, provided that before doing so each party gives the other party, if possible, at least two working days written notice of the particulars of the obligation.
That notwithstanding the other provisions of this order, including paragraph 9, the Wife shall be entitled to draw from the accounts of any entity in the B Group in Australia or Country D, either by way of director’s fees or salary or director’s loan or dividend payment as she may be advised, a net amount that does not exceed $15,000 per calendar month for the payment of her personal and household expenses, with any amount in excess of such sum only to be drawn with the prior written consent of the Husband or an order of this Court.
That notwithstanding the other provisions of this order, including paragraph 9, the Wife shall be entitled to draw from the accounts of any entity in the B Group in Australia or Country D, and the Husband shall be entitled to draw from the accounts of any entity in their Country D interests, either by way of director’s fees or salary or director’s loan or dividend payment as she or he may be advised, an additional net amount that does not exceed $200,000 to be utilised for the payment of his or her legal fees and costs incurred in the conduct of these proceedings, with any amount in excess of such sum only to be drawn by her or him for the payment of his or her legal fees and costs in these proceedings with the prior written consent of the other party or an order of this Court.

Disclosure

Each of the parties shall provide to the other on a monthly basis, in writing, details of the legal fees incurred in the previous month in respect of these proceedings and in respect of any amount paid towards those legal fees in that previous month, the amount of such payment and the source of such payment (identifying the source).
That within 21 days of the date hereof:
(a)The Husband file and serve an affidavit in which he deposes to all of the details surrounding the applications for the two lines of credit for C Industrial Incorporated in Country D, each in the sum of NT$100,000,000 one with the Bank H and the other with Bank I Co Ltd, to the extent that he has not already deposed to same, as well as full details of the use of any of the funds drawn down from those lines of credit in the last twelve months, and he shall exhibit to that affidavit any and all documents related to the matters he is required to depose to that he is obliged to disclose to the Wife that he has not already disclosed, and to the extent that he is unable to do so, he shall depose to the attempts he has made to obtain copies of any such documents; and
(b)The Wife provide such further disclosure or copies of documents requested to be disclosed by her in the letter that was made Exhibit 1 in the proceedings on Thursday, 15 October 2015 and to the extent the Wife is unable to do so, she file and serve an affidavit deposing to the attempts she has made to do so; and
(c)That each party otherwise provide to the other, copies of the documents contained in their respective Lists of Documents and any Supplementary Lists of Documents.

Costs

Each party’s costs of and incidental to the applications heard by the Court on 15 October 2015 are reserved.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Cao & Hong has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE

FILE NUMBER: BRC 5044 of 2015

Ms Cao

Applicant

And

Mr Hong

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

The parties in substantive property adjustment proceedings recently commenced in the Federal Circuit Court and transferred to this Court both seek competing interim orders in the proceedings in circumstances where there were some interim orders made by a Judge of the Federal Circuit Court prior to the transfer of the proceedings to this Court.
The matter was heard on Thursday, 15 October 2015 and both parties were represented by solicitors and counsel. There was agreement as to some of the orders that were to be made that slightly varied the content of the previous orders, but dispute about the effect and precise wording of others. Counsel representing each party provided written submissions and drafts of orders sought by them at the hearing. Indeed, counsel for the husband provided a couple of different drafts of orders sought.
In issue for determination by me were applications for injunctions in respect of the parties’ property and Australian and Country D business interests in variation of, and in addition to, injunctions previously granted by the Federal Circuit Court Judge; for orders that would permit the wife to draw funds from accounts of the parties’ Australian business interests for her support; for orders permitting the use of capital for the payment of legal expenses incurred in these proceedings; and for orders for disclosure.

Some Background

The wife is 60 years of age, was born in Country D, migrated to Australia with her first husband and their two children in 1986 and became an Australian citizen in 1988. She lives in an apartment in a Brisbane suburb.
The husband is almost 54 years of age, was also born in Country D, also migrated to Australia in 1986, and became an Australian citizen in 1989. He now lives in Country D.
The wife separated from her first husband in 1986 and commenced a relationship with the husband later that year. She did not obtain dissolution of her first marriage until 1995. She then married the husband in 1996. They have three of their own children who were born in 1987, 1992 and 1994. All are, of course, now adults.
The husband returned to live principally in Country D in 1997/1998. The wife remained in Australia caring for their three children and managing their Australian investments.
There is no dispute between the parties that they have very significant business and property interests in Australia and in Country D, most of which are held through companies and trusts they own and control. Indeed, there is no dispute that the totality of their wealth is probably worth in excess of $200,000,000, with something like at least $27,000,000 of that value being held in Australia. There are nine Australian registered companies, at least, that constitute what the parties call the B Group, and there are thirteen Country D registered companies, at least, that constitute their Country D corporate interests. They also have some property interests in their own names.
The couple agree that they have now ended their marriage and separated. There is dispute about exactly when this happened. The wife says it was April this year and the husband says it was October 2014. The determination of that factual dispute is not required for the determination of the matters in dispute at this hearing.
Through their shareholdings and directorships in the B Group, the parties own and control significant real property and listed share investments as well as cash holdings. Considerable income is generated by those investments. As already observed, the wife, it seems, has managed these investments in the years since the husband left Australia supporting herself and the parties’ children from the income and the capital.

11.The eldest of the parties’ three adult children is a health professional, the second child is a health professional student and the third is a university student. The two students still live with their mother in Brisbane. Unsurprisingly, she supports them.

The parties’ Country D interests include interests in companies that have an extensive and diverse investment property portfolio. It seems, on the evidence, the parties have personal real property interests in Country D as well.
On the evidence, it appears the parties maintained their marriage and family relationships across international borders for years whilst the husband lived principally in Country D and the wife lived principally in Australia. The wife, at least, has travelled regularly between Australia and Country D, spending time with the husband and her own family of origin on such trips.
The relationship appears to have foundered when the wife learned the husband had formed a relationship with another woman in Country D. The wife deposes to a belief that the husband has bought a valuable apartment for the use and occupation by that other woman using capital of the parties, although she does not depose to the basis of that belief.
The wife commenced these Court proceedings in Australia in the Federal Circuit Court in June this year, seeking orders as a result of the husband convening meetings of shareholders of some of the Australian companies seeking to remove the wife and her two adult children of her first marriage from their directorships of the companies. In response the husband sought freezing orders, but only in respect of their Australian interests.
On 7 August 2015, Judge Coates of the Brisbane Registry of the Federal Circuit Court made Orders that restrained the parties from removing themselves or the other party from any office held in the Australian companies and two of the Country D companies, or from dealing with or disposing of any shares each held in the Australian or Country D companies. Judge Coates also restrained each party from drawing in excess of $1,000 in one transaction from any bank account relating to the group of Australian companies without the consent of the other party or an order of the Court. His Honour also granted injunctions restraining the parties from dealing with the assets of the Australian group of companies, increasing any liability of those companies or increasing any salary, director’s fee or dividend received from any of those companies.
There is no dispute that Judge Coates’ Orders principally impacted upon the wife, controlling and limiting what she could do in respect of the parties’ Australian companies, including severely constraining her access to the funds of those companies, with no corresponding limitation or control on the husband in respect of their Country D interests.
There was dispute between counsel for the parties about whether Judge Coates had given reasons for the Orders he made on 7 August, with counsel for the wife saying he did not and with counsel for the husband saying that his Honour had given brief oral reasons at the time. No written reasons or transcript of oral reasons were adduced into evidence before me.

What is now sought

The wife seeks variation of the existing restraints because every payment made in the management of the Australian companies over $1,000 requires written consent of the husband without there being any exception in respect of payments made in the ordinary course of business or in respect of her reasonable living expenses.
The evidence adduced by the wife demonstrated to my satisfaction that she was having difficulty getting the husband to even consider her requests, as well as difficulty getting him to agree to payment for her personal expenses. At the same time, the husband was not subject to any similar constraint or restraint in respect of his management of their Country D interests and his ability to access money there as he needed it.
The wife deposed to the Australian companies having regular monthly payments of ordinary business expenses that well exceed the $1,000 limit and she sought exception be provided for expenses incurred in the ordinary course of business of those entities. At the same time, she deposed to having personal expenses of around $20,000 per month which, in the past, she has caused to be paid from the accounts of the entities which have, she says, been treated by the company accountants as “wages” paid to her.
It is clear that the existing restraints impact directly upon her capacity to continue to do that, preventing her from drawing such funds where the drawing would be in excess of $1,000, without the husband’s written consent or an order of the Court. Significantly, the wife deposed to not having “enough savings in [her] personal bank accounts to pay for legal fees in [these] current proceedings nor [her] ordinary household expenses”. She deposed to having to borrow money from her eldest son’s company to pay for her legal fees.
At the same time, the wife deposed to becoming aware that her husband, who is not subject to any similar constraints in respect of paying for his legal fees or his own personal expenses or in respect of any expenditure in respect of any of the parties’ Country D interests, had arranged for the approval of an extension of a pre-existing line of credit secured by one of the Country D companies in the order of the equivalent of AUD$4.4 million and the establishment of another line of credit with another Country D bank for a not dissimilar amount, without the wife’s knowledge or approval.
The wife went on to depose that the lines of credit have been drawn on by the husband without her prior knowledge or consent for purposes not known to her. She deposed to a belief that one of the amounts drawn down from one of the lines of credit was an amount similar to the amount allegedly paid by the husband for an apartment for his Country D girlfriend to live in.
As submitted by counsel for the wife, the evidence establishes that the husband discloses a weekly income of $1,838, cash at bank that he has access to of about AUD$700,000 (having received dividends of AUD$846,704 earlier this year from one of the Country D companies), and no asserted difficulties meeting his own personal expenditure needs, including the payment of his legal fees in these proceedings.
For the husband, although conceding in an alternate draft set of proposed Orders that the wife ought to be able to draw a net amount of up to $12,000 from the accounts of the Australian companies, it was still submitted that the wife has not met all of her disclosure obligations, including, in particular, in respect of personal bank accounts and that, consequently, the Court could not reasonably accept that the wife had made out her case for interim financial relief, including in respect of the payment of her reasonable legal fees in these proceedings.

As to that matter, the wife having deposed to not being able to pay her ordinary household expenses or her legal fees without reasonable access to the accounts of the Australian companies of the parties, I was not satisfied by that submission or any evidence adduced by the husband that her evidence should not be accepted. Indeed, as I respectfully made clear to counsel for the husband during the course of the hearing on 15 October 2015, in circumstances where it is not disputed that the parties’ property interests in Australia and Country D are valued at in excess of AUD $200 million, and where the husband, through his counsel, conceded that there was no question about the husband’s capacity or the capacity of the parties’ capital as such, in all the circumstances, to provide for the wife and their children financially as she seeks, there is apparently little need to take a particularly parsimonious approach to the determination of the matters before the Court. This view, in my judgment, is reinforced by the clearly apparent fact that over many years prior to the recent separation of the parties, the husband has clearly acquiesced to circumstances where the wife has caused her personal and household expenses, including expenses related to the support of their adult children, to be paid by drawings out of the Australian companies’ accounts with the treatment of those drawings being determined in conjunction with the companies’ accountants.
The submission of counsel for the husband was that the question of the wife’s entitlement to access the funds as she sought was to be determined pursuant to the spousal maintenance provisions of ss 72, 74 and 75 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”). Principally, counsel for the husband submitted that the wife did not get over the threshold of establishing that she was unable to support herself adequately. As I have observed already, counsel submitted that the Court could not be satisfied that the wife was being truthful when she deposed to not being able to meet her household expenses without reasonable access to the Australian companies’ accounts. Furthermore, for the husband it was submitted that the wife could not include in expenses she sought access to funds to be able to pay, any expenses relating to the parties’ adult children.
There would, I am satisfied, be merit in the last part of that submission if the orders the wife seeks are to be made pursuant to the spousal maintenance provisions of the Act. With respect, I do not consider that they are.
The wife is a director of the relevant Australian companies of the parties. The power to grant the injunctions that Judge Coates put in place in August this year that restricted her and the husband’s access, as directors, to the accounts of the Australian companies had to have been sourced in s 114 (3) of the Act, granted on an interim basis to protect the property of the parties pending finalisation of the substantive property adjustment proceedings between them commenced by the wife.
That power was said by the Full Court in Mullen and De Bry (2006) FLC 93-293 at [46] to be “simply described” as the power “to grant an injunction … in any case in which it is just or convenient to do so”. Such injunctions can be granted “either unconditionally or upon such terms and conditions as the Court considers appropriate.”
As such, I do not consider this application of the wife for variation to those injunctions, so as to allow the wife access to reasonable funds for her support and the support of her household in circumstances where she deposes to having no access to other funds of her own, to be an application for spousal maintenance pursuant to the provisions of s 72 to s 75 of the Act.
Rather, I consider that the wife’s application is for yet another consideration and assessment of “a number of factors to determine the just or convenient result” in respect to the granting of interim injunctions that were initially granted to preserve property of the parties pending trial, as observed by the Full Court in Mullen and De Bry at [47].
I do not consider it a case where the wife is seeking orders that the husband pay her spousal maintenance. I do not consider her application, involving as it does an application for variation to the injunctions that were granted so that she can have access to funds to pay her reasonable legal fees in these proceedings, to be an application for the husband to pay her legal fees pursuant to the costs power or the spousal maintenance power. The wife’s application in this case, in so far as it relates to her getting access to funds for the payment of legal fees, I consider looks to the property adjustment powers of s 79 and, more particularly, the power in s 114(3) to grant ancillary injunctions, as the source of the Court’s power to grant it.
In the circumstances of this case, I am satisfied that the injunctions granted by Judge Coates in August this year have, respectfully, imposed consequences upon the wife that are neither just nor convenient. I intend to vary them – effectively by discharging them and granting fresh injunctions that I consider are just and convenient and that include terms and conditions that I consider appropriate.
The injunctions I will grant will continue the restraints imposed upon each of the husband and the wife not to:
(i)Cause themselves or the other party to be removed from office held in any of the Australian companies or the Country D companies without the consent of the other or order of this Court; or
(ii)Cause any shares each holds in any of the Australian or Country D companies to be disposed of or dealt with without the consent of the other or order of this Court.
Additionally, I will grant injunctions that I consider restrain each of the parties, (it being just, convenient and appropriate in my judgment to impose similar obligations on each of the parties) from withdrawing funds from any personal accounts or accounts of the Australian companies or the Country D companies in excess of the amount of $10,000 as opposed to the much smaller sum of $1,000 previously provided for, without the consent of the other party or order of this Court, subject to exceptions in respect to drawings made in the ordinary course of business; to meet already existing contractual obligations; for the wife to be able to meet personal and household expenses of up to $15,000 per month; and for each party to pay legal expenses in these proceedings up to a limit of $200,000.
I considered the evidence of the wife deposed to in paragraph 10 of her affidavit filed 1 October 2015 and the submissions of counsel for each of the parties and I am satisfied that the monthly ceiling at an amount of $20,000 sought to be accessed by the wife to meet personal and household expenses is excessive, unreasonable and more than is appropriate in the circumstances. For example, I consider that an amount of $6,500 per month for groceries and food for her and the two adult university students is unreasonably excessive. I consider the amount of $1,500 per month for twice yearly flights to Country D for the wife is unreasonably excessive. I consider that the wife has double counted some motor vehicle expenses, some cleaning and pool maintenance expenses and household supplies expenses.
I do consider it appropriate to allow the wife access to funds to meet expenses that include allowances and tuition fees for the parties’ two young adult university students in circumstances where the husband offered no alternative, such as payment of those expenses himself from funds he has access to.
I consider it appropriate, as well as just and convenient, particularly having regard to the enormous amount of capital the parties ultimately own and control, that the wife has access to a reasonable amount to pay her legal expenses in these proceedings. I consider the sum of $200,000 to be a reasonable amount in the first instance, particularly given there were no real estimates or particularisation of her expected legal fees provided in her evidence to support the application for the amount to be $250,000. However, having regard to the total value of the parties’ property interests, and the work that is likely to have to be done by the parties’ legal representatives and valuers before this matter is finalised, I consider that capping the amount at $200,000 at this point in the proceedings is appropriate.
I also consider it just and equitable that the husband be subject to the same restraint in respect of access to funds to pay legal fees, it being appropriate, just and convenient that they be able to access similar amounts for the same purpose. I will subject each of them to an ongoing obligation to disclose on a regular monthly basis the amount they have paid in legal fees and the source of the funds used to make such payment.
I also consider it appropriate that each party be restrained from causing their salary, director’s fees or dividends received from any of their entities from being increased without the consent of the other party or order of this Court, save as otherwise provided for in the conditions that allow each to access funds as specified. I also consider it appropriate, having regard to the evidence about the wife’s former husband and child of that earlier marriage being paid salaries by at least one of the Australian companies, to broaden that restraint to one that applies to those salaries paid to such third parties.
In granting these injunctions in these terms, I am quite satisfied that neither the wife’s nor the husband’s interests in the determination of final property adjustment orders in the substantive proceedings that are just and equitable are likely to be prejudiced or compromised by the injunctions, whilst at the same time being satisfied that suitable interim restraints that do provide each of them with comfort and appropriate protection of their interests whilst substantive proceedings remain pending are provided for.
It will be a matter for each of the parties and their advisers as to how the drawings each makes to pay for personal expenses (in respect of the wife at least) and for legal fees in these proceedings, are to be properly treated in company accounts and in the finalization of property adjustment as between them. In the event of remaining disagreement about any of those matters, they will, of course, be matters for the trial Judge to determine. I consider that all to be entirely appropriate.
In respect to the proposed extension of the injunctions to include restraints on the husband in respect of the parties’ Country D interests that are no different to those imposed on the wife in respect of the parties’ Australian interests, counsel for the husband further submitted that the Court should not impose those on the husband as the evidence establishes that various third parties have interests in some of those Country D entities that would be prejudiced by such restraints.
I accept, as was effectively submitted by counsel for the wife, that the extension of the injunctions to also restrain the husband in similar fashion to the wife is a just, convenient and appropriate way to protect the interests of the wife in the property adjustment proceedings without prejudicing the rights of third parties. To the extent that the husband is a director of Country D companies in which there are third party shareholders, I am satisfied the ordinary and proper course of business exception provides for their interests to be protected. If there are companies in which the husband and wife are minority shareholders but in which the husband is a director, then Country D law dealing with corporate control will, I expect, protect the rights of third party shareholders.
I will, with respect, not refuse to grant the injunctions on the terms that I have determined are just, convenient and appropriate on the basis of the submission made by counsel for the husband about the rights of third parties in Country D.

Disclosure

Accepting the wife’s evidence, as I do, that she is not aware of the husband’s use of funds provided to one of their Country D companies by the two lines of credit she is now aware are in place and have been drawn upon, I consider it appropriate for the husband to file and serve an affidavit in which he deposes to all of the details surrounding the applications for the two lines of credit for C Industrial Incorporated in Country D, each in the sum of CD$100,000,000 one with the Bank H and the other with Bank I Co Ltd, to the extent that he has not already deposed to same. I consider it appropriate, in particular, that he depose in that affidavit to full details of the use of any of those funds drawn down from those lines of credit in the last twelve months. I also consider it appropriate that he exhibit to that affidavit any documents related to the matters he is required to depose to that he is obliged to disclose to the wife that he has not already disclosed. I also consider it appropriate for him to depose to the attempts he has made to obtain copies of any such documents that he is unable to obtain. I will so order.
In dealing with the husband’s submissions that the wife has not met her disclosure obligations, I will also order that the wife provide such further disclosure or copies of documents that were requested to be disclosed by her in the letter that was made Exhibit 1 in the proceedings on Thursday, 15 October 2015. I will also order her to file and serve an affidavit deposing to the attempts she has made to obtain any documents or copies of those documents that she is unable to provide.
I will make an order that the parties otherwise provide to the other copies of the documents contained in their respective Lists of Documents and any Supplementary Lists of Documents already exchanged.
Finally, I will reserve the question of each party’s costs of and incidental to the applications heard on Thursday 15 October determined by this judgment. I do so having regard to remarks I made from the bench to counsel for the husband during the course of his submissions that if subsequent disclosure by the wife reveals that she did already have the capacity to meet her own expenses and the expenses of her household from her own personal assets, contrary to what she deposed to in support of her application that I have by this judgment determined, that an application by the husband for his costs of and incidental to opposing her application might have some merit.
I order in the terms set out at the commencement of these written reasons.

I certify that the preceding fifty-two (52) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Forrest delivered on 22 October 2015.

Associate:

Date: 22 October 2015