Canvil and Merle and Ors

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CANVIL & MERLE AND ORS

[2019] FamCA 684

FAMILY LAW – CHILDREN – Best interests – where an order is made for the children, aged 13 and 9, to live with the mother and spend time with the father – where an order that the children spend unsupervised time, increasing over time with the father – where the mother have sole parental responsibility of the children, other than changes to the children’s living arrangements that make it significantly more difficult for the children to spend time with the father.

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)
Australian Passports Act 2005 (Cth)

Banks v Banks (2015) FLC 93-637

Vigano v Desmond (2012) FLC 93-509

APPLICANT:

Ms Canvil

1st RESPONDENT:

Mr Merle

2nd RESPONDENT:

Mr E Canvil and Mrs G Canvil by her Case Guardian Mr E Canvil

INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER:

Dooley Solicitors

FILE NUMBER:

BRC

4803

2012

DATE DELIVERED:

25 January 2019

PLACE DELIVERED:

Brisbane

PLACE HEARD:

Brisbane

JUDGMENT OF:

Hogan J

HEARING DATE:

29 February 2016;
1, 2 & 3 March 2016;
18 April 2016

REPRESENTATION

THE APPLICANT:

In person

COUNSEL FOR THE 1ST RESPONDENT:

Mr Hackett

SOLICITOR FOR THE 1ST RESPONDENT:

Evans & Company Family Lawyers

COUNSEL FOR THE 2ND RESPONDENT:

Mr Blackah (on 18 April 2016 only)

SOLICITOR FOR THE 2ND RESPONDENT:

Calabrese Lawyers (on 18 April 2016 only)

COUNSEL FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER:

Ms Black

SOLICITOR FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER:

Dooley Solicitors

Orders

IT IS ORDERED BY WAY OF FINAL ORDER THAT:

All previous parenting orders are discharged.
The children L, born … 2006 and F, born … 2009, live with the mother.
The mother have sole parental responsibility in respect of all major long term issues (as that expression is defined in the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)) in respect of the children, other than changes to the children’s living arrangements that make it significantly more difficult for the children to spend time with the father.
Before making a decision about any such issue, the mother shall:
(a)inform the father in writing of the issue about which a decision needs to be made, the decision she would like to make in respect of such issue and the reasons for that proposed decision; and
(b)allow the father fourteen (14) days after the provision by her of the information referred to above to respond to the same in writing; and
(c)consider the father’s response, if any, when coming to her decision about any such issue; and
(d)inform the father of the final decision made with respect to that issue as soon as practicable thereafter.
The parents shall have equal shared parental responsibility in relation to changes to the children’s living arrangements that make it significantly more difficult for the children to spend time with the father.
Each parent has responsibility for daily decisions about the day to day care, welfare and development of the children when they are in that parent’s care.
Unless otherwise agreed by the parents in writing, the children shall spend time with the father as follows:
(a)during school terms: on Monday from after school until 6.30 pm, with L to spend time with his father each alternate Monday and F to spend time with her father each alternate Monday (such that each child spends each alternate Monday alone with their father), with the father to collect the child with whom he is spending time from school at the commencement of time and the mother to collect the child from the father’s residence at the conclusion of time; and
(b)from Saturday 2 February 2019 until Friday 29 March 2019: each alternate weekend, from 3.30 pm Saturday until 5.00 pm Sunday, with changeovers to occur at J Group Supervision or, if it is unavailable, such other place as is agreed between the parents in writing or, failing agreement about this, at McDonald’s Restaurant, Suburb K; and thereafter
(c)from Saturday 30 March 2019 until Friday 3 May 2019: each alternate weekend from 9.00 am Saturday to 5.00 pm Sunday, with changeovers to occur at a place that is agreed between the parents in writing or, failing agreement about this, at McDonald’s Restaurant, Suburb K; and thereafter
(d)commencing on Friday 3 May 2019: each alternate weekend from after school Friday to 5.00 pm Sunday, with the father to collect the children from school at the commencement of their time and changeover at the conclusion of time to occur at a place that is agreed between the parents in writing or, failing agreement about this, at McDonald’s Restaurant, Suburb K; and
(e)during the school holidays at the end of Term 2 in 2019: for three consecutive nights, being from 9.00 am on the first Saturday after school finishes for the Term until 5.00 pm on the next Tuesday; and
(f)during the school holidays at the end of Term 3 in 2019: for five consecutive nights, being from 9.00 am on the first Saturday after school finishes for the Term until 5.00 pm on the next Thursday; and
(g)during the school holidays at the end of Term 4 in 2019:
(i)from 9.00 am Saturday on the second Saturday after school finishes for the Term until 5.00 pm on the third Saturday of the school holiday period (where the Saturday after school ends for the Term is the first Saturday); and
(ii)from 9.00am on the fourth Saturday after school finishes for the Term until 5.00 pm on the fifth Saturday of the school holiday period (where the Saturday after school ends for the Term is the first Saturday);
(iii)from 9.00am on the sixth Saturday after school finishes for the Term (where the Saturday day after school ends for the Term is the first Saturday) until 5.00 pm on the following Saturday.
(h)commencing with the school holidays at the end of Term 1 in 2020: for the first half of each school holiday period at the end of Terms 1, 2 and 3 in even numbered years and for the second half of each school holiday period at the end of Terms 1, 2 and 3 in odd numbered years, with this time to occur as follows:
(i)when the time occurs during the first half of the school holiday period: from 9.00 am Saturday on the day after school finishes for the Term until 5.00 pm on the next Saturday of the school holiday period (where the Saturday after school ends for the Term is the first Saturday); and
(ii)when the time occurs during the second half of the school holiday period: from 9.00 am Saturday on the second Saturday of the school holiday period (where the Saturday after school ends for the Term is the first Saturday) until 5.00 pm on the Saturday before school recommences.
(i)commencing with the school holidays at the end of Term 4 in 2020: for the first half of the school holiday period at the end of Term 4 in even numbered years and for the second half of the school holiday period at the end of Term 4 in odd numbered years, with this time to occur as follows:
(i)when the time occurs during the first half of the school holiday period: from 9.00 am Saturday (being the day after school finishes for the Term) until 5.00 pm on the fourth Saturday of the school holiday period if the holiday period is of six week’s duration or on the fifth Saturday if the holiday period is of eight weeks’ duration (where the Saturday immediately after school ends for the Term is the first Saturday); and
(ii)when the time occurs during the second half of the school holiday period: from 9.00 am Saturday on the fourth Saturday of the school holiday period if the holiday period is of six week’s duration or on the fifth Saturday if the holiday period is of eight weeks’ duration until 5.00 pm on the Saturday before school recommences for the year (where the Saturday immediately after school ends for the Term is the first Saturday).
(j)from 4.00 pm on Christmas Eve to 12.00 pm on Christmas Day in even numbered years; and
(k)from 12.00 pm on Christmas Day to 4.00 pm on Boxing Day in odd numbered years; and
(l)on each of the children’s birthdays (if the children are in the mother’s care on those days):
(i)from 12.00 pm to 4.00 pm if the day falls on a weekend; or
(ii)from 3.00pm or after school until 8.00 pm if the day falls on a week day.
(m)on his birthday (if the children are in the mother’s care on that day):
(i)from 12.00 pm to 4.00 pm if the day falls on a weekend; or
(ii)from 3.00 pm or after school until 8.00 pm if the day falls on a week day.
In the event that the time the children will spend with the father pursuant to Clause (7)(d) above does not fall on the weekend on which Father’s Day occurs, the children will spend time with the father from after school or 3.00 pm on the Friday immediately before Father’s Day until 5.00pm on Father’s Day, with the father to collect the children from school at the start of this time and changeover at the conclusion of time to occur at a public place that is agreed between the parents in writing or, failing agreement about this, at McDonald’s Restaurant Suburb K.
The operation of Clauses (7)(a), (7)(c) and (7)(d) shall be suspended during all school holiday periods commencing with the holidays at the end of Term 2 in 2019 and the time provided for in the applicable Clause shall recommence as follows:
(a)when the children have spent the first half of the school holiday period with the father – on the first weekend after school starts for the Term; and
(b)when the children have spent the second half of the school holiday period with the father – on the second weekend after school starts for the Term.
The operation of Clause (7)(d) is suspended for the weekend on which Mother’s Day occurs, such that the children will remain in the mother’s care for that weekend.
The children shall spend time with the mother:
(a)from 4.00 pm on Christmas Eve to 12.00 pm on Christmas Day in odd numbered years; and
(b)from 12.00 pm on Christmas Day to 4.00 pm on Boxing Day in even numbered years; and
(c)on each of the children’s birthdays (if the children are in the father’s care on those days):
(i)from 12.00 pm to 4.00 pm if the day falls on a weekend; or
(ii)from 3.00 pm or after school until 8.00 pm if the day falls on a week day.
(d)on her birthday (if the children are in the father’s care on that day):
(i)from 12.00 pm to 4.00 pm if the day falls on a weekend; or
(ii)from 3.00 pm or after school until 8.00 pm if the day falls on a week day.
Each parent shall communicate with the children, when they are not in their care, by telephone or Skype at all reasonable times and not less than each Wednesday between 6.30 pm and 7.30 pm and, in order to facilitate this:
(a)the parent with whom the children are not spending time shall initiate the telephone or Skype call; and
(b)the parent in whose care the children are at that time shall make the children available to receive the telephone or Skype call; and
(c)the parent in whose care the children are at that time shall arrange for the children to telephone the calling parent on the following night if, for any unforeseen circumstance, the children miss the telephone or Skype call from that parent; and
(d)each parent shall ensure that the children have privacy during the communication
The children shall be at liberty to call either parent at all reasonable times and the parent with whom they are at the time shall assist them to make any calls they reasonably request.
Unless otherwise specified in this Order or agreed between the parents in writing, changeover on a school day shall occur from school and, otherwise, changeovers shall occur at McDonald’s Restaurant, Suburb K
Each party shall be entitled to have another person attend changeover on their behalf, provided that such person is known to the children.
Neither parent shall enrol the children in any activity which occurs during time they are living or spending time with the other parent, without first obtaining the written consent of that parent.
Each parent shall ensure that each child attends at any extra-curricular activity in which that child is currently enrolled.
Each parent shall comply with the reasonable treatment recommendations of Dr R regarding the treatment of the children’s ADHD and otherwise follow all reasonable recommendations made by any of the children’s treating medical practitioners or allied health professionals.
During any time that the children are in the care of either parent, that parent shall ensure that each child takes all medication that has been prescribed for that child.
Neither parent shall denigrate or insult the other, or their family to, or in front of, or within the hearing of, the children and each shall direct third parties to refrain from denigrating either party or their family to, or in front of, or within hearing of, the children and, failing their compliance with such a direction, shall remove the children from that environment immediately.
During the time the children are with either parent, that parent shall respect the privacy of the other parent and not question the children about the personal life of the other parent.
Each parent keep the other informed of the details of the children’s doctors, health care and other treatment providers and, by this Order, those practitioners are authorised to provide each parent with such information as they are lawfully able to provide about the children.
Each parent inform the other parent as soon as reasonably practicable of any medical emergency, significant health issue or significant illness suffered by the children and, by this Order, any treating medical practitioner is hereby authorised to release medical information about any medical emergency, significant health issue or significant illness suffered by the children to both parents.
Each parent keep the other informed of the details of any school, educational facility or extra-curricular activity provider at which the children attend and, by this Order, such providers are authorised to provide each parent with such information as they are lawfully able to provide about the children and their progress.
If there is a cost associated with the provision of any information or documents by the children’s doctors, health care and other treatment providers or school, educational facility or extra-curricular activity provider, that expense shall be borne by the parent requesting the information.
Each parent shall ensure that the other is nominated as an emergency contact with any school, medical practitioner or extra-curricular service provider upon which the children attend.
Subject to the conditions imposed by the child’s schools, this Order authorises both parents to attend school functions to which parents are ordinarily invited, including but not limited to carnivals, sports days, fetes, concerts, plays and parent/teacher interviews.
Each parent keep the other parent informed at all times of their residential address, contact telephone number and an email address and:
(a)notify the other as to any change in those details as soon as practicable after such change; and
(b)notify the other parent at least sixty (60) days prior to relocating their residence beyond a fifty (50) kilometre radius from where they currently reside.
Save for in therapeutic counselling, neither parent shall discuss these proceedings, nor the allegations made in them, with the children, nor involve the children in any discussions regarding any issue in dispute between them.
Each parent is permitted to remove the children from the Commonwealth of Australia for the purpose of holiday travel and the children L, born … 2006 and F, born … 2009, are permitted to leave the Commonwealth of Australia for their purpose of international holiday travel with either of their parents as provided for in this Order and, in order to facilitate such travel, both children are permitted to have an Australian travel document as that term is defined in and for the purpose of the Australian Passports Act 2005 (Cth).
In the event that a parent wishes to remove the children from the Commonwealth of Australia pursuant to Clause (30), that parent shall provide the other with no less than sixty (60) days’ notice of the intention to travel overseas and shall provide details of the destination and proposed departure and arrival dates.
No less than thirty (30) days before date of departure from the Commonwealth of Australia, the travelling parent shall provide to the other:
(a)a copy of a return ticket for the children, evidencing the date of departure and date of return to the Commonwealth of Australia; and
(b)a copy of an itinerary which contains sufficient contact details to enable telephone or Skype communication between the non-travelling parent and the children to occur in the manner provided for in this Order.
The mother is entitled to possession of the children’s passports on the proviso that, in order to facilitate overseas holiday travel notified by the father in accordance with Clause (31) of this Order, she shall provide the same to the father no less than fourteen (14) days before any notified proposed date of departure from the Commonwealth of Australia.
In the event the father removes the child from the Commonwealth of Australia for the purpose of holiday travel, he shall return the children’s passports to the mother within seven (7) days of the children’s return to the Commonwealth of Australia.
In the event that either parent fails to comply with a request to sign and return any document necessary to put the terms of this Order into effect, a Registrar of the Family Court of Australia is appointed, pursuant to section 106A of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), to sign such document or documents in the name of the parent who has declined to comply with such request.
Each parent has liberty to provide a copy of the Order made 25 January 2019 and the Reasons for Judgment delivered 25 January 2019 to the school at which the children attend and also to any therapist upon whom the parents and/or the children attend for the purpose of family therapy or other supportive therapy.
The Independent Children’s Lawyer is discharged.
Pursuant to s 65DA(2) and s 62B of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), the particulars of the obligations these orders create and the particulars of the consequences that may follow if a person contravenes these orders and details of who can assist parties to adjust to and comply with an order are set out in the Fact Sheet attached and these particulars are included in these orders.

AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT

All outstanding parenting applications are otherwise dismissed and removed from the list of cases requiring finalisation.

AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT

In the event that any party seeks an order that the other party pay his or her costs:
(a)if thought necessary by a party, that party has leave to file a further affidavit by that party containing any evidence relevant to the issue of costs and one other affidavit in support of the same, provided that such affidavits are filed within twenty-eight (28) days of the date of this order; and
(b)any such party shall file and serve any written submissions in support of such application for costs within twenty-eight (28) days of today; and
(c)the party against whom an order for costs is sought shall, within a further fourteen (14) days thereafter, file and serve any brief written submissions in answer to the submissions filed and served by the party seeking costs; and
(d)the party seeking an order for costs shall file and serve any brief further written submissions within seven (7) days of its service, strictly in reply to the submissions served by the party against whom an order for costs is sought,
and any such application for costs shall be considered in Chambers.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Canvil & Merle has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE

FILE NUMBER: BRC 4803 of 2012

Ms Canvil

Applicant

And

Mr Merle

First Respondent

And

Mr E Canvil and Ms G Canvil by her Case Guardian Mr E Canvil

Second Respondent

And

The Independent Children’s Lawyer

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT[1]

[1] I commence these Reasons with a sincere apology to the parties for the significant delay in finalising this matter. I assure them that I have had particular regard to the extensive contemporaneous notes I took during the hearing. I have revisited these notes, the Transcripts, the affidavit material, and the contents of the parties’ respective submissions, however described. I also note that the parties were advised on 20 December 2018 that Judgment would be delivered on 18 January 2019.

The father was born in Country L in 1967. He and his family first moved to live in Australia in 1981. He subsequently returned to Country L in about 1986 and studied there and in Country M, before moving to live in the United Kingdom. The mother, who was born in Country N in 1970, lived in Country O during her childhood. She graduated as a healthcare professional in the United Kingdom in 1995 and later obtained further qualifications in 2007.
The father and the mother commenced their relationship in the United Kingdom in or about October 2002. They commenced cohabitation there in about 2003 and married in Country L in 2006. They continued to live in the United Kingdom until about January 2007, when they moved to live in Sydney. At this time, the father recommenced working for the family business previously operated by his parents.
After this relocation, the mother had to undertake a period of further training – which took about eight months[2] ‑ in order to have her qualifications recognised in this country. She subsequently obtained registration in her specialty here in about August 2008.
[2] Commencing in January 2008.
The father and the mother have two children: now thirteen year old L, born in Country O in 2006 and F, born in Australia in 2009 and now about nine years and five months of age.
In about January 2009, the mother (then pregnant with F) and L (then about three years of age) relocated to Region D. She asserted that the father remained living in Sydney until about March 2012, when he too moved to live at in Region D. He said that he moved at the same time but continued to work in Sydney: his account, contrary to that of the mother, was that he had spent a lot of time in Region D since 2009 (his estimate was that in 2009/2010, he spent 58 per cent of his time in Region D and that, whilst he spent less time than this there in 2011, this was only because the mother made it very hard for him to see the children).
Given the time that has passed, I am not persuaded that it is necessary to resolve this dispute about the father’s historical interaction with the children. It was not disputed by the mother and I accept that, at least since about early 2012, he has demonstrated a consistent desire to be involved in the children’s lives in a meaningful way.
Another issue in dispute is when the parties finally separated: the mother said this happened in September 2011, whereas the father said it happened in January 2012. Given the overall circumstances of this case, resolution of this relatively minor discrepancy is, I consider, unnecessary to determine those parenting orders which are in the children’s best interests.
The mother and the children continue to live on the Region D, in a property at Suburb C which she purchased in January 2010. According to the evidence, she continued to work at a local hospital. The father, who remains a director of, and the marketing manager for, his parents’ business (which is predominantly based in Sydney) lived in rental accommodation at Suburb K. He continued to travel to Sydney for work.

Parenting

A proper consideration of the parenting proposals advanced by the father and the mother can only occur with the benefit of appreciating those parenting arrangements which have occurred to date.
It is clear that, at least since separation in either September 2011 or March 2012 (when L was about five years of age and F about two years of age) the children have lived primarily in, and been primarily cared for within, the mother’s home. Previous parenting Orders have provided that they live with her and for their time with their father, which has occurred on both a supervised and unsupervised basis.

Previous parenting proposals, arrangements and Orders

It seems uncontentious that the father moved out of the previously shared residence in about early 2012. In about March 2012, he obtained his own accommodation. The children then spent time with him each alternate weekend from Saturday morning until Monday morning when he delivered them to school and day care respectively.[3] Whilst the mother later told Ms W (in September 2012) that there were ongoing problems and that the father was unable to cope with the children, this time was unsupervised and continued until an incident during a weekend in July 2012. After that incident, the mother decided that the children should not spend time with their father.
[3] Family Report dated 10 October 2012, [92].
In May 2012, the father applied to the Court seeking an order for equal shared parental responsibility in relation to the children and that they live with each parent on a week about basis. The mother’s proposal, as at August 2012, was that she be accorded sole parental responsibility and that the children live with her and spend time with the father from 9.00 am Saturday until 5.00 pm Sunday each alternate weekend (with changeover to occur at a neutral location). She also proposed that, during school holiday periods, the children’s time continue to occur on an alternate weekend basis but commence on Friday afternoon (that is, so that the children spend two nights per fortnight in the care of their father during school holiday periods). Her proposition was conditional upon the father undertaking to not engage in domestic violence, attend a post separation parenting program and agreeing to return the children to her if he experienced any anxiety about caring for them.
Orders made in August 2012 provided that the children spend two hours[4] with the father on the Saturday and Sunday of two out of three consecutive weekends. This time was to be supervised by either the mother or occur at a local Contact Centre. The orders also provided that the father be at liberty to attend the children’s extra-curricular activities and that he enrol in an anger management course.
[4] From 3.00 pm until 5.00 pm.
On 25 October 2012, the children’s time with their father was increased to a period of four hours on the Saturday and Sunday of each alternate weekend. Supervision continued. Ms P was appointed as the supervisor. On 2 November 2012, further orders were made, included within which was a restraint on the father speaking to the children in the Country L language during their time together.
Further orders were made on 4 February 2013. The February 2013 orders provided that, for four occasions, the children spend time with their father for four hours each alternate Saturday and Sunday. The time remained supervised by Ms P but, if she could accommodate it, was to be extended by two hours on the Saturdays, during which it could occur at the father’s home. After this, and for two occasions, the time was to occur on an unsupervised basis for four hours each alternate Saturday and Sunday, with changeover to be facilitated by Ms P. After this, for four occasions, the children were to spend time with their father for four hours each alternate Saturday and Sunday, with changeovers to occur at a public place. Then, for three months, the time was to occur from 8.00 am and 4.00 pm each alternate Saturday, with changeovers to occur at a public place. After this, the children were to spend from 8.00 am Saturday to 4.00 pm Sunday each alternate weekend with their father, with changeovers to continue to occur at a public place. In addition to this time, each child was to have the opportunity to spend individual time with their father from after school until 5.30pm each alternate Tuesday.
Whilst the mother detailed a number of occasions on which the children are said to have returned to her care injured or sore, their time with their father progressed as prescribed by the February 2013 order until after the weekend on which 20 October 2013 occurred. This event is the subject of further discussion below.
After 20 October 2013, the mother ceased to facilitate the children spending time with their father.
An order made on 24 February 2014 provided that the children spend time with their father for eight hours each alternate Saturday and Sunday. This time was again to be supervised. The cost of supervision was to be borne by the father and the “appropriate supervisor” was to be someone agreed between the parents or, failing agreement, as provided for by the Independent Children’s Lawyer. The terms of the February 2014 order were generally complied with.
An Order made on 16 July 2015 provided that the children spend time with their father from 3.30 pm Saturday to 7.30 am Sunday each alternate weekend. This time was to be supervised at the father’s cost. In addition to this time, each child was to spend individual unsupervised time with their father each alternate Monday afternoon from after school until 5.30 pm. Time for both the children with their father during school holiday periods was to occur from 8.00 am to 6.00 pm on each Monday. This time was to be supervised also and, again, the father was to meet the cost of the same. He was, however, permitted to speak with the children in the Country L language during this time.

The competing proposals

The father proposed that, for twelve months, or such period as the Court determines (which he refers to as the “re-introductory period”), the children continue to live with their mother and that she exercise sole parental responsibility “over day to day decisions” and “all medical decisions”. Save for these aspects of the children’s parenting, he proposed that he and the mother have equal shared parental responsibility “about everything else”.
Whilst the father’s actual proposal for the time the children would spend with him during the re-introductory period was, on occasion at least, somewhat unclear, he suggested that the time (including overnight time) remain supervised by Ms P. He said the mother should pay for this supervision or, alternatively, the costs should be shared. He also proposed to spend unsupervised one-on-one time with each child and that he be permitted to travel with the children on those occasions. As I understand it, the rationale underpinning his proposal for the continuation of their one-on-one time with him was, at least in part, the impact of their Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder on their behaviours and their age difference, such that he thought each would benefit from the opportunity to spend time with him individually.
The father ultimately proposed that, after the “re-introductory period” ended, the children continue to live primarily with their mother and spend time with him in the manner outlined in his written proposal.[5] He also sought specific orders that the children continue to attend their current school (Q School) until the first of them completing Grade 12 or attaining the age of 18 years. In furtherance of this proposal, he sought that the mother be restrained from changing the children’s school.
[5] Exhibit “B”.
The mother initially proposed that the children live with her and spend supervised time with the father for eight hours each alternate Saturday and Sunday for such longer period of time as the Court concluded was necessary. She said he should pay for this supervision. She proposed that, once it was determined that supervision was no longer necessary, the children spend unsupervised time with their father on occasion, including on special occasions. Having initially reserved her right to further particularise her specific proposals when the evidence concluded, she proposed that those orders which were in the children’s best interests were as particularised in the draft Minute handed up by Counsel who appeared on her behalf.
In essence, the mother contended that she should have sole parental responsibility for the children; that they should continue to live her and that their time with their father increase incrementally. Her proposal was that, for twelve months after final parenting orders were made, the children spend time with their father from 9.00 am on Saturday until 4.00 pm on Sunday each alternate weekend and from the conclusion of school until 5.4 5pm on one afternoon each fortnight (provided that such time did not interfere with their existing commitments) and for three consecutive nights during the school holiday periods, with this time to be supervised by either Ms P or a suitably qualified nanny; she proposed that, for the following twelve months, the children’s time with their father during the school week be unsupervised, but their time with him at weekends and during school holidays remain supervised. She then proposed that, after the end of that twelve month period (that is, two years after final orders were made), the children’s time with their father be unsupervised and continue to occur once per fortnight after school, each alternate weekend and during school holiday periods. The mother also proposed that the father and children attend upon a behavioural psychologist for counselling, with an emphasis on behaviour management and play/family therapy.

General comments

Whilst the father and the mother continued to dispute the extent of his involvement with the children in the period from when they relocated to Region D in 2009 until their separation in either late 2011 or early 2012, the passage of time is such that I consider it unnecessary to resolve this aspect of their dispute. Whatever the father’s presence or absence and whatever his reliability or lack of reliability in assisting in the care of the children during this period, other matters, such as how the children have interacted with him since then and how he has managed their behaviours and his commitment to spending time with them are of far greater relevance in determining the future parenting orders.
Such determination is assisted by the contents of reports prepared by Ms W, a social worker, who has interviewed the parents and observed and spoken with the children on a number of occasions.

Principles

I may, subject to s 61DA[6] and s 65DAB[7] and Division 6 of Part VII of the Family Law Act1975 (Cth) (“the Act”), make such parenting order as I think proper.[8] I must have regard to the Objects of Part VII of the Act and the principles which underpin those Objects.[9] In deciding whether to make a parenting order, I must regard the children’s best interests as the paramount consideration.[10]
[6] Presumption of equal shared parental responsibility.
[7] Parenting plans.
[8] s 65D of the Act.
[9] s 60B of the Act.
[10] s 60CA and s 65AA of the Act.
The considerations to which regard must be had in determining those parenting orders which are in the children’s best interests are prescribed by s 60CC of the Act. The requirement to “consider” each of these matters involves taking note of them or giving heed to them or thinking over or reflecting on them; it does not necessarily mean that each must be the subject of any particular discussion, particularly where the evidence leads inexorably to a particular conclusion.[11] Any failure to mention a consideration specifically does not mean it has been overlooked in my deliberations about those orders which are in the children’s best interests and I have given heed to, and reflected on, all of the relevant considerations in arriving at my conclusions about those orders which are in the children’s best interests.
[11] Banks v Banks (2015) FLC 93-637: whilst said in the context of a consideration of interim proceedings, there is no reason to think that the underlying principle does not apply to the final disposition of proceedings.
As is often the case, some of those considerations require little discussion. For example, the geographic proximity of each parent’s residence means that there is no practical impediment to the children spending time and communicating with both parents on a regular basis.[12]

The benefit to the children of a meaningful relationship with both parents[13]

[12] s 60CC(3)(e) of the Act.

[13] ss 60CC(2)(a) of the Act.

The Act does not define the term meaningful relationship, nor does it prescribe criteria on which the Court should rely to assess how children’s parents have, or should have, a meaningful involvement in their lives.
In McCall v Clark[14], the Full Court concluded that the preferred interpretation of ‘benefit to a child of a meaningful relationship’ is the prospective approach. That is, the Court should consider and weigh the evidence at trial and determine how, if it is in children’s best interests, orders can be framed to ensure that they have a meaningful relationship with both of their parents. Thus, the Court must consider and determine whether there is a benefit to each of the children in having a meaningful relationship with each of their parents, such finding not being dependent simply on a lack of danger of physical or psychological harm arising from time and/or communication with the parents. If I determine that such benefit exists, then I must consider whether the benefit needs to give way to the requirement to protect children from physical or psychological harm.[15]
[14] (2009) FLC 93-405
[15]Vigano v Desmond (2012) FLC 93-509, [128]-[129] per Bryant CJ, Strickland & Murphy JJ.
The mother acknowledged that the children will, in fact, benefit from the opportunity to have a meaningful relationship with their father. The father’s proposal for parenting orders implicitly recognises that the children will benefit from the opportunity to continue to have a meaningful relationship with their mother.
In her September 2012 report, Ms W outlined that the children loved the father; she said it was important for them that they were able to have an ongoing relationship with him. I accept her evidence in this respect. I also accept her assertion, at that time, that it was then “essential” that the children’s time with their father was positive and stress-free.
I note that, when she spoke with Ms W in early January 2014, the mother acknowledged that the children loved their father and looked forward to seeing him and going to his house. I accept that she was truthful in her recounting to Ms W.
According to the information Ms P provided Ms W in early January 2014, both children were always glad to see their father during the visits she supervised; she reported that L would tell him that he loved him when he said goodbye. She considered that both children definitely had a relationship with their father. I accept her evidence in this respect.
When she spoke with Ms W in March 2015, the mother said that the children always looked forward to seeing their father and were happy to go to spend time with him and happy to return to her care. Again, I accept that she was truthful in her recounting to Ms W.
Ms W concluded that the children very much enjoyed spending time with their father and that this time was a positive experience for them.

Given Ms W’s evidence and the observations of the children’s interaction with their father during their time with him, as recounted by Ms P (whose evidence about this I accept), I consider that the children will benefit from having a meaningful relationship with both of their parents. Both parents clearly love them dearly. Each parent has much to offer their children.

The need to protect the children from physical or psychological harm from being subjected to, or exposed to, abuse, neglect or family violence[16]

[16] ss 60CC(2)(b);60CC(2A); 60CC(3)(j) of the Act.

The mother’s proposal that the children initially continue to spend supervised time with their father was based upon her assertion that they would be at an unacceptable risk of suffering harm unless their time with him occurred in this manner.
Whilst advancing the continuation of supervision during the “re-introduction period”, the father’s position was that there is no need for such supervision and that its imposition over the children’s time with him was ‘horrible’. His proposal that another adult be present during the children’s time with him appeared to rest on him feeling less confident about managing them together and his concern that, absent another adult’s presence, the mother would again raise issues about the manner in which he cared for the children.
It is uncontroversial that, having moved into his own accommodation in about March 2012, the children spent time with their father on each alternate weekend, from Saturday morning until Monday morning, when he delivered them to school and day-care respectively.

July 2012: the father loses his temper and breaks a plate

I accept that, during an occasion in July 2012 when the children spent time with their father at his home, he lost his temper. the father had previously acknowledged, including to Ms W, that this was the case and that he slammed a plate down on a table, breaking it; it seems that, after it broke, he picked it up and threw it towards the sink but, instead, it hit and broke the glass door of the microwave oven and smashed a jam jar which, in turn, exploded all over the floor. The father also acknowledged the children saw this and looked very scared: he told Ms W that he then sent them to their rooms while he cleaned up; he said he later apologised to L and told him that the way he (the father) had behaved was wrong. He said L forgave him, they hugged and the rest of the day went very well. I accept the father’s evidence about the way he behaved on this occasion.
I accept that, as the mother told Ms W, L told her about this incident when the children returned to her care; I accept as likely that both children were scared by their father’s behaviour. I also accept as likely that L told his mother that he was afraid something like that might happen again and that he had felt like he was going to die during this event. I accept the mother’s evidence to the effect that, after this incident, L was clingy, scared of being alone, followed her around and had nightmares and that F refused to sleep alone. She clearly considered these behaviours to be the consequence of the children’s exposure to their father’s uncontained behaviour that weekend.
The father has consistently maintained that, apart from this occasion, the children’s time with him prior to that had proceeded well. He has also consistently maintained that this is the only occasion on which he has ever been violent or broken anything in the children’s presence and, therefore, the only time they have ever seen any violence from him.[17] Given other aspects of the evidence about the manner in which these two parents interacted during their cohabitation, I think it much more likely than not that the children have, on occasions, been exposed to their parents’ arguing and, I suspect, the aftermath of such arguments.
[17] Family Report dated 10 October 2012, [104].
After that July 2012 event, the mother ceased the children’s time with their father until orders were made in August 2012, which provided the children’s time with him should be supervised. After further orders were made in February 2013, the children’s time with their father progressively increased until, from about May 2013, their time with him was again unsupervised.

27 July 2013: F presents with a mark on her face

The mother said that, on 27 July 2013, F returned to her care with a large red mark on the right side of her face. When she asked the father about it, he said “what do you mean, I can’t see anything”. When she said L had suggested it might have happened when F fell from her bike that morning, the father again dismissed this and insisted there was nothing wrong.
The mother said that she took F to a doctor, who identified a “blue” eye and a bruise on her face: she said that, whilst she was unsure about the cause of these injuries, she felt convinced that it was an injury of some sort that the father was unwilling to discuss; given that she readily accepted that children have accidents, it was the father’s failure to speak with her and to tell her about what had happened that caused her to be concerned that she could not trust that he could care for the children.
When Ms W spoke with the father about this, he said that, whilst F did have a red mark on her face at the end of her visit on this occasion, he did not know how it got there. He insisted the mark was very slight and the mother had exaggerated the incident. He said F had fallen off her bike but didn’t think that caused injury; he also said she bruised very easily, like her mother. He sought to draw attention to the fact that the mother took the child to the hospital where she was well known; he believed this was unnecessary. The father was also sceptical about the photograph the mother took; he raised the possibility that she had exacerbated the redness to try to illustrate her point.
Both parents showed Ms W a photograph of F’s face: the photograph produced by the father demonstrated a barely noticeable red mark whereas that produced by the mother demonstrated what Ms W described as a “very noticeable” red mark. On the basis of the image captured in the photograph produced by the mother, Ms W thought it quite understandable that she had been concerned about the mark and had wanted to discuss it with the father.
I am not persuade that it is more likely than not that the mother altered the photograph she produced to exacerbate what it captured. I think it more likely than not that F suffered some accidental injury to her face whilst in her father’s care. Given the expert evidence about each parent’s functioning and their personality structures (speaking generally), I accept it is more likely than not that the father did not seek to engage with the mother in a discussion about the children’s time with him.

September 2013: L reports that his father pushed him and slapped him on the face

I accept that the mother told Ms W that, on 8 September 2013, seven year old L told her that the father had forcefully pushed him into a corner, slapped him on the face and caused a graze to the side of his right cheek; I accept her account that he only told her about this when she asked him about the graze on his face. I also accept as more likely than not that, when she asked the father about it, he denied that anything had happened and refused to provide any information about the injury.
I accept that, when asked, the father denied to Ms W that he had slapped L. I accept that he said that he had put L in a corner as a disciplinary measure and that, when L refused to comply with his direction, it was necessary for him to physically take L to the corner. I note that it appeared to me that, during her cross-examination, the mother did not object to the father’s use of “time-out” as a method of disciplining the children; she also seemed to accept that, on occasions, it may have been necessary (historically speaking) for the father to make contact with L in order to have him follow his direction to go to the corner.
I am not persuaded that whatever injury L suffered, the father intended to harm him; I am also not persuade that “anything negative” said about this was as a result of the mother’s questioning of L.

September 2013: F has thorns in her foot

I accept that the mother told Ms W that a further “incident” happened on the following Tuesday. I accept that she recounted that, when F returned from time with her father, she couldn’t put any weight on her feet because they were too painful. The mother said that the only information the father provided was that she might have to remove some thorns.
I accept the father’s explanation that F only got thorns in her feet right before she was due to return to her mother’s care and that, as he didn’t have tweezers with him and the mother is a doctor, he decided to leave it to her to remove them.
I am not persuaded that anything that the father did in relation to managing the thorns in F’s feet suggests that she would be at risk of being harmed by him if her time with him is now unsupervised.
I note the father’s evidence to the effect that the mother’s response to this “issue” (or non-issue as he clearly saw it) was a further example of her making a big issue out of a small one and a further attempt to make him out to be a negligent parent. Whether this was the mother’s intention or not, it certainly provides a clear demonstration of the absence of trust and respect that each parent had, at that time at least, for the other.

October 2013: F’s sore finger

I accept that the mother told Ms W that, on 19 October 2013, F had a sore finger when she returned from a visit with her father; she said that, rather than telling her how it happened, the father made a sarcastic comment about her taking F to the hospital casualty department to find out what was wrong.
I accept that the father told Ms W that F had a tiny mark on her finger and that she had not even been concerned about it until the mother made a fuss. I accept that, from his perspective, there had been nothing for him to discuss with the mother. I also accept that he regarded her as trying to make trouble or cause issue where there weren’t any.
I accept that the mother told Ms W that what concerned her the most was the father’s refusal to discuss the matter. Whilst this may have been the case, I consider that the parents’ respective approaches on this occasion also provides a further demonstration of their different approaches: it seemed that the mother considered that every complaint of injury needed to be the subject of parental discussion, whereas the father considered that incidental childhood injuries did not need to be discussed.
Whilst I accept that the father’s response to the mother is highly likely to have irritated and frustrated her (in the same way that I accept that it is highly likely that her raising it with him irritated and frustrated him), I am not persuaded by the manner in which he determined not to engage in discussion about F’s sore finger that either child is now likely to be at risk of suffering harm whilst in his unsupervised care.
I accept that the mother told Ms W that the incident on 20 October 2013 was the last straw; I also accept that, after this, she decided to stop the children from spending time with their father.

20 October 2013: The spiky bush incident

I accept that the mother told Ms W that, after the visit on Sunday 20 October 2013, L told her that his father had thrown him out of the car into a “spiky bush” and then threw him back into the car and caused a significant bruise on his leg; he told her that his father apologised but told him not to tell her otherwise he would never see his father again. She explained that she did not make a report to the Department of Child Safety but simply stopped the children’s time with their father.
I accept that the father told Ms W that the mother had no good reason to stop the children seeing him: he said that she acted as she did because he had refused to take L to literacy classes on the Tuesday they spent time together.
I accept the father learned of the mother’s decision not to make the children available to spend time with him when he arrived to collect L from school. I accept that the mother did not raise any issue with the father before the Tuesday after the Sunday on which this incident was alleged to have occurred. I also accept that the evidence established that, before the father learned that L was not available for collection at the school on Tuesday afternoon, the mother had communicated with him by text (that is, after Sunday 20 October 2013 and on or before Tuesday 22 October 2013) about the extra-curricular activities to which he was to take L after he collected him on Tuesday afternoon: that she did so certainly suggests to me that she had not immediately decided to stop the children time with their father after hearing what L told her – a conclusion which is consistent with the mother’s evidence to the effect that it was only after she sought and was given advice by her solicitor that she decided to stop the children’s time with their father. That this was the case suggests to me that she did not initially assess the children to be so at risk in their father’s care that her decision to cease their time with him father was axiomatic.
The father accepted that he had put L “on detention” that Sunday; he said L had been kicking the back of his car seat and that he pulled him out of the car and made him stand in front of a tree for a five minute time-out. He explained that, instead of doing what he was told, L walked away from him, so he pulled him back into the car. The father said L had been upset and had told him that he was being abusive. He also said that, after L completed his time-out, they went to church, where the child was quite happy.
The father denied “throwing” L into a “spiky bush” and he also denied that L suffered a bruise on his leg because of the incident: he dismissed this account as being a story; he told Ms W that L had “become a drama queen because it gets attention” and that the child sometimes cried and pretended to vomit; he also said that F was also a “drama queen” at times and made a fuss about small issues.
Given the father’s account of his actions toward L that day, I think it quite possible that L suffered a bruise to his leg as a result of being “pulled” out of and back into his father’s car. I also think it quite likely that he came into contact with what he described as a “spiky bush”, but am unable to conclude whether he was “thrown” into it or the contact was incidental to him being “pulled” by the father out of and back into his car.

Further discussion and later events

Whilst the father dismissed any suggestion that, as a result of his previous conduct and the children’s previous experience of him being angry and breaking things, they might have been more sensitised to incidents such as his admitted interactions with L on 20 October 2013, I do not discount that possibility at all. Given their parents’ behaviours (as captured on the recordings each provided to Ms W), I think it highly likely that the children may, at one stage at least, have been particularly reactive to, and effected by, parental behaviour. I am not persuaded that the only way in which either child retained any negative or traumatic memories of their parents’ cohabitation or interactions was because either parent reinforced the same.
Whatever the father’s actual behaviour toward L on 20 October 2013, I note that L has spoken of his experience of this some years later: for example, Ms P recorded that, on 8 August 2015, (that is, nearly two years after this event), after the father (who had suggested that the mother was the parent “reinforcing” L’s recollection of the events of 20 October 2013) told L that, about two months ago (when he asked him if he wanted to stay with him), he had said “as long as you don’t throw me into the spiky bushes; you threw me into the spiky bush and then you pulled me out and threw me into the car” and told him that he didn’t, L said that he had. That L made such comment certainly suggests to me that his view then was that his father had, in fact, previously “thrown” him into a spiky bush.
I consider I am unable to determine whether L’s view about what happened on 20 October 2013 is a true memory of events or a recounting of something that has, over time, become part of his family’s lore. What I can recount though, is that, during this same discussion on 8 August 2015, L told his father that he wouldn’t say that he smashed everything because his house was still okay and that he was a really nice dad who took care of him and gave him nice food.
I also note that, despite her account of the events of 20 October 2013 and despite retaining “grave concerns” about the father’s judgment in parenting matters and not feeling confident that he would make wise choices about what he did with the children during their time together and that she thought him to lack the capacity to deal with the unexpected, the mother told Ms W (when she spoke to her in March 2015) that she proposed that the children spend time with the father for up to four hours each alternate Saturday and Sunday on an unsupervised basis - as she then thought that they would be safe in this shorter period of time.
I am not persuaded by the matters recounted to Ms W in early January 2014 or by any of the other evidence before me that the children will now be at an unacceptable risk of harm if their time with their father is unsupervised.

The children: their views and their relationships with each of their parents[18]

[18] ss 60CC(3)(a) of the Act.

L has been diagnosed with Attention Deficit Disorder or Autistic Spectrum Disorder[19] whilst F has been diagnosed as having Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). I accept that both children have been assessed as having what Dr R, a paediatrician under whose care they have been, described as combined ADHD: that is, issues with focus and concentration and issues with impulsivity and hyperactivity. I accept Dr R’s evidence about the treatment he had provided to the children and the medications he has prescribed to assist them. I accept that L had responded well to stimulant medication, with an improvement in his focus and a reduction in destructibility and impulsiveness. I accept that F had been trialled with medication.
[19] As outlined by Dr R during his oral evidence.
I also accept that it is in the children’s best interests that both of their parents follow the reasonable recommendations of their treating medical and allied health professionals and administer whatever medication may be prescribed from time to time for them.

The October 2012 Family Report (L: 6 ½ years old, F: 3 years old)

Ms W recorded that, given that the mother worked between 9.00 am and 6.00 pm on Mondays, Tuesdays and Thursdays, her practice manager collected the children from school and supervised them until between 5.00 pm and 6.00 pm; as she finished work earlier on Wednesdays and Fridays, she collected the children from after school care on those days. At that time, L was in Grade 1 at Q School and F (then three years of age) attended at child care for five days per week. She had attended on this basis from three months of age.
Ms W noted that, whilst both children appeared happy to see their father, L was especially excited; she reported that the father brought food and toys for the children. Ms W noted that the children did not play together or demonstrate any collaborative behaviour, but instead exhibited intense rivalry. L physically pushed F out of the way to get closer to their father on a couple of occasions: she said that this pattern of strenuously vying for his attention continued during the 30/40 minutes they were together. Ms W also noted that, whilst the father encouraged L to be gentle, the child seemed to ignore him.
Ms W reported that both of the children obviously enjoyed their one-on-one time with their father; they were chatty and affectionate toward him and focused on him and getting his attention. I accept Ms W’s recounting of her observations of the children’s interactions with their father and her assessment of these.

I also note Ms W’s recommendation that the orders made need to be very prescriptive given that the parents’ ability to co-operate and communicate remained very limited. I record that I have taken this into account in formulating those orders which I consider to be in the children’s best interests at this time.
Whilst the father sought that the children’s time with him increase to include overnight time during the week, I am not persuaded that this is likely to be in their best interests. I reach this conclusion because I am not persuaded that any benefits associated with this additional time with him are likely to outweigh the significant disruption to the children’s longstanding routine; I also consider it highly unlikely that these parents could co-operate sufficiently to be able to implement the practicalities associated with the children transitioning between their homes during the school week for an overnight stay, without the same providing fertile ground for the re-ignition of significant conflict.
In determining how the children will transition between their parents, I have taken into account the mother’s desire to limit her contact and interaction with the father. I have sought to utilise school as the mechanism for changeover to the extent consistent with my assessment of the duration of time with their father which is in the children’s best interests; however, I have also placed significant weight upon the practicalities for the children of moving between their parents households, particularly given my assessment of their parents’ likely inability to co-operatively deal with those almost inevitable unpredictable variations to any day-to-day routine involving children.
After an initial period during which changeover will occur at J Group (which requires not insignificant travel for the parents), it will occur in a nominated public place if the parents are able to agree in writing about the same or at the place specified in the Orders; whilst this may require the parents to be at the same location, the children are old enough to make their transition between their parents without the parents having to be particularly proximate to each other: for example, if changeover occurred in the car-park at the McDonalds, the children could simply leave their father’s car and walk to their mother’s.
When he spoke with Ms W in early 2015, the father reported that the Skype calls with the children were going reasonably well, save for the fact that, on occasion, he had to wait for up to two hours for the children to be ready to speak with him. I have taken this into account in formulating the orders which provide for the children to continue to have the opportunity to speak regularly and relatively frequently with their father (and to provide them with the opportunity to speak regularly and relatively frequently with their mother when in their father’s care).
The father outlined his desire to take the children sailing during their time with him. The mother was opposed to this because she was concerned about their safety and considered that he lacked the capacity to deal with the unexpected.
Given the time that has lapsed and the associated aging of the children, the likely improvement in their individual capacities to take responsibility for their own safety and that the father has been assisted by the presence of a supervisor for a much longer period than was anticipated when the trial concluded, I am not persuaded that it is now in the children’s best interests to impose any particular restraint on the activities that they are able to do whilst in the care of either parent – other than to prevent each parent from enrolling the children in new activities that take place during their time with the other parent.
The father has always sought to be able to communicate freely with the children in the Country L language. He has no difficulty with the mother speaking with them in the TT language. These children have the very great fortune to be the children of parents who each speak a language other than English. They can only benefit from the opportunity to learn these languages and communicate in them. I am not persuaded that there is any proper basis to restrict the manner in which the father communicates with the children, nor to deprive them of the opportunity to learn to speak Country L language via their communication with him.
The father was concerned that the mother might unilaterally move the children’s usual location of residence from Region D. He appeared to have based this concern on the fact that the existing geographic restriction on her ability to practice would cease in January 2019. Whilst there is no suggestion in the evidence that the mother would necessarily relocate the children to live elsewhere, the level of antipathy between these parents is such that, as already noted, I consider that the children’s best interests are met by an order which requires their parents to have equal shared parental responsibility for changes to their living arrangements that make it significantly more difficult for them to spend time with their father. That does not, of course, impede the mother in making a decision about moving with the children to live in a home other than her current residence provided that such a move would not make it “significantly” more difficulty for the children to spend time with their father; a moderate increase in the travel required to accommodate such a move would not amount to a change that could sensibly be regarded as meeting this criteria.
The children have previously been permitted to travel internationally for holiday purposes. For example, the Order made on 16 July 2015 permitted them to travel to New Zealand with the mother in October 2015. Given the fact of both parents’ heritage, I consider that it is in the children’s best interests that they are afforded the opportunity to travel internationally with each of their parents. I consider the children are likely to benefit from the opportunity to travel outside of Australia for holidays to see members of their extended maternal and paternal families and to have the opportunity to spend time in the countries of origin of each of their parents. Consequently, they will be permitted to travel internationally for holiday purposes with each of their parents. Orders will be made to facilitate such travel.

Final comments about the terms of the parenting orders to be made

To the extent that any other aspects of the parenting orders to be made are not the subject of particular discussion in these Reasons, I have concluded that the same are in the children’s best interests because such orders will, for example, enable both parents to be kept informed about them and their progress and will afford both of the children the opportunity to maintain communication with each parent in the time between face to face interactions; the orders are also intended to ensure, as far as possible, that the children are protected from the harm which may be caused to each of them as a consequence of exposure to derogatory comments by each parent about the other.
To the extent that the orders made do not include orders sought by either parent or the Independent Children’s Lawyer, that is because I have not been persuaded that the same are in the children’s best interests.

I certify that the preceding two hundred and five (205) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Hogan delivered on 25 January 2019.

Associate:

Date: 25 January 2019

[2019] FamCA 684

25 January 2019

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