Canon & Canon
[2008] FMCAfam 47
•24 January 2008
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| CANON & CANON | [2008] FMCAfam 47 |
| FAMILY LAW – Property – application to set aside a declaration that a third party has an interest in the matrimonial property. FAMILY LAW – Property – contributions. FAMILY LAW – Costs – order to pay costs to a third party. |
| Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), ss.75(2), 78, 79A , 79 |
| Ferrero & Ferrero (1993) FLC 92-335 |
| Applicant: | MS D CANON |
| 1st Respondent: | MR G CANON |
| 2nd Respondent: | MS M CANON |
| File Number: | BRM 15240 of 2005 |
| Judgment of: | Henderson FM |
| Hearing date: | 20 March 2007 |
| Date of Last Submission: | Written Submissions |
| Delivered at: | Parramatta |
| Delivered on: | 24 January 2008 |
REPRESENTATION
| Applicant: | Appearing in Person on 20 March 2007 |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Fishburn Watson O’Brien |
| Counsel for the 1st Respondent: | Mr Theobold |
| Solicitors for the 1st Respondent: | Crane Butcher McKinnon |
| Solicitors for the 2nd Respondent on 20 March 2007: | Filewood Carty |
| Solicitors for the 2nd Respondent for written submissions: | Caldwell Martin & Cox |
ORDERS
The wife’s Application, filed 11 October 2007, that the Declaration made on 20 March 2007 under section 78 of the Act be set aside is dismissed.
Forthwith the solicitors holding the sum of $169,590.92 plus interest in trust from the sale of the parties’ property release the sum of $80,000.00 to the solicitors acting on behalf of the estate of the late Ms M Canon being Messrs Caldwell Martin & Cox.
Thereafter the balance of the proceeds of the sale of the property be dispersed as follows:
(a)Any interest which has accrued on that account to be divided equally between the parties.
(b)The sum of $41,956.50 to the wife.
(c)The balance to the husband.
The wife is to pay costs of the Second Respondent, assessed by me in accordance with the Federal Magistrates Court Scale of Costs in the sum of $3,950.00. Such sum is to be deducted by the solicitors holding the money on trust from the wife’s share of the proceeds of sale of the former matrimonial home prior to those monies being dispersed to the wife.
Unless otherwise specified in these orders:
(a)Each party be solely entitled to the exclusion of the other to all other property and chattels of whatsoever nature and kind in the possession of such party as at the date of these orders and that for this purpose bank accounts are deemed to be in the possession of the person whose name appears on the banks’ record thereof, insurance policies are deemed to be in the possession of the beneficiary thereof and superannuation entitlements are deemed to be in the possession of the person who is named as the worker whose age or working future provides the conditions for payment out of such entitlements.
(b)Each party be solely liable for and indemnify the other against any liability encumbering any item of property to which that party is entitled pursuant to these orders.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Canon & Canon is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT PARRAMATTA |
BRM 15240/2005
| MS D CANON |
Applicant
And
| MR G CANON |
1st Respondent
And
| MS M CANON |
2nd Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The matter of Canon was heard by me at Coffs Harbour on 20 March 2007.
Mr Theobold of Counsel appeared for the husband who was the First Respondent. The wife, who was the Applicant, appeared on her own behalf. Ms Carty appeared on behalf of Ms M Canon, the paternal grandmother and Second Respondent.
Interim orders were made by me by consent to enable the parties to try and halt an impending mortgagee sale of the former matrimonial home.
The interim orders were as follows:
(1)The parties are to do all acts and things and sign all documents necessary to appoint Mr A of Axxx Real Estate, as Agent for the sale of Property B by way of private treaty at a sale price determined by Mr A.
(2)The solicitor for the parties on the sale is to be Ms Carty of Filewood Carty and is to include holding the balance of the proceeds of sale in trust in an interest bearing account in the name of parties pending further order.
(3)The wife is to forthwith and within 14 days do all acts and things necessary to withdraw from her superannuation funds, being First State Super, Unit Super, and NGS Super the sum of $10,000.00 with such sum to be contributed to the home loan arrears to Firstmac.
(4)The husband is to contribute the balance of the arrears of mortgage and legal costs, being as at today’s date the sum of $6,400.00, within 14 days.
(5)Thereafter the parties to await orders of the court as to the distribution of the proceeds of sale.
THE COURT DECLARES THAT:
(6)Ms M Canon has an interest in the property in the sum of $80,000.00.
THE COURT NOTES THAT:
(7)The husband will use his best endeavours to maintain the monthly mortgage repayments on the home until the completion of the sale.
(8)The parties agree that if the home is sold prior to the court making orders in relation to the distribution of proceeds of sale a sum of no more than $80,000.00 is to be released to Ms M Canon forthwith.
(9)The contributions by each of the parties to be paid to the mortgagee to stay the mortgagee from taking action to sell the property due to significant default on the mortgage.
The most important aspect of these orders was the declaration made by agreement between the parties that Ms M Canon had an interest in the property in the sum of $80,000 and the order that if the home was sold prior to the final orders of the Court being entered into Ms M Canon would receive no less than $80,000.
The matter has dragged on. I was unable to make the final orders and a final judgement until written submissions were finalised in late October 2007.
The matter was before me for mention on 16 April 2007 and adjourned to 17 October 2007 to await the outcome of the mortgagee sale of the former matrimonial home. The parties had not discharged the arrears contemplated by the interim orders and the mortgagee pursued its right to sell the home.
The matter came before Federal Magistrate Donald on 24 April 2007 at Coffs Harbour in relation to parenting matters. His Honour made orders that the orders of 2 November 2006 were to continue and the father was restrained from permitting the children M, born in April 1992, and B, born in June 1997, from residing a distance greater than 100kms from Coffs Harbor. It was further ordered that the Father encourage M to consult with a psychologist.
Federal Magistrate Donald adjourned the matter to 9 May 2007 for mention before me at Parramatta. The matter was administratively adjourned by consent to 15 June 2007.
There was no appearance on the 15 June 2007. The parenting issues were stood over to 17 October 2007 to be heard with the property proceedings.
The matter was relisted on 27 September 2007 as the property had been sold. On this occasion the mother withdrew her parenting application resulting in the children remaining living with their father. The parties have agreed that the children may move with their father to Western Australia which event has occurred.
The parties were directed to file their written submissions regarding the distribution of the net proceeds of the sale of the former matrimonial home within 28 days.
I have now received the parties written submissions, including those on behalf of the estate of Ms M Canon, and have a copy of the transcript of the proceedings and evidence that was given on 20 March 2007.
Wife’s Application in relation to the Declaration
The wife’s Application now is to set aside the declaration made by me by consent on 20 March 2007 under section 78 of the Act. Her reasons for so doing was that Ms M Canon died prior to final orders being made and prior to the sale of the home.
I accept the submission of both the husband and the representative of the estate of the late Ms M Canon that the wife has not made out any case why such a declaration entered into by consent on 20 March 2007 should be set aside.
The basis upon which the Application must fail is, firstly, the Declaration made by the Court was clearly made by consent. When the matter commenced on 20 March 2007 I said:
Ms Carty, it seems like the issues with your client have been resolved in that the husband and wife agree. Your client will receive that sum she injected into the home.
Ms Carty replied: “Yes”.
I asked the mother at page 3 of the transcript:
Ma’am, you’re seeking that the father keep the home, the home be sold, Ms M Canon be repaid her $80,000 or her and her son work that, but you be taken off the mortgage of the home and released from Ms M Canon’s debt and you’re seeking the sum of $20,000.
The wife agreed this was correct. She agreed Ms M Canon be paid her money or the husband be responsible for paying Ms M Canon that money if the home was transferred to him.
To have the Declaration set aside the wife must satisfy me under s.79A of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) that such an order should be set aside.
There is no evidence of miscarriages of justice; there is no evidence of fraud or duress. There could not be as the wife in her application filed 25 September 2006 sought that the Second Respondent be paid $80,000 and listed that her share of that debt at $40,000 in her filed financial statement.
There are no circumstances that have arisen since the order was made that make it impossible or impracticable for the order to be carried out. The fact Ms M Canon is deceased has no bearing on the matter.
Ms M Canon’s estate will now receive the money which will be divided between her children in accordance with her will.
There has been no relevant default in either party carrying out an obligation in relation to the declaration.
There is nothing impacting on the care or welfare of the children by the declaration remaining in force.
The wife asserts the $80,000 was a gift. The evidence is to the contrary. The money was paid after a Deed was signed by the wife, husband and the late Ms M Canon. Clearly this was no gift.
Further the operative parts of the Deed are between Mr G Canon, the husband, and his mother. The wife is not mentioned in the operative parts of the Deed at all. The wife’s signature is at the bottom and her name appears at the beginning, but nowhere in the body of the Deed.
It is clear to me that the husband obtained from his mother Ms M Canon a sum of money to assist in the parties buying their home and to provide a home for the late Ms M Canon.
The money was paid to the husband on conditions. A deed of this nature could never be regarded as a gift between the husband and the wife from the paternal grandmother. At best it might be a gift to the husband from the paternal grandmother for which he had to honour certain obligations which were that:
a)Ms M Canon live at Property B, New South Wales, for the term of her natural life.
b)The husband would maintain that property in a suitable condition for her and provide meals.
c)Ms M Canon would not be required to contribute towards any expenses of the property nor pay any licence fee or fee for her accommodation.
d)If Ms M Canon was unable to remain living in the property due to ill health, or the property was sold, the husband was to provide at his expense adequate accommodation.
On its face the benefit of the money flows as between Ms M Canon and her son, not the wife. The husband agrees the money was always to be re-paid to his mother and now her estate.
This was what the wife agreed to as well at the commencement of the proceedings, namely that Ms M Canon was owed $80,000. It is money both the husband and the wife agreed at the commencement of hearing she was entitled to. Her death changes nothing.
The wife gave the following evidence at page 23 of the transcript in answer to questioning by Mr Theobold:
You purchased the house in 2001? --- Yes.
And really it was Ms M Canon’s $80,000 that enabled that to happen?--- Yes.
Is it correct that she also contributed to legal fees and stamp duty?---It was all part of that $80,000.
It was all part of that $80,000?--- It was all part of that, it wasn’t above that.
The mortgage that you obtained at that stage was about $210,000?--- Yes
Thus it is clear that the wife agreed that without Ms M Canon’s money being injected into the property, these parties would have had no hope of purchasing the home or having any property to divide today.
The wife stated in a letter to Ms M Canon dated 23 January 2006, marked Annexure B to the affidavit of the late Ms M Canon filed
8 December 2006:
I have stated to Mr G Canon & my solicitor that you are to get all that you put in should settlement be necessary. I would never rip you off or leave you high & dry.
The wife’s contention that as Ms M Canon has died the Declaration is no longer appropriate because there is no reason for the husband to provide a place for her is not justified. The wife has no interest in or entitlement to the money subject of the declaration and would be unjustly enriched at the expense of the husband and other beneficiaries of Ms M Canon’s estate.
Even if the declaration was set aside there is still Order 8. That order provides that Ms M Canon be paid $80,000 if the home is sold prior to final orders being made. Ms M Canon executors stand in her stead and the money must be paid to her estate pursuant to that order. Her death is not a relevant matter on this issue.
For these reasons I dismiss the wife’s Application to set aside the Declaration which was made by consent in open court and with which the wife has agreed in her filed and oral evidence.
Division of the property
The next issue for determination by me is the just and equitable division of the parties’ property.
The parties filed an enormous quantity of written material, most of which related to parenting proceedings.
It is most distressing that the boys have virtually no relationship with their mother and, at the time the matter was before me in March 2007, were struggling to maintain a relationship with their mother. The children have now moved to Western Australia.
The parties have filed a joint case summary document and each of their solicitors have filed written submissions as has the solicitor for the Second Respondent, the late Ms M Canon.
Documents
The documents for the wife were as follows:
a)The wife’s Application in a Case filed 11 October 2007 and an affidavit filed 11 October 2007 in relation to the declaration.
b)Her Affidavit filed 3 April 2007.
c)Her Affidavit filed 26 February 2007.
d)Her Affidavit filed 25 September 2006.
e)Affidavit of Mr M filed 25 September 2006.
f)Financial Statement filed on 26 February 2007.
g)Property Valuation of Mr B filed 27 February 2007 which became redundant when the property was sold.
h)Valuations of motor vehicles dated 24 January 2007.
i)Valuation of Mr N in relation to furniture valuation.
j)Banks Statements as to bank accounts at separation and when the property was sold.
The wife annexed a large number of letters to her affidavit and her written submission running from 23 January 2007 to 14 August 2007.
The documents for the husband were as follows:
a)The Amended Response filed 11 August 2006.
b)Financial Statement filed 11 August 2006.
c)His affidavit sworn 18 September 2006.
d)Affidavit of his mother, the Second Respondent, Ms M Canon filed 8 December 2006.
Exhibits
There were various exhibits tendered at the hearing.
The wife tendered the following exhibits:
a)Wife’s Exhibit 1: A valuation of the wife’s motor vehicle.
b)
Wife’s Exhibit 2: A bank statement for the period ending
1 January 2007for the home loan account showing the dereliction of the account.
c)Wife’s Exhibit 3: Statement of Claim filed in the Supreme Court in relation to the mortgagee sale.
d)Wife’s Exhibit 4: A valuation of the wife’s household contents.
e)Wife’s Exhibit 5: A letter from the wife’s solicitors to the husband’s solicitors dated 2 March 2007.
The husband tendered the following exhibits:
a)Husband’s Exhibits 1: Red Book valuation for the wife’s car, a 1999 Subaru.
b)Husband’s Exhibit 2: A handwritten statement by the husband.
c)Husband’s Exhibit 3: Letters from Deacons Lawyers in relation to the Supreme Court proceedings.
Assets and Liabilities
The net proceeds of sale of the former matrimonial home are $169,590.92.
The wife asserts that deductions of $44,944.92 from the sale price of the home ought to be borne solely by the husband.
That sum is made up of additional costs incurred due to a mortgagee possession sale, an increase in the mortgage and outstanding council rates during the time the husband and the children occupied the property.
The wife says she should bear no share of those paid expenses and this sum should be added back to the pool.
The agreed assets of the parties are as follows:
ASSETS Net proceeds of sale of the former matrimonial home $169,590.92 What is left of the husband’s business inclusive of tools and truck $10,240.00 Wife’s Car $7,000.00 Wife’s First State Superannuation $4,512.30 Wife’s UniSuper Superannuation $539.54 Wife’s Catholic Super and Retirement Fund $9.69 Wife’s NGS Super $3,927.53 Husband’s Commonwealth retirement saving $263.00 Husband’s Australian Eligible Rollover $4,382.00 Husband’s long service leave $10,000.00
No super splitting order is sought nor could be as the amounts are less than $5,000.
The totality of the wife’s superannuation is $8,989.06. Her other assets are $7,000 being a total asset pool of $15,989.06.
The husband has superannuation of $4382 and other assets not available to the wife totalling of $10,263. Together with the husband’s business of $10,240, the husband’s total assets are $24,885.
The wife has significant liabilities:
a)GE Creditline – Harvey Norman in the sum of $872.92 which it is agreed is a joint debt of the parties.
b)HECS Debt of $12,821 incurred for the qualification as a High School teacher she obtained during the marriage.
c)Debt to Flexirent of $1,127.92 for a computer which the husband has the benefit of.
Husband’s position
The husband’s position is that the $80,000 be repaid to his late mother’s estate and I will make such order. It is just and equitable and proper in all circumstances and was agreed to by the wife in March 2007.
That will then leave, from the net proceeds of sale of $169,590.92 the sum of $89,590.92 to divide.
The husband contends that that money ought to be divided by way of his contribution based entitlement 60% in his favour.
He further contends he should be allowed 25% for s.75(2) factors giving him a share of the divisible property of 85% as well as retaining other assets in his name.
I do not accept the husband’s position that the parties’ superannuation ought be included as an asset to be divided between them. The sums are too small to split. I will not include the present assets in each parties name in the asset pool for division but in my consideration of whether the orders contemplated are just and equitable.
Initially the husband had sought that the property be transferred to him and that he indemnify the wife and take over the mortgage, and indemnify the wife for his mother’s money.
Wife’s position
The wife contention is that the asset pool is $214,535, being the proceeds of the sale inclusive of the late Ms M Canon’s $80,000 and the add back of the sum of $44,944.92.
The wife contends that from that pool she should receive 40% by way of direct financial contribution.
The wife contends her non-financial contribution should be 65% and her contributions as parent and homemaker 60%.
The wife accepts there must be an adjustment to the husband under s.75(2) resulting in 40% of the property pool, as assessed be her, and the remainder to the husband.
Chronology
In late 1980 the husband received $10,000 from an injury claim.
The parties met in 1988 and married in 1990.
The child M was born in April 1992.
The child B was born in June 1997.
The wife commenced studying in March 2000 according to the HECS records.
The parties separated in August 2005 and the children have effectively resided with their father since separation and spend time with the mother.
The relationship between the mother and the child M has since broken down.
The children have, in the last six months, moved to Western Australia with their father and they see their mother in the holidays.
From the evidence it is apparent the parties have had severe financial difficulties from almost the commencement of their relationship.
They clearly had difficulty in maintaining the mortgage on the home when they borrowed the initial sum of $210,000 on 9 March 2003. It is clear, from the wife’s evidence and history, that without the injection of money from the late Ms M Canon these parties would never have had sufficient financial resources to buy property.
The parties increased the home loan on 23 April 2004 by $20,000 to $230,000. They used that money to purchase a car and other goods for the home.
The debt was increased by $25,000 on 8 December 2005. This was to pay off significant debts the husband had in relation to his business. The debt was then $255,000.
Thus from 9 September 2003 to 8 December 2005, the parties mortgage increased from $210,000 to $255,000.
The parties had no significant assets at the commencement of their relationship. The most significant injection of $80,000 was provided from the late Ms M Canon.
However that money is to be repaid to her estate. Ms M Canon received the benefit of her cash injection in that a home was provided to her rent and meal cost free for the duration of her life. Thus I do not see that the injection of this fund gives the husband any significant superior financial contribution over and above the wife’s financial contribution to their present asset base.
The husband paid the mortgage for the home in which he and the children were living for twelve months after separation, and up until about September 2006. After that time the mortgage fell into arrears.
The husband had ample opportunity to sell the property and the wife was agreeable to this course. Twelve months after separation the husband rejected an offer by friends to assist in repaying the mortgage so that the home could be maintained. The husband said in evidence before me that he refused that offer as he did not want to incur any further debt.
The parties did not or could not comply with the March 2007 orders made in an endeavour to stave off the mortgagee sale and ultimately the mortgagee went into possession.
The mortgage was $245,000 at separation and had increased to $284,000 by the time of sale. That is an increase of nearly $40,000. In addition, significant costs were incurred in the mortgagee sale such as solicitor’s costs of $2,472, and $1,250 for property consultants acting for the solicitors for the mortgagee. There were outstanding council rates of $1,594.
I accept some of the wife’s argument that the husband put his head in the sand in relation to the ongoing failure to make mortgage repayments. It must have been clear to him as a joint mortgagee with the wife, that he could not afford the mortgage payments of the home he was occupying, and that the wife who was renting could not to assist him.
The parties should have come together and had an orderly sale of the home. They failed to do that. I find that the husband failed to cooperate with the wife who did make endeavours to have the home sold in an orderly fashion such that the parties could maximise their sale price and minimise their costs.
My view is that it would be unfair and unjust for the wife to bear the entirety of the increase in the mortgage, particularly where the husband had the occupation of the home. However, I note the wife was paying minimal if any child support during this period, despite having qualifications as a High School teacher.
I will allow the wife $10,000 from the husband’s entitlement to property settlement to take account of what I find has been an increase in the debt of the parties due to the husband’s fault and not the wife’s fault.
I will allow the wife one half of the debt to Flexirent, being for a computer in the husband’s possession, and the husband will allow her $600 for that half debt.
The Law
This is a property application. I am required under the law to take a four-stage approach under s.79; the decision of Ferrero & Ferrero (1993) FLC 92-335.
The first stage is to identify the matrimonial property, its value and nature.
The second stage is to assess the value of the parties' contributions expressed as a percentage of the value of their assets to the acquisition, maintenance, conversation and renovation of their matrimonial property, having regard to the factors under s.79(1)(a), (b) and (c).
a)Section 79(1)(a) is an assessment of the parties direct financial contribution;
b)Section 79(1)(b) is an assessment of the indirect contribution; and
c)Section 79(1)(c) is an assessment of the value of each parties' contribution as a parent and homemaker during the marriage.
The third stage under s.79(4)(e) is to determine whether, having regard to the factors under s.75(2), I ought vary the assessed percentage entitlement of either party to take into account their future needs.
The fourth stage is to look back at the consequences of the proposed orders to determine if they are just and equitable in all the circumstances.
Findings
I find that the matrimonial pool for division is $89,590.00. This figure is arrived at as follows: The sum of $169,590.92 being the net proceeds of the sale less the $80,000 to be forthwith paid to the estate of Ms M Canon.
I find, on the initial direct financial contribution by the parties to their present assets, their contribution to be equal. Both parties worked to the best of their ability and used the income they earned to assist in supporting the family and paying debts. I find neither party was able to earn sufficient income to indeed pay the debts they incurred during the marriage.
As for the indirect contributions, the wife makes claim that her father made significant contributions by doing work around the home, including when the granny-flat was constructed for Ms M Canon. However, the wife also admitted in cross examination that the husband was very good around the home and did much work. I find the indirect financial contributions of the parties to be equal.
In relation to parenting and homemaker, I accept that during the early part of the children’s lives, the wife was the primary carer as the husband was a builder who worked long hours. However, once the wife commenced studying in 2000, and certainly since separation, the husband has taken on a major role as parent and homemaker, and I find their contributions on this factor to be equal.
In relation to earning capacity I find the wife has an earning capacity of no less than $45,000 per year as a school teacher.
The wife obtained valuable qualifications during the marriage. That the wife has chosen not to exercise this capacity and has remained in the Coffs Harbour area where she says it is difficult to obtain work, even though her children have moved to Western Australia, is a choice she has made.
The wife clearly has a greater capacity to earn income than the husband who has the care of two children. At best his income was $500 a week during the marriage. The wife’s income was at least $1,000 per week when she worked as a teacher for a period of time prior to separation.
I accept she has a HECS debt of $12,000 odd. However with full time work that debt would soon be paid.
The husband has the full-time care of the two children of the marriage. Due to the poor relationship the wife has with the older child, the full-time parenting of that child has fallen on the husband’s shoulders. With the move to Western Australia the father has the vast majority of parenting for both boys.
The wife, due to her low income, is paying virtually no child support despite being a trained teacher. The husband maintains the children on his limited income.
I find that the husband’s s.75(2) factors are significantly greater than the wife’s, and I will allow him 15%.
In those circumstances I find that the husband’s percentage entitlement to the matrimonial property is 65% and the wife’s is 35%. The husband will receive $58,233.50 and the wife $31, 356.50.
The husband is to pay the wife an additional sum of $10,600 from his entitlement. This is to take account of the increase in debt since separation due to his failure to take all reasonable steps available to him to minimise the financial loss including half the Flexirent debt.
The orders I propose to make today are that the husband receive $47,633.50, and the wife $41,956.50.
The fourth stage is to look back at the consequences of the proposed orders to determine if they are just and equitable in all the circumstances.
The husband has other assets totalling $24,885 and will receive some $10,000 from his mother’s estate. The total of the husband’s assets under his control will be in the vicinity of $82,518.50.
The wife has assets under her control of $15,989.00. This together with the $41,956.50 she is entitled to from the matrimonial property gives her total assets of $57,945.50.
I find that these orders are just and equitable in all the circumstances.
Costs of Second Respondent
A costs application was made by the Second Respondent in relation to the wife’s application to set the Declaration aside.
That application is irresistible.
The wife brought her application on a flawed basis.
The first flaw is that the declaration was made by consent and was not conditional upon Ms M Canon being alive. If money is owed in life it is owed in death unless there is some specific agreement to the contrary or by operation of law. No such factors are evident in this matter.
It was acknowledged by the wife in her affidavit material, letter to the grandmother, and in court on 20 March 2007, that that money was owed to Ms M Canon. There was no evidence brought that satisfied me that the declaration or order made by consent that Ms M Canon be paid $80,000 if the home was sold prior to final orders being made should be set aside.
The wife is to pay costs of the Second Respondent, assessed by me in accordance with the Federal Magistrates Court Scale of Costs in the sum of $3,950.00, being costs for a two day hearing. That sum is to be deducted by the solicitors holding the money on trust from the wife’s share of the proceeds of sale of the former matrimonial home prior to those monies being dispersed to her.
Therefore, I make orders in accordance with those as set out at the commencement of this judgment.
I certify that the preceding one hundred and eighteen (118) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Henderson FM
Deputy Associate: A. Morris
Date: 24 January 2008
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