Candice Spagnuolo v Qatar Airways

[2020] FWC 4473

FAIR WORK COMMISSION

DECISION

Fair Work Act 2009
s.394—Unfair dismissal

Candice Spagnuolo
v
Qatar Airways
(U2020/6170)

DEPUTY PRESIDENT BEAUMONT PERTH, 28 AUGUST 2020

Application for an unfair dismissal remedy - application to dismiss pursuant to ss 399A(1)(c) or 587(1)(c) – deed of release signed – setting aside a deed no authority to do so – ‘accord and satisfaction’

[1] On 05 May 2020, Ms Candice Spagnuolo made an unfair dismissal application under s 394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth)(the Act) (the original application). Ms Spagnuolo was a former Senior Airport Services Agent of the respondent employer, Qatar Airways (Qatar). She had been dismissed by way of redundancy on 29 April 2020, and on that same day, was provided with a deed of release (Deed). An extension of time was provided in which to consider the Deed. Ms Spagnuolo later signed and returned the Deed to Qatar on 1 May 2020.

[2] Qatar has responded to the original application by filing its own application to dismiss Ms Spagnuolo’s claim for unfair dismissal. It does so on the basis that:

a) Ms Spagnuolo signed and returned the Deed;

b) the Deed included an unconditional release of Qatar from all claims connected with the employment and its cessation; and

c) the Deed constitutes an ‘accord and satisfaction’ between the parties, and as such is a complete answer to the original application.

[3] The power to dismiss the original application arises by virtue of ss 587(1)(c) and 399A(1)(c) of the Act. Under s 587(1)(c), the Commission may dismiss an application before it, if it has no reasonable prospects of success. Qatar contends this is one such case. The Deed operates as a bar to the original application, and it follows, said Qatar, the application must be dismissed.

[4] With respect to s 399A(1)(c), Qatar advanced that the original application should be dismissed on the basis of an unreasonable failure to discontinue the original application after a settlement had been concluded.

[5] Ms Spagnuolo’s argument can essentially be distilled into two propositions. The first, there are multiple reasons why the Deed ought not preclude her from pursuing the original application, the high watermark - she was coerced into signing the Deed.

[6] The second, it is not open to ‘contract out’ of the Act. Referring to several Federal Court authorities, 1 Ms Spagnuolo concluded that ‘from these rulings it is clear that the requirements of the FWA 2009 and associated Awards cannot be “contracted out” – they are statutory.’

[7] Having considered the evidence and arguments of both parties, I have concluded that the Deed constitutes an ‘accord and satisfaction’ between the parties and is a complete answer to the original application. It follows the original application is dismissed under s 587(1)(c) on the basis it has no reasonable prospects of success.

[8] Considering this conclusion, it is unnecessary to consider the position under s 399A(1)(c). However, if I were obliged to do…