Campomar Sociedad, Limitada & Anor v Nike International

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Sydney  No S41 of 1999

B e t w e e n -

CAMPOMAR SOCIEDAD, LIMITADA

First Appellant

NIKE COSMETICS SA

Second Appellant

and

NIKE INTERNATIONAL LTD

First Respondent

NIKE AUSTRALIA PTY LTD

Second Respondent

Office of the Registry
  Sydney  No S42 of 1999

B e t w e e n -

CAMPOMAR SOCIEDAD, LIMITADA

Appellant

and

NIKE INTERNATIONAL LTD

First Respondent

NIKE AUSTRALIA PTY LTD

Second Respondent

Application for security for costs

GUMMOW J

(In Chambers)

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT SYDNEY ON THURSDAY, 10 JUNE 1999, AT 9.48 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MR J.V. NICHOLAS:   May it please the Court, I appear for the respondents to the appeal and the applicant on the motion for security for costs.  (instructed by Sprusons:Solicitors)

MR D.K. CATTERNS, QC:  May it please the Court, I appear for the appellants who are the respondents on the summons.  (instructed by Mallesons Stephen Jaques)

HIS HONOUR:   Yes.  Let me just finds the summons first.  There is a summons in each matter, is there not, or is there only one - - -?

MR NICHOLAS:   Yes, your Honour, there is a summons in each matter, both filed on 3 June.  I am sorry, your Honour, there is one summons filed in S41 of 1999, which was filed on 3 June.

HIS HONOUR:   Yes, I have that.

MR NICHOLAS:   And amongst the orders sought, which is not controversial between us - - -

HIS HONOUR:   But there is not a summons in the other one?

MR NICHOLAS:   No, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR:   But there is an application that - it is order 1.  Order 1 sought in the summons is for consolidation.

MR NICHOLAS:   Yes, your Honour, or, alternatively, that they be heard together.  My learned friend and I were agreed that the second of those orders ought to be made subject to any different view your Honour had, that is, that the appeals be heard together.

HIS HONOUR:   Yes.  Why were there two appeals?

MR NICHOLAS:   Your Honour, there were two proceedings in the court below at first instance and that carried through into the appeal.  Both proceedings were heard together before Justice Sheppard.

HIS HONOUR:   Why were there two?

MR NICHOLAS:   There were two, your Honour, because after the first set of proceedings were commenced in relation to passing off and one particular trademark, after that time, there was another trademark which was registered and it was necessary to bring further proceedings.

HIS HONOUR:   Yes, I follow, thank you.

MR NICHOLAS:   Your Honour, I can hand up to your Honour some short minutes of order which - - -

HIS HONOUR:   Very well.

MR NICHOLAS:   As to the matter we have just touched on, deal in order 1 with the hearing of the appeal.  Order 2, your Honour, which is contentious, reflects what, in recent practice, has been the order usually made in this Court when security is ordered under…

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Details
Case
[1999] HCATrans 148
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Campomar Sociedad, Limitada and another sought leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia from a decision of the Full Federal Court. The dispute concerned the alleged infringement of Nike International's trade mark "NIKE" and associated logos by the use of the mark "NIKE" by Campomar in relation to sportswear and footwear. The primary issue was whether the use of the mark by Campomar was likely to deceive or cause confusion among consumers, thereby infringing Nike International's registered trade marks.

The High Court was required to determine whether the Full Federal Court had erred in its assessment of the likelihood of deception or confusion. Specifically, the court considered the principles governing the assessment of trade mark infringement under the *Trade Marks Act 1954* (Cth), particularly the test for whether a mark is "deceptively similar" to a registered trade mark. This involved an examination of the degree of resemblance between the marks and the nature of the goods in respect of which they were used.

Gummow J, in chambers, considered the arguments for and against granting leave to appeal. The central question was whether there was a reasonably arguable case of error by the Full Federal Court in its application of the relevant trade mark law. The judge's decision on leave would depend on whether the appeal raised a question of law of general public importance or whether there was a reasonably arguable ground of appeal.

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