Campion and Gene

[2020] FamCA 588

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CAMPION & GENE [2020] FamCA 588

FAMILY LAW – DE FACTO PROPERTY – where the respondent de facto husband sought orders for property adjustment to effect a 60% division in favour of the Applicant de facto wife – where the Respondent dies before final orders pronounced – where the Court finds the de facto husband’s financial and non-financial contributions were significantly less than that of the de facto wife – where the Court is not is satisfied that an alteration of property interests is just and equitable – orders made for the each party to retain their respective assets and liabilities

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss. 90SM, 90SF

Stanford & Stanford [2012] HCA 52

APPLICANT: Ms Campion

RESPONDENT: Mr Gene

FILE NUMBER: BRC 10271 of 2016

DATE DELIVERED: 23 July 2020

PLACE DELIVERED: Townsville

PLACE HEARD: Brisbane

JUDGMENT OF: Baumann J

HEARING DATES: 18 & 19 September 2018; 17, 18, 19 & 21 December 2018; 22, 23 & 24 May 2019; 12 July 2019; 8 August 2019 and 24 March 2020

REPRESENTATION

COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: Ms K Oakley on:
18 & 19 September 2018;
17, 18, 19 & 21 December 2018;
22, 23 & 24 May 2019; 12 July 2019 and 8 August 2019

SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: Twohill Lawyers

COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT:

Mr P Hanlon on:

18 & 19 September 2018;

17, 18, 19 & 21 December 2018; 22, 23 & 24 May 2019; 12 July 2019 and 8 August 2019

SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: Stolar Law Pty Ltd

Orders

1. That Ms B the legal personal representative of the now deceased Respondent is substituted pursuant to s90SM(8)(a) of the Family Law Act 1975 as the Respondent in these proceedings.

2. That the Estate of the Respondent Mr Gene retain the following assets and superannuation entitlements:

   (a)       motor vehicle 1;

   (b)       motor vehicle 2;

   (c)       his furniture, household and personal effects; and

   (d)his superannuation entitlements with J Superannuation and any other superannuation entitlements held by him.

3. That the Applicant Ms Campion retain the following assets and superannuation:

   (a)the property at C Street, Suburb D, in the state of New South Wales;

   (b)any remaining proceeds of sale of the property at F Street, Suburb G, in the state of Queensland ;

   (c)motor vehicle 3;

   (d)her furniture, household and personal effects; and

   (e)her superannuation entitlements with H Superannuation.

4. That unless otherwise specified in this Order, except for the purposes of enforcing payment of any money due under these or any subsequent orders:

   (a)each party shall be solely entitled to the exclusion of the other to all property in the possession of such party as at this date including any jewellery, furniture, furnishings, shares and motor vehicles;

   (b)moneys standing to the credit of the parties in any bank accounts to be the property of the party in whose name such bank account is held;

   (c)each party hereby forgoes any claims they may have to any superannuation benefit to or owned by the other. The party in whose name any such policy of superannuation or insurance stand shall be deemed to be the owner and the beneficiary of such policy to the exclusion of the other;

   (d)that each party be otherwise solely liable for and indemnify the other against any debts in their own name;

   (e)that each party be otherwise solely liable for and indemnify the other against any liability encumbering any item of property to which that party is entitled pursuant to this Order.

5. That all pending Applications with respect to property be dismissed.

6. That if the Applicant seeks to pursue any application for costs, either of the property proceedings or for the adjournment on 18 September 2018 then:

   (a)       within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Order, the Applicant shall file and serve written submissions in response;

   (b)       within twenty-eight (28) days of the date of this Order, the respondent shall file and serve written submissions in reply; and

   (c)       unless otherwise ordered, any pursued application for an order for costs shall be considered in Chambers on the papers.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Campion & Gene has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT TOWNSVILLE

FILE NUMBER: BRC 10271 of 2016

Ms Campion

Applicant

And

Mr Gene

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

1. A complex parenting case relating to three young children began in trial before me in September 2018, and over three separate tranches totalling 11 days, final oral submissions were delivered on 8 August 2019.  The parents were Ms Campion (“the Applicant”) and Mr Gene (“the Respondent”).

2. The parties’ focus was very much directed to the parenting issues, however the proceedings which commenced in October 2016 introduced de facto property proceedings through the Respondent’s Response filed 1 June 2017 when he sought orders that the pool of interests be altered as to 60% to the Applicant and 40% to the Respondent.  In her Reply filed 22 September 2017, the Applicant sought orders that the Respondent’s cross-application for property adjustment be dismissed.

3. Whilst the judgment on all matters was reserved, tragically the Respondent passed away in late 2019.  As a result, the parenting proceedings came to an end and no determination by the Court was required.

4. On 24 March 2020, the Court made directions for filing of further submissions noting that the Respondent’s wife Ms B (who the Respondent married in 2017) was intending to seek a grant of letters of administration. Such grant was perfected by the Supreme Court of Queensland on 1 June 2020, and Ms B, by my orders now pronounced, has been formally substituted pursuant to s 90SM (8)(a) of the Family Law Act 1975 (“the Act”)

5. The reasons which follow deal with the property applications before the Court.

Principles

1. In the circumstances that arose in this case, s 90SM(8) is relevant and provides that:

   “(8)If a party to the de facto relationship dies after the breakdown of the de facto relationship, but before property settlement proceedings are completed:

   (a)the proceedings may be continued by or against, as the case may be, the legal personal representative of the deceased party and the applicable Rules of Court may make provision in relation to the substitution of the legal personal representative as a party to the proceedings; and

   (b)if the court is of the opinion:

   (i)that it would have made an order with respect to property if the deceased party had not died; and

   (ii)that it is still appropriate to make an order with respect to property;

   the court may make such order as it considers appropriate with respect to:

   (iii)any of the property of the parties to the de facto relationship or either of them; or

(iv)any of the vested bankruptcy property in relation to a bankrupt de facto party to the de facto relationship; and

(c)an order made by the court pursuant to paragraph (b) may be enforced on behalf of, or against, as the case may be, the estate of the deceased party.”

1. The question posed at s 90SM(8)(b)(i) is an enquiry made by reference to the application of the statutory principles set out at s 90SM(4) – which is in similar terms to s 79 of the Act (and relates to parties who were married) and by authority requires a four step process of analysis to be applied, after the Court has determined (consistent with Stanford & Stanford [2012] HCA 52 that s 90SM(3) is satisfied – namely that it is just and equitable to make the order.

2. Before turning to applying these principles, I make the following findings on the evidence about both the history of the relationship between the Applicant and the deceased Respondent, and the evidence heard during the trial.  Statements of fact which follow should be construed as findings of fact.

Contextual history

1. Both parties were born in 1972 – the Applicant now being 47 years of age.  The parties had known each other at school and began an intimate relationship before cohabitation commenced in mid-2011, when the Respondent moved into the Applicant’s unit at Suburb D, Sydney.

2. The Respondent conceded that the Applicant’s contributions at cohabitation were overwhelmingly superior.  I find that the initial contributions were as follows:

   a)Applicant:

   i)The Suburb D unit was purchased in 2008 for $450,000.  The Applicant borrowed approximately $360,000 to purchase the unit, with the balance and costs of acquisition met by the Applicant from her $150,000 property settlement received from her former husband in 2006;

   ii)A motor vehicle and cash savings of $15,000.  It is likely the Applicant had some accrued employment entitlements and superannuation, having joined the New South Wales Public Service some years earlier, however the level of such entitlements are unknown; and

   iii)At the time of cohabitation, the Applicant was a public servant earning approximately $87,000 per annum.

   b)Respondent:

   i)At paragraph 139 of the Respondent’s Affidavit filed 13 September 2018, his only asset at cohabitation is asserted to be a motor vehicle 1.  The Applicant disputes the value attributed (without evidence) to the vehicle by the Respondent, who also owned a motor bike at the time.  The Respondent says he was working for K Company as a tradesman on a wage of $50,000 per annum.  The Respondent did not depose as to the level of his superannuation at the time of cohabitation.

3. The Applicant sustained a work place injury and was medically discharged from the New South Wales Public Service in August 2011, only months before the birth of the parties’ oldest child Z in 2012.  Z is now eight years old.

4. There was an initial period of separation between mid-2012 to approximately January 2013 (about six months).  During this period the Respondent suffered some mental health challenges – the origin and severity of which he disputed – whilst living in the L City, and he contacted the Applicant when an involuntary patient in a local hospital.

5. The Applicant says, and I accept, she was prepared to try and mend the relationship so the parties reconciled in January 2013.

6. However, during the period the parties were separated in about December 2012, the Applicant received a lump sum payment of $505,000 by way of compensation for her medical discharge.  The Respondent (at paragraphs 141 and 152) claims he was unaware at the time the Applicant was receiving a “pension the entire time we were in a relationship” or that she also received the lump sum payment of $505,000.

7. Although I am satisfied the Applicant and Respondent kept their financial affairs separate (save for some payments or modest financial contributions made by the Respondent which I deal with below), I do not accept the Respondent’s assertion of a complete absence of understanding of the Applicant’s finances during the relationship.

8. In circumstances where:

   c)the parties decided to have two further children to be maintained – X born in 2014 (and now six years of age) and Y in 2015 (soon to turn five years of age); and

   d)the Applicant purchased in her name solely the home at Suburb G for $500,000 in September 2013,

   it beggars belief that the Respondent had no knowledge of where funds came to support the family or purchase the Suburb G home – even if his evidence of contributing his whole nett income to the family expenses is accepted (which I do not).

9. The parties moved into the home purchased by the Applicant at Suburb G in early October 2013.  I am satisfied that the home was purchased utilising the Applicant’s compensation award, although the equity in the Suburb D unit might also have been necessary.  What is clear is that the Respondent did not make any direct financial contribution to the acquisition of the Suburb G property, nor did he sign any guarantees or bank documents to facilitate the purchase.

10. The birth of Y and the responsibilities of seeking to parent and manage three infant children under the age of four years caused tensions and a separation under the one roof occured in December 2015, with the Respondent moving out of the Suburb G home on 26 April 2016

11. The Applicant’s Initiating Application seeking parenting orders only was filed in October 2016, and from that point in time significant investigations, numerous court events and serious allegations followed.

12. There is no utility or need to make findings about the risks the Applicant mother raised against the Respondent father, save to say that:

    a)after a period of some months, all contact between the children and their father (whether day time unsupervised or supervised) ceased in around March 2017 (the mother’s version) or September 2017 (the father’s version);

    b)the children lived full-time with the Applicant mother;

    c)the allegations of both violence to and sexual abuse of the children by the father were strenuously contested by the father to the final hearing.  The mother’s position at the hearing was that the children live with her and spend no time with the father; and

    d)the father’s allegations against the mother that the sexual abuse and other allegations against the father were either fabricated or the result of influence/coaching by the mother (which she strenuously denied) resulted in the father agitating for a change of residence, which was modified at the time of final submissions.

13. The death of the father meant that any impact of final parenting orders where, for example, it may have been ordered the children spend some time with their father, no longer applies.

14. The only other relevant historical fact about the property dispute is that on 26 June 2019, the Applicant effected a sale of the Suburb G property for a gross sale price of $600,000.  A full accounting of the use of the funds is revealed accurately, I find, in Exhibit 36.  As disclosed by the correspondence from the solicitors for the Applicant dated 17 July 2019, after usual adjustments for rates and charges, the nett proceeds of $578,862.50 were disbursed as to:

Payment to M City Council	$14,909.46
Payment to be held in accordance with Court Order made 24 May 2019	$150,000.00
Payment for Applicant’s legal expenses past and future	$315,356.49
Payment to the Applicant	$98,596.55
$578,862.50

Pool

1. Exhibit 35, tendered by the Applicant, is marked as Appendix One to these Reasons.  In my assessment on the evidence, some adjustments on that asserted pool are necessary as follows.

Bank accounts

1. Considering the period since final separation, any modest bank accounts held by the parties at the time of the trial represent small balances remaining from post separation income and after allowance for reasonable living expenses.  The only account which should be brought into account in the balance sheet is the Applicant’s Q Bank account of $73,339.39 which represents the amount remaining from the funds she received on the sale of the Suburb G home of $98,596.55.  It is reasonable to accept the Applicant spent the difference on reasonable expenses.  On the same basis, I do not include credit card liabilities.

Motor vehicle s and furniture

1. There is an absence of any reliable or probative evidence about the value of motor vehicles (of modest brand) in the ownership of the parties or their personal furniture.  I find no lack of equity to either party flows, in these circumstances, from ignoring such personal property interests.

Husband’s business

1. The lack of any effective and proper disclosure of the financial position (for example profit and loss statements; balance sheet) relating to the Respondent’s small business makes it impossible to attribute any reliable valuation to his business.  However, I accept the business operates as a service repairer; that the Respondent was the only employee/owner-operator and that his modest income (he estimated at $500 per week) would suggest no maintainable earnings after wages and expenses.  I do not propose to attribute any value to the business known as “R Services”

Personal loan

1. The ANZ personal loan which the Respondent raised and on which $54,922 was outstanding at the time of the hearing, was incurred post separation and should be ignored.

Separation

1. In cross-examination, and not having made more timely disclosure, the Respondent conceded his superannuation had increased from the sum of $32,155 (Item 45 of his Financial Statement) to “$40,000”.  I adopt that figure as a statement against interest.  For completeness, Counsel for the Respondent during final submissions did not oppose the “adding-back” of amounts paid for legal expenses as were set out in Exhibit 35.

2. On the basis of these adjustments, I find the parties’ legal and equitable interests at the time of the hearing are:

PARTY	PROPERTY	VALUE
ASSETS
Applicant	Suburb D unit	$775,000
Applicant	Proceeds of sale of Suburb G property	$202,827
Applicant	Q Bank account ending in …841	$73,339
Applicant	Add back of legal fees	$267,515
Applicant	Superannuation	$179,740
$1,498,421
LIABILITIES
Applicant	Q Bank mortgage	$287,080
Applicant	Q Bank loans	$164,394
Applicant	ATO debt	$10,813
Applicant	Outstanding body corporate fees	$6,106
Total liabilities	$468,393
Applicant	Nett assets	$1,030,028
ASSETS
Respondent	Superannuation	$40,000
Respondent	Add back of legal fees	$56,000
Respondent	Nett assets	$96,000
TOTAL COMBINED NETT ASSETS		$1,126.028

Contributions

1. The history reveals significant unmatched direct financial contributions by the Applicant to the acquisition of the real property.

2. The Respondent deposed to:

   a)being the primary income earner during the relationship (paragraph 140);

   b)contributing “the majority of my wage to her in cash” used, he says “to pay the mortgages and outlays for the properties and the ongoing living expenses for the family” (paragraphs 141 and 142);

   c)having an allowance of only $100 per week for his own expenses; and

   d)relying on Annexure “G11” which he said represented “the list of contributions towards the household expenses incurred during the course of the relationship, which I have identified from my historical bank account statements” (paragraph 148).

3. Frankly, it is hard to make much sense of “G11” which covers the period from 30 November 2013 to 26 April 2016 – a period of 29 months.  After cross-examination of the Respondent I was satisfied he had failed to make full and complete disclosure, and as submitted by Ms Oakley for the Applicant, the Court should treat the evidence of the Respondent cautiously.  In submissions, over this 29 months period, if the annexure is accurate, the following amounts were paid by the Respondent approximately (noting that no attempt was made by the Respondent to “add up” the amounts and frankly, it is not the Court’s task to do so as an “accounting exercise” is not to be undertaken):

   a)Regular or weekly payments to Coles (but also Woolworths and Aldi) – starting on 8 December 2013 ($313.28) to 26 April 2016 ($288.18).  In my assessment, considering the amounts and frequency, it is fair to find the Respondent did contribute regularly to the family’s grocery expenses;

   b)Small amounts regularly, at times more than once on the same day, at a Caltex station.  The frequency of the payments suggest this is more than fuel and likely convenience shopping;

   c)Pharmacy payments; contributions to gas (AGL) and rates and water (M City Council); dentist, Department of Transport; Foxtel; Bunnings; gifts and the like.

1. At least for this period I am prepared to accept that the Respondent did make payments towards the family living expenses and occasionally for rates and like charges. The payments however do not support the Respondent’s evidence about handing over his entire nett wage to the Applicant. If he had done so, he would have had no funds in his bank account to pay the expenses claimed in “G11”.

2. Against this contribution, it is appropriate on the evidence to find that:

   a)the Applicant had a superior income and, more likely than not, contributed more from that source to living expenses.  Although the contribution by the Respondent was made, and this may have slightly relieved the Applicant’s obligation to pay mortgage instalments (after allowance for any nett rental received on the Suburb D unit), there is no evidence that the Respondent directly contributed to the mortgage costs;

   b)during the period from cohabitation in June 2011 to initial separation in June 2012, there is little evidence to establish how the parties may have contributed to joint expenses, but I do accept the evidence of the Applicant that for the six months of separation to early 2013, that the Respondent contributed little by way of child support; and

   c)from the time the Respondent vacated the family home on 26 April 2016 (which co-incidentally is the last date on Annexure “G11” being a purchase at Coles for $281.18), to the hearing finishing on 8 August 2019 (a period of 39 months), the Applicant paid all expenses save for a very modest contribution by the Respondent of child support.

3. When one considers the opportunity the Respondent had (that is when the parties were together but not separated) in the period, even if I accept the Respondent made a contribution when he was around as to homemaker; maintenance around the home and parenting, his contribution (as a full-time worker) was significantly less than that of the Applicant who did not need to leave the home, but had the benefit of the “pension” to which her evidence refers.

4. As a result of these various and diverse contributions of both a financial and non-financial nature – I would assess contribution based entitlements as in the range of 90% to the Applicant and 10% to the Respondent.

5. I accept that the s 90SF(3) factors (to be taken into account by reference to s 90SM(4)(e)), at the time of the hearing, would have been assessed when the parenting orders were determined, as the commitment to support the children arising from the care arrangements would have been an important factor.

6. Furthermore, the Applicant did not enjoy good health, as did the Respondent at the time of hearing, however the contribution based entitlements meant the effect of any property division orders would have resulted in the Applicant being in a superior asset position to the Respondent.

7. I make these findings without assessing a precise percentage adjustment for the relevant s 90SF(3) factors at the time of hearing .

Application of s 90SM(8)

1. Before turning specifically to this pathway, I make the following findings.

2. In my view, at the time of the hearing the Court was satisfied that the breakdown in the relationship and the cessation of the assumptions for support and future benefits arising from the genuine domestic relationship that had existed, were such that it would have been just and equitable within the meaning of s 90SM(3) to make an order.

3. Based on the total pool of assets as found to exist at the hearing ($1,126,028), the Respondent’s share on a contribution based entitlement would have been approximately $126,000 – requiring a payment (before allowance on s 90SF(3) factors) by the Applicant to the Respondent in the region of $30,000.

4. Considering the final parenting position of the Respondent was that the children continue to live primarily with the Applicant, even on his case, it was likely an adjustment to the Applicant would have been proper.

5. The situation sadly only became clearer with the passing of the Respondent father – a s 90SF(3) adjustment of a much greater magnitude would be compelled as the Applicant mother now bears the full responsibility for the financial and emotional care of the three children who are still young with many years of care and schooling before them.

Conclusion

1. In the circumstances of this case, I find:

   a)I am not satisfied that I would have made an order altering the legal interests in property held by the Applicant in favour of the Respondent by requiring her to pay a sum of money to the Respondent.  Certainly, I would not have found it was just and equitable for the Applicant to pay the sum of $150,000 to the Respondent, as was his final position as articulated by his Counsel Mr Hanlon relying on the Respondents evidence under cross-examination.  Such a payment would have meant an adjustment of the pool as to 22% to the Respondent and 78% to the Applicant; and

   b)if I had been inclined, on the evidence, to make an order at the time of hearing, the death of the Respondent father and the significant impact that that event has on the assessment under s 90SF(3) would mean that it is not now appropriate to make an order (s 90SM(8)(b)(ii)).

2. The result is that the orders sought by the Applicant at the time of the hearing and still pressed on the further submissions filed on 14 April 2020 are just and equitable.  They appear at the commencement of these Reasons.

Costs

1. On 12 December 2018, the Applicant filed an Application in a Case seeking an order that:

   “…the Respondent pay the Applicants costs thrown away in relation to the costs for the hearing on 18 September 2018, fixed at the sum of $48,121.00.”

2. Additionally, the Court is reminded by the Applicant’s written submissions filed on 14 April 2020 that she maintains her application for costs “so far as they relate to the orders sought by the Respondent for the adjustment of property”.

3. Limited submissions have been made in respect of the costs of the adjourned hearing on 19 September 2018 save same oral submissions on the day by Ms Oakley of Counsel, which resulted in an order that “the parties’ costs as a result of the adjournment of the final hearing be reserved to trial”.

4. In written submissions filed 5 May 2020 on behalf of the Respondent’s legal personal representative, apart from submitting that the estate has one asset of $27,784 and total debts of $161,176, the only submission made as to costs was:

   “16. a)The reserved costs requested by the Applicant for adjourning the trial on 19 September 2018 were made in relation to electronic filing of CDs in relation to the Respondent and his time with the children relating to parenting Applications.

   b)Following the adjournment the Applicant did not seek to agitate any further evidence as to the CDs.

   c)In the circumstances, pursuant to Order 1 dated 24 March 2020, the reserved costs application should be dismissed.

   17.In relation to costs sought by the Applicant, it is submitted that each party bear their own costs of the proceedings.”

5. If the Applicant wishes to pursue her application for costs of the adjournment and/or costs of the property aspects of the proceedings, then it is appropriate that written submissions in response be filed and served within 14 days of the order.  If the Respondent chooses to file any written submissions in reply then they should be filed within 28 days of the order.

6. Unless otherwise ordered, any pursued application for an order for costs shall be considered in chambers on the papers.

I certify that the preceding fifty-two (52) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Baumann delivered on 23 July 2020

Associate: 

Date: 23 July 2020

APPENDIX ONE

Property Pool Balance Sheet for Campion & Gene

Ownership	Description     Date   provided		Mr Gene	Ms Campion	TOTAL
ASSETS
Property – Suburb D		Valuation April 2018	$775,000.00	$775,000.00
Proceeds – Suburb G		12.07.19	$202,827.82	$202,827.82
Q Bank #...17		20.05.19	$128.59	$128.59
Q Bank #…41		20.05.19	$73,339.39	$73,339.39
Bank Account #…82		20.05.19	$683.42	$683.42
Motor vehicle 3		Estimate	$10,000.00	$10,000.00
Furniture		$5,000.00	$5,000.00
Furniture		$ -	$ -
Motor Vehicle 2		Estimate verbal in Court 21.12.18	$1,500.00	$1,500.00
Motor Vehicle 1		Estimate verbal in Court 21.12.18	$6,000.00	$6,000.00
Motor Vehicle 4		$19,000.00	$19,000.00
ANZ #…55		$1,169.12	$1,169.12
ANZ #…69		$50.53	$50.53
ANZ #…14		$73.99	$73.99
GROSS ASSETS		$27,793.64	$1,066,979.22	$1,094,772.86
LIABILITIES
Q Bank mortgage #…00		20.05.19	$287,080.64	$287,080.64
Q Bank Home Loan #…01		20.05.19	$59,913.64	$59,913.64
Q Bank Home Loan #…02		20.05.19	$104,481.75	$104,481.75
Q Bank Visa #…38		20.05.19	$667.83	$667.83
ATO debt		02.03.19	$10,813.00	$10,813.00
Body Corporate Rates and Levies		20.05.19	$6,106.11	$6,106.11
M City Council Rates (outstanding bill)		20.05.19	$ -	$ -
M City Council Water Rates (outstanding bill)		20.05.19	$ -	$ -
N Company (Outstanding amount to P Pty Ltd)		07.05.19	$5,103.00	$5,103.00
Commission on sale of Suburb G property		20.05.19	$ -	$ -
ANZ Personal Loan #…22		$54,922.00	$54,922.00
ANZ Visa #…64		26.01.2016	$ -	$ -
Total Liabilities			$54,922.00	$474,075.97	$528,997.97
Net Assets (excl. super)			$(27,128.36)	$529,903.25	$565,774.89
Superannuation
H Superannuation		03.03.18	$179,740.00	$179,740.00
J Superannuation		$40,000	$40,000
Net Assets (inc. Super)			$12,871.64	$772,643.25	$785,514.89
Addbacks
Legal Fees
Solicitor and Counsel		$56,000.00	$267,615.21
TOTAL POOL			$68,871.64	$1,040,258.46	$1,109,130.10
TOTAL POOL EXCLUDING SOLICITOR FEES			$12,871.64	$772,643.25	$785,514.89