Campbell v Logan - [2003] WASCA 89

JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

CITATION: CAMPBELL -v- LOGAN [2003] WASCA 89

CORAM: ROBERTS-SMITH J

HEARD: 14 FEBRUARY 2003

DELIVERED : 30 APRIL 2003

FILE NO/S: SJA 1109 of 2002

BETWEEN: ALFRED ROBERT ARTHUR CAMPBELL
Appellant
AND
WILLIAM EDWARD LOGAN
Respondent

Catchwords:

Justices - Appeal - Possession of firearms without being holder of licence - Firearms licence - Renewal - Appellant's refusal to sign renewal notice in particular place on notice - Whether lawful requirement - Whether licence deemed in law to have been renewed

Appeal - Justices - Failure to give reasons explaining process of reasoning - Whether substantial miscarriage of justice

Legislation:

Firearms Act 1973 (WA), s 4, s 9, s 22A, s 34

Firearms Regulations 1974 (WA), reg 4(5), reg 7B

Justices Act 1902 (WA), s 199(1)(b)

Result:

Appeal dismissed

Category: A

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant: Mr R K Williamson
Respondent: Ms L E Christian

Solicitors:

Appellant: Williamson & Co
Respondent: State Crown Solicitor

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Betts v Hardcastle (2001) 23 WAR 559
Garrett v Nicholson (1999) 21 WAR 226
Roddan v Walker (1996) 17 WAR 277

Case(s) also cited:

Boddington v British Transport Police [1999] 2 AC 143
Lester v Booth [2000] WASCA 155
Nevermann v The Queen (1989) 43 A Crim R 347
Selby v Pennings (1998) 19 WAR 520

ROBERTS-SMITH J: This is an appeal against the appellant's conviction on 19 August 2002 before his Worship Mr McIntyre SM, in the Court of Petty Sessions at Armadale, of an offence that between 2 January and 5 February 2002 he knowingly possessed two firearms without being the holder of the requisite licence or permit.
The case has an unusual history.
The appellant is the owner of two firearms, a .32 calibre Winchester lever action repeating rifle and a Savage combination .22 calibre rifle and 20‑gauge shotgun. He was the holder of a Firearm Licence for those firearms under s 16 of the Firearms Act 1973 (WA) ("the Firearms Act").
On 22 September 2001 the appellant received from the Commissioner of Police ("the Commissioner") a form ("the renewal notice") advising him that payment for the renewal of his licence was due by 8 October 2001. The nature of the renewal notice assumes some importance. It actually comprised two forms on one page. The top form was headed "Firearm Licence". It bore the appellant's full name and post office address and the licence number. In a box at the top of the form were the words "licence expires 08 October 2002" (this would have been the expiry date once the licence was renewed). The text in the body of the renewal notice recited that the appellant was licensed in accordance with s 16(1)(a) of the Firearms Act to possess, carry and lawfully use, the firearms described thereunder and the ammunition for them. At the bottom of this part of the document, coloured purple, was the heading "Important" and the following notice:
"This licence includes payment for your extract of licence card. The extract of licence card will carry your photo image and is compulsory for all firearms licence holders. YOU MUST ATTEND IN PERSON.
WARNING
This is not a valid licence unless the imprint of the cash register is on it or a receipt is attached."
There was then a perforated line along which the top and bottom forms could be separated.
The bottom part of the renewal notice was white. In black print was the heading:
"FIREARMS LICENCE RENEWAL
AND EXTRACT OF LICENCE CARD
PAYMENT ADVICE (XR)".
Under that below a bar code and a printed licence number was a yellow box. Adjacent to that was a purple box which contained the words:
"PLEASE SIGN
within the yellow box"
In a box to the right were the words:
"PAYMENT DUE BY
08 October 2001"
The amount to be paid was $36.00.
On 23 September 2001 the appellant went to the Cannington Police Station to renew his licence. He had little in the way of identification and so asked the police officer with whom he was dealing to assist him in that regard. The officer said he knew nothing about it and could not help him with identification and told him to telephone the Firearms Branch the next day.
The appellant was in Bunbury on 24 September 2001 and went to the police station there to renew his licence. He tendered the $36. He asked for assistance with identification again because he had little to establish his identity. He says he was told that it had nothing to do with the police and that he had to sort it out with either the Department of Transport or Australia Post.
He accordingly went to the Bunbury Transport Licensing Centre to renew the licence and again tendered the money and the renewal notice. However, the Customer Service Officer there refused to take the money and to renew the licence because the appellant's proof of identification was not sufficient.
Accordingly, on the same day, he went to Australia Post in Bunbury and received a similar response upon presenting the few identification documents he had, the renewal notice and the money.
The appellant's firearms licence expired on 8 October 2001.
He subsequently wrote to a number of authorities about this, including the Commissioner of Police. He asked for a meeting with the Commissioner regarding what he described as the refusals to renew his licence.
On 1 November 2001 the appellant received advice that the identification problem had been fixed. He accordingly went to the Welshpool Licensing Centre and presented his identification, the renewal notice and the money. However, he was told that the identification problem had not been fixed and his identification documents were not acceptable.
The evidence is not entirely clear, but it does appear the appellant attended the Police Firearms Branch on 2 November 2001 and the Midland Licensing Office on 27 December 2001. He says that on both occasions his request to renew his licence was refused.
On 28 December 2001 he lodged an appeal to a Magistrate under s 22 of the Firearms Act (the "licence appeal"). The grounds of the licence appeal were stated as being that the Commissioner may have erred in:
"Refusal (sic: of) otherwise renewable licence
… Declines a photo or fails to provide signature
… Claiming requirement to sign
… Apparent deeming 'conscientious objector'
… Not providing respective law
… Representation of Transport Rules."
By s 9A of the Firearms Act the Commissioner may renew a licence on application made within one month before, or within 12 months after, its expiration (s 9A(4)). Where a licence is renewed on application made within one month before, or three months after, its expiry, it is deemed to have been renewed immediately after its expiry and the renewal is deemed to be a continuation of the licence (s 9A(5)). Where a licence is renewed on application made more than three months, but not more than 12 months, after its expiration, the renewal takes effect from the day on which it is effected, but for the purpose of determining when the renewed licence expires, it is deemed to have been renewed immediately after it previously expired (s 9A(6)).
The three month period following expiration of the appellant's licence itself expired on 8 January 2002 and it is the latter date from which the period particularised in the complaint begins.
On 23 January 2002 the appellant went to the Welshpool Transport Licensing Centre and again sought to renew his licence. The Customer Service Officer to whom he spoke was a Ms Beverley Bainbridge. He produced identification which was ultimately accepted by her as sufficient and proffered the $36 and asked for a receipt. Ms Bainbridge told him she could not give him a receipt until he signed in the yellow box on the form at the bottom of the renewal notice. The appellant refused, saying he did not believe he had to.
Ms Bainbridge went to her supervisor who confirmed that the appellant had to sign in the yellow box.
The appellant asked several times whether Ms Bainbridge was refusing to serve him but on each occasion she said she was not, she was simply asking him to comply with the signature requirement. She then explained that the Welshpool Licensing office was only an agency for the licensing department and if the appellant had any problems it would be necessary for him to telephone the number on the back of the form.
The appellant left the counter and appeared to make a telephone call on his mobile phone. He sat in the waiting area for a short time and about 25 minutes or so later, he returned to the counter and told her that "they" did not have the time to come down and sort it out and he left.
The appellant subsequently received a letter dated 24 January 2002 from the Commissioner's Personal Assistant confirming her earlier telephone advice that his request for a meeting with the Commissioner to discuss his firearms licensing issues had been denied.
The appellant's licence appeal was heard by his Worship Mr Burton SM on 31 January 2002.
The appellant explained to the learned Magistrate that he had attended a number of licensing centres but at no stage had he been issued with a licence notwithstanding that he was prepared to be photographed and had proffered the requisite fee. He pointed out that under reg 4A(5) the renewal of a firearms licence is not valid unless receipted at one of the collection centres approved by the Commissioner and as they had refused to accept his payment and receipt the form, that amounted in effect to a refusal to renew his licence.
In the course of discussion before the Magistrate the police officer representing the Commissioner referred to reg 7A(1) of the Firearms Regulations which requires an extract of licence to include a photograph of the face of the holder and by subreg 2 states that a person to whom an application is made for the renewal of a licence may require the applicant to attend at a place specified for the purpose of enabling such a photograph to be taken. His understanding seems to have been that the staff refused to accept the appellant's payment and receipt the form because the appellant would not comply with the requirement to have his photograph taken.
The appellant, on the other hand, told the learned Magistrate that he had been quite prepared to be photographed, but the staff had refused to have the photograph taken and issue the renewal. That was because the appellant refused to sign the form. His argument then (and before me) was that neither the Firearms Act nor the regulations impose a requirement for him to sign.
The appellant referred to a document which he described as "Form 9D" which he handed to the learned Magistrate but which has not been included in the materials before me. According to the transcript of the proceedings of 31 January 2002, the form stated in part:
"If a person declines a photograph or fails to provide a signature for an extract of licence card transaction the payment must be returned to the person advised, to contact Firearms Branch where a payment is being processed. The receipt is to be cancelled and the remittance to be returned to the customer."
The appellant maintained that the requirement for a signature was not authorised by the legislation and that he had otherwise complied - or indicated his readiness to comply - with all the other statutory requirements for renewal of his licence, the Commissioner was obliged to renew it.
It became clear in the course of those proceedings that ultimately the appellant's only difficulty in complying with the police requirements for the renewal of his licence was the requirement that he provide a signature.
In the event, the learned Magistrate held that the requirement that an applicant sign the renewal form was a valid requirement of the Commissioner under reg 7B, which provides that:
"A person to whom application is made for the grant, issue, or renewal of a licence, permit, approval, or authorisation may require the applicant to provide evidence of identity in a manner approved by the Commissioner."
He accordingly ordered that if the appellant wished to obtain a renewal of his firearms licence, he attend one of the nominated places to have the required photograph taken and that he sign the firearms licence in the presence of a proper officer at the place of payment. The appeal was otherwise dismissed.
One would have thought that would have been the end of the matter but it was not to be.
On 1 February 2002 the appellant returned to the Welshpool Transport Licensing Centre. He spoke to Customer Service Officer Ms Rebecca Walker. He produced the renewal notice and signed it in front of her in the purple portion. She told him that he had to sign in the yellow box at the bottom. He said he did not.
Ms Bainbridge, who was standing next to Ms Walker and overheard the conversation, interceded and told the appellant to take a seat.
In cross‑examination before the learned Magistrate on 19 August 2002, Ms Walker denied that the appellant had referred to the court order and said to her anything to the effect that the Magistrate had told him he did not have to sign in the yellow box. I note in passing that it is clear from the transcript of 31 January 2002, the learned Magistrate had not in fact said anything of the kind.
Ms Bainbridge sought the assistance of a supervisor.
The supervisor called the police.
One of the police officers who attended, Senior Constable Brooker, spoke to the supervisor and then to the appellant. The appellant told him that the staff were refusing to renew his licence. They both returned to the counter and spoke to a staff member. I assume, although it is not clear, that was the supervisor. She asked the appellant to sign the renewal notice so it could be processed. The appellant said he had already signed it. She asked him to sign in the yellow area so that she could process the licence correctly. The appellant repeated that he did not have to do that. She explained that if he did not do that, she would be unable to process the licence. She explained that it was required for computer scanning.
As I understand it from the evidence, the signed bottom portion of the form (that headed "Firearms Licence Renewal and Extract of Licence Card Payment Advice (XR)" is computer scanned and combined with the applicant's photograph to produce a laminated Extract of Licence card. That card then bears both the applicant's photograph and signature.
The appellant continued to refuse to sign in the yellow area on the form and so after some further discussion Senior Constable Brooker suggested that he contact the Firearms Branch to discuss the matter with them. In the meantime he told the appellant not to re‑enter the licensing area until the appellant was prepared to comply with the requirements of the licensing staff. They both then left the premises.
On 5 February 2002 the appellant delivered his firearms to a licensed dealer. On 14 March 2002 he was served with a firearms renewal licence infringement notice which gave him 28 days to pay an infringement penalty and firearms renewal licence fee, failing which court proceedings would be issued. The appellant having failed to do that, the complaint was laid on 1 May 2002.
In his evidence before the learned Magistrate on 19 August 2002, the appellant explained that he refused to sign in the yellow box as he had very strong civil liberties concerns with the growth of "identity theft" in Western Australia. He said he would have signed the card in that place if there had been a legal requirement for him to do so, but there was not. He said that he signed in the upper part of the document because that is the firearms licence, whereas the lower one‑third is a different document; the learned Magistrate who heard his firearms appeal was familiar with the distinction and had ordered the appellant to sign the firearms licence, not the payment advice slip.
The learned Magistrate delivered brief reasons for decision following consideration of the evidence and submissions over the luncheon adjournment on 19 August 2002. I set them out in full below:
"The defendant, Alfred Robert Arthur Campbell is charged with being in the possession of an unlicensed firearm between the 8th of January 2002 and the 5th of February 2002 at Beckenham. Of course, just to summarise the complaint rather than reading its precise words.
The onus of proving each of the elements on the - - in relation to the offence is on the prosecution. However, section 29 of the Act deals with evidentiary matters, and in circumstances where there's an apparent reversal of the onus of proof or any obligation is imposed on a defendant, it is, of course, to be discharged on the balance of probabilities.
There's no disputing that the defendant was in possession of firearms. In fact, he has been the holder of an appropriate licence. And a notice, a copy of which is in front of me, was generated advising him that his licence was due to expire on the 8th of October 2002. The defendant suggests that on numerous occasions, he has attended an appropriate authority or agency for the express purpose of renewing the licence, to which the notice relates. The defendant says that he did all that he was required to do by law and he has elicited oral evidence, he has produced documents and he has made submissions via counsel which he believes support his assertions.
It is important that in this over-regulated society in which we live, there should be occasional challenges to the seemingly endless ways in which faceless bureaucrats seek to order our lives. By this process of examination, we can be sure that it is the Parliament which is the source of statutory obligations and that this fundamental tenet of our system is not being usurped. It may well be that such an examination will occasionally reveal that through some slip or oversight or for want of clear expression by a draftsperson, the law has missed its mark or has been misapplied or exceeded. It may well be, for example, for want of proper delegation, the Commissioner of Railways, if there be such a person, may have to him or herself personally receive from each intending passenger the fare which entitles carriage between stations. If such a result prevails, then let parliament address it.
Mr Campbell suggests he is caught in an impasse based upon the misplaced expectation of licensing officials that they can impose upon him obligations that are not sanctioned by law. I've had the opportunity now of considering the submissions that have been made to me and having a look at the appropriate legislation, which is of course the Firearms Act, which, as the preamble suggests is:
'An Act to make provision for the control and regulation of firearms and ammunition; the licensing of persons possessing, using, dealing with or manufacturing firearms and ammunition; and for incidental and other purposes.'
Having had an opportunity of considering the submissions, I am satisfied that there is no foundation in the defendant's assertions. The prosecution have proven their charge to the required standard."
The grounds of appeal are that:
"(A)The learned Magistrate should have held that the prosecution had not proven that the applicant was not the holder of a firearms licence because, in law, there was no obligation upon the applicant to provide the police with his signature and the evidence established that the only reason that the relevant public servants would not process the applicant's several applications to renew his licence was his refusal to sign a document with the heading 'Remittance Advice'.
(B)The learned Magistrate erred in law by not giving reasons for his decision."
In summary, the primary propositions advanced on behalf of the appellant are that the appellant became the holder of a (renewed) firearms licence (or was deemed to be) when he attended an authorised collection centre and signified his agreement to be photographed and proffered the renewal fee. This is predicated on the contention that the Commissioner had decided to renew the appellant's licence, that being evidenced by him sending the renewal notice. Alternatively, it is submitted that if the Commissioner (or his agents) did refuse to renew the appellant's licence, the appellant became the holder of a renewed licence when he complied with the requirements of the order made by his Worship Mr Burton SM that he sign the firearms licence in the presence of a proper officer at the place of payment, and proffered the requisite fee.

It is necessary to consider the scheme of the Firearms Act insofar as it concerns licences and is pertinent to this appeal.
"Licence" is not defined. By s 4, "Extract of Licence" is defined as meaning a Firearms Act extract of licence referred to in, and issued under, s 22A.
Section 5A(1) of the Firearms Act provides that the regulations may permit prescribed members of the Police Force to perform the Commissioner's functions upon an application being made for the grant of a licence and subs 2 of that section authorises the Commissioner to delegate to a member of the Police Force any power or duty under the Act.
A firearm licence is valid for 12 months from the day on which it is issued or last renewed (s 9A(3)).
I have already mentioned s 9A(4), (5) and (6).
Section 11 deals with the exercise of the Commissioner's discretion in relation to licences. Section 11(1) stipulates that the Commissioner cannot grant a licence if he is of the opinion that to do so would be contrary to s 11A or the regulations, or it is not desirable in the interests of public safety, or the person is not a fit or proper person to hold the licence. Other subsections set out the nature of the factual circumstances the Commissioner must, or may, take into account.
Other than s 11(7)(a), none of the provisions of s 11 bear upon this case in terms, or because it is apparent the Commissioner (or his delegates) made no express decision to refuse to renew the appellant's licence for any of the statutory reasons.
Section 11(7) allows the Commissioner to refuse an application where the applicant has failed or refused to comply with certain requirements. The only one relevant here is s 11(7)(a), which allows the Commissioner to refuse an application if satisfied the applicant has failed to comply with a regulation providing for the manner in which a photograph of the applicant's face is to be supplied for inclusion on an extract of licence.
An application for a licence lapses and the licence cannot be granted if an applicant fails to comply within 28 days with a request by the Commissioner that they supply information, or further information (s 11(8)). It was not suggested there was any such request made here.
Section 11C provides that the regulations may restrict the grant, issue, or renewal of licences.
Section 16 sets out the various categories of licences which may be issued under the Firearms Act and what is authorised by them.
The licensing procedure is detailed in s 18. By subs (1) a person who wishes to apply for a licence shall make application in the prescribed manner and pay the prescribed fee.
Subsections (4a), (4b), (4c) and (4d) deal with the obligations of the Commissioner to satisfy himself an applicant is a fit and proper person to hold a firearm licence.
Where the Commissioner is satisfied that the requirements of s 18 have been satisfied, that there are no grounds upon which the application ought to be refused, and in the case of an application for the first issue of a firearm licence to a person, a period of at least 28 days has elapsed since the making of the application and the applicant has confirmed the desire to proceed with it, the Commissioner is to enter the prescribed particulars in a register and issue a licence to the applicant (s 18(6)).
I note also that s 20 of the Firearms Act sets out a number of circumstances in which the Commissioner may refuse to renew or may revoke any licence. One such circumstance is that the person applying for the renewal has failed to comply with the regulation providing for the manner in which a photograph of that person's face is to be supplied for inclusion on an Extract of Licence (s 20(1)(ad)(i)).
The Commissioner may cause a firearms Extract of Licence, in such form as he may approve, to identify a person who (inter alia) is the holder of a licence granted under the Firearms Act (s 22A(1B)).
A licence holder is required to have the Extract with them and produce it to a police officer on demand, when in possession of a firearm or ammunition.
Section 22A(6) provides that regulations made under s 34 may require that a photograph of the face of the holder be included on the Extract of Licence, and provide for the manner in which that photograph is to be supplied (s 22A(6)(a)) and require an applicant to provide evidence of identity in a manner approved by the Commissioner (s 22A(6)(b)).
A general regulation‑making power is contained in s 34.
I turn now briefly to the Firearms Regulations 1974 (WA) ("the regulations").
Regulation 4 provides that application for a firearm licence is to be made in accordance with Form 9D of the First Schedule.
The regulations prescribe the fees to be paid for the various categories of licences and reg 4(5) stipulates that the renewal of a firearms licence is not valid unless receipted at one of the collection centres approved by the Commissioner.
The provisions in respect of extracts of licence are contained in reg 7A. Relatively here, subreg (1) states that an extract of licence is required to include on it a photograph of the face of the holder.
The terms of reg 7B are set out above.
The firearm licence Form 9D in the schedule to the 1974 regulations, is similar to in many respects, but is not the same as, the top part of the document sent to the appellant. In particular, Form 9D contains the words "signature of holder" against a dotted line. That does not appear on the firearm licence (the top part of the document) sent to the appellant - there is no requirement for his signature there.
The original Form 9D was deleted by amendment to the regulations in 2001 and a new Form 9D was substituted by reg 7 of the Firearms Amendment Regulations (No 2) 2001 ("Government Gazette" 31/7/2001). The new form did not require a signature by the applicant. The firearm licence part of the document sent to the appellant is in accordance with the new Form 9D.

First ground - the appellant was licensed

Against the above statutory background, I turn to the appellant's first contention that he was at all material times the holder of a licence because he had done all he was required by law to do for the renewal of it, so that it was "deemed" to be continued.
There is in my view a basic problem with this argument. The legislature may as a matter of law deem something to be other than it is (or was) in fact. That is done in s 9A of the Firearms Act, so that, for example, where a licence is renewed on application made within three months after its expiry, it is statutorily deemed to have been renewed immediately after its expiry and the renewal is deemed to be a continuation of the licence. There is no statutory provision which has any such "deeming" operation on the circumstances of this case. That being so, as a matter of fact and law, the appellant was not the holder of a licence between 8 January and 5 February 2002. As the evidence clearly established he was over that period in possession of the two firearms concerned, the necessary elements of the offence were made out.
The appellant relied upon the decision of the Full Court in Roddan v Walker (1996) 17 WAR 277. As I apprehend it, the decision in that case is said to support the argument that upon the appellant's compliance (or proffered compliance) with all necessary lawful requirements to effect the renewal of his licence (that is presentation of the document, his willingness to have his photograph taken, his signing of the document in accordance with the Magistrate's order and his tender of the fee) the licence became renewed notwithstanding the refusal of the collection centre staff to receipt the document because the appellant would not sign in the yellow box.
Again, I think the short answer to this lies in reg 4(5) which stipulates that the renewal of a firearm licence is not valid unless receipted at one of the collection centres approved by the Commissioner. That regulation is clearly within the regulation‑making power contained in s 34(1) and (2)(a), (d) and (e) of the Firearms Act. The simple fact is that the appellant's licence was not receipted and so there was not a valid renewal of it.
Roddan v Walker involved quite a different point. There the appellant had been convicted of failing to comply with a condition of his firearm licence that a pistol be used only for club purposes. The condition was not endorsed on the appellant's licence, but was set out in a separate letter to him. The primary ground of appeal depended on the proposition that a licence is unconditional unless a condition is signified on the face of the licence document carried by the licensee.
Anderson J (with whom Rowland and Murray JJ agreed) was unable to accept that proposition. His Honour held (286) that whilst the Firearms Act and regulations do require that any restrictions or conditions be noted on the licence, it did not follow that the failure to do so had the effect of vitiating the conditions and rendering the licence unconditional.
His Honour concluded that on a proper construction of the Firearms Act the appellant became licensed in respect of the revolver when his application was approved by the delegated police officer, as signified by the entry in the Firearms Register maintained under the Firearms Act. At that point the appellant was granted a licence subject to conditions. Under the legislation, once there was a grant of approval to add a firearm to an existing licence there was nothing more for the applicant to do except present his licence for noting and the notation of the grant of approval was a mere procedural requirement.
In the present appeal the appellant sought to argue that once the conditions for the grant of a renewal had been met (as it was argued they had been here) the renewal took effect and the imprinting of the receipt was a mere procedural step which did not affect that. I do not accept that submission. In Roddan v Walker, the evidence was that the addition of the particular firearm to the appellant's licence, subject to condition, had in fact been approved by the Commissioner's delegate. The approval had been given and recorded. The register maintained under s 18 of the Firearms Act had been amended to reflect that fact. In the present case, no decision to renew the appellant's licence had been made. There had been no renewal in fact.
On the above reasoning, it is immaterial whether the requirement that the appellant sign in the yellow box on the bottom part of the document was a lawful requirement or not. If it was not, then the appellant may have had other legal avenues open to him to compel the Commissioner to renew the licence (or at least make a decision about it), but it is not necessary to explore that possibility here.
I accept the respondent's submission that the reason the appellant was not the holder of a firearm licence at the relevant time is immaterial. In any event, the requirement that he sign in the yellow box was in my opinion valid.
An Extract of Licence is to be in a form approved by the Commissioner (s 22A(1)). It is required to have on it a photograph of the face of the holder (reg 7A(1)). The Extract was the bottom part of the renewal notice issued to the appellant by the Commissioner. There was no issue that the Extract portion was in the form approved by the Commissioner. That form required the holder's signature within the yellow box. The reason for the requirement was to enable computer scanning of the signature and photograph of the holder onto the Extract.
In my view the requirement was also supportable under reg 7B. The reverse of the document bears the following endorsement:
"PROOF OF IDENTITY
You must provide suitable proof of identity such as your Motor Driver's Licence, Australian Passport (not expired by more than two years) current overseas Passport or Birth Certificate AND another form of identification bearing your signature such as a Credit Card or ATM access card issued by a financial institution. (NOTE: Motor Driver's Licence must carry your photograph)."
That requirement is clearly authorised by reg 7B. But that is not to say it is exhaustive. The clear intent is that the applicant must not only attend in person and produce such proof of identity, but also sign the face of the document in the yellow box. That enables confirmation that the signature and the photograph on the document are both of the person whose signature and photograph are shown on the proof of identity documents. In that way the requirement to sign in the yellow box is part of the combined requirements under s 22A(1) (the form of the extract) and reg 7B.
It was submitted for the appellant that reg 7B is ultra vires because it is inconsistent with the regulation‑making power in s 22A(6). It was argued that it is not a regulation which "requires an applicant … to provide evidence of identity in a manner approved by the Commissioner", but purports to authorise "a person to whom an application is made …" to make such a requirement. It was further argued reg 7B was ultra vires because it does not describe the "evidence of identity" which must be provided under the regulation. I do not accept these submissions.
Section 22A(6)(b) provides that regulations made under s 34 may require that an applicant for a licence or renewal provide evidence of identity in a manner approved by the Commissioner.
Regulation 7B does exactly what s 22A(6)(b) authorises, namely requires an applicant to provide evidence of identity in a manner approved by the Commissioner, albeit when required by a person to whom the application is made. The subsection does not require prescription by the regulation itself of the manner of proof of identity approved by the Commissioner, but expressly contemplates that in accordance with the power given by the regulation, the Commissioner may, from time to time, approve the manner in which an applicant's identity is to be proved.
Nor do I consider that subs (6)(b) envisages a regulation which imposes the obligation directly on all applicants in all circumstances, and does not contemplate a regulation which imposes the requirement for proof of identity in the requisite manner, by a person to whom an application is made. The latter is a practical and commonsense construction of the subsection and is to be preferred to the strained and unnecessarily restrictive construction argued for by the appellant.
The next submission advanced on behalf of the appellant was that the order of Mr Burton SM was complied with. This then, I think, is put in two ways. The first is the same as that which I have already rejected above, that having so complied, the appellant became the holder of a renewed licence notwithstanding non‑receipting of the document. In addition to that, however, I would not regard the appellant's argument that the learned Magistrate deliberately cast his order to require the appellant to sign the upper portion of the renewal notice rather than in the yellow box on the lower portion. I appreciate that is the way the order made by the learned Magistrate is capable of being read, but in my view, having read the transcript of the proceedings before his Worship Mr Burton SM, I am satisfied what he understood he was dealing with was simply a refusal by the appellant to sign and that was the substance to which he was directing his order. I consider the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn in the circumstances is that by his reference to the appellant signing "the firearm licence" his Worship was referring simply to the whole document.
Then it is argued that the appellant had an honest and reasonable belief that the learned Magistrate's order required him only to sign on the top part of the document - which he did. That having been his evidence, s 24 of the Criminal Code (WA) was raised and was not negatived by the prosecution.
The fundamental flaw in this argument is even if that understanding had been correct and that had been the real state of things, it would not have affected the appellant's criminal responsibility for the offence of which he had been charged. He was still not the holder of a valid licence at the relevant time. Further, if his belief was that he was the holder of a valid licence, that would in the circumstances have been a mistake of law, not fact. For those reasons s 24 does not arise in the circumstances of this case.
The appellant's first ground fails.

Second ground - failure to give reasons

The duty of a judicial officer to give adequate reasons is well established. To be adequate, they must expose the court's process of reasoning sufficiently to enable a litigant to determine whether or not there is any ground of appeal and for an appeal court to adequately adjudicate an appeal if instituted. I referred to a number of relevant authorities in Betts v Hardcastle (2001) 23 WAR 559 at 569 ‑ 571, and I adopt here without repeating, what I said there (see also Garrett v Nicholson (1999) 21 WAR 226 at [31]).
What was said by the learned Magistrate here was a signal failure to give adequate reasons for decision. In truth, his Worship gave no reasons as such at all. All he said about how or why he came to the conclusion he did was that (AB 45):
"Having had an opportunity of considering the submissions, I am satisfied that there is no foundation in the defendant's assertions. The prosecution have proved their charge to the required standard."
There was no exposure whatsoever of his Worship's process of reasoning.
The question then is whether that failure must result in the quashing of the appellant's conviction.
The case before the learned Magistrate turned solely on an issue of law - namely whether the prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was not the holder of a firearm licence at the relevant time (or to put it the other way, and shortly, whether he was deemed to have been the holder of such a licence in the circumstances).
It is not correct to say, as the respondent does, that under s 28(1)(a) of the Firearms Act the appellant bore the onus of proof of satisfying the court that he was the holder of a firearms licence between 8 January and 5 February 2002.
Section 29(1)(a) of the Firearms Act provides that in a prosecution for an offence against the Act an averment made by the complainant and contained in the complaint of the offence that a person was not the holder of a particular licence at a particular time is evidence of the matter averred. That section does not reverse the legal onus of proof. That remains upon the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant was not the holder of the requisite licence. Section 29(1)(a) is an aid to proof. It relieves the prosecution from having to call evidence that the defendant was not the holder of a licence. The effect is to cast an evidentiary onus on a defendant who wishes to contend otherwise - but the legal onus remains on the prosecution.
The facts here were not in dispute. The point concerned the legal consequences which flowed from them. It was not a case which turned on contested findings of fact. His Worship expressly rejected the appellant's legal argument that he was the holder of a valid licence. That was clearly the correct conclusion.
In my view, in the particular circumstances of this case, the failure of the learned Magistrate to give reasons for his decision (in the sense I have described), did not occasion any substantial miscarriage of justice (s 199(1)(b) Justices Act 1902 (WA)).

Conclusion

The appeal will be dismissed.