Camm v Linke Nominees Pty Ltd (No 4)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Camm v Linke Nominees Pty Ltd (No 4) [2013] FCA 223

Citation: Camm v Linke Nominees Pty Ltd (No 4) [2013] FCA 223
Parties: THE TRUSTEES OF THE PROPERTY OF GARY STIRLING CAMM, A BANKRUPT v LINKE NOMINEES PTY LTD (ACN 005 860 944)
File number: VID 828 of 2009
Judge: TRACEY J
Date of judgment: 15 March 2013
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Failure of respondent to disclose call option deed which would allegedly have affected applicant’s conduct of bankruptcy proceeding – application for leave to discontinue proceeding on terms that respondent and/or its solicitor pay costs on indemnity basis – whether indemnity costs can be ordered where no prejudice demonstrated – consideration of principles relevant to costs orders against practitioners – consideration of ss 37M and 37N of Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – application dismissed.
Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) – ss 81, 121
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – ss 37M, 37N
Federal Court Rules 1979 – O 15, r 2
Federal Court Rules 2011 - r 20.14, 26.12
Cases cited:

Australian Transport Insurance Pty Ltd v Graeme Phillips Road Transport Insurance Pty Ltd (1986) 10 FCR 177 – cited
Citrus Queensland Pty Ltd v Sun State Orchards Pty Ltd(No 2) (2006) 155 FCR 1 – referred to
McIntosh v Linke Nominees Pty Ltd [2008] QCA 275 at [17] – considered
Modra v Victoria (Department of Education and Early Childhood Development and Department of Human Services) (2012) 205 FCR 445 – considered
Preston v Preston [1981] 3 WLR 619 – cited
Reading Entertainment Australia Pty Ltd v Birch Carroll & Coyle Ltd [2002] FCAFC 109 – cited
The Trustees of the Property of Gary Stirling Camm v Linke Nominees Pty Ltd (2010) 190 FCR 193 – cited
White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Flower and Hart (a firm) (1998) 156 ALR 169 – considered, followed

Dates of hearing: 18 and 19 February 2013
Place: Melbourne
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 59
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr G Nash QC and Mr P Baume
Solicitor for the Applicant: Maitland Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr W Sofronoff QC and Mr M Amerena
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Broadley Rees Hogan
Counsel for Mr Broadley: Mr B O'Donnell QC and Mr D Chesterman
Solicitor for Mr Broadley: Coyne & Associates

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

VID 828 of 2009

BETWEEN:

THE TRUSTEES OF THE PROPERTY OF GARY STIRLING CAMM, A BANKRUPT
Applicant

AND:

LINKE NOMINEES PTY LTD (ACN 005 860 944)
Respondent

JUDGE:

TRACEY J

DATE OF ORDER:

15 MARCH 2013

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE (HEARD IN BRISBANE)

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The applicants’ application be dismissed. 

2.The costs of the application be reserved.

THE COURT DIRECTS THAT:

3.The further hearing of the proceeding be fixed for 20 May 2013 on an estimate of eight days.

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules

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Details
Case
[2013] FCA 223
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Camm v Linke Nominees Pty Ltd (No 4) involved the trustees of the estate of Gary Stirling Camm seeking to set aside a transaction between Camm and Linke Nominees. The trustees argued that the transaction was voidable under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) as it was entered into at an undervalue. The dispute centred around the enforceability of a put option deed, which allowed Linke Nominees to purchase the property if it vested in the first trustee. The evidence presented by the trustees included affidavits from Mr John Park, Mr John Shanahan, and Mr John Maitland, who expressed concerns about the potential impact of the option deed on their ability to successfully prosecute their case. The trustees argued that had they known about the option deed earlier, it would have affected their decision to proceed with the case and the steps they would have taken.

The court was required to decide whether the trustees were under an obligation to disclose the existence of the put option deed to Linke Nominees under the discovery rules. The trustees argued that they were not obligated to disclose the deed, while Linke Nominees contended that the deed was material and should have been disclosed. The court also needed to determine the effect of the option deed on the trustees' ability to exercise control over the property if they were successful in their case. The court considered whether the deed could undermine the trustees' rights under the Bankruptcy Act to avoid the transfer of the property if it was found to be voidable.

The court found that the trustees were not under an obligation to disclose the existence of the option deed as it did not fall within the scope of the discovery rules. The court noted that the rules did not impose substantially different obligations on parties required to give discovery, and that the weight of authority supported the proposition that Rule 2 of the Federal Court Rules did not extend to documents which might put a party on a train of inquiry that may turn up evidence which is of assistance to its case. The court also found that the option deed was incapable, as a matter of law, of achieving its objective because the rights vested in trustees pursuant to the Bankruptcy Act were statutory rights which could not be transferred to other parties. The court held that if the trustees were successful in their case, they would have the power to have the transfer of the property from Camm to Linke Nominees avoided, and the deed could in no way undermine any rights which they would then have to exercise control over the property for the benefit of Camm’s creditors.

The court ordered that the trustees were not liable to pay costs to Linke Nominees in relation to the costs of the application for costs. The court also found that the trustees were not required to disclose the existence of the option deed to Linke Nominees, and that the deed was incapable, as a matter of law, of achieving its objective.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Linke Nominees’ solicitor, Mr Jon Broadley, was separately represented by counsel. His firm nonetheless remained solicitor on the record for Linke Nominees and he prepared an affidavit which was sworn by Mr Robert Linke in opposition to any cost order being made against Linke Nominees.THE EVIDENCE The trustees relied on the evidence of three witness: Mr John Park, one of the trustees; Mr John Shanahan, a fellow employee of Mr Park in the firm of FTI Consulting who was himself a registered trustee in bankruptcy and had day to day oversight of the administration of Mr Camm’s estate; and Mr John Maitland, the solicitor acting for the trustees. In his affidavit, Mr Park expressed a series of concerns about the implications of the option deed, and the possibility that the option might be exercised, for the successful prosecution of the trustees’ case. These concerns were outlined in an affidavit sworn by him:“8.Knowledge of the Deed’s existence at an early stage of the proceeding herein would have alerted me to the fact that, if we were successful in the present proceeding and if the option given by that Deed were exercised, we would not be able to enjoy the fruits of any judgment in our favour unless and until we had obtained orders setting aside the Deed. If the proceeding were to continue we would need to obtain a declaration as to the validity and enforceability of the Deed in the present proceeding or, subsequent to judgment in the present proceeding, to issue fresh proceedings against Mr. Linke (and possibly Mr. Schmierer) seeking to set aside the Deed.9.That knowledge would have required us to re-assess the prospects of success in the present proceeding weighed against the potential costs likely to be incurred by the estate of Gary Stirling Camm, and the costs which might, if the proceeding were unsuccessful, be awarded against the estate and to decide whether to continue with the present proceeding and, if we did decide to continue with the proceeding what steps should be taken in relation to the Deed.” While Mr Park was certain that “knowledge of the existence of the Deed would have affected our conduct of the proceeding” he was not in a position to say, with hindsight, how the trustees might have acted upon becoming aware of the existence of the deed. Under cross-examination Mr Park accepted that, once the deed had lapsed without the option being exercised, all of his concerns about the potential impact of the exercise by Mr Linke of the option, on the trustees’ interests, had dissipated. Mr Shanahan also accepted that, if the deed had lapsed without the exercise of the option and had not been renewed, his concerns about the future impact of the exercise of the option on the trustees’ interests would no longer exist. He did not, however, know, at the time at which instructions were given for the present application to be made, whether or not the option had been exercised before the deed had lapsed or whether the deed had lapsed or been renewed.

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Although the language of the present and former Rules differ, they do not impose substantially different obligations on a party who is required to give discovery under them. It had been contemplated in some cases that Order 15 Rule 2 could extend to documents which might put a party on a train of inquiry which may turn up evidence which is of assistance to its case (the Peruvian Guano test): see, for example, Reading Entertainment Australia Pty Ltd v Birch Carroll & Coyle Ltd [2002] FCAFC 109 at [70] (Beaumont J). The weight of authority, however, supports the proposition that Rule 2 displaced this requirement: see the authorities collected in Citrus Queensland Pty Ltd v Sun State Orchards Pty Ltd(No 2) (2006) 155 FCR 1 at 19-23 (Collier J).CONSIDERATION Conflicting submissions were made as to the purpose and effect of the put option deed. The trustees considered that the deed was designed to deprive them of the fruits of any forensic victory they may obtain in the principal proceeding. If it were found that the property vested in the first trustee and Mr Linke exercised his option under the deed, he would have the right to purchase the property. The trustees’ apprehension was fuelled by some evidence given by the first trustee at trial. In the course of his evidence on 29 October 2012 in the principal proceeding, Mr Schmierer disclosed the existence of the deed. It was produced. Having examined it overnight, senior counsel for the trustees asked Mr Schmierer, on the following day, about his understanding of the meaning and effect of the deed and the attached agreement. The following exchange occurred:“COUNSEL: … It’s your understanding, is it not, that if a chose in action in respect of the sale in ‘95 by Camm to Linke of the Noosaville property were, in fact, a chose in action in the first estate and, therefore, only available to the first trustee, being you?ANSWER: Mm.COUNSEL: Then that document, the option, to which we’re referring would give Linke upon payment of $10,000 the ability to defeat that proceeding?ANSWER: That appears to be the case.” Mr Schmierer also gave evidence that he had recently had a discussion with Mr Broadley in which the possibility of extending the period within which the option might be exercised had been raised by Mr Broadley. Counsel for Linke Nominees contended that the trustees’ apprehension was without foundation. If they succeeded in persuading the Court that the property vested in them, they would have the power, under s 121 of the Act, to have the transfer of the property from Mr Camm to Linke Nominees avoided. The deed could in no way undermine any rights which they would then have to exercise control over the property for the benefit of Mr Camm’s creditors. If the trustees were unsuccessful the property would be held to have vested in the first trustee and it would be for the first trustee to exercise control over the property. Counsel for Mr Broadley, supported by counsel for Linke Nominees, submitted that, even though the deed had been intended to advantage Mr Linke in the event that the contract of sale of the property were avoided and the property vested in the first trustee, the deed was incapable, as a matter of law, of achieving its objective. This was because the rights vested in trustees pursuant to s 121 of the Act were statutory rights which could not be transferred to other parties.