FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Camm v Linke Nominees Pty Ltd (No 4) [2013] FCA 223
Citation: Camm v Linke Nominees Pty Ltd (No 4) [2013] FCA 223 Parties: THE TRUSTEES OF THE PROPERTY OF GARY STIRLING CAMM, A BANKRUPT v LINKE NOMINEES PTY LTD (ACN 005 860 944) File number: VID 828 of 2009 Judge: TRACEY J Date of judgment: 15 March 2013 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Failure of respondent to disclose call option deed which would allegedly have affected applicant’s conduct of bankruptcy proceeding – application for leave to discontinue proceeding on terms that respondent and/or its solicitor pay costs on indemnity basis – whether indemnity costs can be ordered where no prejudice demonstrated – consideration of principles relevant to costs orders against practitioners – consideration of ss 37M and 37N of Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – application dismissed. Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) – ss 81, 121
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – ss 37M, 37N
Federal Court Rules 1979 – O 15, r 2
Federal Court Rules 2011 - r 20.14, 26.12Cases cited: Australian Transport Insurance Pty Ltd v Graeme Phillips Road Transport Insurance Pty Ltd (1986) 10 FCR 177 – cited
Citrus Queensland Pty Ltd v Sun State Orchards Pty Ltd(No 2) (2006) 155 FCR 1 – referred to
McIntosh v Linke Nominees Pty Ltd [2008] QCA 275 at [17] – considered
Modra v Victoria (Department of Education and Early Childhood Development and Department of Human Services) (2012) 205 FCR 445 – considered
Preston v Preston [1981] 3 WLR 619 – cited
Reading Entertainment Australia Pty Ltd v Birch Carroll & Coyle Ltd [2002] FCAFC 109 – cited
The Trustees of the Property of Gary Stirling Camm v Linke Nominees Pty Ltd (2010) 190 FCR 193 – cited
White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Flower and Hart (a firm) (1998) 156 ALR 169 – considered, followedDates of hearing: 18 and 19 February 2013 Place: Melbourne Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 59 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr G Nash QC and Mr P Baume Solicitor for the Applicant: Maitland Lawyers Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr W Sofronoff QC and Mr M Amerena Solicitor for the First Respondent: Broadley Rees Hogan Counsel for Mr Broadley: Mr B O'Donnell QC and Mr D Chesterman Solicitor for Mr Broadley: Coyne & Associates
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
VID 828 of 2009
BETWEEN: THE TRUSTEES OF THE PROPERTY OF GARY STIRLING CAMM, A BANKRUPT
ApplicantAND: LINKE NOMINEES PTY LTD (ACN 005 860 944)
Respondent
JUDGE:
TRACEY J
DATE OF ORDER:
15 MARCH 2013
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE (HEARD IN BRISBANE)
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The applicants’ application be dismissed.
2.The costs of the application be reserved.
THE COURT DIRECTS THAT:
3.The further hearing of the proceeding be fixed for 20 May 2013 on an estimate of eight days.
Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules
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- Case
- [2013] FCA 223
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to decide whether the trustees were under an obligation to disclose the existence of the put option deed to Linke Nominees under the discovery rules. The trustees argued that they were not obligated to disclose the deed, while Linke Nominees contended that the deed was material and should have been disclosed. The court also needed to determine the effect of the option deed on the trustees' ability to exercise control over the property if they were successful in their case. The court considered whether the deed could undermine the trustees' rights under the Bankruptcy Act to avoid the transfer of the property if it was found to be voidable.
The court found that the trustees were not under an obligation to disclose the existence of the option deed as it did not fall within the scope of the discovery rules. The court noted that the rules did not impose substantially different obligations on parties required to give discovery, and that the weight of authority supported the proposition that Rule 2 of the Federal Court Rules did not extend to documents which might put a party on a train of inquiry that may turn up evidence which is of assistance to its case. The court also found that the option deed was incapable, as a matter of law, of achieving its objective because the rights vested in trustees pursuant to the Bankruptcy Act were statutory rights which could not be transferred to other parties. The court held that if the trustees were successful in their case, they would have the power to have the transfer of the property from Camm to Linke Nominees avoided, and the deed could in no way undermine any rights which they would then have to exercise control over the property for the benefit of Camm’s creditors.
The court ordered that the trustees were not liable to pay costs to Linke Nominees in relation to the costs of the application for costs. The court also found that the trustees were not required to disclose the existence of the option deed to Linke Nominees, and that the deed was incapable, as a matter of law, of achieving its objective.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Although the language of the present and former Rules differ, they do not impose substantially different obligations on a party who is required to give discovery under them. It had been contemplated in some cases that Order 15 Rule 2 could extend to documents which might put a party on a train of inquiry which may turn up evidence which is of assistance to its case (the Peruvian Guano test): see, for example, Reading Entertainment Australia Pty Ltd v Birch Carroll & Coyle Ltd [2002] FCAFC 109 at [70] (Beaumont J). The weight of authority, however, supports the proposition that Rule 2 displaced this requirement: see the authorities collected in Citrus Queensland Pty Ltd v Sun State Orchards Pty Ltd(No 2) (2006) 155 FCR 1 at 19-23 (Collier J).CONSIDERATION Conflicting submissions were made as to the purpose and effect of the put option deed. The trustees considered that the deed was designed to deprive them of the fruits of any forensic victory they may obtain in the principal proceeding. If it were found that the property vested in the first trustee and Mr Linke exercised his option under the deed, he would have the right to purchase the property. The trustees’ apprehension was fuelled by some evidence given by the first trustee at trial. In the course of his evidence on 29 October 2012 in the principal proceeding, Mr Schmierer disclosed the existence of the deed. It was produced. Having examined it overnight, senior counsel for the trustees asked Mr Schmierer, on the following day, about his understanding of the meaning and effect of the deed and the attached agreement. The following exchange occurred:“COUNSEL: … It’s your understanding, is it not, that if a chose in action in respect of the sale in ‘95 by Camm to Linke of the Noosaville property were, in fact, a chose in action in the first estate and, therefore, only available to the first trustee, being you?ANSWER: Mm.COUNSEL: Then that document, the option, to which we’re referring would give Linke upon payment of $10,000 the ability to defeat that proceeding?ANSWER: That appears to be the case.” Mr Schmierer also gave evidence that he had recently had a discussion with Mr Broadley in which the possibility of extending the period within which the option might be exercised had been raised by Mr Broadley. Counsel for Linke Nominees contended that the trustees’ apprehension was without foundation. If they succeeded in persuading the Court that the property vested in them, they would have the power, under s 121 of the Act, to have the transfer of the property from Mr Camm to Linke Nominees avoided. The deed could in no way undermine any rights which they would then have to exercise control over the property for the benefit of Mr Camm’s creditors. If the trustees were unsuccessful the property would be held to have vested in the first trustee and it would be for the first trustee to exercise control over the property. Counsel for Mr Broadley, supported by counsel for Linke Nominees, submitted that, even though the deed had been intended to advantage Mr Linke in the event that the contract of sale of the property were avoided and the property vested in the first trustee, the deed was incapable, as a matter of law, of achieving its objective. This was because the rights vested in trustees pursuant to s 121 of the Act were statutory rights which could not be transferred to other parties.