Camilleri v Commissioner of Police (NSW)
[2013] NSWADT 80
•17 April 2013
Administrative Decisions Tribunal
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: Camilleri v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2013] NSWADT 80 Hearing dates: 7 November 2012 Decision date: 17 April 2013 Jurisdiction: General Division Before: Naida Isenberg, Judicial member Decision: Matter 123155 (remitted matter 113105): the decision under review is affirmed
Legislation Cited: Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009
Freedom of Information Act 1989Cases Cited: Commissioner of Police v Camilleri [2012] NSWADTAP 19
Nature Conservation Council of NSW v Department of Trade and Investment, Regional Infrastructure and Services [2012] NSWADT 195
Commissioner of Police v Camilleri [2012] NSWADTAP 19Category: Principal judgment Parties: Clement Camilleri (Applicant)
Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force (Respondent)Representation: C Camilleri (Applicant in person)
Sparke Helmore Lawyers (Respondent)
File Number(s): 123155
reasons for decision
BACKGROUND
There has been conflict between Clement Camilleri, the Applicant and the owner of a neighbouring property, Mr Bartolo for some years. A 000 telephone call was made from the Bartolo residence, at about 3.00 am on 1 April 2008 complaining that the Applicant had splashed paint on parts of the Bartolo property. At about the same time that night the Applicant reported to Police, alleging that Mr Bartolo had fired shots at his car. The complaint against the Applicant led to a charge of malicious damage, which was ultimately dismissed. The Applicant, requested the Respondent to provide access to information, pursuant to the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 ('GIPA Act'), the transcript or recording of the 000 call. The Respondent refused the request.
The Applicant sought review by the Tribunal ('the first hearing') and I set aside the Respondent's determination: Camilleri v Commissioner of Police [2012] NSWADT 5. That decision was appealed by the Respondent and the Appeal Panel allowed the appeal and remitted the matter for reconsideration: Commissioner of Police v Camilleri [2012] NSWADTAP 19.
The Applicant also made a request for information in relation to a network radio call between 2 Police officers. That request was also refused, and that decision was also for review by the Tribunal. When it was ascertained that there was no radio call using the network, the parties agreed that the appropriate course was for the application for review in respect of that matter to be dismissed.
EVIDENCE
Evidence had been given at the first hearing by the Applicant and by Constable Colman, who had the conduct of the investigation of the April 2008 allegations by Mr Bartolo and by the Applicant. The Appeal Panel observed that the Tribunal at the first hearing may have been assisted had there been more information as to the protocols and practices that surround the 000 service and in relation to such matters as the instructions given to operators in relation to confidentiality. A statement by Scott Robinson, the Acting Commander of the Police's Penrith Communications Centre was provided to the Appeal Panel. On remittal, the statement was tendered and Commander Robinson also gave evidence.
Commander Robinson's evidence was that the 000 service is the principal method used by members of the public for contacting Police in the event of an emergency. As most people do not know the number of the nearest Police station, the service provides an essential and immediate way to contact the Police, especially in emergencies. The service is available 24 hours a day and is managed by Telstra. Calls for Police assistance are transferred to Police Communications Centres. He said that names and addresses are sought but if anonymity is requested the call is nonetheless accepted. Calls are recorded and are kept confidential and are not ordinarily accessible by Police officers or anyone other than the caller. Recordings/transcripts are not released other than by court order (which includes subpoenae).
Commander Robinson considered it very important that people who contact the Police using 000 calls provide complete and frank information so the Police can immediately and appropriately respond to the emergency. Emergency calls can be as short as one minute or as long as 45 minutes. He said in cross-examination that there can be 20-50 calls a day that are not strictly 'emergencies'. He agreed there were sometimes prank calls and calls from those with mental health issues and inadvertent calls.
He considered that release of 000 calls or transcripts could dissuade people from providing information to Police in the future for fear of reprisals. Reporting of crime would be inhibited if persons making reports knew the recording of the report could be released to the alleged offender.
He agreed in cross-examination that sometimes calls may be released to a police investigator who may then allow a defendant to listen to a recording. By way of example, he said, the disc may be played so a defendant may hear a precise description of items that have been stolen, and which have been found in his possession. Another alternative would be to provide the transcript, especially if the identity of the informant might be compromised by playing the recording. Allowing a defendant to hear a recording or view a transcript may be appropriate so as better inform the defendant of the strength of the case to be answered. A decision to take that course would be made by the officer-in-charge of an investigation or the prosecutor.
He said there were guidelines against providing a disc of a 000 call or a transcript to a defendant, but agreed that if it were provided in a brief of evidence then that would amount to releasing the information to the defendant, albeit in breach of the guidelines.
As to expectations of confidentiality he said that callers expected Police would hold the information provided in the strictest confidence. He gave examples of standover tactics by some elements of society and domestic violence situations which are subsequently denied. When people telephone they may be under stress, fearful or in pain. He gave an example of being able to 'hear the fear in a child's voice'. He said people needed to know that they could be able to call again and not fear reprisals. He said that the 000 call can trigger an investigation and the fact of a tip-off call via the 000 service may never be divulged.
CONSIDERATION
Has the information already been disclosed?
It is important to consider at the outset whether the information sought by the Applicant has already been disclosed. If information in a record has already been disclosed, it cannot then be "revealed", as defined in cl.1 of Schedule 4 GIPA Act, by giving access under the GIPA Act: Nature Conservation Council of NSW v Department of Trade and Investment, Regional Infrastructure and Services [2012] NSWADT 195 at [174].
It is helpful to recall that the definitions of 'government information', 'personal information', and 'reveal' in the GIPA Act operate with respect to information alone, not, as was the case under the Freedom of Information Act 1989, with respect to documents. Further, the issue for consideration is not whether the document, or in this case, recording, has been publicly disclosed, but whether the information contained therein has been publicly disclosed: see Richards v Commissioner, Department of Corrective Services [2011] NSWADT 98.
The Applicant provided copies of subpoenae which he had issued in the Local court proceedings but the evidence of Constable Colman was that nothing had been produced in answer to the subpoenae. There was no evidence that the Applicant had previously had access to the recording or transcript as Commander Robinson said sometimes occurs. The copy of the transcript of the Record of Interview to which the Applicant referred, did not refer to the 000 call. The Applicant also provided an extract from the Local Court proceedings, which did not serve to lead me to the view that all the information from the recording or its transcript had already been provided to him. I note too, Commander Robinson's evidence to the effect that a call may indicate some nuances such as whether the caller was, at that time, experiencing stress, fear or pain. That type of information would, generally speaking, be unlikely to have been previously revealed in any event, even if the whole content were provided, in the absence of the recording actually being played to a defendant.
Confidential submissions were made by the Respondent in closed session which demonstrated some of the information which could not have been previously disclosed, other than by providing access to the actual recording. It probably goes without saying that if the Applicant had previously had access to the actual recording, it is unlikely he would have persevered with these proceedings, notwithstanding his claim that "90%" of the recording has been disclosed.
Steps to be taken in deciding whether to release information
The Tribunal must apply the public interest test and decide whether or not an overriding public interest against disclosure applies to the information. Section 13 of the GIPA Act requires the Tribunal to undertake the following steps:
- identify the relevant public interest considerations in favour of disclosure
- identify the relevant public interest considerations against disclosure.
- determine the weight of the public interest considerations in favour of and against disclosure and where the balance between those interests lies.
Public interest considerations in favour of disclosure
Section 12 of the GIPA Act reiterates the general presumption in favour of disclosure of government information, and lists examples of public interest considerations that favour disclosure.
Section 5 of the GIPA Act provides that there is a presumption in favour of the disclosure of government information unless there is an 'overriding public interest against disclosure'. Section 12(1) provides that there is a 'general public interest in favour of the disclosure of government information.' Subsection 12(2) sets out a number of examples of public interest considerations in favour of disclosure of government information, including that disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to promote open discussion of public affairs; and disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to inform the public about the operations of agencies and, in particular, their policies and practices for dealing with members of the public.
The Applicant's counsel submitted that a public interest in favour of disclosure was that disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to substantiate the Applicant's belief that the Police had engaged in misconduct. I agree, that if this were the case, then this is a very weighty public interest consideration in favour of disclosure: s.12(2)(e) of the GIPA Act. The weight in the present circumstances, is discussed below.
Public interest considerations against disclosure
The public interest considerations against disclosure are limited to those set out in the Table in s.14 of the GIPA Act ('the Table').
To raise these as relevant considerations in the application of the public interest test the Respondent must establish that the disclosure of the information "... could reasonably be expected to have .... the effect" outlined in the Table.
The principles for the interpretation of "could reasonably be expected" were discussed in Flack v Commissioner of Police [2011] NSWADT 286 (at [40] - [41]), ('Flack'), adopting the approach taken in Leech v Sydney Water Corporation [2010] NSWADT 298:
25 The term 'could reasonably be expected' has been considered in a number of cases. The words have their ordinary meaning: Searle Australia Pty Ltd v PIAC (1992) 108 ALR 163. The test to be applied is an objective one, approached from the view point of the reasonable decision-maker: Neary v State Rail Authority. Something which could reasonably be expected is something which is more than a mere possibility, risk or a chance. It must be based on real and substantial grounds, and it must not be purely speculative, fanciful, imaginary or contrived: Searle Australia Pty Ltd v PIAC.
The Respondent submitted that the following public interest considerations against disclosure are relevant:
a) disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to prejudice the supply to the Police of confidential information that facilitates the effective exercise of the Police's functions: cl 1(d) of the Table;
b) disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to prejudice the effective exercise by the Police of the Police's functions: cl.1(f) of the Table.
c) disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to reveal personal information of a number of individuals: cl 3(a) of the Table;
d) disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to expose a person to a risk of harm or of serious harassment or intimidation: cl 3(f) of the Table.
Each is discussed below, although there is some overlap between cl 1(d) and 1(f) of the Table.
disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to prejudice the supply to the Police of confidential information that facilitates the effective exercise of the Police's functions: cl 1(d) of the Table
disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to prejudice the effective exercise by the Police of the Police's functions: cl.1(f) of the Table.
The Appeal Panel, after citing with approval the approach in Director General, Department of Education & Training v Mullett & Anor (GD) [2002] NSWADTAP 13 considered confidentiality in the context of cl.1(d) and cl.1(f) of the Table:
[33] In our view, the question of whether the information supplied is 'confidential information' must be examined, primarily at least, by reference to the agency's evidence as to the conditions under which it conducts the service within which the information was received. The agency's case is that all information received by the triple zero service at the point of receipt is treated as confidential. The agency's case is that members of the community expected the triple zero service to be a confidential service. ....
[34] .... The enquiry, so far as cl 1(d) is concerned, should focus on the point of receipt, and the administrative standards and community understandings which surrounded it.
The Appeal Panel referred at [40] to a long history of cases which "recognise the confidentiality that ordinarily attaches to complaint communications to law enforcement agencies". I agree that that approach is consistent with the Tribunal's finding in Fisher v NSW Police [2002] NSWADT 267 where the Applicant sought access under the FOI legislation to a number of documents, including the 000 call of an informant. JM Britton said (at [34]):
It seems to me a matter of commonsense, as well as consistent with the weight of authority, that unless there is clear evidence to the contrary, information given by informers to Police must be presumed to be given on a confidential basis. Evidence that might tend to contradict that presumption would be, for example, where a witness statement has been given to the Police along with an undertaking to give evidence. In other words, where an informer is willing to identify him or herself publicly as the accuser of another or is willing to give some evidence which would inevitability be given in a public trial or hearing without a claim of confidentiality. Otherwise, however, it seems to me that it is reasonable to presume that communications between Police and informers are confidential.
The Appeal Panel did not consider that it was valid that I distinguished between informants in the strict sense of the word and those seeking intervention by Police.
The Appeal Panel also considered (at [26]) that s. 14 considerations need to be examined at a broad operational level and that those considerations "are concerned with systemic features of the operation of government". At the first hearing there was very little, if any, evidence before me as to the protocols and practices that surround the 000 service. Now I have Commander Robinson's evidence.
Commander Robinson's evidence was that the 000 service is the principal method used by members of the public for contacting Police in the event of an emergency. Calls are kept confidential and are not ordinarily accessible to anyone (including other Police officers) other than the caller. Recordings/transcripts are not ordinarily released other than by court order and there are guidelines to that effect. Sometimes though the officer-in-charge of an investigation or the prosecutor may permit a defendant to listen to a recording or may be provided with the transcript of the 000 call.
The Respondent submitted that there is an expectation that information reported to the Police will be kept confidential and will only be used and disclosed by the Police in the conduct of law enforcement activities. Commander Robinson's evidence as to expectations of confidentiality was that callers expected Police would hold the information provided in the strictest confidence.
The expectation of confidentiality when providing information to the Police was discussed in Simring v Commissioner of Police [2009] NSWSC 270, at [69] per Smart JA:
When a person speaks with the Police in respect of a criminal offence and reveals sensitive matters that person expects that statements made will only be used for the purpose of the Court proceedings and not otherwise. There are limits on what can be published. There is a strong public interest in criminal offences being reported to the Police and the sources of information not drying up. If victims of crime thought that statements made in the course of a criminal investigation revealing their personal affairs, or some of them, could be released to an Applicant under the FOI Act, those sources of information may well dry up or at least there could be a reduction in the flow of information available to the Police....
Commander Robinson said that while names and addresses are sought from callers, if anonymity is requested the call is nonetheless accepted. He considered that release of 000 calls or transcripts could dissuade people from providing information in the future for fear of reprisals. Reporting of crime would be inhibited if persons making reports knew the recording of the report could be released to the alleged offender.
The Respondent submitted that it is well established in case law dealing with right to information legislation that the confidentiality of information communicated can be inferred from all of the circumstances: Re Maher and Attorney General's Department (1985) 7 ALD 731 at 737, Re B and Brisbane North Regional Health Authority (1994) 1 QAR 279 at 338, and McMahon v Director General, Department of Fair Trading [2003] NSWADT 164 at 23. In Department of Health v Jephcott (1985) 8 FCR 85 per Forster J at [89] the court confirmed the confidential quality of information may be inferred from the nature of the relationship between the informer and the person informed.
The Appeal Panel however considered it was of little, and perhaps no, consequence whether the caller does not care whether confidentiality is afforded to the call.
That the Applicant knows the identity of the 000 caller does not impact on the confidentiality of the information reported to the Police in the 000 call: DZ v NSW Police [2002] NSWADT 274.and FA v NSW Police [2003] NSWADT 196.
The Respondent submitted that disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to prejudice the supply of confidential information to the Police, as disclosure could reasonably be expected to impede the willingness of members of the community to volunteer information to assist investigations for fear of reprisal. Commander Robinson evidence was that it very important that people who contact the Police using 000 calls provide complete and frank information so the Police can immediately and appropriately respond.
As to whether disclosure could "prejudice" supply, the Respondent submitted the approach by the Tribunal in McMahon v Director General, Department of Fair Training [2003] NSWADT 164 is correct. In particular, at paragraph [25]:
In respect of determining whether disclosure of the information would "prejudice" the future supply of such information to the agency, it is well established that the test is not whether the particular confider whose confidential information is being considered for disclosure, could reasonably be expected to refuse to supply such information in future. The test is whether the agency will be able to obtain such information in the future (see Ryder v Booth [1985] VR 870 at 872 and Re B and Brisbane North Regional Health Authority (1994) 1 QAR 279 at 341).
In Mullett, the Appeal Panel held at [58] (albeit in respect to the exemption in cl.13(b)(ii) of Schedule 1 of the FOI Act) that:
In our view, clause 13(b)(ii) requires the Tribunal to engage in a relatively abstract analysis. It must ask whether material of the kind sought to be protected on the present occasion would, if released, prejudice the supply of similar material to government in future, as a matter of reasonable expectation. That requires the Tribunal to characterise the nature of the material sought to be protected on the present occasion; to identify the extent to which material of that kind can only be obtained, or can reasonably be obtained, by confidential communication; the extent to which guarantees of confidentiality may be necessary...
As later observed in Martin v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police [2005] NSWADT 23 (which also was in relation to the FOI Act) at [45]:
In determining whether disclosure of information obtained in confidence could "reasonably be expected to prejudice future supply of such information", the question is not whether the confider of the information in question would in future refuse to supply such information to the agency. It is [a] question as to whether disclosure of the information could reasonably prejudice future supply of this type of information from those sources that are available or likely to be available to the agency (see Re B (1994) 1QAR 279 at 341).
The Respondent submitted the same approach applies in respect to the public interest consideration against disclosure set out in cls.(1)(d) and (f) of the Table. On the basis of the Appeal Panel's decision, the test is not whether a particular person whose confidential information is being considered for disclosure could reasonably be expected to refuse to supply such information in future, but whether the agency will be able to obtain such information in future. In view of Commander Robinson's evidence I find that disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to prejudice the supply to the Police of confidential information that facilitates the effective exercise of the Police's functions and that disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to prejudice the effective exercise by the Police of the Police's functions: cls.1(d) and (f) of the Table.
disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to reveal personal information of a number of individuals: cl 3(a) of the Table
The Respondent submitted that disclosure of the 000 call would reveal personal information about the person or persons who made the 000 call.
The Respondent accepted that some information about the events the subject of the 000 call is already known to the Applicant. However, the Respondent submitted, and I agree, that the 000 call contains other personal information which has not been revealed. As discussed above, even if the Applicant was aware of '90% of the content' as claimed, there remained personal information that had not been released. Further, the voice(s) of person(s) who make 000 calls, their personal account of the events and their emotional responses to those events, are the personal information of those individuals. In this matter these have not been revealed to the Applicant.
I find that disclosure of the 000 call could reasonably be expected to reveal personal information about the person(s) who made the 000 call.
the disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to expose a person to a risk of harm or of serious harassment or serious intimidation: cl. 3(f) of the Table.
The Respondent submitted, taking into account the Applicant's evidence that he has had an ongoing dispute with Mr Bartolo for some years, that the disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to expose a person to a risk of harm or of serious harassment or serious intimidation.
The Tribunal may have regard to the personal factors set out in s. 55(1) of the GIPA Act for the purposes of considering the public interest considerations against disclosure set out in cls. 3(a) and (f) of the Table. These personal factors include the Applicant's identity and relationship with any other person, the Applicant's motives for making the access application, any other factors particular to the Applicant. In this matter these factors are especially relevant in relation to cl. 3(f) of the Table.
In my earlier decision I discussed what I considered to be the relevant personal factors. I understand neither the Appeal Panel nor the parties have an issue with my understanding:
Mr Camilleri would like to know who called the Police; at what the time the 000 call was made; and what information was contained in the 000 call. These are personal factors of the application to which I may have regard to under section 55(1)(b) when determining whether there is an overriding public interest against disclosure of the personal information contained in the 000 call. The Respondent submitted there are a number of other personal factors of the application, which are relevant and referred to Mr Camilleri's evidence that there has been an ongoing dispute between him and Mr Bartolo for 18 years; that he considered Mr Bartolo as a "monster" and a "psycho"; that he alleged Mr Bartolo "almost killed his other neighbours some years back"; that Mr Bartolo "came out of his property with a full brick in his hand coming into my property to hit me"; and that the Police have attended Mr Camilleri's residence in response to complaints on numerous occasions.
The long-standing nature of the ongoing Camilleri/Bartolo dispute and that the Police have been called to attend to disputes on numerous occasions, the allegation the subject of the 000 call and the allegation of shots fired at the Applicant's car may suggest that their dispute has escalated to include elements of violence. This leads me to the view that disclosure of the 000 call could reasonably be expected to expose members of the Bartolo family to a risk of harm or of serious harassment or serious intimidation. It would be inappropriate for the Tribunal to try to assess the gravity of the risk; I need only conclude that the disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to expose a person to a risk of harm or of serious harassment or serious intimidation: cl. 3(f) of the Table. The history between Mr Camilleri and Mr Bartolo speaks for itself and I accept that their dispute may escalate further and the disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected pose a risk of harm or of serious harassment or of serious intimidation the information in the 000 call is disclosed to Mr Camilleri.
Balancing the public interest considerations
The Tribunal's task is to determine whether there is an overriding public interest against disclosure of the information in accordance with the Act, paying due regard to the principles in s. 16 of the GIPA Act. This requires the Tribunal to consider whether, on balance, the public interest considerations against disclosure outweigh those in favour of disclosure: see Flack at [19] and Hurst v Wagga Wagga City Council [2011] NSWADT 307 at [47]. Unless there is an overriding public interest against disclosure the presumption in favour of disclosure applies: s. 5 GIPA Act.
The GIPA Act does not provide a set formula for working out the weight of public interest considerations for or against disclosure, or deciding if one set of considerations outweighs the other. Each matter is different. The balancing of competing interests "is a question of fact and degree, requiring the weighing of competing matters, and is a task that is not amenable to mathematical calculation": Hurst v Wagga Wagga City Council: at [70].
The general consideration in favour of disclosure in s.12 has been accorded significant weight, consistent with the object of the GIPA Act.
The Applicant also contended that that a public interest in favour of disclosure was that the information could reasonably be expected to substantiate his belief that the Police had engaged in misconduct. I have found, if this were the case, then this is a weighty public interest consideration in favour of disclosure. The Applicant submitted that he needed to know when the 000 call was made so he could demonstrate that he could not have been present at the Bartolo property causing malicious damage as was alleged, because at the same time he was at the Police station complaining about Mr Bartolo and that his prosecution was therefore malicious and he had been defamed. There was some emphasis on the timing of the phone call and his attendance at the Police station. The assertion by the Applicant (and the consequent inference of impropriety by Police) that he could not have been at the Bartolo premises at the time of the phone call because he was at the Police station, appears to assume that the call was made contemporaneously with the alleged paint attack. I note Commander Robinson's evidence that not all 000 calls are emergency calls, from which it is reasonable to assume, that non-emergency calls are not necessarily contemporaneous with the events the subject of the call. His evidence also was that 000 is used when callers do not know the number of their local Police station.
In the Record of Interview (provided by the Applicant) he said that although he was not sure of the time, he agreed he had attended his property (adjacent to the Bartolo premises) at about 3.00 am on 1 April 2008 (Q37). However Constable Colman had recorded in his notebook (part of Exhibit R4) Mr Bartolo's statement (on 1 April 2008 at 4.15 am) that at about 2.30 am he was disturbed by his dogs barking and subsequently saw the Applicant at his property. Ms Bartolo's signed statement (also part of Exhibit R4) was to the same effect, noting that her father told her to phone the Police and about half an hour later the Police attended the Bartolo premises. Constable Colman's statement dated 6 May 2011 tendered at the first hearing (Exhibit R1) was to the effect that Mr Bartolo had alleged the Applicant had been at his property at about 2.00 am, but I prefer the contemporaneous statements, which would suggest this was an error as to the time.
It is not necessary for me to come to a view about the precise timings. It was pointed out that the timing of the phone call was not disputed by the Respondent.
It is understandable that the Applicant is annoyed that he was charged with an offence, when that charge was - after a prima facie case was found - dismissed. It was probably emotionally demanding, expensive and time-consuming to be engaged in defending the charge. He no doubt was particularly annoyed when his complaint about Mr Bartolo was rejected by Police. There was no evidence however that would suggest to me any impropriety by the Police. It would appear that the Applicant's reliance on the timing of the call in support of his assertion of some misconduct by Police is ill-founded. In the circumstances, and on the basis of the evidence before me, I attach little weight to the claimed public interest consideration in favour of disclosure that disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to substantiate the Applicant's belief that the Police had engaged in misconduct.
The Respondent submitted that ensuring public safety and enforcing the law are such important tasks that the greater public interest requires, in circumstances such as this, that the continued ability of the Police to gather confidential information overrides the public interest in favour of releasing the 000 call. I have found that the disclosure of the 000 call could be reasonably expected to prejudice the supply to the Police of confidential information that facilitates the effective exercise of the Police's functions and prejudice the effective exercise of the Police's functions. I have attached significant weight to each of these matters.
I have also found that disclosure of the information could be reasonably expected to reveal personal information of individual(s). I have attached moderately significant weight to this consideration, because some of the personal information in the 000 call is likely to already be known to the Applicant. I have also found that disclosure of the information could be reasonably expected to expose a person or persons to a risk of harm or of serious harassment or intimidation and, in the circumstances, I have attached some weight to that consideration.
I find that the Respondent has discharged its onus under s.105(1) of the GIPA Act and I find that, on balance, the public interest considerations against disclosure outweigh those in favour of disclosure.
DECISION
Matter 123155 (remitted matter 113105): The decision under review is affirmed.
**********
Decision last updated: 17 April 2013
35
15
2