Cameron v Police No. Scgrg-97-1386 Judgment No. S6434

[1997] SASC 6434

CAMERON v POLICE

Matheson J (ex tempore)

The appellant pleaded guilty in the Magistrates' Court at Elizabeth to three counts on a complaint, namely:

"Count 1 on the complaint alleged that on the 2nd day of May 1997 at Elizabeth Downs in the State of South Australia, he drove a motor vehicle on a road namely Adams Road while there was present in his blood the prescribed concentration of alcohol as defined in s.47a of the Road Traffic Act, 1961, contrary to s.47b of the Road Traffic Act, 1961. It is further alleged that the concentration of alcohol was .284 grams in a hundred millilitres of blood.

Count 2 on the complaint alleged that on the 2nd day of May 1997 at Elizabeth Downs in the said State he drove a vehicle namely a car on roads namely Yorktown Road and Adams Road without due care, contrary to s.45 of the Road Traffic Act, 1961.

Count 3 on the complaint alleged that on the 2nd day of May 1997 at Elizabeth Downs in the said State, he drove a vehicle namely a car on a road namely Adams Road, whilst the said vehicle in some respect did not comply with the requirements of s.119 of the Road Traffic Act, 1961, relating to lamps and reflectors namely that two rear lamps fitted to the vehicle pursuant to the Road Traffic Act were not alight, contrary to s.111 of the Road Traffic Act, 1961."

He was convicted.  On the first count, he was fined $1100 with $137 costs and disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver's licence for a period of three years. On the second count, he was fined $400 with $28 costs.  On the third count, he was fined $150 with $28 costs.

He now appeals on the ground that the period of disqualification was manifestly excessive.

The circumstances which led to the prosecution were as follows: At about 10.30 pm. on Friday, 2 May 1997, police were travelling east on Yorktown Road, Elizabeth Downs. They saw a cream Datsun sedan travelling ahead without the rear lights in operation.  They followed.  As it turned left from Yorktown Road into the left slip lane to travel north on Adams Road, it mounted the slip lane island and continued across the median strip into the wrong carriageway and travelled north for about 10 metres.  The vehicle then spun anticlockwise to complete a 180 degree turn.  The vehicle then reversed back onto the correct side of Adams Road, mounted the western kerb, and reversed into bushes on the vacant land.  The vehicle then came to a halt, facing in an easterly direction.  The police saw that the driver, the appellant, appeared to be disorientated.  He then stepped out of the vehicle and the police had a conversation with him.  They detected a moderate smell of alcohol on his breath and he was Alcotested, which gave a positive result.  He was conveyed to the Elizabeth Police Station, where a breath analysis test detected 0.284 grams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.

When questioned, the appellant stated that he did not have his lights on because he had a blown fuse.  He said the reason for mounting the island in the slip lane was because he was being chased by police.  He stated that when he continued across the median strip over the wrong side of the carriageway, he went into a spin and was scared.  He tried to take control of the situation and went into reverse to control that.  He stated he had been drinking scotch and beer, that he had four to five scotches during the night and about 10 schooners of full strength beer.  He had his first drink at 7 pm. and his last about half an hour before being picked up.

The appellant had several previous convictions, including one for exceeding the prescribed concentration of alcohol in his blood, on 15 July 1986 in the Elizabeth Magistrates' Court, for which he was fined $550 and lost his licence for 20 months.  I accept that that was 11 years ago, and that he did not lose any demerit points in the intervening period.  However, it was a conviction which could not be ignored.

Parliament has provided that for a first offence of what it calls a category 3 offence, which this was, the period of disqualification should be not less than 12 months.

It is true, as the appellant has said, that the three year period of disqualification was a severe penalty, and that it had the potential to prejudice his employability,  but, having regard to the extent of his inebriation, and to his driving, I am not, in the end, persuaded that this court should interfere on the basis that the period is manifestly excessive.

In all the circumstances, therefore, the appeal will be dismissed.  The appellant is to pay the respondent’s costs and disbursements which I fix at $150.