Cameron v Commissioner of Taxation

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Cameron v Commissioner of Taxation [2012] FCAFC 76

Citation: Cameron v Commissioner of Taxation [2012] FCAFC 76
Appeal from: Cameron v Commissioner of Taxation [2011] FCA 1378
Parties: MICHAEL CAMERON v COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION; COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION v MICHAEL CAMERON
File number: NSD 97 of 2012
Judges: EMMETT, MIDDLETON AND ROBERTSON JJ
Date of judgment: 30 May 2012
Catchwords:

TAXATION – whether personal services business – application of unrelated clients test – whether making offers or invitations to the public at large or to a section of the public to provide services – nature or character of offer

TAXATION – whether personal services business –  application of business premises test –  whether business premises at which the individual or entity mainly conducted activities from which personal services income gained or produced

Legislation: Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) ss 84-5, 87-10, 87-15, 87-20, 87-30
Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) s 14ZZK(b)
Cases cited:

Campbell's Cash & Carry Pty Ltd v Director of Public Prosecutions (Commonwealth) [1998] 4 VR 208 applied
Commissioner of Taxation v Metaskills Pty Ltd (2003) 130 FCR 248 cited
Commissioner of Taxation v Raptis (1989) 89 ATC 4994 applied
Corporate Affairs Commissioner (SA) v Australian Central Credit Union (1985) 157 CLR 201 considered
Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Haxton (2012) 286 ALR 12; [2012] HCA 7 cited
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Yalos Engineering Pty Ltd (2009) 77 ATR 542 considered
Glennan v Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 90 FCR 538 cited
Hurst v Vestcorp Ltd (1988) 12 NSWLR 394 distinguished
IRG Technical Services Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2007) 165 FCR 57 cited
Lee v Evans (1964) 112 CLR 276 referred to
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 applied
Morales v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1995) 60 FCR 550 referred to

Date of hearing: 7 May 2012
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 120
Counsel for the Appellant/Cross-Respondent: Mr DB McGovern SC with Mr M Heraghty
Solicitor for the Appellant/Cross-Respondent: AJH Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent/Cross-Appellant: Mr BJ Sullivan SC with Ms C Burnett
Solicitor for the Respondent/Cross-Appellant: Australian Taxation Office Legal Services Branch

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 97 of 2012

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

MICHAEL CAMERON
Appellant

COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
Cross-Appellant

AND:

COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
Respondent

MICHAEL CAMERON
Cross-Respondent

JUDGES:

EMMETT, MIDDLETON AND ROBERTSON JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

30 MAY 2012

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

3.The cross-appeal be allowed.

4.The cross-respondent pay the cross-appellant’s costs of the cross-appeal.

5.The orders of the Court made by the primary judge on 8 December 2011 be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered:

(i)the application be dismissed;

(ii)the applicant pay the respondent’s costs.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal…

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Details
Case
[2012] FCAFC 76
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Cameron v Commissioner of Taxation involved a dispute over whether the taxpayer, Mr Cameron, was carrying on a personal services business under the relevant provisions of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997. The matter was ultimately determined by the High Court of Australia, which was asked to consider the correctness of the decisions made by both the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) and the Federal Court in relation to the tax assessments issued by the Commissioner of Taxation. The central issue before the court was whether Mr Cameron was carrying on a personal services business for the purposes of the taxation legislation, specifically whether the services he provided were offered to the public or a section of the public.

The High Court examined the application of two tests outlined in the taxation legislation: the unrelated clients test and the business premises test. The unrelated clients test required the court to determine whether Mr Cameron made offers or invitations to the public at large or to a section of the public to provide his services, and whether the services provided to unrelated entities were a direct result of those offers or invitations. The business premises test required the court to identify whether Mr Cameron had business premises from which he mainly conducted his activities. The Court found that the AAT had not adequately applied these tests in its consideration of Mr Cameron's case. The Court held that the phrase "the public, or a section of the public" needed to be construed in context, and that the AAT had erred by not sufficiently considering the nature and terms of the offers or invitations made by Mr Cameron.

The High Court concluded that the AAT's decision contained legal errors in its application of the relevant tests and set aside the orders made by the Federal Court. The Court dismissed Mr Cameron's appeal and allowed the cross-appeal by the Commissioner of Taxation, ordering that Mr Cameron pay the Commissioner's costs of the appeal and cross-appeal. The Court also set aside the orders of the primary judge, directing that the application be dismissed and that Mr Cameron pay the Commissioner's costs. This decision underscored the importance of correctly applying the statutory tests and considering the context in which offers or invitations to the public are made when determining whether an individual is carrying on a personal services business for tax purposes.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

3. The cross-appeal be allowed.

4. The cross-respondent pay the cross-appellant’s costs of the cross-appeal.

5. The orders of the Court made by the primary judge on 8 December 2011 be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered:

(i) the application be dismissed;

(ii) the applicant pay the respondent’s costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

In the context of judicial review the use of the expression by the Tribunal “must give rise to a conclusion” does not, in our opinion, and with respect to the primary judge, bespeak legal error: in context it was no more than an emphatic turn of phrase: see Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (above).Conclusion The appeal should be dismissed and the cross-appeal should be allowed. Mr Cameron should pay the Commissioner’s costs of the appeal and the cross-appeal. While the Commissioner’s success in the appeal has been on a point that was not the subject of a notice of contention on his part or written submissions but on a point raised by the Court in the course of argument, Mr Cameron maintained his contention that there was an error of law on the part of the Tribunal.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

As to the TR 2001/8 argument, the Commissioner submitted that there was nothing in that ruling that was inconsistent with the reasoning of the primary judge or the Tribunal in relation to the unrelated clients test and the primary judge made no error in relation to it.Consideration In our view the appropriate starting point is whether there was an error of law by the Tribunal. If there was no such error then it will not be necessary to consider the exercise by the primary judge of the discretion under s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (AAT Act) as to whether or not to remit the matter to the Tribunal. Contrary to the submission of the Commissioner, it may be to mask any error to involve in that analysis the conclusion of the primary judge in the exercise of the discretion conferred by s 44. We have set out above the terms of s 87-20(1). Generally, the section would involve:(i)an identification of each income year;(ii)an identification of the income in question;(iii)whether that income was gained or produced from providing services to 2 or more unrelated entities and the identification of those unrelated entities;(iv)whether the individual or personal services entity made any offers or invitations to the public at large or to a section of the public to provide those services;(v)if so, whether the services provided to the unrelated entities were so provided as a direct result of the individual or personal services entity making those offers or invitations. In the present case there was an elision before the Tribunal of what we have identified as (iv) and (v) above, in that it appears that Mr Cameron’s case was there presented on the basis that it was evident from the manner of obtaining the contracts with the limited number of unrelated entities that those offers or invitations were to the public at large or to a section of the public to provide those services. This may, depending on the facts, be sufficient but it is unlikely to be sufficient where the number of communications is small. We agree with the observation of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria in Campbell's Cash & Carry Pty Ltd v Director of Public Prosecutions (Commonwealth) [1998] 4 VR 208 at 212-213 that the phrase “the public, or a section of the public” is to be construed according to its context. Reference was there made to Australian Central Credit Union at 208 and 211. The context of the prospectus cases is an evident policy to protect members of the public by requiring prior disclosure of information relevant to their investment decision: see Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Haxton [2012] HCA 7; (2012) 286 ALR 12 at [22]. The relevant policy or purpose is expressly referred to in Hurst v Vestcorp Ltd (above) at 402 per Kirby P, 421 per Mahoney JA and 439 per McHugh JA, as their Honours then were. In contrast, there is no such protective purpose in s 87-20(1). Even in the prospectus context the courts have paid particular attention to the inherent nature and terms of the offer itself, especially its width, and the manner and width of its communication to the audience said to be the public. The clearest case of an offer to the public is one where the terms of the offer indicate that it is addressed to members of the public generally such that any member of the public may accept the offer; Hurst v Vestcorp Ltd (above) at 422. An offer made to a particular individual which, if rejected, will be repeated to other specified individuals until an acceptor is finally found has been held not to be an offer to the public: Lee v Evans (above) at 287 per Kitto J.