Cameron Robertson v Hastings Deering (Australia) Limited

[2025] FWCFB 162

[2025] FWCFB 162

FAIR WORK COMMISSION

DECISION

Fair Work Act 2009

s.604 - Appeal of decisions

Cameron Robertson
v

Hastings Deering (Australia) Limited

(C2025/6033)

DEPUTY PRESIDENT COLMAN
DEPUTY PRESIDENT BUTLER
COMMISSIONER HUNT MELBOURNE, 31 JULY 2025

Appeal against decision [2025] FWC 1302 of Deputy President Lake at Brisbane on 26 June 2025 in matter number U2025/554 – permission to appeal refused

1. Cameron Robertson has lodged an appeal under s 604 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Act) against a decision of Deputy President Lake issued on 26 June 2025 ([2025] FWC 1302) in which the Deputy President concluded that Mr Robertson had not been employed or dismissed by Hastings Deering (Australia) Limited (Hastings), and consequently dismissed his application for an unfair dismissal remedy. The matter was listed for hearing in relation to permission to appeal only. Mr Robertson advised the Full Bench that he did not wish to take part in the hearing. Hastings consented to the matter being determined without a hearing. We advised the parties that we would determine the application for permission to appeal based on the written material before the Commission, without holding a hearing. We are satisfied that the matter can be adequately determined without the parties making oral submissions (see s 607(1)).

1. In his decision, the Deputy President considered Mr Robertson’s contentions that he had been recruited and employed by Hastings, but noted that his offer of employment was from Haynes Mechanical Pty Ltd (Haynes), that the offer contained a notice of assignment identifying Hastings as the relevant ‘client’, and that it was Haynes that notified Mr Robertson of his dismissal. The Deputy President considered that Mr Robertson had either misunderstood or deliberately misconstrued his situation. He found that there was no contract between Mr Robertson and Hastings and that Mr Robertson had not been employed or dismissed by Hastings. He therefore dismissed Mr Robertson’s application.

Permission to appeal

1. There is no right to an appeal from the Deputy President’s decision. An appeal may only be brought with the permission of the Commission under s 604(1). Section 400 of the Act applies to this appeal, because the decision under appeal was made under Part 3-2 of the Act. Section 400(1) states that the Commission must not grant permission to appeal unless it is in the public interest to do so. Section 400(2) provides that an appeal on a question of fact can only be on the made on the ground that the decision involved a significant error of fact. Consideration of the public interest involves a broad value judgment (Coal & Allied Mining Services Pty Ltd v Lawler and others (2011) 192 FCR 78 at [44]). Matters that may engage the public interest include issues of importance and general application, a diversity of decisions at first instance, or where the decision manifests an injustice (GlaxoSmithKline Australia Pty Ltd v Makin (2010) 197 IR 266 at [27]). In deciding whether to grant permission to appeal, it is unnecessary and inappropriate to conduct a detailed examination of the appeal grounds (Trustee for the MTGI Trust v Johnston [2016] FCAFC 140 at [82]). However, it is necessary to engage with the appeal grounds to consider whether they raise an arguable case of appealable error. An appellant must ordinarily demonstrate that there is such a case in order to be granted permission to appeal, as an appeal cannot ultimately succeed in the absence of error (Coal & Allied Operations Pty Ltd v AIRC (2000) 203 CLR 194 at 204).

Grounds of appeal

1. Mr Robertson’s notice of appeal contained a single ground, expressed in a single word: ‘Negligence’. Mr Robertson failed to comply with the direction to file an outline of submissions. In email correspondence to the Commission, Mr Robertson made various uncontextualised assertions, including that he had discussed full-time employment with Hastings; that because of the ‘same job, same pay’ laws, he was ‘cut short’; that he had proof that he had been working for Hastings; and that according to the Commission’s website, hire agencies and host firms are to remain completely separate. In earlier correspondence to the Commission, Mr Robertson made various submissions to the effect that the Deputy President had disregarded the law, without explaining how he had done so, and restated arguments made at first instance, including that it was Hastings that had interviewed him and given him a roster.

1. Mr Robertson’s appeal is not coherent. He disputes the outcome of his application before the Deputy President in general terms. Mr Roberston appears to believe that the Full Bench will simply reconsider for itself whether he was employed and dismissed by Hastings. But appeals exist for the correction of error, and no arguable error is apparent. Further, an application for permission to appeal must address why the Commission should grant permission, and, in the present case, why it is in the public interest to do so. This appeal does not engage the public interest in any way.

Conclusion and disposition

1. We are not satisfied that it is in the public interest to grant permission to appeal. As required by s 400(1), we refuse permission to appeal.

DEPUTY PRESIDENT


Determined on the papers

Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer

<PR790261>